Archive for April, 2017


FORM 0028 – SAMPLE FORM OF PARKING LEASE AGREEMENT

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April 26, 2017

FORM 0028 – PARKING LEASE AGREEMENT

 

YOU MAY ACCESS THE FORM IN MICROSOFT WORD. JUST CLICK THE FORM FILE BELOW:

 

FORM 0028 – PARKING LEASE AGREEMENT

 

OR YOU MAY COPY THE FILE BELOW. (HIGHLIGHT CTRL C, OPEN WORD, CTRL V):

 

PARKING LEASE AGREEMENT

 

LESSOR :________________________       ADDRESS:            ___________________________________

___________________________________

___________________________________

 

LESSEE:________________________         ADDRESS:            ___________________________________

___________________________________

___________________________________

 

BUILDING:           _________________________________________

 

PARKING SLOT NO.: ___________________           CONTACT:  _______________________________

TEL. NO.: _________________________________

 

MONTHLY RENTAL AMOUNT: PHP_____________ INCLUSIVE OF VAT, INCLUSIVE  OF

MONTHLY DUES AND INCLUSIVE OF COMMON AREA FEES.

 

PAYMENT SCHEDULE: UPON SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT LESSEE PAYS SECURITY DEPOSIT EQUIVALENT TO ONE MONTH RENT AND ONE MONTH ADVANCE RENT AND SHALL SUBMIT POSTDATED CHECKS PAYABLE TO LESSOR FOR SUCCEEDING MONTHLY RENTS TO BE DATED FIFTH DAY OF THE MONTH.

 

OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS

 

 

  1. The LESSEE shall use the Leased premises exclusively for parking use only. The LESSEE shall not use the leased premises for any other purpose. No loss or damage in leased premises shall impair the LESSEE’s obligations under this Agreement.

 

  1. The LESSOR reserves the right to terminate the LEASE CONTRACT in the event that the parking slot is already sold by the LESSOR and the LESSEE hereby agrees to vacate the said parking slot within Fifteen (15) Calendar days after written notice by the LESSOR. After lapse of the Fifteen (15) day notice, the LESSOR shall automatically have the right to repossess the leased premises without need of further court action. All expenses incurred to re-possess the leased premises shall be for the account of the LESSEE.

 

  1. In the event of pre-termination due to Section 4, LESSOR may transfer the lessee to another parking slot which is available for lease if there is any.

 

  1. In case of pre-termination other than due to Section 2, the LESSEE must forward written notice/advice to the LESSOR three(3) weeks prior to cancellation of contract. The rentals for the period that the parking slot is not leased to any third party shall be charged to the LESSEE. In case the unit shall have been rented out anew, the postdated checks for the remaining period shall be returned by the LESSOR to the LESSEE. Any Pre-termination advice with less than three(3) weeks’ notice shall not entitle the LESSEE to any refund. In any case security deposit shall be forfeited in favor of the LESSOR.

 

 

  1. The LESSEE shall comply with any and all rules, regulations and policies currently existing or which may be promulgated from time to time by the LESSOR or the relevant Condominium Corporation as well as the rules, regulations, ordinances and laws established by all duly constituted authorities of the Municipal / City or National Government arising from or regarding the use, occupancy, sanitation and pollution of the leased premises.

 

  1. The LESSEE will be responsible for securing required parking car pass and will only park his / her vehicle at the designated parking slot and must display the car pass on the dashboard or windshield for inspection or entry. Only Registered Cars will be allowed to use the said leased slot. Any change of vehicle during the lease term must be subject for registration to Property Management Office (PMO) and Leasing Department of the building.

 

  1. The LESSEE agrees to vacate immediately and surrender the leased parking slot as soon as this Agreement expires or is terminated. In the event that the LESSEE has not renewed his / her contract with the LESSOR, the  PROPERTY MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO) will have full authority to confiscate car pass and barricade the Parking Slot. The  LESSOR shall automatically have the right to re-possess the leased premises without need of further court action. All expenses incurred to re-possess the leased premises shall be for the account of the LESSEE.

 

  1. Upon the dishonor by the bank of any of the post-dated checks or the LESSEE’s failure to pay rent, associations due, common dues and / or the violation of any of the terms and conditions of this AGREEMENT by the LESSEE, the LESSOR may immediately declare, without need of a written notice, the LESSEE in default. Upon the LESSEE being in default, the LESSOR shall exercise, in addition to any other remedies as may be prescribed by law, the following rights:

 

A) To terminate the Agreement without the need of any prior notice, demand or judicial declaration;

 

B) To immediately repossess the Leased Premises without the necessity of instituting any court or judicial action.

