J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2012-0064: FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 172035, 04 JULY 2012, BRION, J.) SUBJECT/S: PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IN A BRIBERY CASE; REQUIREMENTS OF INFORMATION FILED AGAINST ACCUSED (BRIEF TITLE: MIGUEL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN INFORMATION?

THERE ARE TWO:

1. 1.               IT SHALL STATE THE DESIGNATION OF THE OFFENSE GIVEN BY THE STATUTE AND THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS IMPUTED WHICH CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

1. 2.                  THESE ACTS OR OMISSIONS AND ITS ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES “MUST BE STATED IN ORDINARY AND CONCISE LANGUAGE” AND “IN TERMS SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE A PERSON OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO KNOW WHAT OFFENSE IS BEING CHARGED X  X  X  AND FOR THE COURT TO PRONOUNCE JUDGMENT.”^[1][33]

        In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him,^[2][31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules)^[3][32] requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances “must be stated in ordinary and concise language” and “in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x  x  x  and for the court to pronounce judgment.”^[4][33]

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WHAT IS THE TEST TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT?

WHETHER THE CRIME IS:

        DESCRIBED IN INTELLIGIBLE TERMS;

        AND

        WITH SUCH PARTICULARITY WITH REASONABLE       CERTAINTY SO THAT THE ACCUSED IS DULY        INFORMED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

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WHAT IS THE REASON FOR THIS RULE?

TO ENABLE THE ACCUSED TO SUITABLY PREPARE HIS DEFENSE.^[5][34]

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.^[6][34]

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PETITIONER MOVED TO QUASH THE INFORMATION BECAUSE IT CONTAINED THE ALLEGEDLY VAGUE  PHRASE “ACTING WITH EVIDENT BAD FAITH AND MANIFEST PARTIALITY”. IS HE CORRECT?

NO. THE PHRASE WAS MERELY A CONTINUATION OF THE PRIOR ALLEGATION OF THE ACTS OF THE PETITIONER. IN PLAIN TERMS IT MEANS HE ULTIMATELY ACTED WITH EVIDENT BAD FAITH AND MANIFEST PARTIALITY IN GIVING UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGES TO HIS CO-ACCUSED PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.

IF THE SUBJECT IS AMBIGUOUS, HIS REMEDY IS TO MOVE  FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS AND NOT TO FILE A MOTION TO QUASH.

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a “person of common understanding” in appreciating the import of the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.” A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality” was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.             

Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in the information^[7][35] when, in his reaction to the OSP’s comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrase’s position, in relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,” the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.^[8][36] 

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PETITIONER WAS SUSPENDED AFTER THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST HIM FOR BRIBERY UNDER R.A. NO. 3019. WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR SUCH SUSPENSION?

SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 3019.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

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WHAT IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO SUCH SUSPENSION?

THE SUSPENSION REQUIRES A PRIOR HEARING TO DETERMINE “THE VALIDITY OF THE INFORMATION”^[9][38] FILED AGAINST HIM, “TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SERIOUS AND FAR REACHING CONSEQUENCES OF A SUSPENSION OF AN ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICIAL EVEN BEFORE HIS CONVICTION.”^[10][39]

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WHAT RIGHT DOES THE ACCUSED HAVE DURING SUCH HEARING?

THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE INFORMATION BEFORE A SUSPENSION ORDER MAY BE ISSUED.

SUCH RIGHT  INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE

(I)               VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING LEADING TO THE FILING OF AN INFORMATION AGAINST HIM, AND

(II)    PROPRIETY OF HIS PROSECUTION ON THE   GROUND THAT THE ACTS CHARGED DO NOT        CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF R.A. NO. 3019       OR OF THE PROVISIONS ON BRIBERY OF THE      REVISED PENAL CODE.^[11][40]

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,^[12][37] the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the information”^[13][38] filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction.”^[14][39]  The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.^[15][40]

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PETITIONER ARGUES THAT THERE WAS NO ACTUAL HEARING PRIOR TO SUSPENSION. WAS HE DEPRIVED OF SUCH RIGHT TO HEARING?

NO. THE ABSENCE OF AN ACTUAL HEARING ALONE CANNOT BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE VALIDITY OF A SUSPENSION ORDER.

IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE PETITIONER (I) FILED HIS VIGOROUS OPPOSITION (TO THE OSP’S MOTION TO SUSPEND ACCUSED PENDENTE LITE), AND AFTER RECEIVING AN ADVERSE RULING FROM THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (II) MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER ISSUED AGAINST HIM, AND (III) FILED A REPLY TO THE OSP’S OPPOSITION TO HIS PLEA FOR RECONSIDERATION.^[16][49]  GIVEN THIS OPPORTUNITY, WE FIND THAT THE PETITIONER’S CONTINUED DEMAND FOR THE CONDUCT OF AN ACTUAL PRE-SUSPENSION HEARING – BASED ON THE SAME ALLEGED “DEFECT IN THE INFORMATION,”^[17][50] WHICH WE HAVE FOUND WANTING – HAS LEGALLY NOTHING TO ANCHOR ITSELF ON.

In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,^[18][45]the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing.

In Luciano v. Mariano^[19][41] that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, “by way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension,” that –

(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.

The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity.  That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.^[20][42]

While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him,^[21][43] Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.^[22][44]  With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.

In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,^[23][45]the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,^[24][46] where the Court ruled:

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.^[25][47] It is well settled that “to be heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.^[26][48]

In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.^[27][49]  Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing – based on the same alleged “defect in the information,”^[28][50] which we have found wanting – has legally nothing to anchor itself on.

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PETITIONER ARGUES THAT THE PROVISION ON SUSPENSION MUST BE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY IN HIS FAVOR SINCE HE IS AN ACCUSED. IS HE CORRECT?

NO.

