J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

LEGAL NOTE 0117: RECOGNITION  OF FOREIGN DIVORCE IN THE PHILIPPINES.

SOURCE: MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN VS. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE (G. R. No. 183622 08 FEBRUARY 2012, SERENO, J.) SUBJECT/S: RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE; LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION  (BRIEF TITLE: CATALAN VS. CATALAN-LEE).

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

ORLANDO, AN AMERICAN,  WAS MARRIED TO FELICITAS. IN THE U.S. ORLANDO DIVORCED FELICITAS AND MARRIED MEROPE. WHEN ORLANDO DIED, MEROPE FILED INTESTATE CASE PRAYING THAT SHE BE APPOINTED ADMINISTRATRIX. LOUELLA, THE DAUGHTER OF ORLANDO OPPOSED ON THE GROUND THAT MEROPE IS NOT A PARTY IN INTEREST BECAUSE SHE WAS CHARGED WITH BIGAMY BY FELICITAS AS MEROPE  WAS MARRIED TO EUSEBIO BEFORE SHE MARRIED ORLANDO. RTC  RULED THAT MEROPE WAS NOT MARRIED TO EUSEBIO BUT SINCE DIVORCE IS NOT RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN ORLANDO AND MEROPE WAS NOT VALID. MEROPE, NOT BEING MARRIED TO ORLANDO,  IS THEREFORE IS A DISINTERESTED PARTY. HER INTESTATE CASE  WAS DISMISSED. CA AFFIRMED.

ARE RTC AND CA CORRECT?

NO. FOREIGN  DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT IT MUST BE PROVEN. TRIAL FIRST BE HELD TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH FOREIGN DIVORCE WAS VALIDLY OBTAINED. CASE REMANDED TO RTC.

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IS FOREIGN DIVORCE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES? WHAT IS THE BASIS?

YES. AS RULED IN VAN DORN V. ROMILLO, JR.^[1][7]

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.^[2][7] wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

 We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,^[3][8] to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could “very well lose her right to inherit” from him.  

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Xxx

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WHAT IS NEEDED IN RECOGNIZING A FOREIGN DIVORCE?

THE FACT OF DIVORCE MUST STILL FIRST BE PROVEN AS RULED  IN GARCIA V. RECIO,^[4][9]

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,^[5][9] to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in thePhilippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippinesand the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United Statesand the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,^[6][10] in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in thePhilippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized inCalifornia,U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

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Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision^[7][1] and Resolution^[8][2] regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in theUnited Statesfrom his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004,Orlandodied intestate in thePhilippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofDagupanCitya Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate ofOrlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children ofOrlandofrom his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate ofOrlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage toOrlandodespite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.^[9][3] The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court inDagupanCityfiled by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan  dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.^[10][4]

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an “uninterested person,” the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest.  Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedent’s properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an “interested party,” inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

xxx                       xxx                       xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.

xxx                       xxx                       xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.^[11][5] (Emphasis supplied)

        Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.^[12][6]  She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage withBristol still existed and was valid.  By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner andBristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate ofOrlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.^[13][7] wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

 We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,^[14][8] to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could “very well lose her right to inherit” from him.  

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,^[15][9] to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in thePhilippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippinesand the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United Statesand the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,^[16][10] in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in thePhilippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized inCalifornia,U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

               ARTURO D. BRION                        JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                

                   Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                    ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                        Associate Justice

                                                          Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution  had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                 Chief Justice

LEGAL NOTE 0116: NOTES ON EVIDENCE: PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE; HEIRARCHY OF EVIDENCE; PROOF IN DISBARMENT; EQUIPOISE DOCTRINE.

SOURCE: SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, and BENJAMIN DANDA VS. ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., WENCESLAO “PEEWEE” TRINIDAD, and ANDRESITO FORNIER (A.C. NO. 7649, 14 DECEMBER 2011, CARPIO, J.) (BRIEF TITLE: ABA VS. ATTY DE GUZMAN)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and DISMISS the charges against Attys. Wenceslao “Peewee” Trinidad and Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit. We REVERSE the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying and increasing the penalty in the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. also for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION ABOUT ONE CHARGED WITH CRIME?