 

C) To demand and receive from the LESSEE payment for any and all unpaid rentals and other financial obligations stipulated in, or arising out of this Agreement;

 

D) To demand and receive from the LESSEE payment for the rentals and fees corresponding to the unexpired portion of the lease period;

 

  1. The LESSOR and LESSEE may renew this agreement but solely on the discretion of the LESSOR and under such terms and conditions as the parties may mutually agree. In the event that the LESSEE wishes to renew this Lease, the LESSEE must notify the LESSOR in writing of its wish to renew at least thirty 30) calendar days before the expiration of the lease. The LESSOR and LESSEE shall endeavor to execute a contract of lease for the renewed term at least thirty (30) calendar days before the actual expiration of this agreement.

 

  1. The LESSOR shall not be accountable or liable for any loss, injury or damages that may be suffered by the LESSEE, his/her family, agents, guests or his parked motor vehicle, by reason of theft, robbery, arson or other crimes or caused by fire, earthquake, strike, demonstration, riot, rebellion, typhoon, war or other unforeseen cause or event.

 

  1. The LESSEE is not allowed to assign or transfer its right in this Agreement to another party without the LESSOR’s prior written consent.

 

  1. The LESSEE hereby declares that he/she is the registered owner of the motor vehicle and agrees to give the LESSOR a copy of the OR and CR. If the LESSEE is a corporation, the user of the leased premises must secure authorization from the corporation.

 

  1. The LESSOR will refund Five Hundred PESS (Php500.00) security deposit upon surrender of car pass and upon clearance with (Property Management Office) PMO provided that the LESSEE has no outstanding obligation to the LESSOR in which case the security deposit shall be applied.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto affixed their signatures  this _______________ at _______________________________.

 

 

LESSOR: _____________________                                      LESSEE : ____________________________

Signature over Printed Name                                     Signature over Printed Name

Date : ________________________                                    Date: _____________________________

 

Signed in the presence of:

 

 

_____________________                     _____________________

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Republic of the Philippines)

_____________________                  ) SS.

 

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for  and in ___________________________ this ______________________  personally appeared the following persons  whose identities I have confirmed through competent evidence of identity bearing their pictures and signatures as described below:

 

NAME TYPE OF ID. NUMBER DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUANCE/EXPIRY DATE.
 

 

      
 

 

      

 

All known to me to be the same persons who executed  the foregoing instrument consisting of ____ pages including this page where the Acknowledgment is written and they acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntary act and deed as well as that of the entities that they respectively represent.

 

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL at the place and on the date first-above written.

 

Doc. No. _______;

Page No. _______;

Book No. _______;

Series of ________.

 

Comment

CASE 2017-0008: ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS VS. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. (SODACO), ET AL. (G.R. NO. 198209, 22 MARCH, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (QUESTION OF LAW VS QUESTION OF FACT; MODES OF APPEAL RE RTC DECISION; HEIRARCHY OF COURTS) (BRIEF TITLE: ALMENDRAS VS SODACO)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment
April 14, 2017

CASE 2017-0018: ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS VS. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. (SODACO), ET AL. (G.R. NO. 198209, 22 MARCH, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (QUESTION OF LAW VS QUESTION OF FACT; MODES OF  APPEAL RE RTC DECISION; HEIRARCHY OF COURTS) (BRIEF TITLE: ALMENDRAS VS SODACO)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.

 

The Resolution dated August 27, 2014 directing petitioner to file a
Consolidated Reply is RECALLED and SET ASIDE.

 

The Motion for Leave to Enter Appearance as Collaborating Counsel with
Manifestation filed by Atty. Edgar Y. T01res, Jr. which did not bear the
conformity of petitioner is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 AND PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65?

 

PETITION FOR REVIEW IS LIMITED TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND ERRORS OF JUDGMENT. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CONCERNS ERRORS OF JURISDICTION INCLUDING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

 

IN THIS CASE PETITIONER RAISED THE ISSUE ON WHETHER A COPY OF A MOTION WAS DULY SERVED TO HIM. THIS IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE RAISED IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED WITH THE SUPREME COURT UNDER RULE 45.

 

HOW TO DETERMINE QUESTION OF LAW FROM QUESTION OF FACT?

 

A QUESTION OF LAW ARISES WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE LAW IS ON A CERTAIN STATE OF FACTS. A QUESTION OF FACT ARISES WHEN DOUBT ARISES AS TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF THE ALLEGED FACTS.

