J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0195: JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA VS. JONATHAN BRIONES AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 164682, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECT: APPEAL FROM ORDER DENYING MOTION TO QUASH. (BRIEF TITLE: GALZOTE VS. PEOPLE)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2004 and July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. Treble costs against the petitioner.

        SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

ACCUSED WAS CHARGED AT MTC FOR ROBBERY COMMITTED IN AN UNINHABITED PLACE. HE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH. MTC DENIED HIS MOTION.  HE FILED AT RTC A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65. WAS HIS ACTION PROPER?

NO. HE SHOULD HAVE PROCEEDED TO TRIAL FIRST.

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WHAT IS THE USUAL PROCEDURE IF A MOTION TO QUASH IS DENIED.

TRIAL CONTINUES. IF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS RENDERED THE ACCUSED CAN RAISE IN HIS APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO QUASH AS AN ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling.

In  this  case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

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WHAT IS THE NATURE OF A MOTION TO QUASH?  IS IT APPEALABLE?

IT IS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER AND IS NOT APPEALABLE. NEITHER CAN IT BE A PROPER SUBJECT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

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WHY CAN YOU NOT QUESTION IT BY PETITION FOR CERTIORARI?

BECAUSE THERE IS PLAIN AND SPEEDY REMEDY WHICH IS TO PROCEED TO TRIAL.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.^[1][11] The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.

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BUT ARE THERE CASES WHEN PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS ALLOWED?

YES. IN THE FOLLOWING CASES CITED AND FOR THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:  IN THE INTEREST OF A “MORE ENLIGHTENED AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE”;^[2][12] THE PROMOTION OF PUBLIC WELFARE AND PUBLIC POLICY;^[3][13] CASES THAT “HAVE ATTRACTED NATIONWIDE ATTENTION, MAKING IT ESSENTIAL TO PROCEED WITH DISPATCH IN THE CONSIDERATION THEREOF”;^[4][14]OR JUDGMENTS ON ORDER ATTENDED BY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THESE ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO JUSTIFY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.^[5][15]

Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a “more enlightened and substantial justice”;^[6][12] the promotion of public welfare and public policy;^[7][13] cases that “have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof”;^[8][14]or judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.^[9][15]

In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.

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THE GROUND RAISED BY THE ACCUSED IN HIS MOTION TO QUASH IS THAT HIS CO-CONSPIRATOR WAS CONVICTED NOT FOR ROBBERY BUT FOR A LESSER OFFENSE. WAS HIS REASON JUSTIFIED.

NO. THE GROUND ALLOWED IN MOTION TO QUASH IS DEFECT OR DEFENSE APPARENT IN THE FACE OF THE INFORMATION.  HERE, SUCH REASON IS NOT APPARENT IN THE FACE OF THE INFORMATION.

We find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner failed  to  show  that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the  above  exceptional circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was  consistent  with  the  existing  rules  and applicable jurisprudence. The  ground  used  by  the  petitioner  in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated  under Section  3,  Rule  117  of  the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that  warrant the quashal of a criminal information.^[10][16]

This ground, too, is an extraneous matter that has no bearing and is irrelevant to the validity of the criminal information filed against the accused; the designated purpose of a motion to quash is to assail the validity of the criminal information (or criminal complaint) for defects or defenses apparent on the face of the information.^[11][17]  A facial examination of the criminal information against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on its face considering its conformity with the guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

 Under  the  circumstances,  the  criminal  information  is  sufficient  in  form  and  substance  for  it  states:  (a)   the   name   of   the  petitioner  as the accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how the offense of robbery was committed and the petitioner’s participation were alleged with particularity; and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the robbery were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the petitioner can be properly tried under the allegations of the information.

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WHEN RTC DISMISSED THE CERTIORARI PETITION OF THE ACCUSED, THE LATTER FILED A CERTIORARI PETITION AT C.A.? WAS HIS ACTION PROPER?

NO. THE CERTIORARI PETITION AT RTC WAS AN ORIGINAL ACTION. THE DECISION WAS A FINAL ORDER. THE REMEDY IS APPEAL TO C.A. PURSUANT TO RULE 41, NOT BY CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.  SINCE THERE WAS A SPEEDY AND PLAIN REMEDY OF APPEAL THE CERTIORARI PETITION WAS NOT PROPER.

To proceed to the merits of the CA resolution that is the main subject of this review, we find no reversible error in the CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s order; the petition was both procedurally and substantively infirm.

 We find that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was a wrong legal remedy to question the RTC order. The petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner before the RTC was an original action whose resulting decision is a final order that completely disposed of the petition;^[12][18] the assailed CA resolution was in all respect a ruling on the propriety of the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC. Hence, the petitioner’s remedy was to appeal the RTC order to the CA pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –

(a)                Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

Given the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of appeal, the petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari.^[13][19]

Even  on  the  substantive  aspect,  the  petition for certiorari filed with the CA must fail considering the petitioner’s failure to show any justifiable reason for his chosen mode of review. In addition, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC since it was merely affirming a correct ruling of denial by the MeTC of the petitioner’s motion to quash.

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SINCE ACCUSED FILED CERTIORARI PETITION BASED ON SCANT ALLEGATIONS OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF HIS FILING SUCH CERTIORARI PETITION.

HIS FILING OF THE PETITION IS CONSIDERED A DILATORY MOVE THAT DESERVE SANCTION BY THE COURT. HE IS DIRECTED TO PAY TREBLE COSTS OF SUIT.