HE IS PRESUMED INNOCENT OF THE CRIME 0R WRONGDOING.

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IN THE CASE OF A LAWYER CHARGED WITH WRONGDOING IN HIS CAPACITY AS LAWYER, WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION ABOUT HIM?

THAT HE IS INNOCENT AND AS LAWYER HE PERFORMED HIS DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS OATH.

AN ATTORNEY ENJOYS THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT HE IS INNOCENT OF CHARGES AGAINST HIM UNTIL THE CONTRARY IS PROVED, AND THAT AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT, HE IS PRESUMED TO HAVE PERFORMED HIS DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS OATH.⁷⁰

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WHAT IS BURDEN OF PROOF?

THE DUTY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE.

THE DUTY OF A PARTY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE FACTS IN ISSUE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIM OR DEFENSE BY THE AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED BY LAW.

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WHAT PROOF IS NECESSARY IN DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS?

PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE. BUT WHICH MUST BE CONVINCING AND SATISFACTORY.

CONSIDERING THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF A MEMBER OF THE BAR, THE COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT CLEARLY PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY ON A MEMBER OF THE BAR.⁷⁴

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GIVE THE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE?

FIRST EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THEN CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THEN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE, THEN SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

IN THE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES, PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, FOLLOWED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THEN BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, AND LASTLY BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IN THAT ORDER.⁷³

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WHAT IS MEANT BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?

MORE CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE MEANS THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY ONE SIDE IS, AS A WHOLE, SUPERIOR TO OR HAS GREATER WEIGHT THAN THAT OF THE OTHER.⁷⁵ IT MEANS EVIDENCE WHICH IS MORE CONVINCING TO THE COURT AS WORTHY OF BELIEF THAN THAT WHICH IS OFFERED IN OPPOSITION THERETO.⁷⁶

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WHAT SHOULD THE COURT CONSIDER IN DETERMINING PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE?

UNDER SECTION 1 OF RULE 133, IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, THE COURT MAY CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

(A) ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE;

(B) THE WITNESSES’ MANNER OF TESTIFYING, THEIR INTELLIGENCE, THEIR MEANS AND OPPORTUNITY OF KNOWING THE FACTS TO WHICH THEY ARE TESTIFYING, THE NATURE OF THE FACTS TO WHICH THEY TESTIFY, THE PROBABILITY OR IMPROBABILITY OF THEIR TESTIMONY;

(C) THE WITNESSES’ INTEREST OR WANT OF INTEREST, AND ALSO THEIR PERSONAL CREDIBILITY SO FAR AS THE SAME MAY ULTIMATELY APPEAR IN THE TRIAL; AND

(D) THE NUMBER OF WITNESSES, ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT PREPONDERANCE IS NECESSARILY WITH THE GREATER NUMBER.

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WHAT DETERMINES WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE?

THE EFFECT ON THE JUDGE.

WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, UNDER RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF COURT, IS NOT DETERMINED MATHEMATICALLY BY THE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF THE WITNESSES TESTIFYING TO A GIVEN FACT. IT DEPENDS UPON ITS PRACTICAL EFFECT IN INDUCING BELIEF FOR THE PARTY ON THE JUDGE TRYING THE CASE.⁷²

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SUPPOSE THE EVIDENCE ARE EVENLY BALANCED, HOW WILL THE COURT RULE?

BASED ON THE EQUIPOISE DOCTRINE.

WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES ARE EVENLY BALANCED OR THERE IS DOUBT ON WHICH SIDE THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES, THE DECISION SHOULD BE AGAINST THE PARTY WITH THE BURDEN OF PROOF, ACCORDING TO THE EQUIPOISE DOCTRINE.⁷⁷

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of crime or wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.⁷⁰

Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.⁷¹

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.⁷²

Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.⁷³ Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.⁷⁴

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.⁷⁵ It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.⁷⁶ Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.⁷⁷

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.

