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 CASE 2011-0027: FREDDY H. REYES VS. VIVIAN L. PABILANE, COURT INTERPRETER, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, TAGKAWAYAN, QUEZON (A.M. NO. P-09-2696, 12 JANUARY 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) SUBJECT: DUTY OF COURT INTERPRETER. (BRIEF TITLE: REYES VS. PABILANE).

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R E S O L U T I O N

 

 

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Freddy H. Reyes (complainant), by Affidavit[1][1] of September 16, 2008, charges Vivian L. Pabilane, Court Interpreter of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calauag, Quezon, now detailed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tagkawayan, Quezon, with maliciously, intentionally, deliberately and feloniously failing to make an accurate record of the minutes of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1349, a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order filed by complainant’s wife, Lany Rosas (Lany), before the Calauag RTC. 

In the April 7, 2006 Minutes of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1349 during the presentation of evidence for the therein plaintiff-wife of complainant, respondent wrote the following:[2][2]

Witness/es: Clarita Villamayor Mendoza 78 years old, a widow, retired teacher and a resident of Brgy. Pinagtalliwan, Calauag, Quezon.

Marked Documentary Evidence: Exh “C” – Declaration of Real Property “I” – Kasulatan ng Sanglaan ng Lupang Minana Exh “2” – Bilihan Exh “2-B” paragraph mentioning about the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan ng Lupang Minana Exh “I-B” same paragraph as Exh “2-B”  (underscoring supplied)

The transcript of Clarita Mendoza’s testimony on April 7, 2006[3][3] showed, however, that what she testified on were Exhibits  “A,”  “C” and “E,” inclusive of sub-markings.  

Complainant likewise charges respondent with deliberately failing to enter into the Minutes of the August 4, 2006[4][4] hearing the correct documentary evidence marked during his testimony as she wrote the following therein:

Witness/es: Freddie Hugo Reyes, 65 years old, married, government pensioner and a resident of Barangay 3, Calauag, Quezon.

Marked Documentary Evidence: Exh “A” – Receipt,

whereas the documentary evidence introduced consisted of Exhibits “G,” “H,” “I” and “J,” inclusive of submarkings.[5][5]

In her December 18, 2008[6][6] Comment to the complaint, respondent stated as follows:   

 

x x x x

With regards [to] the fourth paragraph of the affidavit-complaint, when an individual testifies in court, what appears in the interpreter’s minutes is the witness’ name, the data about him and the markings which had been caused by him, not the name of the plaintiff or the defendant for whom he testifies.  In this case, though the word plaintiff does not appear in the space provided for it, still it could easily be told that this hearing was for plaintiff by simply reading the first part of the transcript of stenographic notes of the date wherein the prosecutor introduced plaintiff’s witness.  This would not mislead the Judge in [the] decision making because testimonies appearing on the minutes were really said by witness, Clarita Villamayor Mendoza, who as public knowledge, was then testifying on behalf of the plaintiff.

x x x x

How could the interpreter’s minutes mislead a judge in the latter’s judgment as what the complainant alleges?  The transcript of stenographic notes is intact and very much complete and the formal offer of evidence is also easily and readily available.  The two bear all the evidence that may be needed by the judge and these are what he refers to when preparing decisions.  Besides, a judge listens so attentively to every case being heard and weighs every argument and any important detail that is being presented.  Let it be cited for clarity, that the interpreter’s minutes is just a brief summary of what transpired during a day’s session.  (underscoring supplied)

By Memorandum of August 6, 2009,[7][7] the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), passing on the duties of court interpreters in this wise:

x x x Among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare and sign “all Minutes of the session” (Manual for Clerks of Court).  After every session, they must prepare the Minutes and attach to it the record.  It will not take an hour to prepare it.  The Minutes is a very important document because it gives a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of a case.  It is, in fact, a capsulized history of the case at a given session or a hearing, for it states the date and time of session;  the  names  of the  judge, clerk of court, court stenographer and
court interpreter who were present; the names of the counsel for parties who appeared; the party presenting evidence marked; and the date of then next hearing.  In criminal cases, the Minutes also includes data concerning the number of pages of the stenographic notes.  (underscoring supplied),

concluded that respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty for failure to enter into the minutes of the hearings of April 7, 2006 and August 4, 2006 the accurate and complete documentary evidence marked, and accordingly recommended that she be fined in the amount of P3,000.00.

The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA well taken.

A court interpreter is duty-bound to prepare and sign the minutes of court sessions[8][8] which is an important document, for it gives a brief summary of the events that take place thereat including a statement of the date and time of the session; the name of the judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and court interpreter who are present; the names of the counsel for the parties who appear; the parties presenting evidence; the names of the witnesses who testified; the documentary evidence marked; and the date of the next hearing.[9][9]

In the present case, respondent failed to reflect in the minutes of the April 7 and August 4, 2006 hearings in Civil Case No. 1349 the correct documentary evidence offered in evidence.  Such failure constitutes simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.[10][10]

Simple neglect of duty is, under Section 52 (B) (1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[11][11] classified as a less grave offense punishable by one month and one day to six months suspension for the first offense.

Under Section 19, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, a fine may be imposed in the alternative.[12][12]

Considering that this appears to be respondent’s first infraction, the Court finds in order the OCA recommendation to impose on her a fine in the amount of P3,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

 

WHEREFORE, respondent Vivian L. Pabilane, Court Interpreter of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, presently on detail at the Municipal Trial Court of Tagkawayan, Quezon, is found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and is FINED the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

                                                       CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                                                  Associate Justice

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

 


 


[1][1]           Rollo, pp. 3-4.

[2][2]           Id. at 5.

[3][3]           Id. at 6-35.

[4][4]           Id. at 36.

[5][5]           Id. at 37-46.

[6][6]           Id. at 60-61.

[7][7]           Id. at 69-71.

[8][8]           Vide 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court

[9][9]           OCA  v. Perello, A.M. No.RTJ-05-1952, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 394, 409 citing Bandong v. Ching, A.M. No. P-95-1161, August 23, 1996, 261 SCRA 10, 14.

[10][10]         Contreras v. Monge, A.M. No. P-06-2264, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 218, 224.

[11][11]         CSC Resolution No. 991936, August 31, 1999.

[12][12]         Vide OCA v. Roque, A.M. No. P-06-2200, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 21, 25; OCA v. Montalla, A.M. No. P-06-2269, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 328, 333.

LEGAL NOTE 16: VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING

 SOURCE:      SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION and GAUVAIN J. BENZONAN  vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ROLANDO FABRIGAR, MERLYN VELARDE, VINCE LAMBOC, FELIPE GALINDO, LEONARDO MIGUEL, JULIUS RUBIN, EDEL RODEROS, MERLYN COLIAO and EDGAR JOPSON (G.R. NO. 173326, 15 DECEMBER 2010)

 

IF THE PRESIDENT SIGNS THE REQUIRED VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING IS HE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE A BOARD RESOLUTION.

NO.

Anent the first procedural issue, the Court has summarized the jurisprudential principles on the matter in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[1][15]  In said case, we held that a President of a corporation, among other enumerated corporate officers and employees, can sign the verification and certification against of non-forum shopping in behalf of the said corporation without the benefit of a board resolution.  We quote the pertinent portion of the decision here:

It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

 

IN SUMMARY, WHO ARE THE OFFICIALS OF THE COMPANY WHO CAN SIGN THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION WITHOUT NEED OF A BOARD RESOLUTION?

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.”[2][16] (Emphases supplied.)

 

IS THE REQUIRED CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING JURISDICTIONAL?

NO.

Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it bears reiterating that the requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.  However, the Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that, although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.  Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.[3][18]


[1][15]          G.R. No. 151413, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 10.

[2][16]          Id. at 17-19.

[3][18]          PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Workers Organization (PSTMSDWO) v. PNCC Skyway Corporation, G.R. No. 171231, February 17, 2010.

 

CASE  2011-0026: CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS.  ARMI S. ABEL (G.R. NO. 182547, 10 JANUARY 2011, ABAD, J.) SUBJECTS: WRIT OF EXECUTION; WRIT OF POSSESSION. (BRIEF TITLE: CHINA BANK VS. ABEL)

x —————————————————————– x

 

DECISION

 

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the trial court’s grant of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the possessor of the property could be heard on her opposition and its subsequent denial of her motion for reconsideration.

The Facts and the Case

In a foreclosure sale, petitioner China Banking Corporation (China Bank) acquired title[1][1] over respondent Armi S. Abel’s property at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, she having failed to pay her loan.  To enforce its ownership, in January 2003 China Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in LRC Case Q-16014(03) an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in its favor.