 As a final word, we cannot allow a party to delay litigation by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave abuse of discretion.^[14][20] We repeat that it is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances where a resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.^[15][21] Under the circumstances, the petitioner’s recourses cannot but be dilatory moves that deserve sanction from this Court.

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

          Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the twin resolutions^[16][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)  dated  April 30, 2004  and  July 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. The assailed April 30, 2004 resolution dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Joel S. Galzote (petitioner), while the challengedJuly 23, 2004 resolution denied his motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

          On January 23, 1997, the prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an uninhabited place against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 1,Manila. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

The undersigned accuses JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA of the crime of Robbery in anUninhabited Place, committed as follows:

That on or about July 22, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one ROSENDO OQUINA Y ESMALI who is already charged with the same offense with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 304765, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain, by means of force upon things, break into and enter the Administration Office of the Prince Town Inn Corporation located at Valenzuela Street, Sta. Mesa, this City, which is an uninhabited place, by then and there destroying the Jipson board ceiling of the said establishment with the use of a fan knife and passing through the same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, and once inside, and without the knowledge  and consent of the owner thereof, took, stole and carried away cash money in the amount of P109,000.00 belonging to said Prince Town Inn Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P109,000.00, Philippine Currency [sic].

Contrary to law.^[17][2]

The petitioner moved to quash the above information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed in form and in substance. The MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion to quash in its order of September 15, 1997.^[18][3] Likewise, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial.^[19][4]

Via a petition for certiorari,^[20][5] the petitioner elevated the unfavorable ruling of the MeTC to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila. The petitioner argued that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting his motion to quash. Respondent Jonathan Briones (respondent) moved to dismiss the petition for certiorari, arguing that: (a) the petitioner failed to prosecute the petition for an unreasonably long period of time; (b) a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to address the denial of a motion to quash; and (c) the MeTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion to quash.^[21][6]

In its order^[22][7] of March 22, 2002, the RTC granted the respondent’s motion and dismissed the petition for certiorari. The RTC also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.^[23][8]

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. The CA dismissed the petition in its resolution of April 30, 2004.^[24][9]

The CA held that the petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA explained that the petitioner should have filed an appeal, instead of a special civil action for certiorari, upon receipt of the RTC’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. The CA also noted that the petitioner failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in his petition.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the lower courts erred in denying his motion to quash. It explained that the allegation of conspiracy in his case need not be alleged with particularity since it was not charged as an offense in itself, but only as a manner of incurring criminal liability. The fact that the petitioner’s alleged co-conspirator had been convicted of the lesser offense of malicious mischief in another case is not a bar to the petitioner’s prosecution for the crime of robbery.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this resolution, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution^[25][10] datedJuly 23, 2004.

THE PETITION

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner claims that his recourse to a petition for certiorari before the CA was proper. He argues that both the MeTC and the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when they denied his motion to quash. He alleges that the trial courts failed to see that the information filed against him was flawed both in form and in substance.

The petitioner additionally claims that his failure to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent was not fatal to his petition.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

Remedy from the Denial of a Motion to Quash

A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling.

In  this  case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy.^[26][11] The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.

Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a “more enlightened and substantial justice”;^[27][12] the promotion of public welfare and public policy;^[28][13] cases that “have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof”;^[29][14]or judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.^[30][15]

In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.

At the RTC

We find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition for certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner failed  to  show  that the factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the  above  exceptional circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its denial of the motion to quash was  consistent  with  the  existing  rules  and applicable jurisprudence. The  ground  used  by  the  petitioner  in his motion to quash (i.e., that his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery) is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated  under Section  3,  Rule  117  of  the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that  warrant the quashal of a criminal information.^[31][16]

This ground, too, is an extraneous matter that has no bearing and is irrelevant to the validity of the criminal information filed against the accused; the designated purpose of a motion to quash is to assail the validity of the criminal information (or criminal complaint) for defects or defenses apparent on the face of the information.^[32][17]  A facial examination of the criminal information against the petitioner shows it to be valid and regular on its face considering its conformity with the guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

 Under  the  circumstances,  the  criminal  information  is  sufficient  in  form  and  substance  for  it  states:  (a)   the   name   of   the  petitioner  as the accused; (b) the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how the offense of robbery was committed and the petitioner’s participation were alleged with particularity; and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the robbery were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the petitioner can be properly tried under the allegations of the information.

The CA Resolution

To proceed to the merits of the CA resolution that is the main subject of this review, we find no reversible error in the CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s order; the petition was both procedurally and substantively infirm.

 We find that the petition for certiorari filed with the CA was a wrong legal remedy to question the RTC order. The petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner before the RTC was an original action whose resulting decision is a final order that completely disposed of the petition;^[33][18] the assailed CA resolution was in all respect a ruling on the propriety of the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC. Hence, the petitioner’s remedy was to appeal the RTC order to the CA pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –

(b)               Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

Given the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of appeal, the petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of certiorari.^[34][19]

Even  on  the  substantive  aspect,  the  petition for certiorari filed with the CA must fail considering the petitioner’s failure to show any justifiable reason for his chosen mode of review. In addition, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC since it was merely affirming a correct ruling of denial by the MeTC of the petitioner’s motion to quash.

 As a final word, we cannot allow a party to delay litigation by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave abuse of discretion.^[35][20] We repeat that it is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances where a resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.^[36][21] Under the circumstances, the petitioner’s recourses cannot but be dilatory moves that deserve sanction from this Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals datedApril 30, 2004 andJuly 23, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76783. Treble costs against the petitioner.

          SO ORDERED.