THE SUSPENSION REQUIRED UNDER THIS PROVISION IS NOT A PENALTY, AS IT IS NOT IMPOSED AS A RESULT OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; IN FACT, IF ACQUITTED, THE ACCUSED OFFICIAL SHALL BE ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AND TO THE SALARIES AND BENEFITS WHICH HE FAILED TO RECEIVE DURING HIS SUSPENSION.^[29][52]

RATHER, THE SUSPENSION UNDER SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 3019 IS A MERE PREVENTIVE MEASURE^[30][53] THAT ARISES FROM THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT UNLESS THE ACCUSED IS SUSPENDED, HE MAY FRUSTRATE HIS PROSECUTION OR COMMIT FURTHER ACTS OF MALFEASANCE OR DO BOTH, IN THE SAME WAY THAT UPON A FINDING THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY GUILTY THEREOF, THE LAW REQUIRES THE JUDGE TO ISSUE A WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED.^[31][54]

Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a strict construction against the State.^[32][51]  The suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension.^[33][52]

Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure^[34][53] that arises from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.^[35][54]

Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days,^[36][55] the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.

Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust.^[37][56] In light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioner’s demand for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL,                 G.R. No. 172035

                                    Petitioner,           

Present:

                                                          CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

                                                          BRION,

                                                  PEREZ,

       – versus –                            SERENO, and

  REYES, JJ.

THE HONORABLE                                 Promulgated:                    

SANDIGANBAYAN,                                 

                            Respondent.        July 4, 2012

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D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65^[38][1] filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions^[39][2] of the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioner’s suspension from public office and (ii) denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the suspension order. 

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials^[40][3] of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)^[41][4] charging the petitioner, among others,^[42][5] with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project).^[43][6]

In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.^[44][7]  In its July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.^[45][8]

On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.^[46][9] The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from participating in said prequalification.^[47][10] (Emphases and underscoring added)

On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-accused,^[48][11] the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.^[49][12]

Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked^[50][13] the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the extension requested, the petitioner asked^[51][14] the OSP for an additional thirty-day period to file his counter-affidavit.  Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension period.^[52][15]

Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.^[53][16]

On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the other accused private individuals.^[54][17]   

On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On February 18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation – this, despite the OSP’s earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his counter-affidavit.^[55][18] The petitioner did not question the denial of his motion.

        On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases.^[56][19]

        On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the petitioner filed his “Vigorous Opposition” based on the “obvious and fatal defect of the [i]nformation” in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.^[57][20]

        On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution^[58][21] suspending the petitioner pendente lite –

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution’s Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Court hereby orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position as City Mayor, KoronadalCity, South Cotabato, and from any other public position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a period of ninety (90) days only.^[59][22]

        On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.^[60][23]  The Sandiganbayan denied his motion,^[61][24] prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.

THE PETITION

        The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through “manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.” He alleges that the phrases “evident bad faith” and “manifest partiality” actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused,^[62][25] rendering the information fatally defective.

The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al.,^[63][26] he claims that “[n]owhere in the records of the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended.”^[64][27] For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the “defect” in the information.  

THE OSP’S COMMENT

        The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the offense under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts.  These elements are:

1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time material to the acts complained of;

1. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he invited only his co-accused private individuals to participate in the prequalification of consultants for the project instead of publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation; and

1. The petitioner’s actions, performed in relation to his office, gave unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused.^[65][28]

The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the sufficiency of the allegations in the information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality” when the petitioner quoted the “relevant” portions of the information in his petition.  

Citing Juan v. People,^[66][29] the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was conducted, the events preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satisfied the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension hearing – i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the petitioner already moved to quash the information, although unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence in the reinvestigation by the OSP.^[67][30]  

ISSUES

There are only two issues presented for our resolution:

1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and

1. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order against the petitioner. 

THE COURT’S RULING

We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed resolutions.

The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid

        In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him,^[68][31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules)^[69][32] requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances “must be stated in ordinary and concise language” and “in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x  x  x  and for the court to pronounce judgment.”^[70][33]

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.^[71][34]

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a “person of common understanding” in appreciating the import of the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.” A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality” was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.             

Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in the information^[72][35] when, in his reaction to the OSP’s comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrase’s position, in relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,” the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.^[73][36] 

The pre-suspension order is valid

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,^[74][37] the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the information”^[75][38] filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction.”^[76][39]  The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.^[77][40]

In Luciano v. Mariano^[78][41] that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, “by way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension,” that –

(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.

The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity.  That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.^[79][42]

While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him,^[80][43] Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.^[81][44]  With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.

In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,^[82][45]the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,^[83][46] where the Court ruled:

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.^[84][47] It is well settled that “to be heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.^[85][48]

In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.^[86][49]  Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing – based on the same alleged “defect in the information,”^[87][50] which we have found wanting – has legally nothing to anchor itself on.

Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a strict construction against the State.^[88][51]  The suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension.^[89][52]

Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure^[90][53] that arises from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.^[91][54]

Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days,^[92][55] the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.

Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust.^[93][56] In light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioner’s demand for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

                                        ARTURO D. BRION

                                           Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

        I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                        ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                         Senior Associate Justice

(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

CASE 2012-0063: PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC. VS. TAKENAKA CORPORATION AND ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION (G.R. NO. 180245, 04 JULY 2012, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECTS: WHAT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; WHAT IS MEANT BY HEARING; RULE ON VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING RELAXED.   (BRIEF TITLE: PIATCO VS. TAKENAKA CORP)

====================

DISPOSITIVE:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.  The Court of Appeal’s Decision dated July 27, 2007, and the CA Resolutiondated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98166 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

====================

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT IS MEANT BY GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION?

