Archive for June, 2019


CASE 2019-0017: ROLANDO D. CORTEZ, PETITIONER, V. LUZ G. CORTEZ, RESPONDENT (G.R. NO. 224638, 10 APRIL 2019, PERALTA, J.) (SUBJECT/S: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY) (BRIEF TITLE: CORTEZ VS CORTEZ)

 

 DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated November 5, 2015 and the Resolution dated May 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100062 are hereby AFFIRMED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

PETITIONER WAS NOT LOVING RESPONDENT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. IS THIS A MANIFESTATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY?

 

IT IS NOT. MERE “DIFFICULTY,” “REFUSAL,” OR “NEGLECT” IN THE PERFORMANCE OF MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OR “ILL WILL” ON THE PART OF THE SPOUSE IS DIFFERENT FROM “INCAPACITY” ROOTED ON SOME DEBILITATING PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OR ILLNESS.

 

PETITIONER  HAS NO INTENTION IN THE BEGINNING TO DO THE DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF A HUSBAND AND FATHER. IS THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY?

 

IT IS NOT. MERE “DIFFICULTY,” “REFUSAL,” OR “NEGLECT” IN THE PERFORMANCE OF MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OR “ILL WILL” ON THE PART OF THE SPOUSE IS DIFFERENT FROM “INCAPACITY” ROOTED ON SOME DEBILITATING PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OR ILLNESS.

 

PETITIONER LACKED REALIZATION THAT HE HAS MARITAL OBLIGATION TO PERFORM AS HUSBAND TO RESPONDENT. IT IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY?

 

IT IS NOT. WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES IS A MENTAL ILLNESS THAT LEADS TO AN INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH OR COMPREHEND ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

 

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT ON WHETHER PETITIONER WAS PSYCHOLOGICALL INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM MARITAL OBLIGATIONS:

 

Thus, the antecedence can be traced to his rearing and family environment making him a person with dependency inclination and passive-aggressive in traits. As said, his psychological incapacity stems from his traits and his not loving the respondent from the very beginning. That is where gravity comes in as that is obviously, solid evidence, that he, from the beginning had no intentions whatsoever to do the duties and obligations of a husband and a father.[25]

 

We find that the report failed to show how petitioner’s personality traits incapacitated him from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. On the contrary, the report established that because petitioner was forced to marry respondent without love, he had no intention to do his full obligations as a husband. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal,” or “neglect” in the performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.[26]

 

Notably, petitioner admitted that it was only when he learned in 1994 that respondent had a child prior to their marriage in 1990 that he stopped giving support to respondent and their two children; that because of the abandonment case filed against him and the threats coming from respondent’s brothers if he would stop supporting respondent and the children that he entered into a compromise agreement with respondent regarding the financial support for their children; that despite giving support, however, he refused to live with respondent. Petitioner’s showing of ill-will and refusal to perform marital obligations do not amount to psychological incapacity on his part.

 

Petitioner’s claim of lack of realization that he has marital obligation to perform as husband to respondent is not a consideration under Article 36 of the Family Code as what the law requires is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations.[27]

 

We, likewise, agree with the CA’s and the RTC’s findings that respondent was not shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. As the CA found, respondent was shown to be a caring wife and a loving mother to her children. The findings and conclusions made by Dr. Soriano that respondent did not have the mind, will and heart to perform the obligations of marriage as she did not show concern for petitioner and was just contented to get money from the latter cannot be given credence. There was no other basis for Dr. Soriano to arrive at such finding other than the information supplied by petitioner. To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[28] Moreover, such finding was contradicted by respondent’s letters[29] to petitioner which were attached to petitioner’s Reply filed with the RTC where she wrote how much she wished for petitioner’s good health and safety; that the money she received from petitioner’s allotment was used to pay for the house rental, children’s education and other incidental expenses; that she would like to save money to buy a house for the future of their children; and that she asked for forgiveness for nagging him because of jealousy and that she still loves him. Respondent had shown that she is capable of fulfilling her marital obligations and that she valued her marriage as she even opposed the petition for annulment of her marriage and participated in the trial of the case.