      ARTURO D. BRION    

                                                                        Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

     ANTONIO T. CARPIO  

                                                                           Associate Justice

                                                                                Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0194: CITY GOVERNMENT OF TUGUEGARAO, REPRESENTED BY ROBERT P. GUZMAN VS. RANDOLPH S. TING (G.R. NOS. 192435-36, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011, VILLARAMA, J.) SUBJECT: PROPER PARTY TO APPEAL DISMISSAL ORDER OF THE SANDIGANYAYAN. (BRIEF TITLE: TUGUEGARAO CITY VS. TING).

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.  

With costs against petitioner Robert P. Guzman.

        SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

POWER OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE

It is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the sole power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The power to withdraw the Information already filed is a mere adjunct or consequence of the Ombudsman’s overall power to prosecute.^[1][20]  

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BUT ONCE CASE IS FILED IN SANDIGANBAYAN, IT IS THE LATTER AND NO LONGER THE OMBUDSMAN WHO HAS FULL CONTROL OF THE CASE

However, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the Information may not be dismissed without the approval of said court.^[2][21]  Further, it does not matter whether such filing of a motion to dismiss by the prosecution is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation.^[3][22] 

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PRIVATE PETITIONER FILED AN APPEAL FROM THE DISMISSAL ORDER OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN. IS THIS PROPER?

NO. IT IS THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WHO MUST FILE THE APPEAL.

We hold that petitioner is not the proper party to file the present action.  Section 4 (c) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, clearly provides that “In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.”

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GUZMAN, A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, WAS THE ONE WHO SIGNED THE COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT. IS HE ALSO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT?

NO. PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS TUGUEGARAO CITY BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONE WHO SUFFERED DAMAGE.

A private complainant in a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan is allowed to appeal only the civil aspect of the criminal case after its dismissal by said court.  While petitioner’s name was included in the caption of the cases as private complainant during the preliminary investigation and re-investigation proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman, he is not the offended party or private complainant in the main case.  As evident from a reading of the informations, it is the City ofTuguegaraowhich suffered damage as a consequence of the subject purchase of lands by the respondent and hence is the private complainant in the main case.

As this Court declared in People v. Velez:^[4][26]

On the first issue, the Court agrees with the contention of the respondent Office of the Ombudsman that Salmingo is not the proper party as petitioner in this case.  The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which reads:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. —  A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.  The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

The Court has previously held that the “party” referred to in the rule is the original party in the main case aggrieved by the order or decision in the main case.  Hence, only the aggrieved original party in the main case is the only proper party as petitioner.  One who has not been an original party in the main case has no personality to file a petition under said rule.

x x x x

The Court notes that Salmingo was not a party in the main case.  While it is true that he initiated the criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents for various offenses, however, under the Information filed with the SB, the parties are the People of the Philippines as plaintiff and the respondents as the accused.  The private complainant is the City of Silay while Salmingo is merely a witness for the plaintiff.

The private complainant in a criminal case before the SB is also a proper party to file a petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, but only on the civil aspect of the case.  It must be noted that Salmingo was not the private complainant in the main case.  As gleaned from the Information, Silay City was the party which suffered damage as a consequence of the wrongful acts of the malefactors and hence is the private complainant in the main case.

Salmingo’s inclusion in the caption of his petition of the People of the Philippinesas a party petitioner is patently unauthorized.  The Court believes that it is a futile attempt in compliance with Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.^[5][27] (Emphasis supplied.)

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FIRST DIVISION

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DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

           Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolutions^[6][1] dated May 26, 2009 and December 9, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in SB-09-CRM-0004 to 0005.  The Sandiganbayan directed the Ombudsman to resolve respondent’s motion for reinvestigation which was treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s resolution finding probable cause against the respondent.   Subsequently, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for withdrawal of informations which the Sandiganbayan granted.

          On June 12, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution^[7][2] finding probable cause to charge respondent Randolph S. Ting, then Mayor of Tuguegarao City, with violation of Section 3(g)^[8][3] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection with the purchase of three (3) parcels of land in the year 2004 under two separate deeds of sale. The City Government intended to use the properties as a public cemetery as these are situated near the existing public cemetery and traverse Barangays Atulayan Sur and Penque.

          In his complaint-affidavit,^[9][4] petitioner Robert P. Guzman alleged that the purchase of the subject lots was anomalous because it was done despite the lack of a project study on the suitability of the properties for their intended purpose, an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and initial clearance from the Department of Health (DOH) as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 856 (Sanitation Code).  Petitioner pointed out that the transaction was grossly disadvantageous to the city government considering that the area is flood-prone and the subject properties are situated along a waterway/floodway which are inundated during the rainy season. The purchased contiguous lots also adjoin a creek and a road where box culverts were constructed, and are lower than the elevation of the road.  Petitioner further claimed that respondent entered into the sale transaction knowing fully well that the purchase price was way above the properties’ fair market value, as reflected in the fair market value appraisal of Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. (Cuervo Report).