On October 2, 2003 the RTC rendered a decision, granting China Bank’s petition and directing the issuance of a writ of possession over the property in its favor.  Abel appealed from this decision but lost her appeal[2][2] in the Court of Appeals (CA).  She filed a petition for review before this Court in G.R. 169229 but this, too, failed.  She filed a motion for reconsideration and a second similar motion without success.  The Court’s judgment became final and executory and, eventually, the record of her case was remanded to the RTC for execution.

China Bank filed a motion for execution with the RTC, setting it for hearing on June 8, 2007.  On June 7, 2007 Abel filed a motion to cancel and reset the hearing on the ground that she needed more time to comment on or oppose the bank’s motion.  On June 8, 2007 the RTC granted her the 10-day period she asked but “from notice.”

On June 19, 2007, noting Abel’s failure to file her opposition to or comment on the motion for execution, the RTC issued an Order granting China Bank’s motion.  After being served with the notice to vacate, Abel filed on June 21, 2007 an omnibus urgent motion for reconsideration and to admit her opposition to the bank’s motion for execution.  She set her urgent motion for hearing on June 29, 2007.  On June 22, 2007, however, the day after receiving her motion, the RTC denied the same for lack of merit.

On June 25, 2007 the sheriff implemented the writ against Abel and placed China Bank in possession of the subject property.  On even date, Abel filed a petition for certiorari with the CA in CA-G.R. SP 99413, assailing the RTC’s June 19 and 22, 2007 Orders.  On July 2, 2007, a Saturday, Abel took back possession of the premises on the strength of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) that the CA issued on June 29, 2007.

On January 3, 2008 the CA rendered a decision,[3][3] setting aside the assailed orders of the RTC.  China Bank moved for its reconsideration but the CA denied this in an April 9, 2008 Resolution.[4][4]  The CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the bank’s motion for execution, noting that the latter court gave Abel 10 days from notice of its order, not 10 days from the issuance of such order, within which to file her opposition.  Parenthetically, the shorter period was what she asked for in her motion for postponement.  But there was no proof, said the CA, as to when Abel had notice of the RTC’s June 8, 2007 Order as to determine when the 10-day period actually began to run.

China Bank thus filed this petition for review on certiorari against the CA decision and resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. 

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the assailed RTC’s June 19 and 22, 2007 Orders on the ground of failure to observe due process respecting Abel’s right to be heard on the bank’s motion for execution.

The Court’s Ruling

The CA erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.  Although the RTC caused the issuance of the writ of execution before it could establish that Abel’s 10 days “from notice” within which to file her opposition had lapsed, she filed with that court on June 21, 2007 an urgent motion for reconsideration with her opposition to the motion for execution attached.  The Court, acting on her motion, denied it on the following day, June 22, 2007.  Any perceived denial of her right to be heard on the bank’s motion for execution had been cured by her motion for reconsideration and the RTC’s action on the same. 

True, Abel gave notice to China Bank that she would submit her motion for reconsideration for the RTC’s consideration on June 29, 2007 but that notice is for the benefit of the bank, not for her, that it may be heard on the matter.  She cannot complain that the court acted on her motion more promptly than she expected especially since she actually offered no legitimate reason for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession in the bank’s favor. 

Orders for the issuance of a writ of possession are issued as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and approval of the corresponding bond since no discretion is left to the court to deny it.[5][5]  The RTC’s issuance of such writ conformably with the express provisions of law cannot be regarded as done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.  Such issuance being ministerial, its execution by the sheriff is likewise ministerial.[6][6]  In truth, the bank has failed to take possession of the property after more than seven years on account of Abel’s legal maneuverings.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition of China Banking Corporation, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals decision dated January 3, 2008 and resolution dated April 9, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP 99413, and REINSTATES the orders of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 220) in LRC Case Q-16014(03) dated June 19 and 22, 2007.  With costs against respondent Armi S. Abel.

SO ORDERED.

 

ROBERTO A. ABAD 

                                                              Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO 

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA      DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                  Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                  

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

 


 


[1][1]  Transfer Certificate of Title N-241387 in the name of China Banking Corporation.

[2][2]  CA-G.R. CV 80522.

[3][3] Rollo, pp. 49-61; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.

[4][4]  Id. at 62-63.

[5][5]  Spouses Camacho v. Philippine National Bank, 415 Phil. 581, 586 (2001).

[6][6]  Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. v. Pizarro, 489 Phil. 127, 138 (2005).