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HOW DID THE SC DECIDE THE CASE AGAINST DE GUZMAN?

THE SC DISMISSED THE CASE. THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED AGAINST HIM WERE SPURIOUS. COMPLAINANTS DID NOT APPEAR BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING BODY. DE GUZMAN DENIED THE CHARGES.

The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner regarding De Guzman’s liability for the following reasons: (a) the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint are not credible; (b) complainants did not appear in any of the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint; and (c) complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for the purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of extortion.

The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First, complainants submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman, Trinidad and Fornier. Complainants misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the illegal recruitment charges against them. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint purportedly appears to be subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the submission of this document by complainants:

This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO LUMABAO and SIAO ALBA were among the respondents named and charged with Violation of Republic Act No. 8042 under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol. XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated December 29, 2006 rendered by the Office.

This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection to the complaints filed against them, and neither did they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person.⁷⁸ (Emphasis supplied)

To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn to before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to the credibility of the other documents complainants submitted in support of their administrative charges against respondents. Worse, complainants submitted falsified documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and this Court.

Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidadall claim that complainants are part of a syndicate headed by Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges. Given this claim that complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated criminal charges supported by fabricated documents, this Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents submitted by complainants. Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the documents they submitted in support of their allegations of misconduct against respondents are authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not even attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner to identify the documents and substantiate or narrate in detail the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by respondents. To make matters worse, the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint complainants attached to their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained all their allegations of misconduct against respondents, is spurious, not having been submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan, despite purportedly having the signature and seal of the prosecutor.

Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their communication with De Guzman. If De Guzman really called and texted them that a warrant of arrest would be issued, what mobile number did De Guzman use? Out of the voluminous documents that complainants submitted, where is the warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or profession? Who are these complainants? These questions are unanswered because complainants did not even bother to attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner, despite due notice. For this reason, the allegations of De Guzman’s misconduct are really doubtful.

Lastly, the supposedly “vicious” evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he allegedly sent to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter states:

Dear Orly,

Thank you very much for a wonderful visit toCotabatoCity. I learned much about the South and the way of life there.

It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed charges against us inMarawiCity! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your man, Ben Danda, with instructions for him and the other two complainants to sign the same before an assistant prosecutor and file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to orchestrate the whole thing, from the prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the warrants of arrest.

Thank you and best regards.⁷⁹

The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported letter have material discrepancies. At the same time, complainants did not even explain how they were able to get a copy of the purported letter. Complainants did not present the recipients, Orlando Badoy or Atty. Francis V. Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their allegations or authenticate the supporting documents.

The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and credibility into this purported letter:

Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer denial of the letter or explain the import of the same differently from what is understood by the Complainants. But even with that effort, the letter is so plain to understand. Verily, the undersigned cannot ignore the same and the message it conveys.⁸⁰

Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that complainants, whom respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are consistently involved in the fabrication of evidence in support of their criminal complaints. Moreover, contrary to the Investigating Commissioner’s observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the preparation of complainants’ criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of Clarification, De Guzman stated:

5.      Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his surprise, he recently received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c) Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. (his records at the Surpeme Court does not have any “Daryll”);

6.      Undersigned counsel’s name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit of Atty. Nicanor G. Alcarez (Montesclaros’ lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay RTC Judge Francisco Mendiola as against the undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman of Montesclaros and a squatter at the Monica Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and for this reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation to make this affidavit of clarification for the guidance of the Investigating Prosecutor;

x x x

4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment Agency nor with the complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City), nor with the other respondents, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.⁸¹

For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint against De Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the charges against De Guzman.

