J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2017-0035: PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO), REGION 7 CHAPTER, INC., Petitioner, -versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) AND/OR ITS COMMITTEE ON THE BAN ON FIREARMS AND SECURITY (G.R. NO. 223505, 03 OCT 2017, CAGUIOA, J) (EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS, COMELEC POWER TO ISSUE RULES) (BRIEF TITLE: PADPAO VS COMELEC)

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari with prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order are DENIED for lack of merit. The Court upholds Section 2( e ), Rule III ofCOMELEC Resolution No. 10015 as valid and constitutional.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE?

COMELEC ISSUED A RESOLUTION REQUIRING, AMONG OTHERS, PRIVATE SECUTIRY AGENCIES (PSA)  AUTHORITY FROM COMELEC TO CARRY FIREARMS. PETITIONER ASSAILS THE VALIDITY OF SUCH RESOLUTION. THEY ALLEGED THAT RA 5487 GOVERNING PSAs ALREADY GRANTS THEM SUCH AUTHORITY.  THEY ALSO ARGUE THAT THE RESOLUTION VIOLATES CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

WHAT DOES RA 5487 PROVIDES?

SECTION 13 OF RA 5487 STATES:

SEC. 13. Issuance of Firearms. -A watchman or security agency shall be entitled to possess firearms after having satisfactorily passed the requirements prescribed by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary pertinent to the possession of firearm of any caliber not higher than 45 caliber in a number not exceeding one firearm for every two watchmen or security guards in its employ: Provided, however, That a watchman or security agent shall be entitled to possess not more than one riot gun or shotgun in order to provide adequate security when circumstances so demand: Provided, further, That all the firearms mentioned herein shall be carried by the watchman or security guard only during his tour of duty in proper unifonn within the compound of the establishment except when he escorts big amounts of cash or valuables in and out of said compound.

BASED ON ABOVE PROVISION, WHAT IS THE ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER?

THAT THE POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO SAID LAW IS GRANTED TO THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PADPAO, UNDER SECTION 17 OF THE SAID LAW:

SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. -The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Incorporated and subject to the provisions of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.

WHAT ARE THE OTHER ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER?

PETITIONER FURTHER AVERS THAT RESOLUTION NO. 10015 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL TENETS OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS AND NON-IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS AS IT IMPAIRS THE CONTRACTS OF ITS MEMBER PSAS WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE CLIENTS.

THE RESOLUTION WAS PROMULGATED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MAY 2016 ELECTIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. IS THE CASE NOT MOOT?

IT IS NOT MOOT.

WHAT IS THE GENERAL RULE ON MOOTNESS?

AS A RULE, THE COURT MAY ONLY ADJUDICATE ACTUAL, ONGOING CONTROVERSIES.

WHEN IS AN ACTION MOOT?

“An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.”

WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON MOOTNESS?

THERE ARE RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE.

FIRST, THERE IS A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;

SECOND, THE EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER OF THE SITUATION AND THE PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST ARE INVOLVED;

THIRD, WHEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE RAISED REQUIRES FORMULATION OF CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE BENCH, THE BAR, AND THE PUBLIC; AND

 FOURTH, THE CASE IS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET EVADING REVIEW.

 WHAT IS THE EXCEPTION APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE?

THAT THE CASE IS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET EVADING REVIEW.

FOR THIS EXCEPTION TO APPLY WHAT ARE THE FACTORS REQUIRED?

( 1) THE CHALLENGED ACTION IS IN ITS DURATION TOO SHORT TO BE FULLY LITIGATED PRIOR TO ITS CESSATION OR EXPIRATION; AND (2) THERE IS A REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THE SAME COMPLAINING PARTY WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO THE SAME ACTION.19

“The election period in 2016 was from January 10 until June 8, 2016, or a total of only 150 days. The petition was filed only on April 8, 2016. There was thus not enough time for the resolution of the controversy. Moreover, the COMELEC has consistently issued rules and regulations on the Gun Ban for previous elections in accordance with RA 7166: Resolution No. 871420 for the 2010 elections, Resolution No. 9561-A21 for the 2013 elections, and the assailed Resolution No. 10015 for the 2016 elections. Thus, the COMELEC is expected to promulgate similar rules in the next elections. Prudence accordingly dictates that the Court exercise its power of judicial review to finally settle this controversy.”

IS PETITIONER CORRECT WHEN IT ARGUES THAT COMELEC DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE PSA WRITTEN AUTHORITY FROM COMELEC AS THAT POWER BELONGS TO PNP UNDER RA 5487?

PETITIONER IS WRONG.

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CITED LAWS SPECIFICALLY EMPOWER THE COMELEC TO ISSUE RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE SO-CALLED GUN BAN DURING ELECTION PERIOD.

