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CASE 2011-0025: LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. VS. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION AND R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION (G.R. NO. 179446, 10 JANUARY 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECTS: SUBROGATION; COMMON CARRIER; EQUITY. (BRIEF TITLE: LOADMASTERS VS; GLODEL BROKERAGE)

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January 30, 2011

CASE 2011-0025: LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. VS. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION  AND R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION (G.R. NO.  179446, 10 JANUARY 2011,  MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECTS: SUBROGATION; COMMON CARRIER; EQUITY. (BRIEF TITLE: LOADMASTERS VS; GLODEL BROKERAGE)

X —————————————————————- X

 

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

          This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision[1][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled “R&B Insurance Corporation v. Glodel Brokerage Corporation and Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.,” which held petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity which R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the insured-consignee, Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia).

THE FACTS:

          On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks.  On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel “Richard Rey” from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila.  They arrived on the same date.

Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants.  Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.

The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers.  Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City.  The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbia’s warehouses there.  Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination.  One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.

          Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes.  Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39.  After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040.  It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo.  It claimed that it had been subrogated “to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss.”[2][2]

          On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision[3][3] holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters’ counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees against R&B Insurance.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the plaintiff having established by preponderance of evidence its claims against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the latter:

1.       To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P1,896,789.62 as actual and compensatory damages, with interest from the date of complaint until fully paid;

2.      To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the amount equivalent to 10% of the principal amount recovered as and for attorney’s fees plus P1,500.00 per appearance in Court;

3.      To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P22,427.18 as litigation expenses.

WHEREAS, the defendant Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees against plaintiff are hereby dismissed.

With costs against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation.

SO ORDERED.[4][4]

Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA. 

On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision which reads in part:

Considering that appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED in that the appellee Loadmasters is likewise held liable to appellant Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity appellant Glodel has been held liable to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation.

Appellant Glodel’s appeal to absolve it from any liability is herein DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[5][5]

Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court presenting the following

ISSUES

1.  Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to Respondent      Glodel in spite of the fact that the latter respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it (Loadmasters)?

 

2.  Under the set of facts established and undisputed in the case, can petitioner Loadmasters be legally considered as an Agent of respondent Glodel?[6][6]

To totally exculpate itself from responsibility for the lost goods, Loadmasters argues that it cannot be considered an agent of Glodel because it never represented the latter in its dealings with the consignee. At any rate, it further contends that Glodel has no recourse against it for its (Glodel’s) failure to file a cross-claim pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 

          Glodel, in its Comment,[7][7] counters that Loadmasters is liable to it under its cross-claim because the latter was grossly negligent in the transportation of the subject cargo.  With respect to Loadmasters’ claim that it is already estopped from filing a cross-claim, Glodel insists that it can still do so even for the first time on appeal because there is no rule that provides otherwise.  Finally, Glodel argues that its relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the transporter (Loadmasters) is only hired for the specific job of delivering the merchandise.  Thus, the diligence required in this case is merely ordinary diligence or that of a good father of the family, not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers.

          R&B Insurance, for its part, claims that Glodel is deemed to have interposed a cross-claim against Loadmasters because it was not prevented from presenting evidence to prove its position even without amending its Answer.  As to the relationship between Loadmasters and Glodel, it contends that a contract of agency existed between the two corporations.[8][8]

Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or securities.[9][9] Doubtless, R&B Insurance is subrogated to the rights of the insured to the extent of the amount it paid the consignee under the marine insurance, as provided under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2207.  If the plaintiff’s property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrong-doer or the person who has violated the contract.  If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance has the right to seek reimbursement from either Loadmasters or Glodel or both for breach of contract and/or tort.

          The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia.

          At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo.  Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.

Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service.  It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public.[10][10]  The distinction is significant in the sense that “the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.”[11][11]   

In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was private in character.  There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel. 

In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier.[12][12]

In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732.  In its Memorandum,[13][13] it states that it “is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering.”  It cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc.,[14][14] a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.

Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.  When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights.[15][15]  This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment.[16][16] Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.[17][17]  This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.   

With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.[18][18] 

Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo.  Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, “the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.”

 Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense.  It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:

ART. 2176.  Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.  Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 

Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York,/McGee & Co., Inc.[19][19] where this Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a contractual relationship, to wit:

            We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.  In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.  In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict.  [Emphases supplied]

In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:

ART. 2180.  The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

x x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment.  As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse. 

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.[20][20]  To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.[21][21]  In this regard, Loadmasters failed.

Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.  It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination.  It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes.  Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters.  Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.

 At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the CA.  Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: “By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.” The elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.[22][22]

Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties.  Loadmasters never represented Glodel.  Neither was it ever authorized to make such representation.  It is a settled rule that the basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal.  On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it.[23][23]  Such mutual intent is not obtaining in this case.

What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel?  Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even partially.  It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted.  It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.  As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals,[24][24]

X x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. [Emphasis supplied]

 The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect from Loadmasters, it having failed to file a cross-claim against the latter.  

Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of contract of service as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo.  In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter.   Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance.  Under the Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.[25][25]  Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal. 

 

For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself.  The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds.  “Equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice outside legality,’ is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.”[26][26] The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.

 

 

 

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The August 24, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent R&B Insurance Corporation for the insurance indemnity it paid to consignee Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and ordering both parties to pay, jointly and severally, R&B Insurance Corporation a] the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent thereof for attorney’s fees; and c] the amount of P22,427.18 for litigation expenses. 

The cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation against petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. is DENIED.

 

SO ORDERED.

                                                               JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA                                                                                 Associate Justice

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

 Associate Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA         DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                  Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

 

 

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                                 Associate Justice

                                                        Chairperson, Second Division

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                          RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                    Chief Justice                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

 

[1][1] Rollo, pp. 33-48. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.

[2][2] Petition for review on certiorari, p. 4; id. at 26.

[3][3] Id.

[4][4] Id. at 26-27.

[5][5] Annex A, Petition, id. at 47.

[6][6] Id. at 28.

[7][7] Id. at 96.

[8][8] Id. at 71-74.

[9][9] Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Chubb and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 147724, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 266, 275, citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).

[10][10] National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 345, 361 (1997).

[11][11] Lea Mer Industries, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., 508 Phil. 656, 663 (2005), citing National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 345, 362 (1997).

[12][12] Pre-Trial Order dated September 5, 2002, records, p. 136.

[13][13] Dated June 19, 2009, rollo, p. 178.

[14][14] 496 Phil. 437, 450 (2005), citing Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., 429 Phil. 244 (2002).

[15][15] National Trucking and Forwarding Corporation v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, 491 Phil. 151, 156 (2005), citing Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) 411.

[16][16] Id. 

[17][17] Civil Code, Art. 1735.

[18][18] Civil Code, Art. 1736.

[19][19] G.R. No. 162467, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 429, 434, citing Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil.722, 739 (1966); Singson  v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 132 Phil. 597, 600 (1968); Mr. & Mrs. Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 775, 785 (1996); PSBA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 729, 734.

[20][20] Tan v. Jam Transit, Inc., G.R. No. 183198, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 659, 675, citing Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v.    C & A  Construction, Inc., 459 Phil. 156 (2003).

[21][21] Id., citing Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, 445 Phil. 31 (2003); Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 129 (2002).

[22][22] Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, G.R. No. 167552, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 584, 593, citing Yu Eng Cho v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 385 Phil. 453, 465 (2000).

[23][23] Yun Kwan Byung v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 163553, December 11, 2009, 608 SCRA 107, 130-131, citing Burdador v. Luz, 347 Phi. 654, 662 (1997); Eurotech Industrial Technologies, Inc. v. Cuizon, G.R. No. 167552, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 584, 593; Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 184, 196 (2000).

[24][24] 357 Phil 703, 751-752 (1998).

[25][25] Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[26][26] Causapin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107432, July 4, 1994, 233 SCRA 615, 625.