 

THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER AN ISSUE INVOLVES A QUESTION OF LAW OR QUESTION OF FACT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN REPUBLIC V. MALABANAN 18 WHERE THIS COURT EXPLAINED:

 

A QUESTION OF LAW ARISES WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE LAW IS ON A CERTAIN STATE OF FACT; WHILE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHEN THE DOUBT ARISES AS TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF THE ALLEGED FACTS.

 

FOR A QUESTION TO BE ONE OF LAW, THE SAME MUST NOT INVOLVE AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE LITIGANT OR ANY OF THEM. THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE MUST REST SOLELY ON WHAT THE LAW PROVIDES ON THE GIVEN SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

 

WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT MODES OF APPEALING AN RTC DECISION?

 

THEY ARE:

 

A) ORDINARY APPEAL OR APPEAL BY WRIT OF ERROR, WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED IN A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION BY THE RTC IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION;

 

B) PETITION FOR REVIEW, WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED BY THE RTC IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION;

 

AND  C) PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE SUPREME COURT.

 

THE FIRST MODE OF APPEAL IS GOVERNED BY RULE 41, AND IS TAKEN TO THE CA ON QUESTIONS OF FACT OR MIXED  QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

 

THE SECOND MODE, COVERED BY RULE 42, IS BROUGHT TO THE CA ON QUESTIONS OF FACT, OF LAW, OR MIXED QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

 

THE THIRD MODE, PROVIDED FOR BY RULE 45, IS ELEVATED TO THIS COURT ONLY ON QUESTIONS OFLAW.

 

SUPPOSE A WRONG MODE OF APPEAL IS RESORTED TO, WHAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE?

 

THE APPEAL WILL BE DISMISSED.

 

Section 4 of Circular 2-90 in effect provides that an appeal taken either to this Court or to the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

 

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE RULE ON HEIRARCHY OF COURTS?

 

DIRECT RESORT FROM LOWER COURT TO THE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT BE ENTERTAINED UNLESS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY CANNOT BE OBTAINED IN THE LOWER TRIBUNALS.

 

Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court departs from the hierarchy of courts. Normally,  direct resort from the lower courts to this Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2017-0008-ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS VS. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. (SODACO), ET AL.

 

NOTE: TO RESEARCH ON A TOPIC IN YAHOO OR GOOGLE SEARCH  JUST TYPE “jabbulao and the topic”. EXAMPLE: TO RESEARCH ON FORUM SHOPPING JUST  TYPE “jabbulao and forum shopping”.

 

Comment

CASE 2017-0007: JONATHAN Y. DEE, VERSUS HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., (G.R. NO. 224834); HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., VERSUS ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS, (G.R. NO. 224871 15 MARCH 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:)

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April 4, 2017

CASE 2017-0007: JONATHAN Y. DEE, VERSUS HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., (G.R. NO. 224834);  HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., VERSUS ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS,  (G.R. NO. 224871  15 MARCH 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:)


DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM’L. CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.

 

SO ORDERED.”


SUBJECTS/DOC. TRINES/DIGEST:

 

THERE IS A GENERAL RULE THAT STATUTES ARE PROSPECTIVE AND AND NOT RETROACTIVE. IS THIS RULE APPLICABLE TO PROCEDURAL LAWS?

NOT APPLICABLE. A RETROACTIVE LAW TAKES AWAY OR IMPAIRED VESTED RIGHTS UNDER EXISTING  LAWS. PROCEDURAL LAW DOES NOT CREATE  CREATE OR TAKE AWAY VESTED RIGHTS. IT OPERATES IN FURTHERANCE OF REMEDY OR CONFIRMATION OF RIGHTS ALREADY EXISTING. NO VESTED RIGHT MAY ATTACH TO NOR RISE FROM PROCEDURAL LAWS.

“The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that “a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.” The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are pending.

 

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” 40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

 

In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.’ s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R TC in order:

 

(a) to first determine if Harvest, et al.’ s payment of filing fees in the amount of P8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;

 

(b) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.’ s payment of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or

 

(c) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of ?8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.”


TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

 SCD-2017-0007-JONATHAN Y. DEE VS. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL.HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL. VS. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

 

NOTE: TO RESEARCH ON A TOPIC IN YAHOO OR GOOGLE SEARCH  JUST TYPE “jabbulao and the topic”. EXAMPLE: TO RESEARCH ON FORUM SHOPPING JUST  TYPE “jabbulao and forum shopping”.

 

 

Comment