          Respondent filed his counter-affidavit^[10][5] asserting that the subject transaction was duly authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City, its terms were above-board and did not violate any provision of R.A. No. 3019.  He pointed out that when the lots were offered for sale at P700 per square meter to the City Government, the City Appraisal Committee conducted an evaluation of the proposed acquisition of properties for the Tuguegarao City public cemetery expansion project which was included in the 2001-2005 City Comprehensive Development Plan/Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CCDP/CLUP) adopted by the Sanngguniang Panlungsod. Said committee, after a thorough study, recommended that the City Government negotiate for the price of P351.54 per square meter which it found as the just and reasonable market value of the offered properties as the average amount in the deeds of sale and sworn statements of property owners. As for the clearances from DOH and DENR, respondent thought that these requirements shall be secured at the time the intended cemetery will be constructed.  Respondent also explained that flooding occurs only when there is an unusually large volume of rainfall in the Cagayan Valley Region and for a short period.  Moreover, the various resolutions passed by the City Development Council (CDC) already factored in such possibility when it required the backfilling of the acquired area.  As to the price of P160 per square meter indicated in the Cuervo Report, this runs counter to the findings of the City Appraisal Committee also based on deeds of sale and sworn statements of lot owners.

          As already mentioned, the Ombudsman approved the recommendation of Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer I Albert S. Almojuela to indict the respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. It was noted that respondent failed to attach copies of the deeds of sale and sworn statements supposedly used as basis for the resolution of the City Appraisal Committee recommending the price per square meter of the properties for acquisition as their fair market value.^[11][6] Consequently, on January 30, 2009, the corresponding informations^[12][7] were filed in the Sandiganbayan.

          Except for the names of the lot owners-sellers and specific properties subject of sale, the two (2) informations contain identical allegations, as follows:

That on or about May 05, 2004 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Randy (Randolph) S. Ting, a public officer, being then the City Mayor of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, while in the performance of his official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously purchase/enter into a Contract of Sale of two (2) parcels of land with a total area of24,816 square meters(Lot Nos. 5860 and 5861 of the Cadastral survey of Tuguegarao previously covered by TCT No. 36942, now TCT No. 144828 and TCT No. 36943 now TCT No. 144829, respectively), on behalf of the City Government of Tuguegarao from ANSELMO ALMAZAN, ANGELO ALMAZAN and ANSELMO ALMAZAN III, unsuitable for the intended purpose (public cemetery) as the said parcels of land are at least1.6 meterslower than the elevation of the Cabalza-Santol Road located along a waterway, adjacent to a box culvert and are periodically inundated during rainy season and overpriced by one hundred ninety one pesos and fifty four centavos (191.54) per square meter, which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the City Government of Tuguegarao to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid City.

CONTRARY TO LAW.^[13][8]

          Prior to his arraignment,^[14][9] respondent filed on March 3, 2009 a Motion For Reinvestigation^[15][10] alleging that the Ombudsman committed serious irregularity when it failed to consider that in the acquisition of the subject properties for the public cemetery expansion project, the City Appraisal Committee met and deliberated on the proposed purchase, and eventually passed a resolution adopting the average amount of P351.54 per sq. m.  Hence, the City Appraisal Committee should have been subpoenaed to produce those bunched deeds of sale and sworn statements (photocopies of which were attached to the motion) in its possession, which were used in the evaluation of the offered price for the subject lots, and for which the said body spent considerable time in determining the fair market value of the properties offered.  Respondent stressed that the Sangguniang Panlungsod  adopted the committee’s findings and authorized the respondent to enter into a contract of sale with the property owners at such price.  It was noted that the Ombudsman based its findings mainly on the Cuervo Report which contained errors and inaccuracies such as the acquisition cost by the property owners, ground elevation of fronting roads and zonal valuation figures. 

Respondent further emphasized the fact that petitioner himself is engaged in the cemetery business being the President of Tuguegarao Memorial, Inc. located near the subject properties as well as the old and “overloaded” public cemetery. Copies of five (5) contracts to sell involving petitioner’s burial lots were submitted by the respondent indicating the much higher selling price of petitioner’s burial lots compared with the fair market value of the acquired properties.  Respondent claimed that petitioner knew such expansion and development of the public cemetery would bring serious competition for the sales of burial lots in petitioner’s private cemetery. Finally, respondent called attention to his election as City Mayor of Tuguegarao for three consecutive terms, and the various government awards he received as community leader and for the City Government, that would attest to his integrity and honesty in governance.

          The Special Prosecutor, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, filed its Comment^[16][11] stating that there is no necessity to conduct a reinvestigation but respondent’s motion can instead be treated as a motion for reconsideration.

          On May 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution^[17][12] ordering the prosecution to resolve respondent’s motion for re-investigation which was treated as a motion for reconsideration.         

By Resolution^[18][13] datedSeptember 8, 2009, the Ombudsman reversed her earlier ruling and found no probable cause to charge the respondent with violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.  On the issues of overpricing and unsuitability of the purchased properties, the Ombudsman made the following findings:

Accused, however, was able to submit documents which served as basis for the amount arrived at by the City Appraisal Committee.  In his Motion for Reinvestigation, accused submitted deeds of sale and tax declarations over properties in Barangay Atulayan Sur showing that some lots were sold for as much as P520 per sq. m. in the years 2002 to 2003.  Accused also submitted another set of deeds of sale and tax declarations showing that in Barangay Penque, the average selling price of lots is P647.80 for the years 2002 to 2004.  It would appear, therefore, that the City Appraisal Committee, relied on by [the] accused, had some basis in arriving at its recommendation.

The actions of the City Appraisal Committee, in the absence of any evidence of some illegality in its proceedings, should be accorded the presumption of regularity.  Their official findings and recommendations, based as they are on actual data, should prevail over the findings of a private appraisal firm which was hired by [the] complainant.  This private appraiser apparently used the so-called “Stripping Method” and the “Anticipated Development Approach” when it arrived at the price of P160.00 per sq. m.  When it came, however, to the “Market Data Approach,” the appraisal report stated that the buying and selling price of the lots within the vicinity was P800-P1000 per sq. m. – as gathered from local bank appraisers (Allied Bank and Chinabank).  In the final analysis, it would appear that the City Appraisal Committee’s recommendation is more realistic, being based on actual data and official records while that of the private appraiser – using the “Stripping Method” and “Anticipated Development Approach” – is more of a theory or an opinion.