BY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS MEANT SUCH CAPRICIOUS OR WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT AS IS EQUIVALENT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.  THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION MUST BE PATENT AND GROSS AS TO AMOUNT TO AN EVASION OF A POSITIVE DUTY OR A VIRTUAL REFUSAL TO PERFORM A DUTY ENJOINED BY LAW, OR TO ACT AT ALL IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW AS WHERE THE POWER IS EXERCISED IN AN ARBITRARY AND DESPOTIC MANNER BY REASON OF PASSION AND HOSTILITY.  IN SUM, FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO LIE, THERE MUST BE CAPRICIOUS, ARBITRARY OR WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF POWER.^[1][6]

The Court does not see any reason to overturn the CA’s finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Set the Motion to Dismiss for Hearing.   The established definition of grave abuse of discretion was reiterated in Ligeralde v. Patalinghug^[2][5] in this wise:

x   x   x   By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.  The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.  In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.^[3][6]  (Emphases supplied)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PETITIONER ARGUED THAT WHILE THERE WAS A SCHEDULED HEARING ON 07 APRIL 2006, THE PARTIES WERE ONLY ALLOWED TO FILE PLEADINGS BUT THERE WAS NO ACTUAL HEARING WHERE THE PARTIES WERE ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE. WAS THERE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS?

NO. IT IS AN OFT-REPEATED PRINCIPLE THAT WHERE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, EITHER THROUGH ORAL ARGUMENTS OR PLEADINGS, IS ACCORDED, THERE IS NO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.^[4][7]

In this case, there is no showing of such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power committed by the trial court.  In fact, records reveal that both parties were given ample opportunity to be heard.  A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was, in fact, held on    April 7, 2006.  Thereafter, both parties submitted their pleadings setting forth their claims, arguments and supporting evidence.  Petitioner points out that at the April 7, 2006 hearing, the parties were only allowed to file their pleadings, and no actual hearing, or presentation of evidence, was conducted.   It is an oft-repeated principle that where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.^[5][7]  Moreover, the issues that petitioner seeks to tackle in the requested hearing on the motion to dismiss, i.e., novation, payment, extinguishment or abandonment of the obligation, are the meat of their defense and would require the presentation of voluminous evidence.  Such issues are better threshed out during trial proper.  Thus, the trial court was not amiss in ruling that petitioner already had the opportunity to be heard and there was no longer any need to set another hearing on the motion to dismiss.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE PROOF THAT THERE WAS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT?

THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY BOTH PARTIES.

        It also appears from the RTC’s Orders and the CA’s Decision that any and all evidence and argument advanced by both parties were seriously taken into consideration by said lower courts in arriving at their rulings.  Such being the case, there could be no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PLAINTIFF CORPORATION SUBMITTED ONLY AN SPA AND NOT A BOARD RESOLUTION TO SHOW THE AUTHORITY OF THE SIGNATORY OF THE VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING. IS THIS DEFECT SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE?

NO. THE COURT MAY RELAX THE APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES FOR THE GREATER INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. THIS CASE IS ONE OF THOSE THAT DESERVES A MORE LENIENT APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES, CONSIDERING THAT IT AFFECTS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC UTILITIES OF OUR COUNTRY. 

        Lastly, on the issue of the Verification/Certification, the court has the power to give due course to the complaint even with the supposed defect, if special circumstances warrant.  Even assuming arguendo, that the form used to show Mr. Kurebayashi’s authority to execute the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping is defective, petitioner should bear in mind that this Court may relax the application of procedural rules for the greater interest of substantial justice.  Thus, in Cua, Jr. v. Tan,^[6][8] this Court explained thus:

x  x  x Although the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Hence, in this case in which such a certification was in fact submitted – only, it was defective – the  Court may still refuse to dismiss and may, instead, give due course to the Petition in light of attendant exceptional circumstances.
          x x x x                  

x x x [I]n the interest of substantial justice, the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of this case on the merits.   x  x  x

          x x x x                  

x  x  x  Indeed, where, as here, there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, the Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular case from its operation.^[7][9]  (Emphasis supplied)   

        This case is one of those that deserves a more lenient application of procedural rules, considering that it affects one of the most important public utilities of our country.  In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,^[8][10] this Court has already stated that these cases involving the construction and operation of the country’s premier international airport, has attained transcendental importance.^[9][11]  Therefore, the Court sees it fit to relax the rules in this case to arrive at a full settlement of the parties’ claims and avoid further delay in the administration of justice.

=====================

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

    THIRD DIVISION

x—————————————————————————————-x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

        This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of  Court, praying that the Decision^[10][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 27, 2007, and the CA Resolution^[11][2] dated October 23, 2007, denying herein petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.

        The antecedent facts were accurately narrated in the CA Decision as follows.

In 1997, by way of a Concession Agreement, the Philippine Government awarded to petitioner the right to build and operate the NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (“NAIA IPT3”).  Petitioner then contracted respondents Takenaka Corporation, and Asahikosan Corporation (“private respondents”) to construct and equip NAIA IPT3.

          Private respondents are both foreign corporations organized under the laws ofJapan, but only respondent Takenaka Corporation is licensed to do business in thePhilippinesthrough its local branch office.

          Claiming that petitioner made no further payments after May 2002 despite continued performance of their obligations, private respondents filed two collection suits before the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Technology and Construction Court in London, England (“London Court”), docketed as Claim No. HT-04-248 and Claim No. HT-05-269.  In both claims, respondent Takenaka Corporation was designated as the First Claimant and respondent Asahikosan Corporation, the Second Claimant.

          Ruling in favor of private respondents, the London Courtissued an Order dated February 18, 2005 in Claim No. HT-04-248 and an Order dated December 2, 1005 in Claim No. HT-05-269, directing that –

   Claim No. HT-04-248

“1.  Judgment be entered for the First Claimant in the sum of 6,602,971.00United Statesdollars, together with interest in the sum of 116,825,365.34 Philippine pesos up to and including 18 February 2005.

2.                 Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant in the sum of 8,224,236.00United Statesdollars, together with interest in the sum of 2,947,564.87United Statesdollars up to and including 18 February 2005, being a total of 11,171,800.87United Statesdollars.

