J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2014-0019: T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN CORPORATION, STINNES HUANG, BEN HUANG and ROGELIO MADRIAGA, Petitioners – versus – T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN WORKERS UNION, ELPIDIO ZALDIVAR, DARI OS GONZALES, WILLIAM DOMINGO, BOBBY CASTILLO, JIMMY M. PASCUA, GERMANO M. BAJO, RICO L. MANZANO, ALLAN L. CALLORINA, ROMEO BLANCO, GILBERT M. GARCIA, CARLOS F. GERILLO, EDUARDO A. GRANDE, EDILBRANDO MARTICIO, VIVENCIO SUSANO, ROLANDO GARCIA, JR., MICHAEL FABABIER, ROWELL MADRIAGA, PRESNIL TOLENTINO, MARVIN VENTURA, FRANCISCO RIV ARES, PLACIDO TOLENTINO and ROLANDO ROMERO (G.R. No. 191714, 26 FEBRUARY 2014, MENDOZA) (BRIEF TITLE: T&H SHOPFITTERS ET AL. VS. T&H SHOPFITTERS CORP UNION ET AL.)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the November 12, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its March 24, 2010 Resolution, in CA-G.R. SP No. 107188, are AFFIRMED, except with respect to the award of attorney’s fees which 1s hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.”

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SCD-2014-0019-FEB 2014-T & H SHOPFITTERS

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES: 

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:  

a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications; 

b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and

c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.  

2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL: 

a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;

b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;

c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;

d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another;

e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;

f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;

g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of information and communications technologies; 

h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;

i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months;

j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the prescribed holding periods;

m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;

n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); 

o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and

p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel. 

Further, the Court DECLARES: 

1. 1.    Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and

1. 2.    Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.  

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of: 

1.   Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as  

1. 2.       Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

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SCD-2014-0018-FEB 2014-DISINI

CASE 2014-0017: SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner, – versus – HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents. (G.R. NO. 176830; RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner, – versus – HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Offict-r-in- Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, m his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents (G.R. NO. 185587; RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner – versus – HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in- Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacify as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, m his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents; VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,  – versus – HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.  (G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587, 185636 and 190005, G .R. No. 185636, G .R. No. 190005) SUBJECTS: PROBABLE CAUSE; ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST; DUE PROCESS IN PRELIM INVESTIGATION; POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE  (11 FEBRUARY 2014, SERENO, CJ)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT FROM THE EMBARRASSMENT, EXPENSE AND ANXIETY OF A PUBLIC TRIAL.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS ONLY STATUTORY NOT CONSTITUTIONAL. THUS, IS IT NOT A PROCEDURAL RIGHT ONLY?

IT IS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT AND A COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

A preliminary investigation is “not a casual affair.” It is conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.

WHAT IS THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

IT MEANS TO ACCORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRESENTATION OF RESPONDENT’S SIDE WITH REGARD TO THE ACCUSATION.

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS?

IT IS REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND SUBMIT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ONE’S DEFENSE.”

WHAT IS PROSCRIBED IN DUE PROCESS?

THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

“The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s defense.”88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.90

CERTAIN RESPONDENTS CLAIMED THEY WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE HEY WERE NOT FURNISHED DOCUMENTS. IS  THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO,  BECAUSE THEY COULD NO LONGER BE FOUND IN THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES.

WHAT IS THE RULE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES?

AS LONG AS EFFORTS TO REACH A RESPONDENT WERE MADE, AND HE WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REMAINS VALID. THE RULE WAS PUT IN PLACE IN ORDER TO FOIL UNDERHANDED ATTEMPTS OF A RESPONDENT TO DELAY THE PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.100 The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.

OCAMPO CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE HE WAS NOT FURNISHED COPY OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT. IS HIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO. HIS INDICTMENT WAS BASED NOT ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT ALONE BUT ON THE COLLECTIVE AFFIDAVITS OF SEVERAL OTHER WITNESSES.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.

OCAMPO ALLEGED THAT JUDGE ABANDO DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT “NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE.”  THE JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT ANY EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES. IS HIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO.  SC HAS RULED THAT  A HEARING IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE DETERMINATION THEREOF. IN FACT, THE JUDGE’S PERSONAL EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES IS NOT MANDATORY AND INDISPENSABLE FOR DETERMINING THE APTNESS OF ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST. IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE JUDGE PERSONALLY EVALUATES THE PROSECUTOR’S REPORT AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS SHOWING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE INDICTMENT AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF, ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST; OR IF, ON THE BASIS OF HIS EVALUATION, HE FINDS NO PROBABLE CAUSE, TO DISREGARD THE PROSECUTOR’S RESOLUTION AND REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVITS OF WITNESSES TO AID HIM IN DETERMINING ITS EXISTENCE.113

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.” Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.

ECHANIS AND BAYLOSIS CLAIM THAT IF JUDGE ABANDO HAVE PAINSTAKINGLY EXAMINED THE RECORDS THE JUDGE WOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT. BY NOT DISMISSING THE INDICTMENT HE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION? ARE THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO.

THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST PETITIONERS IS ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF JUDGE ABANDO. JUDGES ARE GIVEN WIDE LATITUDE IN ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST. THE TRIAL COURT’S EXERCISE OF ITS JUDICIAL DISCRETION SHOULD NOT, AS A GENERAL RULE, BE INTERFERED WITH IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. INDEED, CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE TO CURE ERRORS IN THE TRIAL COURT’S APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES, THE CONCLUSION OF FACTS IT REACHED BASED ON THE SAID FINDINGS, AS WELL AS THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against them. Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:

x x x. The trial court’s exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the conclusions of law. x x x. Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the allegations.

WHAT IS THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE?

UNDER THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE, “COMMON CRIMES, PERPETRATED IN FURTHERANCE OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE, ARE DIVESTED OF THEIR CHARACTER AS ‘COMMON’ OFFENSES AND ASSUME THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE MAIN CRIME.”

The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion.

Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.”

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

WHO HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE POLITICAL MOTIVATION?

THE BURDEN MUST BE DISCHARGED BY THE DEFENSE SINCE MOTIVE IS A STATE OF MIND WHICH ONLY THE ACCUSED KNOWS.

We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.

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SCD-2014-0017-FEB 2014-OCAMPO