Moreover, while the area did, at some time, experience some flooding, any doubts as to the propriety of putting up a cemetery thereon has been laid to rest by the findings of the Regional Offices of the Environmental Management Bureau and the Mines Geo Sciences Bureau of DENR.  The Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Region 2 Office reported that the “proposed site can be developed as a cemetery or memorial park, provided, that proper mitigating measures like a well-designed drainage system and proper foundation designs shall be incorporated in the development plan of the project.”  The Environmental Management Bureau, for its part, stated that the project does not require an Environmental Compliance Certificate under PD 1586 but echoed the need to put up mitigating measures.

Other regulatory agencies of the government also gave approval to the project such as the Regional Office of the Center for Health of the DOH who gave INITIAL CLEARANCE to the project on January 30, 2008.  The NWRB, in its letter dated July 21, 2008, stated that the “water table depth in the concerned area is within the permissible 4.5 metersbelow ground surface.^[19][14]  

          The Ombudsman thus concluded that the existence of the element of a “contract or transaction being grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government” had become doubtful since the buying price of the subject lots falls within the prevailing fair market value of the properties within the area.  It was also noted that there was no evidence of a better offer received by the City Government of Tuguegarao in terms of price, size and location that also meets its requirements.  Moreover, since the lots purchased have been shown to be suitable for use as a public cemetery by the DENR, it cannot be said that the transaction entered into by respondent is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 

On October 12, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for the withdrawal of the informations.^[20][15] 

Petitioner filed his Opposition^[21][16] reiterating his arguments that the newly submitted evidence on the buying and selling price of lots in the area have no relevance while there is no comparison between lots in a fully developed memorial park and an undeveloped flood-prone land which forms part of a waterway.  As to the DENR reports, petitioner pointed out that it was clearly indicated that the properties are located in a flood-prone area and require backfilling as certified by DENR officials. Also, the City Appraisal Committee certified only as to the fair market value of the properties without the backfilling cost. There was also non-compliance with public hearing requirement on re-zoning as affected residents in the vicinity have objected to the construction of a new public cemetery on the subject lots. 

OnDecember 9, 2009, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution’s motion under the assailed resolution:

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion to Withdraw Informations is hereby GRANTED.  The Informations against accused Randolph S. Ting are hereby ordered WITHDRAWN and the instant cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.^[22][17]

          Petitioner claims that he learned of the dismissal of the cases against the respondent during the campaign for theMay 10, 2010elections.  Upon the request of his lawyer, petitioner was able to secure a certified copy of the above resolution from Executive Clerk IV Atty. Renato Bocar onJune 3, 2010.  Hence, he filed the present petition onJune 18, 2010.

          Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan departed from the accepted usual and prescribed course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision when it:

1.   Acted upon the motion for reinvestigation by the accused and considered the same as a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the ombudsman when the said resolution has already become final and the accused has been arraigned at the honorable Sandiganbayan and has pleaded not guilty.

2.   Dismissed prior to pre-trial the informations merely based on the Motion of the Ombudsman without a complete finding and/or discussion of all the issues raised in the pleadings in clear violation of Sec. 7 of P.D. 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan and totally ignoring the oppositions of the private complainant Guzman.

3.   Merely noted to appearance of the private complainant and totally ignored the pleadings filed by said private complainant Guzman.^[23][18]

          In his Comment,^[24][19] respondent contends that petitioner raised the correctness of the finding of absence of probable cause, a question of fact which is not proper in a Rule 45 petition. Moreover, the petition is time-barred.  Respondent points out that the Special Prosecutor did not file an appeal from the December 9, 2009 resolution of the Sandiganbayan within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof; and necessarily so, because it was at their instance that the informations were withdrawn and pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent.   In any case, the petitioner cannot represent Tuguegarao City before the courts as he is not a proper party and neither does he have locus standi to bring a derivative suit in representation ofTuguegaraoCity as a public corporation.

We deny the petition.

The crucial issue in this case concerns the petitioner’s legal personality to challenge before this Court the dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of the criminal cases against the respondent.

It is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the sole power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The power to withdraw the Information already filed is a mere adjunct or consequence of the Ombudsman’s overall power to prosecute.^[25][20]  

However, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the Information may not be dismissed without the approval of said court.^[26][21]  Further, it does not matter whether such filing of a motion to dismiss by the prosecution is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation.^[27][22] 

In this case, the Sandiganbayan, ordered the Special Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation and subsequently granted his motion to withdraw the informations, after finding no probable cause against the latter on reinvestigation.  The Sandiganbayan thus gave its approval to the withdrawal of the informations and ordered the dismissal of the cases.  Since no appeal was taken by the Special Prosecutor from the order of dismissal within the reglementary period, the same had become final and executory pursuant to Section 7, paragraph 2^[28][23] of P.D. No. 1606,^[29][24] as amended by R.A. No. 8249^[30][25].

But disregarding for the moment the question of timeliness, does petitioner have the legal personality to prosecute this appeal from the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of the criminal cases? 

We hold that petitioner is not the proper party to file the present action.  Section 4 (c) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, clearly provides that “In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in1986.”