3.                 Save for the costs of and caused by the amendment of the particulars of claim, which will be the subject of a separate order, the Defendant to pay the First Claimant’s and the Second Claimant’s costs in the action, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.”

    Claim No. HT-05-269

“1.  Judgment be entered for the First Claimant in the sum of 21,688,012.18United Statesdollars, together with interest in the sum of 6,052,805.83United Statesdollars.

2.                 Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant in the sum of 30,319,248.36United Statesdollars, together with interest in the sum of 5,442,628.26United Statesdollars.

3.                 The Defendant to pay the Claimants’ costs in the action, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.”

          On March 1, 2006, private respondents filed a Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-171, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 58, to enforce the aforesaid Orders of theLondon Court.

          Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of: (a)  defective verification and certification against forum shopping, because there was no board resolution showing that Mr. Takeshi Kurebayashi was authorized by private respondents to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, and the special powers of attorney executed in favor of Mr. Kurebayashi by the Executive Vice-President and President of respondents Takenaka Corporation and Asahikosan Corporation, respectively, were not only insufficient but also improperly authenticated since the said officers never personally appeared before the notary public, and finally, Mr. Kurebayashi was not competent to guarantee that respondent Asahikosan Corporation has not engaged in forum shopping, not being an employee or member of the said corporation; (b) forum shopping, because the Complaint was allegedly private respondents’ third attempt to file the same claim, the first attempt being private respondents’ voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the Pasay Court in Civil Case No. 04-0876, the expropriation case filed by the Republic of the Philippines against herein petitioner, where private respondents manifested that they are not objecting to the taking of the condemned property (NAIA IPT3), provided that they are justly compensated for their claims as unpaid contractors, and the second attempt having been made before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 166429 where private respondents moved for partial reconsideration (in intervention) of the Supreme Court’s decision affirming, with modification, the Pasay Court’s Order allowing the full release to herein petitioner of the funds deposited by the Republic of the Philippines for the expropriation of the NAIA IPT3; (c ) payment, novation, abandonment or extinguishment of the claims, inasmuch as private respondents have allegedly entered into a contract with the Philippine government pursuant to which private respondents supposedly received payment of US$10Million from the Philippine government, with the latter committing to deliver more; and (d) non-compliance with a condition precedent, because petitioner failed to resort to arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) as allegedly provided by the terms of the parties’ agreement.

          During the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss on April 7, 2006, private respondents asked for time to file their Opposition.  Private respondents subsequently filed their Opposition, which was followed by petitioner’s Reply, private respondents’ Rejoinder and petitioner’s Sur-Rejoinder.

          On May 9, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion to Set its Motion to Dismiss for hearing, to enable it to present evidence on the alleged payment, novation and extinguishment of its obligations to private respondents.  Thereafter, petitioner filed a Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to direct Mr. Takeshi Kurebayashi to appear and testify in court, and to bring the alleged General Framework Agreement (“GFA”) between private respondents and the Philippine government as represented by the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA).  Petitioner likewise filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents to require private respondents, or any of its officers and representatives, to produce and permit the inspection, copying and photographing of the GFA by petitioner.

          Private respondents opposed the said Motions and Request, arguing that the Motion to Dismiss need not be heard anew because the ground sought to be proved, i.e., payment, novation or extinguishment of obligation, was based on mere newspaper reports which are hearsay evidence.  Private respondents also asserted that Mr. Kurebayashi may not be compelled to testify as an adverse party witness without first being served interrogatories.  They further argued that discovery of documents may not be allowed until the answer is filed since the materiality of the document requested cannot be determined until the issues are joined.  And assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner could prove the partial payment of US$10Million, the payment would allegedly not extinguish petitioner’s total obligation as to result in the dismissal of the action.

          Petitioner thereafter filed with the trial court, and served upon the President of respondent Takenaka Corporation, Written Interrogatories which, among others, asked if Takenaka entered into a General Framework Agreement with the Philippine government, what its salient features are, and if any amount has been paid to Takenaka by the Philippine government.

          Private respondents moved to expunge the Written Interrogatories, arguing that written interrogatories cannot be served without leave of court before an Answer has been filed.

          On June 26, 2006, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to serve its Written Interrogatories on the President of respondent Takenaka Corporation.  That same day, respondent judge issued the first assailed Omnibus Order denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Set the Motion to Dismiss for hearing, Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, and Written Interrogatories.

          Respondent judge held that Mr. Takeshi Kurebayashi was duly authorized to represent both private respondents noting the Special Powers of Attorney attached to the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, which were executed by the representative directors of private respondents, and accompanied by Notarial Certificates executed in Tokyo by a Japanese Notary, giving authority to Mr. Kurebayashi to file the Complaint.  Respondent judge observed that under Articles 261 and 78 of the Commercial Law of Japan, corporations may act through their representative directors, similar to the Executive Committee under Philippine Corporation Law.  Respondent judge held that under the principle of lex loci celebrationis, the validity of the Special Powers of Attorney is determined by the law of the place where they were executed.

          Respondent judge rejected petitioner’s claim of forum shopping, holding that private respondents simply served notice on the Pasay Court and the Supreme Court about their being unpaid contractors.  Respondent judge found that private respondents merely prayed that the said Courts hold in abeyance the release of the funds to petitioner until such time they can enforce the London Court Orders by virtue of a final judgment, which neither the Pasay court nor the Supreme Court may render because the case before them was one for expropriation.

          Respondent judge likewise rejected petitioner’s assertion that its obligation has been extinguished by payment or novation.  According to respondent judge, petitioner’s claim that private respondents had entered into a contract with the Philippine government was based on alleged newspaper articles which are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.  If at all, said respondent judge, such claim should be raised as an affirmative defense in the Answer and substantiated in a full-blown trial.  And assuming private respondents were indeed paid US$10Million under the alleged contract with the Philippine government, the same is but a small portion of the total amount claimed which is around US$198Million, excluding attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

          Anent private respondents’ alleged failure to resort to arbitration, respondent judge held that “this ground, which actually assails the jurisdiction of the foreign court,” is “a matter of affirmative or special defense” which should be threshed out in a trial.