Comment

LEGAL NOTE 0015: WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS TO PROVE IN THE PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUG? WHAT IS MEANT BY CHAIN OF CUSTODY?

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LEGAL NOTE 0015:  WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS TO PROVE IN THE PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUG? WHAT IS MEANT BY CHAIN OF CUSTODY?

 

WHAT ELEMENTS MUST BE PROVEN IN A PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUG.

The following must be proven under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165:

(1)   the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;

(2)   the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.[1][13]

 

WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR SEIZURE AND CUSTODY OF ILLEGAL DRUG?

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides such procedure:

(1)   The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

 

WHAT IS RATIONALE FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE:

The illegal drug’s unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.

 

IS NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE AUTHORITIES OF AFORESAID SECTION 21 FATAL.

People v. Pringas[2][16] teaches that non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not necessarily fatal.  Its non-compliance will not automatically render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[3][17] 

As provided in Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

          (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] 

          x x x x  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

 

WHY IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE ABOVE?

Strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.[4][18]

 

TO BE COVERED BY THE SAVING CLAUSE, WHAT MUST BE PROSECUTION DO?

Even so, for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.[5][19]

It must be shown that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same specimen seized from the accused. This function is performed by the “chain of custody” requirement to erase all doubts as to the identity of the seized drugs by establishing its movement from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist and finally to the court.[6][20] 

 

WHAT IS MEANT BY CHAIN OF CUSTODY?

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defines “chain of custody” as follows:

“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous           drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature  of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.][7][21]

Every link must be accounted for.

 

SOURCE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAY LORENA Y LABAG (G.R. NO. 184954, 10 JANUARY 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.) SUBJECTS: PROSECUTION OF ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS; CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF PROHIBITED DRUGS. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. LORENA)

[1][13] People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029, August 9, 2010, p. 7, citing People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259, 266.

[2][16] G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828.

[3][17] Id. at 842-843.

[4][18] People v. Pagaduan, supra note 13 at 10-11.

[5][19] People v. Almorfe, G.R. No. 181831, March 29, 2010, 617 SCRA 52, 60, citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 212.

[6][20] People v. Almorfe, id. at 60-61, citing Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619.

[7][21] See People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2000, 596 SCRA 257, 271.

Comment

CASE 2011-0024: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, THROUGH THE HON. SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN VS. SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP., REPRESENTED BY SALVADOR N. LOPEZ, JR., PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER (G.R. NO. 178895, 10 JANUARY 2011, SERENO, J.) SUBJECT: EXEMPTION OF GRAZING LAND UNDER THE CARL. LOPEZ LAND EXEMPT. LIMOT LAND COVERED. (BRIEF TITLE: REPUBLIC VS. LOPEZ).

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CASE NO.2011-0024: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, THROUGH THE HON. SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN VS.  SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP., REPRESENTED BY SALVADOR N. LOPEZ, JR., PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER (G.R. NO. 178895, 10 JANUARY 2011, SERENO, J.) SUBJECT: EXEMPTION OF GRAZING LAND UNDER THE CARL. LOPEZ LAND EXEMPT. LIMOT LAND COVERED. (BRIEF TITLE: REPUBLIC VS. LOPEZ).

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D E C I S I O N

 


SERENO, J.:

Before us are two Rule 45 Petitions[1][1] filed separately by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the Office of the Solicitor General, and by the Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp. (SNLABC). Each Petition partially assails the Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 June 2006[2][2] with respect to the application for exemption of four parcels of land – located in Mati, Davao Oriental and owned by SNLABC – from Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

          There is little dispute as to the facts of the case, as succinctly discussed by the Court of Appeals and adopted herein by the Court, to wit:

Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation. Said parcels of land are hereinafter described as follows:

Title No. Area Location
TCT No. T-12635 (Lot 1454-A & 1296) 49.5706 has. Bo. Limot, Mati, Davao Oriental
TCT No. T-12637 (Lot 1298) 42.6822 has. Bo. Don Enrique Lopez, Mati, Dvo. Or.
TCT No. T-12639 (Lot 1293-B) 67.8633 has. Bo. Don Enrique Lopez, Mati, Dvo. Or.

 

On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).

On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioner’s 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated. The Investigation Report dated March 9, 1993 stated:

That there are at least 2[5] to 30 heads of cows that farrow every year and if the trend of farrowing persist (sic), then the cattle shall become overcrowded and will result to scarcity of grasses for the cattle to graze;

That during the week cycle, the herds are being moved to the different adjacent lots owned by the corporation. It even reached Lot 1454-A and Lot 1296. Thereafter, the herds are returned to their respective night chute corrals which are constructed under Lot 1293-B and Lot 1298.

x x x

That the age of coconut trees planted in the area are already 40 to 50 years and have been affected by the recent drought that hit the locality.

That the presence of livestocks (sic) have already existed in the area prior to the Supreme Court decision on LUZ FARMS vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. We were surprised however, why the management of the corporation did not apply for Commercial Farm Deferment (CFD) before, when the two years reglamentary (sic) period which the landowner was given the chance to file their application pursuant to R.A. 6657, implementing Administrative Order No. 16, Series of 1989;

However, with regards to what venture comes (sic) first, coconut or livestocks (sic), majority of the farmworkers including the overseer affirmed that the coconut trees and livestocks (sic) were (sic) simultaneously and all of these were inherited by his (applicant) parent. In addition, the financial statement showed 80% of its annual income is derived from the livestocks (sic) and only 20% from the coconut industry.

Cognitive thereto, we are favorably recommending for the exemption from the coverage of CARP based on LUZ FARMS as enunciated by the Supreme Court the herein Lot No. 1293-B Psd-65835 under TCT No. T-12639 except Lot No. 1298, Cad. 286 of TCT No. T-12637 which is already covered under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Scheme and had already been valued by the Land Valuation Office, Land Bank of the Philippines.

On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter-affidavit addressed to the respondent-Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 stating that it has been operating grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its grazing land.

The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.

On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that Lots 1454-A & 1296 were taken beyond the operation of the CARP pursuant to its reclassification to a Pollutive Industrial District (Heavy Industry) per Resolution No. 39 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, Davao Oriental, enacted on April 7, 1992. The DAR Regional Director denied the Motion through an Order dated September 4, 1997, ratiocinating that the reclassification does not affect agricultural lands already issued a Notice of Coverage as provided in Memorandum Circular No. 54-93: Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. 7160.

Undaunted, petitioner appealed the Regional Director’s Orders to respondent DAR. On June 10, 1998, the latter issued its assailed Order affirming the Regional Director’s ruling on Lots 1454-A & 1296 and further declared Lots 1298 and 1293-B as covered by the CARP. Respondent ruled in this wise considering the documentary evidence presented by petitioner such as the Business Permit to engage in livestock, the certification of ownership of large cattle and the Corporate Income Tax Returns, which were issued during the effectivity of the Agrarian Reform Law thereby debunking petitioner’s claim that it has been engaged in livestock farming since the 1960s. Respondent further ruled that the incorporation by the Lopez family on February 12, 1988 or four (4) months before the effectivity of R.A. 6657 was an attempt to evade the noble purposes of the said law.

On October 17, 2002, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent prompting the former to file the instant petition.[3][3]

          In the assailed Decision dated 30 June 2006,[4][4] the Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T-12637 and T-12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the “Lopez lands”) from coverage of the CARL.
However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director[5][5] and the DAR[6][6] Secretary denying the application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T-12635) in Barrio Limot (the “Limot lands”). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the Philippines (RP T-16356).

          The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 08 June 2007.[7][7] 

          The DAR and SNLABC elevated the matter to this Court by filing separate Rule 45 Petitions (docketed as G.R. No. 178895[8][8] and 179071,[9][9] respectively), which were subsequently ordered consolidated by the Court.

          The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the Court’s ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR.[10][10] The DAR questions the disposition of the Court of Appeals, insofar as the latter allowed the exemption of the Lopez lands, while SNLABC assails the inclusion of the Limot lands within the coverage of the CARL.