A private complainant in a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan is allowed to appeal only the civil aspect of the criminal case after its dismissal by said court.  While petitioner’s name was included in the caption of the cases as private complainant during the preliminary investigation and re-investigation proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman, he is not the offended party or private complainant in the main case.  As evident from a reading of the informations, it is the City ofTuguegaraowhich suffered damage as a consequence of the subject purchase of lands by the respondent and hence is the private complainant in the main case.

As this Court declared in People v. Velez:^[31][26]

On the first issue, the Court agrees with the contention of the respondent Office of the Ombudsman that Salmingo is not the proper party as petitioner in this case.  The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which reads:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. —  A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.  The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

The Court has previously held that the “party” referred to in the rule is the original party in the main case aggrieved by the order or decision in the main case.  Hence, only the aggrieved original party in the main case is the only proper party as petitioner.  One who has not been an original party in the main case has no personality to file a petition under said rule.

x x x x

The Court notes that Salmingo was not a party in the main case.  While it is true that he initiated the criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents for various offenses, however, under the Information filed with the SB, the parties are the People of the Philippines as plaintiff and the respondents as the accused.  The private complainant is the City of Silay while Salmingo is merely a witness for the plaintiff.

The private complainant in a criminal case before the SB is also a proper party to file a petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, but only on the civil aspect of the case.  It must be noted that Salmingo was not the private complainant in the main case.  As gleaned from the Information, Silay City was the party which suffered damage as a consequence of the wrongful acts of the malefactors and hence is the private complainant in the main case.

Salmingo’s inclusion in the caption of his petition of the People of the Philippinesas a party petitioner is patently unauthorized.  The Court believes that it is a futile attempt in compliance with Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.^[32][27] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss other matters raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.  

With costs against petitioner Robert P. Guzman.

          SO ORDERED.

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CASE 2011-0193: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, THROUGH THE HON. SECRETARY, HERMOGENES EBDANE,          PETITIONER,  VERSUS  ALBERTO A. DOMINGO, RESPONDENT. (G.R. NO. 175299, 14 SEPTEMBER 2011, LEONARDO DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECTS: SERVICE OF SUMMONS; SUIT AGAINST THE STATE. (BRIEF TITLE: REPUBLIC VS. DOMINGO)

=====================================

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78813 are REVERSED.  The Decision dated February 18, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the original action in the proper Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.

====================================

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.:

          In this Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1][1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called upon to reverse and set aside the Decision^[2][2] dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution^[3][3] dated October 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78813, as well as to declare null and void the Decision^[4][4] dated February 18, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.   

          As culled from the records, the factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

          On April 26, 2002, herein respondent Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages^[5][5] against the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region III, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18.  Domingo averred that from April to September 1992, he entered into seven contracts with the DPWH Region III for the lease of his construction equipment to said government agency.^[6][6]  The lease contracts were allegedly executed in order to implement the emergency projects of the DPWH Region III, which aimed to control the flow of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo in the adjacent towns in the provinces of Tarlac and Pampanga.  After the completion of the projects, Domingo claimed that the unpaid rentals of the DPWH Region III amounted to P6,320,163.05.  Despite repeated demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH Region III failed to pay its obligations.  Domingo was, thus, compelled to file the above case for the payment of the P6,320,163.05 balance, plus P200,000.00 as moral and compensatory damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees.^[7][7]

          Thereafter, summons was issued by the RTC. The Proof of Service^[8][8] of the Sheriff dated May 9, 2002 stated, thus:

PROOF OF SERVICE

            The undersigned personally served the copy of the Summons together with the complaint issued in the above-entitled case upon defendant The Department of Public Works and Highways, Region III, San Fernando Pampanga on May 6, 2002 through Nora Cortez, Clerk III of said office as shown by her signature and stamped mark received by said office appearing on the original Summons.

            WHEREFORE, the original Summons respectfully returned to the Court “DULY SERVED”, for its record and information.

            Malolos, Bulacan, May 9, 2002.

            Subsequently, on July 30, 2002, Domingo filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default^[9][9] in view of the failure of the DPWH Region III to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period as required under the Rules of Court.  During the hearing of the motion on August 8, 2002, the RTC directed the counsel of Domingo to submit proof of service of said motion on the DPWH Region III.  Thereafter, the motion was deemed submitted for resolution.^[10][10]  Counsel for Domingo timely filed a Manifestation,^[11][11] showing compliance with the order of the trial court.

          In an Order^[12][12] dated September 2, 2002, the RTC declared the DPWH Region III in default and thereafter set the date for the reception of Domingo’s evidence ex parte. 

After the ex parte presentation of Domingo’s evidence, the RTC rendered judgment on February 18, 2003, finding that:

          From the evidence presented by [Domingo], testimonial and documentary, it was convincingly proven that [Domingo] is entitled to the relief prayed for.

            In his seven causes of actions, [Domingo] has religiously undertaken what is incumbent upon him in the contracts of lease signed by both [Domingo] and [the DPWH Region III].  As a matter of course, the [DPWH Region III] has the duty to pay [Domingo] the amount equivalent to the services performed by [Domingo] which [in] this case now amount to P6,320,163.05 excluding interest.

            Considering that there was a long delay in the payment of the obligation on the part of the [DPWH Region III], Article 2209 of the New Civil Code finds application as to imputation of legal interest at six (6%) percent per annum, in the absence of stipulation of interest on the amount due.