“The language of RA 5487 and its implementing rules is not so restrictive as to prohibit other government agencies from imposing additional restrictions relating to the conduct of business by PSAs and PSSPs under special circumstances. In this case, the special circumstance is the election period. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that historically, Philippine elections have been marred by violence and unnecessary bloodshed and additional guidelines must be put in place to eliminate, or at least, lessen the threat. Whether or not the Gun Ban has been an effective deterrent is a different matter, which is beyond the Court’s domain.”

DOES THE COMELEC RESOLUTION VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE?

NO.

WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?

UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, SECTION 1:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS?

UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, SECTION 10:

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?

IT MEANS THAT “NO PERSON OR CLASS OF PERSONS SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF THE SAME PROTECTION OF LAWS WHICH IS ENJOYED BY OTHER PERSONS OR OTHER CLASSES IN THE SAME PLACE AND IN LIKE CIRCUMSTANCES.”

WHEN IS IT NOT VIOLATED?

BY A LEGISLATION BASED ON A REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.

“The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.”

FOR CLASSIFICATION TO BE REASONABLE WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS?

THE CLASSIFICATION MUST ( 1) REST ON SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS; (2) BE GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW; (3) NOT BE LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY; AND ( 4) APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SAME CLASS.

ARE THESE REQUIREMENTS COMPLIED IN THIS CASE?

YES.

“Resolution No. 10015 applies to any and all persons, whether private individuals or public officers. Rule III thereof contains a comprehensive list of persons required to obtain written authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside his place or residence or business. Aside from PSAs and PSSPs, the regulation applies even to the President of the Republic of the Philippines, Vice President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals and Judges of lower courts, members of the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and to cashiers and disbursing officers or persons who by the nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation habitually carry large sums of money or valuables, among others.”

TO WHAT LAWS OR REGULATIONS DO  THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE APPLIES?

TO LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT DEROGATE FROM PRIOR ACTS OR CONTRACTS BY ENLARGING, ABRIDGING OR IN ANY MANNER CHANGING THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES.

WHEN IS THERE AN IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT?

IF A SUBSEQUENT LAW CHANGES THE TERMS OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, IMPOSES NEW CONDITIONS, DISPENSES WITH THOSE AGREED UPON OR WITHDRAWS REMEDIES FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES. 

DOES THE COMELEC REGULATION IMPAIR PSA’s CONTRACTS WITH THEIR CLIENTS?

NO.

“In this case, PSAs’ contracts with their clients are not affected in any manner by the requirement of having to obtain from the COMELEC written authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside of their residence or place of work and in public places, during election period. All that PSAs must do is to secure such authority.”

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SCD-2017-0036-PADPAO Region 7 Chapter Inc. Vs. Commission on Elections et al

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CASE 2017-0035: PILIPINAS MAKRO, INC. VS. COCO CHARCOAL PHILIPPINES, INC. AND LIM KIM SAN (G.R. NO. 196419, 4 OCT 2017, MARTIREZ, J.) (SUBJECT/S: EXPRESSED WARRANTY AND IMPLIED WARRANTY OF EVICTION; ATTORNEY’S FEES; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION FOR RECON- DOES IT STOP RUNNING OF APPEAL PERIOD?)  (BRIEF TITLE: PILIPINAS MACRO VS. COCO CHARCOAL PHILIPPINES)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 30 December 2010 Decision and 7 April 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83836 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Pilipinas Makro, Inc. is entitled to recover Pl,113,500.00 from respondent Coco Charcoal Phils., Inc. and Pl,105,000.00 from respondent Lim Kim San.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

MAKRO FILED  TWO MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IS THIS ALLOWED UNDER THE RULES?

GENERALLY, NOT ALLOWED. THE EXCEPTION IS IF THERE IS COGENT REASON. IN THIS CASE THE COGENT REASON IS THAT THEIR COUNSEL, ATTY. EDWIN LACIERDA WITHDRAW BECAUSE OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS PRESS SECRETARY.

Makro filed two motions for extension to file a motion for reconsideration. On the first motion, it sought an extension after its former lawyer, Atty. Edwin Lacierda, withdrew as a counsel in view of his appointment as press secretary for former President Benigno Aquino III. Makro again asked for an extension after its present counsel was confined for dengue and typhoid fever. Eventually, it filed its motion for reconsideration on 7 March 2011.

In its 7 April 2011 Resolution, the CA denied Makro’ s motions for extension to file a motion for reconsideration, explaining that the 15-day period for the filing of such is non-extendible and that a motion for extension is prohibited.

It must be remembered that procedural rules are set not to frustrate the ends of substantial justice, but are tools to expedite the resolution of cases on their merits. The Court reminds us in Gonzales v. Serrano13 that the prohibition on motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration is not absolute. . . . .  

………………………………………………..

Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed. This rule is consistent with the rule in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that unless an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15-day reglementary period, the CA’s decision becomes final. Thus, a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not stop the running of the 15-day period for the computation of a decision’s finality. At the end of the period, a CA judgment becomes final, immutable and beyond our power to review.

This rule, however, admits of exceptions based on a liberal reading of the rule, so long as the petitioner is able to prove the existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance. xxx

While the CA was correct in denying his Urgent Motion for Extension to File Motion for Reconsideration for being a prohibited motion, the Court, in the interest of justice, looked into the merits of the case, and opted to suspend the prohibition against such motion for extension after it found that a modification of the CA Decision is warranted by the law and the jurisprudence on administrative cases involving sexual harassment. The emerging trend of jurisprudence, after all, is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of procedural rules. Rules of procedure exist to ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases; to this end, inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. Thus, the relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. (emphases and underscoring supplied)

The Court finds that cogent reason exists to justify the relaxation of the rules regarding the filing of motions for extension to file a motion for reconsideration. The explanation put forth by Makro in filing its motions for extension clearly were not intended to delay the proceedings but were caused by reasons beyond its control, which cannot be avoided even with the exercise of appropriate care or prudence. Its former counsel had to withdraw in the light of his appointment as a cabinet secretary and its new lawyer was unfortunately afflicted with a serious illness. Thus, it would have been more prudent for the CA to relax the procedural rules so that the substantive issues would be thoroughly ventilated.

More importantly, the liberal application of the rules becomes more imperative considering that Makro’s position is meritorious.

THE DEEDS OF SALE PROVIDE THAT BOTH PARTIES APPOINT A SURVEYOR WHO SHALL SURVEY THE PROPERTY AND IF THE AREA IS NOT THE AREA IN THE DEEDS OF SALE THE PRICE HAS TO BE ADJUSTED. THERE WAS A DISCREPANCY IN AREA BUT DISCOVERED LATER. IS BUYER ENTITLED TO ADJUSTMENT IN PRICE?

CA SAID NO BECAUSE BUYER SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THE DISCREPANCY BEFORE SIGNING THE DEEDS.

SUPREME COURT SAID BUYER IS ENTITLED TO ADJUSTMENT. READ BELOW THE REASON WHY.

The courts a quo agree that the DPWH project encroached upon the properties Makro had purchased from respondents. Nevertheless, the CA opined that Makro was not entitled to a refund because it had actual knowledge of the ongoing road widening project. The appellate court likened Section 4(i) of the deeds of sale as a warranty against eviction, which necessitates that the buyer be in good faith for it to be enforced.

WHAT IS WARRANTY IN DEED OF SALE?

A warranty is a collateral undertaking in a sale of either real or personal property, express or implied; that if the property sold does not possess certain incidents or qualities, the purchaser may either consider the sale void or claim damages for breach of warranty.18 Thus, a warranty may either be express or implied.

WHAT IS AN EXPRESS WARRANTY?

An express warranty pertains to any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the thing, the natural tendency of which is to induce the buyer to purchase the same.19 It includes all warranties derived from the language of the contract, so long as the language is express-it may take the form of an affirmation, a promise or a representation.20

WHAT IS AN IMPLIED WARRANTY?

An implied warranty is one which the law derives by application or inference from the nature of transaction or the relative situation or circumstances of the parties, irrespective of any intention of the seller to create it. 21

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO?

In other words, an express warranty is different from an implied warranty in that the former is found within the very language of the contract while the latter is by operation of law.

THE CA ERRED. THE REASON IS:

Thus, the CA erred in treating Section 4(i) of the deeds of sale as akin to an implied warranty against eviction. First, the deeds of sale categorically state that the sellers assure that the properties sold were free from any encumbrances which may prevent Makro from fully and absolutely possessing the properties in question. Second, in order for the implied warranty against eviction to be enforceable, the following requisites must concur: (a) there must be a final judgment; (b) the purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold; ( c) said deprivation was by virtue of a prior right to the sale made by the vendor; and ( d) the vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee. 22 Evidently, there was no final judgment and no opportunity for the vendors to have been summoned precisely because no judicial action was instituted.
 

MAKRO’S LEGAL COUNSEL CONDUCTED AN OCULAR INSPECTION. MAKRO THEREFORE MUST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DISCREPANCY IN AREA.

BUT THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROPERTIES IN RELATION TO THE DPWH PROJECT COULD HAVE NOT BEEN ACCURATELY ASCERTAINED THROUGH THE NAKED EYE. A MERE OCULAR INSPECTION COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLY DETERMINED THE EXACT EXTENT OF THE ENCROACHMENT.