De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or wrongdoing. Complainants have the burden of proof to prove their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman. Complainants were not able to discharge this burden because the documents they submitted were not authenticated and were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not appear in the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint. In disbarment proceedings, what is required to merit the administrative penalty is preponderance of evidence, which weight is even higher than substantial evidence in the hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file fabricated charges against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced, the Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to the equipoise doctrine. For these reasons, the Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly dismisses the charges against De Guzman.

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WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CASE AGAINST TRINIDAD AND FORNIER?

DISMISSAL OF CASE WAS AFFIRMED. COMPLAINANTS FAILED MISERABLY TO SUBSTANTIATE THEIR CHARGES AGAINST RESPONDENTS. OTHER THAN THEIR BARE ALLEGATIONS, THE COMPLAINANTS DID NOT ADDUCE PROOF OF RESPONDENT’S SUPPOSED INVOLVEMENT OR PARTICIPATION DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IN THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF.

The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect toTrinidad’s and Fornier’s liabilities:

A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Counter Affidavit with Affidavit of Complaint reveals that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate their charges against Respondents. Other than their bare allegations, the Complainants did not adduce proof of Respondent’s supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts complained of. For instance, they failed to prove though faintly that Respondents had gone to Cotabato City to personally induce and persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment charges against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen (16) others or that they have prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any form of communication. The supposed telephone call the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made during the proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor’s Office to the Complainants is unbelievable and absurd. It is inconceivable that Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during a serious proceeding such as the inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint before the City Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly militates against the reliabiity of Complainants’ charges against Respondents.

x x x

But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made unmistakable Respondents’ non-participation or non-involvement in the charges they have filed when they wittingly filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only. The undersigned realizes only too well that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in this Commission, however, any such pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A clear reading of the same reveals that the Complainants had wanted to clarify that they have erroneously included Respondents Trinidad and Fornier as parties to the case. In particular, they explained that they had no communication or dealings whatsoever with the said lawyers as to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their charges. The undersigned finds the affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to ignore the import of the same as a piece of evidence.⁸²

At any rate, we consider the case againstTrinidadand Fornier terminated. Under Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, the administrative case is deemed terminated if the penalty imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is less than suspension or disbarment (such as reprimand, admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a petition with this Court within 15 days from notice:

       c.            If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing the charges againstTrinidadand Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Against Trinidad and Fornier.

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SECOND DIVISION

SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO,                                                                                                    A.C. No. 7649

ALMASIS LAUBAN, and

BENJAMIN DANDA,                                                          Present:

Complainants,

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION, PEREZ,

– versus –                                                                                                                          SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR.,

WENCESLAO “PEEWEE” TRINIDAD,

and ANDRESITO FORNIER,                                              Promulgated:

Respondents.                                                                    December 14, 2011

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DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban and Benjamin Danda (complainants) against lawyers Salvador De Guzman, Jr., Wenceslao “Peewee” Trinidad, and Andresito Fornier (respondents). Complainants claim that respondents instigated and filed fabricated criminal complaints against them before the Iligan City Prosecutor’s Office for Large Scale and Syndicated Illegal Recruitment and Estafa under I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835.¹ Complainants pray for the imposition of the grave penalty of disbarment upon respondents.² Attached to complainants’ letter-complaint is the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint³ allegedly submitted by complainants in the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints.

The Facts

Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial Court Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in CotabatoCity.⁴ De Guzman allegedly persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31, Lauban, et al. vs. Alvarez, Amante, Montesclaros, et al.) against certain persons, in exchange for money.⁵ De Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his group, composed of Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao “Peewee” Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty. Andresito Fornier (Fornier), Everson Lim Go Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Stevenson Lim Go Tian (Go Tian Brothers), were untouchable.⁶

In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De Guzman a prepared Joint Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents, which they were directed to sign and file.⁷ The Joint Complaint-Affidavit and supporting documents were allegedly fabricated and manufactured by De Guzman.⁸

During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor’s Office, complainants allegedly received several phone calls from De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers, all of them continuously telling complainants to pursue the case.⁹ When complainants asked De Guzman what would happen if a warrant of arrest would be issued, De Guzman allegedly replied, “Ipa tubus natin sa kanila, perahan natin sila.”¹⁰

Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why they told De Guzman and his group that they planned to withdraw the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31.¹¹ Complainants were allegedly offered by respondents ₱200,000.00 to pursue the case, but they refused.¹² Complainants were once again allegedly offered by respondents One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) to pursue the case until the end, but they refused again.¹³ For this reason, respondents allegedly orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants in Iligan City.¹⁴ On 30 November 2006, Aba claims to have received a text message from De Guzman, saying, “Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan Warrant of Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck kayo.”¹⁵

In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants submitted the allegedly fabricated complaint,¹⁶ supporting documents,¹⁷ letter of De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy,¹⁸ De Guzman’s Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31,¹⁹ and other relevant documents. Subsequently, complainants filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier,²⁰ and prayed that the complaint be pursued against De Guzman.

Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court²¹ and Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,²² denied all the allegations in the complaint. Trinidad vehemently declared that he has never communicated with any of the complainants and has never been to Cotabato.²³ He further claimed that the subscribed letter-complaint does not contain ultimate facts because it does not specify the times, dates, places and circumstances of the meetings and conversations with him.²⁴ Trinidad asserted that the complaint was a fabricated, politically motivated charge, spearheaded by a certain Joseph Montesclaros (Montesclaros), designed to tarnish Trinidad’s reputation as a lawyer and city mayor.²⁵ Trinidad claims that Montesclaros was motivated by revenge because Montesclaros mistakenly believed that Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay City.²⁶ Trinidad also claims that he, his family members and close friends have been victims of fabricated criminal charges committed by the syndicate headed by Montesclaros.²⁷

Trinidadpointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing court processes by filing fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated addresses of defendants.²⁸ Since the defendants’ addresses are fabricated, the defendants are not informed of the criminal complaint, and thus the information is filed with the court.²⁹ Consequently, a warrant of arrest is issued by the court, and only when the warrant of arrest is served upon the defendant will the latter know of the criminal complaint.³⁰ At this point, Montesclaros intervenes by extorting money from the defendant in order for the complainants to drop the criminal complaint.³¹ To prove the existence of this syndicate, Trinidad presented the letter of Eden Rabor, then a second year law student in Cebu City, to the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these institutions to investigate the syndicate of Montesclaros, who has victimized a Canadian citizen who was at that time jailed in Cebu City due to an extortion racket.³² Trinidad also presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City on the illegal recruitment charge against his friend, Emmanuel Cinco, which charge was dismissed because the charge was fabricated, as admitted by complainants themselves.³³

Trinidadfurther claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate included some of their members as respondents to divert suspicion.³⁴ Trinidad pointed out that his wife was a victim of this fabricated criminal charge of illegal recruitment filed in Marawi City.³⁵ Fortunately, when the warrant of arrest was being served in Pasay City Hall, Trinidad’s wife was not there.³⁶ Lastly, Trinidad declared that Montesclaros has perfected the method of filing fabricated cases in remote and dangerous places to harass his victims.³⁷

Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court³⁸ and Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,³⁹ claimed that in his 35 years as a member of the bar, he has conducted himself professionally in accordance with the exacting standards of the legal profession.⁴⁰ Fornier denied knowing any of the complainants, and also denied having any dealings or communication with any of them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed, either for himself or on behalf of a client, any case, civil, criminal or otherwise, against complainants.⁴¹ Fornier claimed that he was included in this case for acting as defense counsel for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal recruitment.⁴² Fornier claimed that the Go Tian Brothers are victims of an extortion racket led by Montesclaros.⁴³ For coming to the legal aid of the Go Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the plan of the group of Montesclaros to extort millions of pesos from his clients.⁴⁴ Fornier claimed that the filing of the complaint is apparently an attempt of the syndicate to get even at those who may have exposed and thwarted their criminal designs at extortion.⁴⁵ Fornier prays that the Court will not fall prey to the scheme and machinations of this syndicate that has made and continues to make a mockery of the justice system by utilizing the courts, the Prosecutor’s Offices, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in carrying out their criminal activities.⁴⁶ Lastly, Fornier claimed that complainants failed to establish the charges against him by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, as complainants’ affidavits are replete with pure hearsay, speculations, conjectures and sweeping conclusions, unsupported by specific, clear and convincing evidence.⁴⁷

De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court, filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint⁴⁸ on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint attached to the Letter-Complaint, which was made the basis of this administrative complaint, are spurious.⁴⁹ According to the Certification issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan City, complainants Lauban, Lumabao and Aba, who were charged for violation of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), which charge was subsequently dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered by the Prosecutor, did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection with the charge, nor did they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person.⁵⁰

In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,⁵¹ De Guzman stated he is an 81-year old retired Regional Trial Court judge.⁵² He pointed out that there are no details regarding the allegations of grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery, falsification of documents, violation of lawyers’ oath and other administrative infractions.⁵³ De Guzman invited the attention of the Investigating Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification which he submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 to deny any participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint and to narrate in detail how he became involved in this case which was masterminded by Montesclaros.⁵⁴ In his Affidavit of Clarification,⁵⁵ De Guzman claimed that he had no participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31, and he was surprised to receive a photocopy of the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, Lolita Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr., implicating him in the preparation of the complaint.⁵⁶ De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find his and his clients’ names in the counter-affidavit, and for this reason, felt under obligation to make the Affidavit of Clarification.⁵⁷ Lastly, De Guzman declared that he has “no familiarity with the complainants or Tesclaros Recruitment and Employment Agency, nor with other respondents in the complaint, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.”⁵⁸

During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 2008⁵⁹ and 13 March 2009,⁶⁰ none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate the allegations in their complaint despite due notice.⁶¹

Report and Recommendation

of the Commission on Bar Discipline

The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline reads:

In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and Fornier are deemed to be without basis and consequently, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL of the charges against them.

As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court Judge, there is enough basis to hold him administratively liable. Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for two (2) months is hereby recommended.⁶²

The Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint as well as in the attachments, that complainants failed to substantiate their charges against respondents Trinidadand Fornier.⁶³ Other than bare allegations, complainants did not adduce proof of Trinidad and Fornier’s supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts constituting the complaint.⁶⁴ In addition, complainants, on their own volition, admitted the non-participation and non-involvement of Trinidad and Fornier when complainants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.⁶⁵ For these reasons, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charges againstTrinidad and Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman failed to deny the allegations in the Letter-Complaint or to explain the import of the same.⁶⁶ Moreover, De Guzman failed to controvert the “truly vicious evidence” against him:

But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for Respondent is the letter he sent to Orlando D. Badoy, City Councilor, CotabatoCitydated February 16, 2006. This letter was alleged in and attached to the Joint Counter-Affiavit with Affidavit of Complaint. The letter had confirmed the allegation of his travel to CotabatoCityto file charges against persons he did not identify. He intriguingly mentioned the name Ben Danda as the one to whom he handed the complaint. Danda, incidentally, was one of those who executed the Letter of Complaint along with Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Benjamin Danda and Almasis Lauban which was filed before the Supreme Court.⁶⁷

The Decision of the Board of Governors of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesadopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation on the dismissal of the charges against Fornier and Trinidad.⁶⁸ In De Guzman’s case, the Board of Governors increased the penalty from a suspension of two (2) months to a suspension of two (2) years from the practice of law for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases to extort money:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED with modification, and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A” and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case against Respondents Trinidad and Fornier is without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. However, Atty. Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases in order to extort money.⁶⁹

The Issue

The issue in this case is whetherTrinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal of the charges againstTrinidadand Fornier.

We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with regard to De Guzman’s liability, and likewise dismiss the charges against De Guzman.

Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of crime or wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.⁷⁰

Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.⁷¹

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.⁷²

Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.⁷³ Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.⁷⁴

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.⁷⁵ It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.⁷⁶ Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.⁷⁷

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.

De Guzman’s Liability

The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner regarding De Guzman’s liability for the following reasons: (a) the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint are not credible; (b) complainants did not appear in any of the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint; and (c) complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for the purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of extortion.

The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First, complainants submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman, Trinidad and Fornier. Complainants misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the illegal recruitment charges against them. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint purportedly appears to be subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the submission of this document by complainants:

This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO LUMABAO and SIAO ALBA were among the respondents named and charged with Violation of Republic Act No. 8042 under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol. XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated December 29, 2006 rendered by the Office.

This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection to the complaints filed against them, and neither did they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person.⁷⁸ (Emphasis supplied)

To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn to before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to the credibility of the other documents complainants submitted in support of their administrative charges against respondents. Worse, complainants submitted falsified documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and this Court.

Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidadall claim that complainants are part of a syndicate headed by Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges. Given this claim that complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated criminal charges supported by fabricated documents, this Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents submitted by complainants. Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the documents they submitted in support of their allegations of misconduct against respondents are authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not even attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner to identify the documents and substantiate or narrate in detail the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by respondents. To make matters worse, the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint complainants attached to their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained all their allegations of misconduct against respondents, is spurious, not having been submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan, despite purportedly having the signature and seal of the prosecutor.

Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their communication with De Guzman. If De Guzman really called and texted them that a warrant of arrest would be issued, what mobile number did De Guzman use? Out of the voluminous documents that complainants submitted, where is the warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or profession? Who are these complainants? These questions are unanswered because complainants did not even bother to attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner, despite due notice. For this reason, the allegations of De Guzman’s misconduct are really doubtful.

Lastly, the supposedly “vicious” evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he allegedly sent to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter states:

Dear Orly,

Thank you very much for a wonderful visit toCotabatoCity. I learned much about the South and the way of life there.

It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed charges against us inMarawiCity! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your man, Ben Danda, with instructions for him and the other two complainants to sign the same before an assistant prosecutor and file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to orchestrate the whole thing, from the prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the warrants of arrest.

Thank you and best regards.⁷⁹

The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported letter have material discrepancies. At the same time, complainants did not even explain how they were able to get a copy of the purported letter. Complainants did not present the recipients, Orlando Badoy or Atty. Francis V. Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their allegations or authenticate the supporting documents.

The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and credibility into this purported letter:

Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer denial of the letter or explain the import of the same differently from what is understood by the Complainants. But even with that effort, the letter is so plain to understand. Verily, the undersigned cannot ignore the same and the message it conveys.⁸⁰

Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that complainants, whom respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are consistently involved in the fabrication of evidence in support of their criminal complaints. Moreover, contrary to the Investigating Commissioner’s observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the preparation of complainants’ criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of Clarification, De Guzman stated:

5.      Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his surprise, he recently received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c) Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. (his records at the Surpeme Court does not have any “Daryll”);

6.      Undersigned counsel’s name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit of Atty. Nicanor G. Alcarez (Montesclaros’ lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay RTC Judge Francisco Mendiola as against the undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman of Montesclaros and a squatter at the Monica Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and for this reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation to make this affidavit of clarification for the guidance of the Investigating Prosecutor;

x x x

4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment Agency nor with the complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City), nor with the other respondents, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.⁸¹

For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint against De Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the charges against De Guzman.

De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or wrongdoing. Complainants have the burden of proof to prove their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman. Complainants were not able to discharge this burden because the documents they submitted were not authenticated and were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not appear in the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint. In disbarment proceedings, what is required to merit the administrative penalty is preponderance of evidence, which weight is even higher than substantial evidence in the hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file fabricated charges against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced, the Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to the equipoise doctrine. For these reasons, the Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly dismisses the charges against De Guzman.