            With respect to the claim for attorney’s fees, although as a general rule, attorney’s fees cannot be rewarded because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate, this rule does not apply in the case at bar in the face of the stubborn refusal of [the DPWH Region III] to respect the valid claim of [Domingo] x x x.  Award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P30,000.00 appears proper.  Moreover, as to [the] demand for moral and exemplary damages, the same are hereby denied for lack of persuasive and sufficient evidence.^[13][13]

          Thus, the RTC disposed:

Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Alberto Domingo and against defendant DPWH Region III, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:

1.  the sum of Six Million Three Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Sixty[-]Three and 05/100 Pesos (P6,320,163.05) representing the principal obligation of the defendant plus interest at six percent (6%) per annum from 1993 until the obligation is fully paid;

2.  to pay attorney’s fees in the total amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and

3.  to pay the costs of suit.^[14][14]

          On March 12, 2003, Domingo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution,^[15][15] asserting that the DPWH Region III failed to file an appeal or a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration despite its receipt of a copy of the RTC decision on February 19, 2003.  On March 20, 2003, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion of Domingo.^[16][16]  A Writ of Execution^[17][17] was then issued on March 24, 2003, commanding the sheriff to enforce the RTC Decision dated February 18, 2003. 

          On August 27, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.^[18][18]  The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78813.  The Republic argued that it was not impleaded as an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  The seven contracts sued upon in the trial court stated that they were entered into by the Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director and/or Project Manager of the DPWH Region III for and in behalf of the Republic of thePhilippines, which purportedly was the real party to the contract.  Moreover, the Republic averred that, under the law, the statutory representatives of the government for purposes of litigation are either the Solicitor General or the Legal Service Branch of the Executive Department concerned.  Since no summons was issued to either of said representatives, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the Republic.  The absence of indispensable parties allegedly rendered null and void the subsequent acts of the trial court because of its lack of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.  The Republic prayed for the annulment of the RTC Decision dated February 18, 2003 and the dismissal of the said case, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.

          On May 19, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic.  The appellate court elaborated that:

          The hair-splitting distinction being made by [the Republic] between the DPWH as a department under the Republic, and the Regional Office of the DPWH fails to persuade Us.  Instead, We uphold [Domingo’s] position that the regional office is an extension of the department itself and service of summons upon the former is service upon the latter. x x x.

            x x x x

x x x [A] regional office of the DPWH is part of the composition of the department itself and is therefore, not an entity that is altogether separate from the department.  This conclusion lends credence to [Domingo’s] position that service of summons upon the regional office is service upon the department itself because the former is essentially part of the latter.  Indeed, what militates heavily against [the Republic’s] theory is the simple fact that the regional office is not a different entity at all, but, as can be gleaned from the manner of its creation, a part of the department itself, so much so that it does not even have a juridical personality of its own. x x x.

            Anent the claim that the procedure for service of summons upon the Republic was not followed because service should have been made on the OSG or the Legal Service Department of the DPWH, We are likewise not persuaded.  A perusal of the Revised Administrative Code of thePhilippinessuggests nothing of this import. x x x.

            x x x x

            Clearly, nothing [in the functions of the OSG] remotely suggests that service of summons upon the Republic should be made exclusively on the OSG.  What the [provisions] merely state is that the OSG will represent the government in all proceedings involving it.  It cannot be deduced nor implied from this, however, that summons should be served upon it alone.

            The same conclusion applies to the legal service branch of the DPWH, as there is also nothing in the law that suggests that service of summons on the DPWH should be made upon it alone. x x x.

            x x x x

            Obviously, petitioner’s conclusion that the proper procedure for service of summons was not observed is a mere conjecture because We find nothing in the provisions invoked by it that such indeed is the procedure sanctioned by law.  We are thus inclined to give more credence to [the Republic’s] argument that it was the regional office’s fault if it failed to bring the subject case to the attention of the OSG for proper representation.  To allow it to benefit from its own omission in order to evade its just and valid obligation would be the height of injustice.

            Finally, anent the argument that the Republic is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court, We rule in the negative.  The existence of another case against the regional office of the DPWH where the OSG appeared is of no moment as it concerns a totally different transaction.  Thus, it would be erroneous for Us to rule on that basis alone, that the OSG is already acknowledging the service of summons upon the regional office, especially considering the categorical stand taken by the OSG on the matter in the case now before Us.  Be that as it may, however, We still rule, as We have discussed above, that [Domingo’s] position is more impressed with merit.

            WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.^[19][19]

          The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[20][20] of the above decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in the assailed Resolution dated October 25, 2006.

Consequently, the Republic filed the instant petition before this Court.  In a Resolution^[21][21] dated February 19, 2007, we denied the Republic’s petition for failure to properly verify the petition and that the jurat in the verification and certification against forum shopping did not contain any competent evidence of the affiant’s identity.  In addition, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues payment (under IBP O.R. No. 663485) of one of the counsels who signed the petition was not updated.  The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[22][22] of the above resolution.^[23][23]  On July 2, 2007, the Court resolved^[24][24] to grant the Republic’s motion, thereby reinstating its petition.

In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Republic brings to fore the following arguments:

I.

If in the act by which the Republic consents to be sued, no designation is made as to the officer to be served with summons, then the process can only be served upon the Solicitor General.

[II.]

The State is not bound by the errors or mistakes of its agents.

III.

Respondent can recover on the government contracts sued upon in Civil Case No. [3]33-M-2002 only on a quantum meruit basis.^[25][25]

          In essence, the primary issue that must be resolved in the instant petition is whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic.