          The Court finds no reversible error in the Decision of the Court of Appeals and dismisses the Petitions of DAR and SNLABC.

Preliminarily, in a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45, the issues that can be raised are, as a general rule, limited to questions of law.[11][11] However, as pointed out by both the DAR and SNLABC, there are several recognized exceptions wherein the Court has found it appropriate to re-examine the evidence presented.[12][12] In this case, the factual findings of the DAR Regional Director, the DAR Secretary and the CA are contrary to one another with respect to the following issue: whether the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC’s livestock business; and whether there was intent to evade coverage from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) based on the documentary evidence. On the other hand, SNLABC argues that these authorities misapprehended and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts as regards the inclusion of the Limot lands under the CARL. These circumstances fall within the recognized exceptions and, thus, the Court is persuaded to review the facts and evidence on record in the disposition of these present Petitions.

The Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

 

Briefly stated, the DAR questions the object or autoptic evidence relied upon by the DAR Regional Director in concluding that the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABC’s livestock business prior to the enactment of the CARL.

          In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,[13][13]the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions[14][14]that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word “agricultural” showed that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.[15][15] Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform.[16][16]

          Under the rules then prevailing, it was the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) who was primarily responsible for investigating the legal status, type and areas of the land sought to be excluded;[17][17] and for ascertaining whether the area subject of the application for exemption had been devoted to livestock-raising as of 15 June 1988.[18][18] The MARO’s authority to investigate has subsequently been replicated in the current DAR guidelines regarding lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising.[19][19] As the primary official in charge of investigating the land sought to be exempted as livestock land, the MARO’s findings on the use and nature of the land, if supported by substantial evidence on record, are to be accorded greater weight, if not finality.

Verily, factual findings of administrative officials and agencies that have acquired expertise in the performance of their official duties and the exercise of their primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.[20][20] The Court generally accords great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.[21][21]

In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection[22][22] found on the Lopez lands several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs, some of which were covered by several certificates of ownership. There were likewise structures on the Lopez lands used for its livestock business, structures consisting of two chutes where the livestock were kept during nighttime. The existence of the cattle prior to the enactment of the CARL was positively affirmed by the farm workers and the overseer who were interviewed by the MARO. Considering these factual findings and the fact that the lands were in fact being used for SNLABC’s livestock business even prior to 15 June 1988, the DAR Regional Director ordered the exemption of the Lopez lands from CARP coverage. The Court gives great probative value to the actual, on-site investigation made by the MARO as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director. The Court finds that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-raising.

Simply because the on-site investigation was belatedly conducted three or four years after the effectivity of the CARL does not perforce make it unworthy of belief or unfit to be offered as substantial evidence in this case. Contrary to DAR’s claims, the lack of information as regards the initial breeders and the specific date when the cattle were first introduced in the MARO’s Report does not conclusively demonstrate that there was no livestock-raising on the Lopez lands prior to the CARL. Although information as to these facts are significant, their non-appearance in the reports does not leave the MARO without any other means to ascertain the duration of livestock-raising on the Lopez lands, such as interviews with farm workers, the presence of livestock infrastructure, and evidence of sales of cattle – all of which should have formed part of the MARO’s Investigation Report.

Hence, the Court looks with favor on the expertise of the MARO in determining whether livestock-raising on the Lopez lands has only been recently conducted or has been a going concern for several years already. Absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or bias, the findings of the MARO – as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director – are to be accorded great probative value, owing to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties.[23][23]

          The DAR, however, insisted in its Petition[24][24] on giving greater weight to the inconsistencies appearing in the documentary evidence presented, and noted by the DAR Secretary, in order to defeat SNLABC’s claim of exemption over the Lopez lands. The Court is not so persuaded.

          In the Petition, the DAR argued that that the tax declarations covering the Lopez lands characterized them as agricultural lands and, thus, detracted from the claim that they were used for livestock purposes. The Court has since held that “there is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry”; hence, “tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land.”[25][25] Applying the foregoing principles, the tax declarations of the Lopez lands as agricultural lands are not conclusive or final, so as to prevent their exclusion from CARP coverage as lands devoted to livestock-raising. Indeed, the MARO’s on-site inspection and actual investigation showing that the Lopez lands were being used for livestock-grazing are more convincing in the determination of the nature of those lands.

          Neither can the DAR in the instant case assail the timing of the incorporation of SNLABC and the latter’s operation shortly before the enactment of the CARL.  That persons  employ tactics to precipitously convert their lands from agricultural use to industrial livestock is not unheard of; they even exploit the creation of a new corporate vehicle to operate the livestock business to substantiate the deceitful conversion in the hopes of evading CARP coverage. Exemption from CARP, however, is directly a function of the land’s usage, and not of the identity of the entity operating it. Otherwise stated, lands actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock are exempt from CARP coverage, regardless of the change of owner.[26][26] In the instant case, whether SNLABC was incorporated prior to the CARL is immaterial, since the Lopez lands were already being used for livestock-grazing purposes prior to the enactment of the CARL, as found by the MARO. Although the managing entity had been changed, the business interest of raising livestock on the Lopez lands still remained without any indication that it was initiated after the effectivity of the CARL.

          As stated by SNLABC, the Lopez lands were the legacy of Don Salvador Lopez, Sr. The ownership of these lands was passed from Don Salvador Lopez, Sr., to Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., and subsequently to the latter’s children before being registered under the name of SNLABC. Significantly, SNLABC was incorporated by the same members of the Lopez family, which had previously owned the lands and managed the livestock business.[27][27] In all these past years, despite the change in ownership, the Lopez lands have been used for purposes of grazing and pasturing cattle, horses, carabaos and goats. Simply put, SNLABC was chosen as the entity to take over the reins of the livestock business of the Lopez family. Absent any other compelling evidence, the inopportune timing of the incorporation of the SNLABC prior to the enactment of the CARL was not by itself a categorical manifestation of an intent to avoid CARP coverage.

          Furthermore, the presence of coconut trees, although an indicia that the lands may be agricultural, must be placed within the context of how they figure in the actual, direct and exclusive use of the subject lands. The DAR failed to demonstrate that the Lopez lands were actually and primarily agricultural lands planted with coconut trees. This is in fact contradicted by the findings of its own official, the MARO. Indeed, the DAR did not adduce any proof to show that the coconut trees on the Lopez lands were used for agricultural business, as required by the Court in DAR v. Uy,[28][28] wherein we ruled thus:

It is not uncommon for an enormous landholding to be intermittently planted with trees, and this would not necessarily detract it from the purpose of livestock farming and be immediately considered as an agricultural land. It would be surprising if there were no trees on the land.  Also, petitioner did not adduce any proof to show that the coconut trees were planted by respondent and used for agricultural business or were already existing when the land was purchased in 1979. In the present case, the area planted with coconut trees bears an insignificant value to the area used for the cattle and other livestock-raising, including the infrastructure needed for the business. There can be no presumption, other than that the “coconut area” is indeed used for shade and to augment the supply of fodder during the warm months; any other use would be only be incidental to livestock farming. The substantial quantity of livestock heads could only mean that respondent is engaged in farming for this purpose. The single conclusion gathered here is that the land is entirely devoted to livestock farming and exempted from the CARP.

          On the assumption that five thousand five hundred forty-eight (5,548) coconut trees were existing on the Lopez land (TCT No. T-12637), the DAR did not refute the findings of the MARO that these coconut trees were merely incidental. Given the number of livestock heads of SNLABC, it is not surprising that the areas planted with coconut trees on the Lopez lands where forage grass grew were being used as grazing areas for the livestock. It was never sufficiently adduced that SNLABC was primarily engaged in agricultural business on the Lopez lands, specifically, coconut-harvesting. Indeed, the substantial quantity of SNLABC’s livestock amounting to a little over one hundred forty (140) livestock heads, if measured against the combined 110.5455 hectares of land and applying the DAR-formulated ratio, leads to no other conclusion than that the Lopez lands were exclusively devoted to livestock farming.[29][29]

          In any case, the inconsistencies appearing in the documentation presented (albeit sufficiently explained) pale in comparison to the positive assertion made by the MARO in its on-site, actual investigation – that the Lopez lands were being used actually, directly and exclusively for its livestock-raising business. The Court affirms the findings of the DAR Regional Director and the Court of Appeals that the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABC’s livestock business and, thus, are exempt from CARP coverage.

The Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and directly being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL.

          In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.

          In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the inspection found that the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts (41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the denial of the application for exemption.[30][30] Verily, the Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of the inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional Director who denied the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals.

          SNLABC argues that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the factual circumstances and overlooked certain relevant facts, which deserve a second look. SNLABC’s arguments fail to convince the Court to reverse the rulings of the Court of Appeals.

          In the 07 February 1994 Letter-Affidavit addressed to the DAR Secretary, SNLABC requested the exemption of the Limot lands on the ground that the corporation needed the additional area for its livestock business. As pointed out by the DAR Regional Director, this Letter-Affidavit is a clear indication that the Limot lands were not directly, actually and exclusively used for livestock raising. SNLABC casually dismisses the clear import of their Letter-Affidavit as a “poor choice of words.” Unfortunately, the semantics of the declarations of SNLABC in its application for exemption are corroborated by the other attendant factual circumstances and indicate its treatment of the subject properties as non-livestock.

Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary even described SNLABC’s use of the area as a “seasonal extension of the applicant’s ‘grazing lands’ during the summer.” Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC’s livestock business, especially since these were only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable — and are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used — for agricultural purposes.

SNLABC’s treatment of the land for non-livestock purposes is highlighted by its undue delay in filing the application for exemption of the Limot lands. SNLABC filed the application only on 07 February 1994, or three years after the Notice of Coverage was issued; two years after it filed the first application for the Lopez lands; and a year after the titles to the Limot lands were transferred to the Republic. The SNLABC slept on its rights and delayed asking for exemption of the Limot lands. The lands were undoubtedly being used for agricultural purposes, not for its livestock business; thus, these lands are subject to CARP coverage. Had SNLABC indeed utilized the Limot lands in conjunction with the livestock business it was conducting on the adjacent Lopez lands, there was nothing that would have prevented it from simultaneously applying for a total exemption of all the lands necessary for its livestock.

The defense of SNLABC that it wanted to “save” first the Lopez lands where the corrals and chutes were located, before acting to save the other properties does not help its cause. The piecemeal application for exemption of SNLABC speaks of the value or importance of the Lopez lands, compared with the Limot lands, with respect to its livestock business. If the Lopez and the Limot lands were equally significant to its operations and were actually being used for its livestock business, it would have been more reasonable for it to apply for exemption for the entire lands. Indeed, the belated filing of the application for exemption was a mere afterthought on the part of SNLABC, which wanted to increase the area of its landholdings to be exempted from CARP on the ground that these were being used for its livestock business.

In any case, SNLABC admits that the title to the Limot lands has already been transferred to the Republic and subsequently awarded to SNLABC’s farm workers.[31][31] This fact only demonstrates that the land is indeed being used for agricultural activities and not for livestock grazing.

The confluence of these factual circumstances leads to the logical conclusion that the Limot lands were not being used for livestock grazing and, thus, do not qualify for exemption from CARP coverage. SNLABC’s belated filing of the application for exemption of the Limot lands was a ruse to increase its retention of its landholdings and an attempt to “save” these from compulsory acquisition.

            WHEREFORE, the Petitions of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp. are DISMISSED, and the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the DAR Regional Director are hereby AFFIRMED.

          SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

         

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice
   

 

                                            

 

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

 

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                               CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                                 Associate Justice

                                                         Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                               RENATO C. CORONA

                                                         Chief Justice

                                                         

 

 

[1][1]  Department of Agrarian Reform’s Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 August 2007, rollo (G.R. No. 178895), pp. 9-80; Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation’s Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 04 September 2007, rollo (G.R. No. 179071), pp. 10-72.

[2][2]  Rollo (G.R. No. 178895), pp. 44-56; rollo (G.R. No. 179071), pp. 31-43.

[3][3] Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 June 2006, pp. 2-6; rollo (G.R. No. 178895), pp. 45-49; Rollo (G.R. No. 179071), pp. 32-36.

[4][4] Supra. Note 2.

[5][5] DAR Regional Director’s Order dated 05 March 1997. (Annex “C” of DAR’s Petition; rollo [G.R. No. 178895], pp. 59-62; and Annex “F” of SNLABC’s Petition); rollo [G.R. No. 179071], pp. 69-72.)

[6][6] DAR Secretary’s Order dated 10 June 1998 (Annex “C” of DAR’s Petition; rollo [G.R. No. 178895], pp. 63-80)

[7][7] Court of Appeals Resolution 08 June 2007; rollo (G.R. No. 178895), pp. 57-58, and rollo (G.R. No. 179071), pp. 45-46.

[8][8] DAR’s Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 August 2007; rollo (G.R. No. 178895), pp. 9-80.

[9][9] SNLABC’s Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 04 September 2007; rollo (G.R. No. 179071), pp. 10-72.

[10][10] The Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land; and declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Luz Farms v. DAR, G.R. No. 86889, 04 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51; DAR v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070, 19 October 2005, 473 SCRA 392; DAR v. Berenguer, G.R. No. 154094, 09 March 2010)

[11][11] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 1; New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.), Inc. v. Abad, G.R. No. 161818, 20 August 2008, 562 SCRA 503.

[12][12] “The rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the  admissions of both parties.” (Emphasis supplied; Malayan Insurance Co., v. Jardine Davies Transport Services, Inc., G.R. No. 181300, 18 September 2009, 600 SCRA 706, citing International Container Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 161539, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 194, 199)

[13][13] Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 04 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51.

[14][14] CARL, Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32.

[15][15] Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, supra.

[16][16] DAR v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070, 19 October 2005, 473 SCRA 392.

[17][17] DAR Administrative Order No. 9-1993, Rule IV (A) (2).

[18][18] DAR Administrative Order No. 9-1993, Rule IV (A) (3).

[19][19] “The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), together with a representative of the DAR Provincial Office (DARPO), shall conduct an inventory and ocular inspection of all agricultural lands with livestock raising activities.” (DAR Administrative Order No. 07-08 dated 03 September 2008)

[20][20] Taguinod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154654, 14 September 2007, 533 SCRA 403.

[21][21] A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc., v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 170623, 09 July 2010.

[22][22] Investigation Report dated 09 March 1993. (Annex “E” of SNLABC’s Petition for Review on Certiorari; rollo [G.R. No. 179071], pp. 67-68)

[23][23] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).

[24][24] DAR’s Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 04 September 2007, pp. 26-29 (Rollo [G.R. No. 178895], pp. 34-37).

[25][25] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139592, 05 October 2000, 342 SCRA 189.

[26][26] “Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents’ family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.” (DAR v. Sutton, supra note 10; emphasis supplied.)

[27][27] Memorandum dated 03 June 2009, pp. 5-6; rollo (G.R. No. 178895), pp. 155-156.

[28][28] G.R. No. 169277, 09 February 2007, 515 SCRA 376.

[29][29] Under DAR Administrative Order No. 09-1993, for land to be excluded from the coverage of the CARL because it is devoted to livestock, there must be established a proportion of a minimum ratio of one head of cattle to one hectare of land, and one head of cattle to 1.7815 hectares of infrastructure as of 15 June 1998, the date of the effectivity of the CARL. (DAR v. Berenguer, G.R. No. 154904, 09 March 2010)

[30][30] Order dated 05 March 1997 at 3; rollo (G.R. No. 178895), p. 61; rollo (G.R. No. 179071), p. 71.

[31][31] SNLABC’s Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 6, para. 12; rollo (G.R. No. 179071), p. 15, and SNLABC’s Memorandum dated 03 June 2009, p. 8; rollo (G.R. No. 178895), p. 158.

Comment