          Finally, respondent judge held that the Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents and the Written Interrogatories are modes of discovery that can only be availed of after the Answer has been filed, pursuant to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC.

          Dissatisfied with respondent judge’s ruling, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the June 26, 2006 Omnibus Order.

          Noting that petitioner “failed to attach a copy of the alleged General Framework (of) Agreement in its Motion for Reconsideration that will give flesh and blood to its bones of contentions that (private respondents’) claim has already been paid, novated or extinguished,” respondent judge issued his Order dated September 5, 2006, directing petitioner to submit the alleged GFA within 5 days from notice.

          Accordingly, petitioner filed a Request for Subpoena Duces Tecum for Alfonso Cusi, General Manager or Records Custodian of MIAA, to bring the GFA, vouchers, receipts and other papers proving MIAA’s alleged payments to respondent Takenaka Corporation.

          On September 22, 2006, respondent judge granted petitioner’s request and directed the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum.

          On September 27, 2006, the MIAA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion to Quash the subpoena duces tecum, without serving a copy of their motion on the parties.   The MIAA averred that the subpoena was oppressive and unreasonable for it allegedly violated Section 6, Rule 21, and petitioner allegedly failed to show the relevance of the documents sought to be produced.  The MIAA added that “(t)he only objective that (petitioner) has in asking for the GFA is to use against the Government and shift its burden of paying its EPC contractors, Takenaka Corporation and Asahikosan Corporation for the unpaid services rendered before the government expropriated the NAIA Terminal III.”  The MIAA averred that “(petitioner) is venturing into a ‘fishing expedition’ to evade its obligations to Takenaka Corporation and Asahikosan Corporation, and shifting the burden to the Government.”

          On October 9, 2006, respondent judge issued the second assailed Order quashing the subpoena duces tecum, because the MIAA was not given ample opportunity to prepare for the submission of the requested document, and because petitioner had to show the relevancy of the said document in the light of MIAA’s contention that petitioner is merely shifting the burden to pay its contractors for unpaid services rendered before the expropriation of the NAIA IPT3.

          Consequently, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the October 9, 2006 Order.

          On January 15, 2007, respondent judge issued the third assailed Omnibus Order, denying petitioner’s motions for reconsideration of the assailed June 26, 2006 Omnibus Order, and October 9, 2006 Order. ^[12][3]

        Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to set another hearing for the motion to dismiss, when it denied the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, and the Written Interrogatories.  The CA ruled that since a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was held on April 7, 2006 and, thereafter, both parties filed an exchange of pleadings, then petitioner had reasonable opportunity to be heard, which was the essence of due process.   The CA concluded that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and the motion to set said motion for hearing.  However, the CA ruled that it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial judge not to grant the motion for production and inspection of documents and written interrogatories, because Section 1, Rule 25, in relation to Section 1, Rule 23 provides that written interrogatories may be served even before the Answer is filed so long as leave of court has been obtained, and Section 1, Rule 27 states that the motion for production of documents or things may be filed while the action is pending, which includes the period before the Answer is filed.  With regard to the quashal of the subpoena duces tecum,  the CA held that MIAA’s Motion to Quash should not have been acted upon by the trial court because it did not contain a Notice of Hearing, making it a mere scrap of paper. Thus, it held that the issuance of the Order dated October 9, 2007 quashing the subject subpoena was done with grave abuse of discretion.   On July 27, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

         WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.  The assailed Order dated October 9, 2006, which quashed the subpoena duces tecum, is hereby SET ASIDE.  The assailed Omnibus Order dated June 26, 2006 is SET ASIDE IN PART insofar as it denied petitioner’s Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents and Written Interrogatories.  The assailed Omnibus Order dated January 15, 2007 is likewise SET ASIDE IN PART insofar as it denied reconsideration of the June 26, 2006 denial of the Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents and Written Interrogatories, and the October 9, 2006 quashal of the subpoena duces tecum.  The assailed June 26, 2006 and January 15, 2007 Omnibus Orders are AFFIRMED IN PART insofar as they denied the Motion to Set the Motion to Dismiss for hearing, and the Motion to Dismiss.

         SO ORDERED.^[13][4]

        Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 23, 2007.

        Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner alleges that the CA erred (1) in ruling that the Complaint is not fatally defective despite the fact that only a Special Power of Attorney, and not a Board Resolution was attached to the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping; and (2) in depriving petitioner the right to present evidence on its Motion to Dismiss.

        On the other hand, respondents countered in their Comment that the petition should be dismissed outright because it was filed out of time; it did not include a material portion of the record below, i.e., respondents’ Comment to the petition before the CA; and the CA did not err in ruling that Mr. Kurebayashi was duly authorized by respondents to sign the verification/certification of non-forum shopping, because under the laws of Japan, under which laws respondents were incorporated, the board of directors of a Japanese corporation may appoint one or more Representative Directors who shall have the authority to perform all acts within court proceedings and out-of-court acts relating to the business of the corporation, and Mr. Kurebayashi was validly appointed by respondents’ Representative Directors to execute the Verification/Certification.

        The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

        At the outset, respondents must be disabused of the belief that the petition was filed late. Petitioner originally had only until December 14, 2007 within which to file action.  However, the Court indeed suspended office transactions on December 14, 2007 due to the celebration of the Christmas party so the Court’s receiving section was closed. Petitioner, therefore, had until the next working day, or until December 17, 2007, within which to file the petition.  As long as the petition was filed on that last day of December 17, 2007, then it is considered to have been filed on time.  Records show that the petition was indeed filed on December 17, 2007.  Hence, it is of no moment that the Secretary’s Certificate attached to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was notarized on December 17, 2007, or later than December 14, 2007.

        Having resolved the question on the timeliness of the petition, we go on to discuss the main issues in this case.

        The Court does not see any reason to overturn the CA’s finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to Set the Motion to Dismiss for Hearing.   The established definition of grave abuse of discretion was reiterated in Ligeralde v. Patalinghug^[14][5] in this wise:

x   x   x   By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.  The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.  In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.^[15][6]  (Emphases supplied)

In this case, there is no showing of such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power committed by the trial court.  In fact, records reveal that both parties were given ample opportunity to be heard.  A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was, in fact, held on    April 7, 2006.  Thereafter, both parties submitted their pleadings setting forth their claims, arguments and supporting evidence.  Petitioner points out that at the April 7, 2006 hearing, the parties were only allowed to file their pleadings, and no actual hearing, or presentation of evidence, was conducted.   It is an oft-repeated principle that where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.^[16][7]  Moreover, the issues that petitioner seeks to tackle in the requested hearing on the motion to dismiss, i.e., novation, payment, extinguishment or abandonment of the obligation, are the meat of their defense and would require the presentation of voluminous evidence.  Such issues are better threshed out during trial proper.  Thus, the trial court was not amiss in ruling that petitioner already had the opportunity to be heard and there was no longer any need to set another hearing on the motion to dismiss.

        It also appears from the RTC’s Orders and the CA’s Decision that any and all evidence and argument advanced by both parties were seriously taken into consideration by said lower courts in arriving at their rulings.  Such being the case, there could be no grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court.

        Lastly, on the issue of the Verification/Certification, the court has the power to give due course to the complaint even with the supposed defect, if special circumstances warrant.  Even assuming arguendo, that the form used to show Mr. Kurebayashi’s authority to execute the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping is defective, petitioner should bear in mind that this Court may relax the application of procedural rules for the greater interest of substantial justice.  Thus, in Cua, Jr. v. Tan,^[17][8] this Court explained thus:

x  x  x Although the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Hence, in this case in which such a certification was in fact submitted – only, it was defective – the  Court may still refuse to dismiss and may, instead, give due course to the Petition in light of attendant exceptional circumstances.
          x x x x                  

x x x [I]n the interest of substantial justice, the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of this case on the merits.   x  x  x

          x x x x                  

x  x  x  Indeed, where, as here, there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, the Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular case from its operation.^[18][9]  (Emphasis supplied)   

        This case is one of those that deserves a more lenient application of procedural rules, considering that it affects one of the most important public utilities of our country.  In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,^[19][10] this Court has already stated that these cases involving the construction and operation of the country’s premier international airport, has attained transcendental importance.^[20][11]  Therefore, the Court sees it fit to relax the rules in this case to arrive at a full settlement of the parties’ claims and avoid further delay in the administration of justice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.  The Court of Appeal’s Decision dated July 27, 2007, and the CA Resolutiondated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98166 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

                                                             DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                                Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

                          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

    Associate Justice

         Chairperson

 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA                BIENVENIDO L. REYES

            Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

         ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

                                            Associate Justice

                                     ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                        PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

      Associate Justice

       Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                        ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                                 Senior Associate Justice

                                                        (Per Section 12, R.A. 296,

                                       The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

CASE 2012-0062: ISABELO ESPERIDA, LORENZO HIPOLITO, and ROMEO DE BELEN VS. FRANCO K. JURADO, JR. (G.R. No. 172538, 25 APRIL 2012, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECTS: INDIRECT CONTEMPT; PROCEDURES IN INDIRECT CONTEMPT; MEANING OF HEARING; LIBERALITY GRANTED TO SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE; THERE MUST BE HEARING IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS EVEN IF ANSWER IS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT (BRIEF TITLE: ESPERIDA VS. JURADO)

========================

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 2, 2006 and April 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to admit petitioners’ Answer.

The case shall not be deemed submitted for resolution until a hearing is conducted in accordance with the Rules.  The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resume the proceedings below with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

========================

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURAL REQUISITES BEFORE THE A PERSON  MAY BE PUNISHED FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT?

THERE ARE FOUR:

FIRST, THERE MUST BE AN ORDER REQUIRING THE RESPONDENT TO SHOW CAUSE WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE CITED FOR CONTEMPT.

SECOND, THE RESPONDENT MUST BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM.

THIRD, THERE MUST BE A HEARING AND THE COURT MUST INVESTIGATE THE CHARGE AND CONSIDER RESPONDENT’S ANSWER.

FINALLY, ONLY IF FOUND GUILTY WILL RESPONDENT BE PUNISHED ACCORDINGLY.^[1][18]

Sections 3^[2][16] and 4,^[3][17] Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically outlines the procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent’s answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.^[4][18]  The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed in court, and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel.  What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses.  This is due process, which must be observed at all times.^[5][19]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS MEANT BY “HEARING” IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS?

IT MEANS EITHER ACTUAL HEARING  OR BY PLEADING.   “TO BE HEARD” DOES NOT ONLY MEAN VERBAL ARGUMENTS IN COURT; ONE MAY BE HEARD ALSO THROUGH PLEADINGS. WHERE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, EITHER THROUGH ORAL ARGUMENTS OR PLEADINGS, IS ACCORDED, THERE IS NO DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.^[6][21]

The case of Mutuc v. Court of Appeals^[7][20] is instructive as to what due process means in contempt proceedings.  This Court stated:

There is no question that the “essence of due process is a hearing before conviction and before an impartial and disinterested tribunal” x x x but due process as a constitutional precept does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding x x x. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. x x x  “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.^[8][21]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL REASONED OUT THAT THE FAILURE OF FILING THE MOTION FOR EXTENSION ON TIME WAS DUE TO THE FACT THAT COUNSEL’S LIAISON OFFICER FAILED TO FOLLOW HIS INSTRUCTIONS. IS THIS EXCUSSABLE?

YES.  INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS PARTAKE OF THE NATURE OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION; HENCE, GOVERNING THEM ARE TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED.^[9][23]STRICT RULES THAT GOVERN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS ALSO APPLY TO A PROSECUTION FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT; THE ACCUSED IS TO BE AFFORDED MANY OF THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED IN REGULAR CRIMINAL CASES; AND PROCEEDINGS UNDER STATUTES

In the case at bar, petitioners were indeed given ample opportunity to file their Answer.  In denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion and Second Motion for Extension, the CA ratiocinated that the justifications advanced by petitioners do not warrant the grant of liberality in the application of the Rules and their omissions are unpardonable and should not be tolerated.^[10][22]

It must be stressed, however, that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution; hence, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions also apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.^[11][23]  Moreover, in contempt proceedings, if the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.^[12][24]

In the present recourse, petitioners plead for the liberal application of the Rules. Admittedly, in their Omnibus Motion before the appellate court, petitioners’ counsel acknowledged his shortcomings in complying with the resolution of the court and took full responsibility for such oversight and omission.  Petitioners’ counsel also reasoned that the lack of personal service of the motion for extension was due to the considerable distance between the parties’ respective offices and that the failure of filing the motion for extension on time was due to the fact that counsel’s liaison officer failed to follow his instructions.  Indeed, counsel’s liaison officer attested such facts in his Explanation/Affidavit,^[13][25] which was attached to the Omnibus Motion.  More importantly, also attached to the Omnibus Motion was petitioners’ Answer to the petition to cite them in contempt.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PETITIONERS  FILED THEIR ANSWER BUT LATE. IS THIS EXCUSSABLE?

YES. “SUBSEQUENT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE MAY CALL FOR THE RELAXATION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.”^[14][26]

It is settled that “subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.”^[15][26]  Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.^[16][27]  Considering the nature of contempt proceedings and the fact that petitioners actually filed their Answer, albeit belatedly, the CA should have been more liberal in the application of the Rules and admitted the Answer.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE CA DENIED PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO FILE AN ANSWER AND IMMEDIATELY ORDERED THAT THE CASE BE DEEMED SUBMITTED FOR RESOLUTION. WAS THE CA CORRECT?

NO. THE CA SHOULD SET AND CONDUCT A HEARING ON A FIXED DATE AND TIME. IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS, THE PROCEDURES SET MUST BE FOLLOWED.

Moreover, this Court finds that the CA also erred in considering the case deemed submitted for resolution sans the answer^[17][28] of petitioners without setting and conducting a hearing on a fixed date and time on which petitioners may personally, or through counsel, answer the charges against them.

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed.^[18][29]  To be sure, since an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings.^[19][30]  A respondent in a contempt charge must be served with a copy of the motion/petition. Unlike in civil actions, the Court does not issue summons on the respondent. While the respondent is not required to file a formal answer similar to that in ordinary civil actions, the court must set the contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and time on which the respondent must make his appearance to answer the charge.  On the date and time of the hearing, the court shall proceed to investigate the charges and consider such answer or testimony as the respondent may make or offer. The mode of procedure and rules of evidence therein are assimilated to criminal prosecutions. If he fails to appear on that date after due notice without justifiable reason, the court may order his arrest, just like the accused in a criminal case who fails to appear when so required. The court does not declare the respondent in a contempt charge in default.^[20][31]

Clearly, the contempt case against petitioners is still in the early stage of the proceedings.  The proceedings have not reached that stage wherein the court below has set a hearing to provide petitioners with the opportunity to state their defenses.  Verily, a hearing affords the contemner the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing will also allow the court a more thorough evaluation of the defense of the contemner, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or the court itself.^[21][32] In fine, the proper procedure must be observed and petitioners must be afforded full and real opportunity to be heard.

=============================

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

BaguioCity

THIRD DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution^[22][1] dated March 2, 2006 denying the Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer filed by petitioners Isabelo Esperida, Lorenzo Hipolito, and Romeo de Belen, and the Resolution^[23][2] dated April 19, 2006 denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion and Second Motion for Extension, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90525.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

On February 5, 2001, petitioners Isabelo Esperida, Lorenzo Hipolito, and Romeo de Belen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Franco K. Jurado, Jr. before the Labor Arbiter. 

On March 14, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision^[24][3] in favor of petitioners, declaring that they have been illegally dismissed and awarding them their corresponding backwages and separation pay.  Respondent appealed the decision before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but the latter issued a Resolution^[25][4] dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.

Aggrieved, respondent sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81118.  On December 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision^[26][5] dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed Resolution of the NLRC.  Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was eventually denied in the Resolution^[27][6] dated September 27, 2005.

However, during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, or on July 21, 2005, respondent filed before the CA a Petition to Declare Petitioners in Contempt of Court^[28][7] against the petitioners.  In the said petition, respondent sought to declare herein petitioners guilty of indirect contempt of court on the basis of their alleged acts of dishonesty, fraud, and falsification of documents to mislead the CA to rule in their favor in CA-G.R. SP No. 81118.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the CA issued a Resolution^[29][8] ordering herein petitioners to file their Answer within 15 days from notice, showing cause why they should not be adjudged guilty of indirect contempt of court.

On February 8, 2006, counsel for petitioners filed his entry of appearance, together with a motion for extension of time, seeking that petitioners be granted 15 days from February 3, 2006, or up to February 18, 2006, within which to submit their Answer to the petition.

On March 2, 2006, the CA issued one of the assailed Resolutions^[30][9] denying the motion for extension, to wit:

The entry of appearance filed by mail by Atty. Daniel F. Furaque is NOTED.

The motion for extension filed together with the entry of appearance, seeking for the respondents fifteen (15) days from February 3, 2006 within which to submit their answer to the petition, is DENIED, considering that it was mailed only on February 8, 2006 despite the last day to file being on February 3, 2006, and considering that it did not contain any explanation why it was not served and filed personally.

The case is now deemed submitted for resolution sans the answer of respondents Isabelo E. Esperida, Lorenzo Hipolito, and Romeo de Belen.