          Section 1, Rule 47^[26][26] of the Rules of Court provides for the remedy of annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

          Under the first paragraph of Section 2, Rule 47^[27][27] of the Rules of Court, the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.  As a ground for annulment of judgment, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.^[28][28]  

In the petition at bar, the Republic argues that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the former.  The Republic reiterates that the service of summons upon the DPWH Region III alone was insufficient.   According to the Republic, the applicable rule of procedure in this case is Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that when the defendant is the Republic of thePhilippines, the service of summons may be effected on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).  The DPWH and its regional office are simply agents of the Republic, which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  The Republic posits that, since it was not impleaded in the case below and the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 are null and void. 

On the other hand, Domingo argues that the DPWH Region III is part of the DPWH itself; hence, a suit against the regional office is a suit against the said department and the Republic as well.  Domingo stresses that the case he filed was against the Republic, that is, against the DPWH Region III, and it was clear that the summons and a copy of the complaint was duly served on the said regional office.  Likewise, Domingo submits that the Republic is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in the instant case given that he has filed two other civil actions for specific performance and damages against the DPWH Region III and, in the said cases, the OSG formally entered its appearance for and in behalf of the Republic.  Domingo alleges that the foregoing action of the OSG proved that it recognized the validity of the service of summons upon the DPWH Region III and the jurisdiction of the trial court over the said regional office.

          The Court finds merit in the Republic’s petition.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.  Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.  Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant’s voluntary appearance or submission to the court.^[29][29]

Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. – When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.  (Emphasis ours.)

          Jurisprudence further instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency, which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency’s principal, i.e., the State.^[30][30]  In the similar case of Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat v. Court of Appeals,^[31][31] where summons was served on the Bureau of Telecommunications which was an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, we held that:

Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides:

SEC. 13.          Service upon public corporations. — When the defendant is the Republic of thePhilippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.

It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The BUTEL is an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications created under E.O. No. 546 on July 23, 1979, and is in charge of providing telecommunication facilities, including telephone systems to government offices. It also provides its services to augment limited or inadequate existing similar private communication facilities. It extends its services to areas where no communication facilities exist yet; and assists the private sector engaged in telecommunication services by providing and maintaining backbone telecommunication network. It is indisputably part of the Republic, and summons should have been served on the Solicitor General.   

We now turn to the question of whether summons was properly served according to the Rules of Court. Petitioners rely solely on the sheriff’s return to prove that summons was properly served. We quote its contents, viz:

“THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 19th day of May 1999, the undersigned caused the service of Summons and Complaint upon defendant J.A. Development Corporation at the address indicated in the summons, the same having been received by a certain Jacqueline delos Santos, a person employed thereat, of sufficient age and discretion to receive such process, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof.

Likewise, copy of the Summons and Complaint was served upon defendant Bureau of Telecommunications at the address indicated in the Summons, a copy of the same was received by a certain Cholito Anitola, a person employed thereat, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof.”

It is incumbent upon the party alleging that summons was validly served to prove that all requirements were met in the service thereof. We find that this burden was not discharged by the petitioners. The records show that the sheriff served summons on an ordinary employee and not on the Solicitor General. Consequently, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over BUTEL, and all proceedings therein are null and void.^[32][32]    (Emphases supplied.)

In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region III.  As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.

          Quite inexplicably, the Court of Appeals failed to apply, nay, to even consider, the provisions of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in rendering its assailed Decision.  A perusal of the Decision dated May 19, 2006 shows that the appellate court mainly dissertated regarding the functions and organizational structures of the DPWH and the OSG, as provided for in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in an attempt to demonstrate the relationship between the DPWH and its regional offices, as well as to refute the claim that the service of summons upon the Republic should be made exclusively upon the OSG.  Such an oversight on the part of the Court of Appeals is most unfortunate given the relevance and materiality of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to the instant case, in addition to the fact that the Republic itself quoted the aforesaid provision in its petition before the appellate court.^[33][33]

The Court, nonetheless, subscribes to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in the case at bar in view of the alleged entry of appearance of the OSG, in behalf of the Republic, in the other civil cases supposedly filed by Domingo against the DPWH Region III.  As held by the appellate court, the other civil cases presumably pertained to transactions involving Domingo and the DPWH Region III, which were totally different from the contracts involved in the instant case.  The fact that the OSG entered its appearance in the other civil cases, notwithstanding that the summons therein were only served upon the DPWH Region III, has no bearing in the case now before us.  All this indicates is that, despite the improper service of summons in these other civil cases, there appeared to be notice to the OSG and voluntary appearance on the latter’s part.

Here, there was no indication, and Domingo did not insist otherwise, that the OSG had any notice of the filing of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Domingo speculates that, in the subsequent civil actions against the DPWH Region III, the latter most likely brought the said cases to the attention of the OSG.  On the other hand, Domingo opines that the DPWH Region III apparently neglected to inform the OSG of the pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Accordingly, Domingo asserted that he should not be faulted therefor.  The Court disagrees.  Domingo ought to bear in mind that it is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the complete determination of the action.^[34][34]  It was, thus, incumbent upon him to name and implead the proper defendant in this case, i.e., the Republic, and cause the service of summons to be made upon the officer mandated by law, that is, the OSG.  As Domingo failed to discharge this burden, he cannot now be allowed to shift the blame on the DPWH Region III or hold in estoppel the OSG.   

In sum, the Court holds that the Republic was not validly served with summons in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002.  Hence, the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the Republic.  Consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court and its Decision dated February 18, 2003 are hereby declared void.

In accordance with Section 7, Rule 47^[35][35] of the Rules of Court, a judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.

In view of the above ruling of the Court declaring the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC, the Court shall no longer pass upon the other issues raised by the parties in the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78813 are REVERSED.  The Decision dated February 18, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the original action in the proper Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

  Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice