Archive for August, 2017


CASE 2017-0028: REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE, REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO, Petitioners, -versus – SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARINAS, and REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, Respondents (G.R. NO. 227757, 25 JULY 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (SUBJECT/S: WHEN WILL SUPREME COURT INTERFERE WITH PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS?)(BRIEF TITLE: REPR. BAGUILAT JR ET AL VS. SPEAKER ALVAREZ ET AL)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

WHAT IS THIS CASE ALL ABOUT?

 

THIS CASE CONCERNS AN INTERNAL MATTER OF A COEQUAL, POLITICAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT WHICH, ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CANNOT BE JUDICIALLY INTERFERED WITH.

 

However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine.33 Verily, “[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.”

 

BUT CAN THE COURT STILL INTERFERE WITH THE PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS?

 

YES. THIS IS THE EXCEPTION. WHILE THE COURT IN TAKING JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS QUESTIONING AN ACT OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT, WILL NOT REVIEW THE WISDOM, MERITS OR PROPRIETY OF SUCH ACTION, IT WILL, HOWEVER, STRIKE IT DOWN ON THE GROUND OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

 

Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.29 This stems from the expanded concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Case law decrees that “[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department’s duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion: 30

 

[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.31

 

Accordingly, this Court “will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the govemment.”32

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2017-0028-Representative Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr., et al. Vs. Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez, et al. 

 

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CASE 2017-0027– DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) VS. BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION & AD HOC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (G.R. NO. 225051, 19 JULY 2017, PERALTA, J.) (SUBJECT/S: APPLICATION OF CERTIORARI IN ARBITRATION) (BRIEF TITLE: DFA VS BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND AD HOC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the petition for failure to observe the rules on court intervention allowed by RA No. 9285 and the Special ADR Rules, specifically Rule 19.36 and Rule 19.37 of the latter, in the pending arbitration proceedings of the parties to this case.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

THE AD HOC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL ADMITTED RESPONDENT’S AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIMS. PETITIONER FILED THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI  ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. IS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI PROPER?

 

NO. THE ORDER BEING QUESTIONED IS NOT FROM A JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS BUT ONLY FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL.

 

“It is clear that an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court is from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals and only questions of law may be raised. There have been instances when we overlooked the rule on hierarchy of courts and took cognizance of a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by the Regional Trial Court when it granted interim relief to a party and issued an Order assailed by the petitioner, considering the transcendental importance of the issue involved therein35 or to better serve the ends of justice when the case is determined on the merits rather on technicality.36 However, in this case, the appeal by certiorari is not from a final Order of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, but from an interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal; hence, the petition must be dismissed.”

 

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SCD-2017-0027-Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Vs. BCA International Corporation & Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal

 

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CASE 2017-0026– HON. MYLYN P. CAYABYAB, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF LUBAO, PAMPANGA AND ANGELITO L. DAVID, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE BARANGAY CHAIRMAN OF PRADO SIONGCO, LUBAO, PAMPANGA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EMMANUEL SANTOS VS. JAIME C. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT, CARMELA R. DIMSON AND IRENE R. DIMSON (G.R. NO. 223862, 1O JULY 2017,  PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (SUBJECT/S: CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT AS BASIS OF CERTIORARI; ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS PRESUMED REGULAR) (BRIEF TITLE: MAYOR CAYABYAB VS. JAIME C. DIMSON).

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 18, 2015 and the Resolution dated March 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138699 are hereby SET ASIDE.

 

SO ORDERED.’

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

CAN YOU OPERATE A BUSINESS MERELY BECAUSE THE BUSINESS IS LEGITIMATE IN NATURE?

 

NO. YOU MUST FIRST OBTAIN A BUSINESS PERMIT FROM THE MUNICIPALITY OR CITY.

 

“A business permit must be secured from the municipal business permits and licensing office in order for the business to legally operate in the locality.41 While poultry farming is admittedly a legitimate business, it cannot operate without a business permit, which expires on the 31st of December of every year and must be renewed before the end of January of the following year.”

 

IN THIS CASE COMPLAINTS FROM NEIGHBORING BARANGAYS WERE RECEIVED BY THE OFFICE OF MAYOR CAYABYAB BEWAILING THE FOUL ODOR COMING FROM THE SAID FARM, 42 WHICH WAS CONFIRMED UPON OCULAR INSPECTION CONDUCTED BY THE HEALTH AND SANITATION OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF LUBAO, PAMPANGA. IS THE OCULAR INSPECTION FINDING VALID?

 

YES. SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE PRESUMED TO BE REGULAR AND VALID, UNLESS SUFFICIENTLY SHOWN TO BE OTHERWISE.

  

“In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson filed any application for renewal of his business permit to operate the subject poultry farm in 2014, apparently due to his failure to secure the necessary barangay clearance which was not issued based on complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said farm. Records show that complaints from neighboring barangays were received by the office of Mayor Cayabyab bewailing the foul odor coming from the said farm, 42 which was confirmed upon ocular inspection conducted by the Health and Sanitation Office of the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga.43 Settled is the rule that acts of public officers are presumed to be regular and valid, unless sufficiently shown to be otherwise.44 In this case, Dimson was unable to refute the finding that foul odor is being emitted by his farm, having failed to present the inspection report of the sanitary officer who purportedly did not note any such foul smell in the fann.45 Not having passed the necessary sanitation standard, there was, therefore, a prima facie valid reason for the withholding of the required barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the renewal of Dimson’s business permit to operate.

 

Having failed to apply for and secure the necessary business pennit to operate in 2014 on account of his inability to obtain the required barangay clearance due to non-compliance with a requirement standard,46 Dimson may not legally operate in the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, thereby, warranting the issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the CDO and the Closure Order. Accordingly, no error, much less grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed on the RTC in denying Dimson’s application for the issuance of a TRO against the said orders. In the absence of a business permit, Dimson has no clear legal right to resume his operations pending final determination by the RTC of the merits of the main case for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law, which is not extant in the present case. It is settled that the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance of an injunctive.”

 

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SCD-2017-0026-Hon. Mylyn P. Cayabyab, in her capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga . . . . .

 

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