SO ORDERED.^[31][10]

On February 21, 2006, petitioners filed a Second Motion for Extension,^[32][11] alleging that the Answer to the petition is due on February 18, 2006, but due to counsel’s work load, they are praying that they be allowed to submit their Answer until February 28, 2006.

On March 20, 2006, petitioners’ counsel also filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration of the March 02, 2006 Resolution; and For Admission of Respondent’s Answer),^[33][12] reasoning that the late filing of the motion for extension was because counsel was so tied up with the preparations of equally important paper works and pleadings for the other cases which he is also handling.  Counsel explained that he failed to give instructions to his liaison officer to mail the motion on the same day.  Also, personal service was not possible due to the considerable distance between the parties’ respective offices.  Ultimately, petitioners, through counsel, prayed that the Resolution be set aside and their Answer,^[34][13] which is attached to said Omnibus Motion, be admitted.

On April 19, 2006, the CA issued the other assailed Resolution,^[35][14] denying both the Omnibus Motion and Second Motion for Extension for lack of merit.

In denying the motions, the CA ratiocinated that petitioners did not file their Answer within the reglementary period and clearly disregarded the rules of procedure. Petitioners’ plea for liberality is, therefore, undeserving of any sympathy.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors: 

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE CASE SUBMITTED FOR DECISION WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONERS THEIR INHERENT AND INALIENABLE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW; and

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING BOTH THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF PETITIONERS’ ANSWER.^[36][15]

Petitioners argue that the reasoning advanced by its counsel in failing to submit their Answer on time, and their failure to submit the Explanation why their answer was not served personally, erases any legal defect or impediment for the admission of their Answer by the CA.  Petitioners maintain that the CA should have practiced liberality in interpreting and applying the rules in the interest of justice, fair play and equity. 

Petitioners contend that if their Answer would not be considered and appreciated in the disposition of the case, they will be adjudged guilty of falsification and misrepresentation without being afforded an opportunity to explain their side of the controversy, in gross violation of their constitutional right to due process of law.

On his part, respondent maintains that the CA did not err in denying petitioners’ motions and that they were not denied due process of law.  Moreover, respondent avers that even if petitioners’ Answer was not admitted, it does not mean that they will unceremoniously be adjudged in contempt of court.  It only means that the contempt proceedings will commence without petitioners’ Answer, in accordance with the Rules.

The petition is meritorious.

Sections 3^[37][16] and 4,^[38][17] Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically outlines the procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent’s answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.^[39][18]  The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed in court, and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel.  What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses.  This is due process, which must be observed at all times.^[40][19]

The case of Mutuc v. Court of Appeals^[41][20] is instructive as to what due process means in contempt proceedings.  This Court stated:

There is no question that the “essence of due process is a hearing before conviction and before an impartial and disinterested tribunal” x x x but due process as a constitutional precept does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding x x x. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. x x x  “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.^[42][21]

In the case at bar, petitioners were indeed given ample opportunity to file their Answer.  In denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion and Second Motion for Extension, the CA ratiocinated that the justifications advanced by petitioners do not warrant the grant of liberality in the application of the Rules and their omissions are unpardonable and should not be tolerated.^[43][22]

It must be stressed, however, that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution; hence, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions also apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.^[44][23]  Moreover, in contempt proceedings, if the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.^[45][24]

In the present recourse, petitioners plead for the liberal application of the Rules. Admittedly, in their Omnibus Motion before the appellate court, petitioners’ counsel acknowledged his shortcomings in complying with the resolution of the court and took full responsibility for such oversight and omission.  Petitioners’ counsel also reasoned that the lack of personal service of the motion for extension was due to the considerable distance between the parties’ respective offices and that the failure of filing the motion for extension on time was due to the fact that counsel’s liaison officer failed to follow his instructions.  Indeed, counsel’s liaison officer attested such facts in his Explanation/Affidavit,^[46][25] which was attached to the Omnibus Motion.  More importantly, also attached to the Omnibus Motion was petitioners’ Answer to the petition to cite them in contempt.

It is settled that “subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.”^[47][26]  Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.^[48][27]  Considering the nature of contempt proceedings and the fact that petitioners actually filed their Answer, albeit belatedly, the CA should have been more liberal in the application of the Rules and admitted the Answer.

Moreover, this Court finds that the CA also erred in considering the case deemed submitted for resolution sans the answer^[49][28] of petitioners without setting and conducting a hearing on a fixed date and time on which petitioners may personally, or through counsel, answer the charges against them.

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed.^[50][29]  To be sure, since an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings.^[51][30]  A respondent in a contempt charge must be served with a copy of the motion/petition. Unlike in civil actions, the Court does not issue summons on the respondent. While the respondent is not required to file a formal answer similar to that in ordinary civil actions, the court must set the contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and time on which the respondent must make his appearance to answer the charge.  On the date and time of the hearing, the court shall proceed to investigate the charges and consider such answer or testimony as the respondent may make or offer. The mode of procedure and rules of evidence therein are assimilated to criminal prosecutions. If he fails to appear on that date after due notice without justifiable reason, the court may order his arrest, just like the accused in a criminal case who fails to appear when so required. The court does not declare the respondent in a contempt charge in default.^[52][31]

Clearly, the contempt case against petitioners is still in the early stage of the proceedings.  The proceedings have not reached that stage wherein the court below has set a hearing to provide petitioners with the opportunity to state their defenses.  Verily, a hearing affords the contemner the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing will also allow the court a more thorough evaluation of the defense of the contemner, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or the court itself.^[53][32] In fine, the proper procedure must be observed and petitioners must be afforded full and real opportunity to be heard.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 2, 2006 and April 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to admit petitioners’ Answer.

The case shall not be deemed submitted for resolution until a hearing is conducted in accordance with the Rules.  The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resume the proceedings below with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                        Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

        ROBERTO A. ABAD                        JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

            Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

      ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

                                          Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

             Associate Justice

  Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                               RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                                          Chief Justice