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CASE 2018-0017:  VALENTINO S. LINGAT AND APRONIANO ALTOVEROS VS. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL. (G.R. NO. 205688, 04 JULY 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (SUBJECT: PERMISSIBLE LABOR CONTRACTING VIS A VIS LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING; WHEN WORK IS CONSIDERED DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE BUSINESS OF A COMPANY) (BRIEF TITLE: LINGAT AND OLIVEROS VS COCA-COLA BOTTLERS)

  

DISPOSITIVE:

  

“WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The July 4, 2012 Decision and January 16, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112829 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED WITH MODIFICATIONS in that separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary grants are awarded to petitioners. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the l~ate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

 

SO ORDERED.”

  

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTOR AND A LEGITIMATE JOB CONTRACTOR?

 

 In Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Southern Philippines Federation of Lahar (SPFL)-Workers Solidarity of DARBMUPCO/Diamond-SPFL,23 the Court distinguished a labor-only contractor and a legitimate job contractor in this wise:

 

The Omnibus Rules implenenting the Labor Code distinguishes between permissible job contracting (or independent contractorship) and labor-only contracting. Job contracting is permissible Wlder the Code if the following conditions are met:

 A)  The contractor carries on an independent business and Wldertakes the contract work on his own accoWlt Wlder his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with ~e pe~ce of the work except as to the results thereof;

 B) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business.

 

In contrast, job contracting shall be deemed as labor-only contracting, an arrangement prohibited by law, if a person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer:

 

(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials; and

 

(2)  The workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed.

 

PETITIONERS WERE EMPLOYEES OF AN AGENCY ENGAGED BY COCA-COLA TO DO WAREHOUSING. CAN THEY BE CONSIDERED REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF COCA-COLA?

 

YES, BECAUSE WAREHOUSING IS PART OF THE BUSINESS OF COCA-COLA WHICH IS ENGAGED NOT ONLY IN PRODUCTION BUT ALSO IN DISTRIBUTION AND SALE.

 

 Here, based on their Warehousing Management Agreement, CCBPI hired MDTC to perform warehousing management services, which it claimed did not directly relate to its (CCBPI’s) manufacturing operations.24 However, it must be stressed that CCBPI’s business not only involved the manufacture of its products but also included their distribution and sale. Thus, CCBPI’ s argument that petitioners were employees ofMDTC because they performed tasks directly related to “warehousing management services,” lacks merit. On the contrary, records show that petitioners were performing tasks directly related to CCBPI’s distribution and sale aspects of its business.

 

To reiterate, CCBPI is engaged in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of its products; in turn, as plant driver and segregator/mixer of soft drinks, petitioners were engaged to perform tasks relevant to the distribution and sale of CCBPI’s products, which relate to the core business of CCBPI, not to the supposed warehousing service being rendered by MDTC to CCBPI. Petitioners’ work were directly connected to the achievement of the purposes for which CCBPI was incorporated. Certainly, they were regular employees ofCCBPI.

  

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2018-0017-Valentino S. Lingat and Aproniano Altoveros Vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., et al.

 

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CASE 2018-0016: COLEGIO MEDICO-FARMACEUTICO DE FILIPINAS, INC. VS. LILY LIM AND ALL PERSON CLAIMING UNDER HER (G.R. NO. 212034, 02 JULY 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (SUBJECT/S: UNLAWFUL DETAINER; CAN PRESIDENT OF A CORPORATION SEND DEMAND LETTER WITHOUT BOARD APPROVAL?) (BRIEF TITLE: COLEGIO MEDICO-FARMACEUTICO VS. LIM)

  

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed June 13, 2013 Decision and the April 7, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G .R. SP No. 114856 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11, dated May 13, 2010 is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of reasonable compensation for the use of the subject property be increased to 1155,000.00 as stipulated in the Contract of Lease. In addition, the award of actual damages shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum from March 5, 2008, the date of extrajudicial demand, to June 30, 2013. From July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction of the monetary award, the rate of interest shall be six percent ( 6%) per annum.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

CAN THE PRESIDENT OF A CORPORATION SEND DEMAND LETTER WITHOUT BOARD RESOLUTION?

 

YES.

 

“In the absence of a charter or byr-1law provision to the contrary, the president is presumed to have the authority to act within the domain of the general objectives ofits business and within the scope of his or her usual duties.”

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

“In this case, the issuance of the demand letter dated March 5, 2008 to collect the payment of unpaid rentals from respondent and to demand the latter to vacate the subject property was done in the ordinary course of business, and thus, within the scope of the powers of Del Castillo. In fact, it was his duty as President to manage the affairs of petitioner, which included the collection of receivables. Article IV, Section 2 of the By-laws of petitioner expressly states that the President has the power to:

 

xx xx

 

  1. Exercise general [supervision], control and direction of the business and affairs of the Colegio;

 

xx xx

 

  1. Execute in behalf of the Colegio, bonds, mortgages, and all other contracts and agreements which the Colegio may enter into.

 

xx xx

 

  1. Exercise or perfonn such other duties as are incident to his office or such powers and duties as the Board may from time to time [prescribe]. 33

 

Accordingly, even without a board resolution, Del Castillo had the power and authority to issue the demand letter dated March 5, 2008.

 

In any case, even if, for the sake of argument, Del Castillo acted beyond the scope of his authority in issuing the demand letter dated March 5, 2008, the subsequent issuance of the Board Resolution dated May 13, 2008 cured any defect possibly arising therefrom as it was a clear indication that the Board agreed to, consented to, acquiesced in, or ratified the issuance of the said demand letter.”

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

 SCD-2018-0016-Colegio Medico-Farmaceutico De Filipinas, Inc. Vs. Lily Lim and all person claiming under her

 

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CASE 2018-0015: LEAH B. TADAY VS. ATTY. DIONISIO B. APOYA, JR., (A.C. NO. 11981,  JULY 3, 2018,  PER CURIAM) SUBJECT/S: DISBARMENT (BRIEF TITLE: TADAY VS ATTY APOYA JR)

 

 DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors and finds Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

 

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. ‘s records. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Comi Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

“In this case, respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct, and lessened the confidence of the public in the legal system. Instead of being an advocate of justice, he became a perpetrator of injustice. His reprehensible acts do not merit him to remain in the rolls of the legal profession. Thus, the ultimate penalty of disbarment must be imposed upon him.”

 

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2018-0015-Leah B. Taday Vs. Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. 

 

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