It is undisputed that Makro’ s legal counsel conducted an ocular inspection on the properties in question before the execution of the deeds of sale and that there were noticeable works and constructions going on near them. Nonetheless, these are insufficient to charge Makro with actual knowledge that the DPWH project had encroached upon respondents’ properties. The dimensions of the properties in relation to the DPWH project could have not been accurately ascertained through the naked eye. A mere ocular inspection could not have possibly determined the exact extent of the encroachment. It is for this reason that only upon a relocation survey performed by a geodetic engineer, was it discovered that 131 square meters and 130 square meters of the lots purchased from Coco Charcoal and Lim, respectively, had been adversely affected by the DPWH project.

To reiterate, the fact of encroachment is settled as even the CA found that the DPWH project had disturbed a portion of the properties Makro had purchased. The only reason the appellate court denied Makro recompense was because of its purported actual knowledge of the intrusion which is not reason enough to deny Makro a refund of the proportionate amount pursuant to Section 2 of the deeds of sale.

RTC AWARDED MAKRO ATTORNEY’S FEES. IS THIS CORRECT?

NOT CORRECT.

THE FACT THAT A PARTY WAS COMPELLED TO LITIGATE HIS CAUSE DOES NOT NECESSARILY WARRANT THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES.

OTHER THAN THE BARE FACT THAT MAKRO WAS COMPELLED TO HIRE THE SERVICES OF COUNSEL TO PROSECUTE ITS CASE, THE RTC DID NOT PROVIDE COMPELLING REASONS TO JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES.

In finding for Makro, the RTC also awarded attorney’s fees and exemplary damages in its favor. The trial court ruled that Makro was entitled to attorney’s fees because it was forced to bring the matter before the court assisted by counsel. It found the grant of exemplary damages in order because respondents were in bad faith for concealing from Makro the fact that the DPWH had already dispossessed a portion of the lots purchased.

 In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court cautioned that the fact that a party was compelled to litigate his cause does not necessarily warrant the award of attorney’s fees, to wit:

As regards attorney’s fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. (emphasis supplied)

Other than the bare fact that Makro was compelled to hire the services of counsel to prosecute its case, the RTC did not provide compelling reasons to justify the award of attorney’s fees.

Thus, it is but right to delete the award especially since there is no showing that respondents had acted in bad faith in refusing Makro’s demand for refund. It is in consonance with the policy that there is no premium on the right to litigate.25

WAS MACRO ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES?

NO. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO DEFINITIVELY ASCERTAIN THAT RESPONDENTS’ OMISSION TO MENTION THE ONGOING DPWH PROJECTS WAS IMPELLED BY A CONSCIOUS DESIRE O DEFRAUD MAKRO.

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SCD-2017-0035-Pilipinas Makro, Inc. Vs. Coco Charcoal Philippines, Inc. and Lim Kim San

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CASE 2017-0034: MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS’ ASSOCIATION (MPSTA), ET AL. VS. MR. WINSTON F. GARCIA, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 192708, 02 OCT 2017, SERENO, CJ) (SUBJECT/S: PUBLICATION OF REGULATIONS) (BRIEF TITLE: MPSTA ET AL VS. GARCIA ET AL).

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. GSIS Resolutions Nos. 238, 90, and 179, which respectively embody the Claims and Loans Interdependency Policy, Premium-Based Policy, and Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse, are declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.

Let a copy of this Decision be forwarded to the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Department of Budget and Management for their consideration on th~ matter of funding the payment of the portion pertaining to the personal share of the employees. A copy should likewise be furnished the Office of the Ombudsman for its consideration on the matter of filing the appropriate cases against the officials and persons responsible for the nonremittance or delayed remittance of premiums and loan repayment.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

INTERPRETATIVE REGULATIONS THAT DO NOT AFFECT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED.

“According to the Court in Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, 56 interpretative regulations that do not add anything to the law or affect substantial rights of any person do not entail publication. This is because “they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.”57 However, “when xxx an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.”58

In this case, the resolutions additionally obligate member-employees to ensure that their employer-agency includes the GS in the budget, deducts the PS, as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits them; and that the GSIS receives, processes, and posts the payments. These processes are beyond the control of the employees; yet they are being made to bear the consequences of any misstep or delay by either their agency or GSIS. As aptly observed by ·:he CA, “the fault lies with how the deficiencies in payment by the DepEd, real or imagined, are attributed to the employeesmembers. “59

Surely, this was not the scenario contemplated by law. The statutorily prescribed mechanism -through salary deduction -is a clear indication that the law’s intent is precisely to make contribution by members less cumbersome. Considering the heavy burden imposed, the requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should have been observed.”

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 SCD-2017-0034-Manila Public School Teachers’ Association (MPSTA), et al. Vs. Mr. Winston F. Garcia, et al.

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