Trinidad’s and Fornier’s Liabilities

The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect toTrinidad’s and Fornier’s liabilities:

A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Counter Affidavit with Affidavit of Complaint reveals that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate their charges against Respondents. Other than their bare allegations, the Complainants did not adduce proof of Respondent’s supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts complained of. For instance, they failed to prove though faintly that Respondents had gone to Cotabato City to personally induce and persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment charges against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen (16) others or that they have prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any form of communication. The supposed telephone call the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made during the proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor’s Office to the Complainants is unbelievable and absurd. It is inconceivable that Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during a serious proceeding such as the inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint before the City Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly militates against the reliabiity of Complainants’ charges against Respondents.

x x x

But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made unmistakable Respondents’ non-participation or non-involvement in the charges they have filed when they wittingly filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only. The undersigned realizes only too well that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in this Commission, however, any such pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A clear reading of the same reveals that the Complainants had wanted to clarify that they have erroneously included Respondents Trinidad and Fornier as parties to the case. In particular, they explained that they had no communication or dealings whatsoever with the said lawyers as to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their charges. The undersigned finds the affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to ignore the import of the same as a piece of evidence.⁸²

At any rate, we consider the case againstTrinidadand Fornier terminated. Under Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, the administrative case is deemed terminated if the penalty imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is less than suspension or disbarment (such as reprimand, admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a petition with this Court within 15 days from notice:

       c.            If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing the charges againstTrinidadand Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a Motion to Dismiss Complaint Against Trinidad and Fornier.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and DISMISS the charges against Attys. Wenceslao “Peewee” Trinidad and Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit. We REVERSE the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying and increasing the penalty in the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. also for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

1 Rollo, p. 1.

2Id. at 2.

3Id. at 3-10.

4Id. at 4.

5Id.

6Id.

7Id. at 4-5.

8Id.

9Id. at 5.

10Id.

11Id.

12Id.

13Id. at 6.

14Id. at 7.

15Id. at 6.

16Id. at 11-14.

17Id. at 15-61.

18Id. at 24.

19Id. at 27-29.

20Id. at 493-498.

21Id. at 135-167.

22Id. at 549-560.

23Id. at 140, 507.

24Id. at 149.

25Id. at 151.

26Id. at 152.

27Id. at 151.

28Id. at 138-139.

29Id.

30Id.

31Id. at 156-157.

32Id. at 169-171.

33Id. at 181-182.

34Id. at 158.

35Id. at 153.

36Id. at 152.

37Id. at 156.

38Id. at 240-300.

39Id. at 584-612.

40Id. at 244-245.

41Id. at 245.

42Id. at 245-246.

43Id. at 246.

44Id.

45Id.

46Id.

47Id. at 247.

48Id. at 218-220.

49Id. at 219.

50Id. at 221.

51Id. at 572-575.

52Id. at 572.

53Id.

54Id. at 573.

55Id. at 27-29.

56Id. at 27.

57Id.

58Id. at 29.

59Id. at 515.

60Id. at 541.

61Id. at 515, 541.

62Id. at 733-737.

63Id. at 734.

64Id.

65Id. at 735.

66Id. at 736.

67Id.

68Id. at 731.

69Id.

70 In Re: De Guzman, 154 Phil. 127 (1974); De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554 (1939); In Re: Tiongko, 43 Phil. 191 (1922); Acosta v. Serrano 166 Phil. 257 (1977).

71 Santos v. Dichoso, 174 Phil. 115 (1978); Noriega v. Sison, 210 Phil. 236 (1983).

72 Lim v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 400, 413 (1996).

73 Manalo v. Roldan-Confessor, G.R. No. 102358, 19 November 1992, 215 SCRA 808.

74 Santos v. Dichoso, supra note 71; Noriega v. Sison, supra note 71.

75 Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 613 (2005); Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157177, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 206, 216.

76 Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 169801, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 598, 612.

77 Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 743 (1998); Marubeni Corp. v. Lirag, 415 Phil. 29 (2001).

78 Rollo, p. 221.

79Id. at 24.

80Id. at 736.

81Id. at 27-29.

82Id. at 734-735.