 

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SC-2019-0017-G.R. No. 224638-10 APRIL 2019-ROLANDO CORTEZ VS LUZ G. CORTEZ

 

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CASE 2019-0015:  ALYANSA PARA SA BAGONG PILIPINAS, INC. (ABP), REPRESENTED BY EVELYN V. JALLORINA AND NOEL VILLONES, PETITIONER, VS. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, JOSE VICENTE B. SALAZAR, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY ALFONSO G. CUSI, MERALCO, CENTRAL LUZON PREMIERE POWER CORPORATION, ST. RAPHAEL POWER GENERATION CORPORATION, PANAY ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARIVELES POWER GENERATION CORPORATION, GLOBAL LUZON ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ATIMONAN ONE ENERGY, INC., REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., AND PHILIPPINE COMPETITION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS (G.R. NO. 227670, 03 MAY 2019, 03 MAY 2019, CARPIO, J.) (BRIEF TITLE: ALYANSA VS ERC).

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The first paragraph of Section 4 of Energy Regulatory Commission Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015 (CSP Guidelines), and Energy Regulatory Commission Resolution No. 1, Series of 2016 (ERC Clarificatory Resolution), are hereby declared VOID ab initio. Consequently, all Power Supply Agreement applications submitted by Distribution Utilities to the Energy Regulatory Commission on or after 30 June 2015 shall comply with the Competitive Selection Process in accordance with Department of Energy Circular No. DC2018-02-0003 (2018 DOE Circular) and its Annex “A.” Upon compliance with the Competitive Selection Process, the power purchase cost resulting from such compliance shall retroact to the date of effectivity of the complying Power Supply Agreement, but in no case earlier than 30 June 2015, for purposes of passing on the power purchase cost to consumers.

 


SO ORDERED.”

  

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

“Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9209 provides that “[t]he retail rates to [Meralco’s] captive market and charges for the distribution of electric power by [Meralco] to its end-users shall be regulated by and subject to the approval of the ERC.” As the holder of a distribution franchise, Meralco is obligated to provide electricity at the least cost to its consumers. The ERC, as Meralco’s rate regulator, approves the retail rates – comprising of power and distribution costs – to be charged to end-users. As we have demonstrated above, both Meralco and the ERC have been remiss in their obligations. Going through competitive public bidding as prescribed in the 2015 DOE Circular is the only way to ensure a transparent and reasonable cost of electricity to consumers.

Lest we forget, the ERC is expressly mandated in Section 43(o) of the EP1RA of “ensuring that the x x x pass through of bulk purchase cost by distributors is transparent.” The ERC’s postponement of CSP twice, totaling 305 days and enabling 90 PSAs in various areas of the country to avoid CSP for at least 20 years, directly and glaringly violates this express mandate of the ERC, resulting in the non-transparent, secretive fixing of prices for bulk purchases of electricity, to the great prejudice of the 95 million Filipinos living in this country as well as the millions of business enterprises operating in this country. This ERC action is a most extreme instance of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, warranting the strong condemnation by this Court and the annulment of the ERC’s action.

Absent compliance with CSP in accordance with the 2015 DOE Circular, the PSAs shall be valid only as between the DUs and the power generation suppliers, and shall not bind the DOE, the ERC, and the public for purposes of determining the transparent and reasonable power purchase cost to be passed on to consumers.

On 1 February 2018, the DOE issued Circular No. DC2018-02-0003 entitled “Adopting and Prescribing the Policy for the Competitive Selection Process in the Procurement by the Distribution Utilities of Power Supply Agreements for the Captive Market” (2018 DOE Circular). The DOE prescribed, in Annex “A” of this 2018 DOE Circular, the DOE’s own CSP Policy in the procurement of power supply by DUs for their captive market (2018 DOE CSP Policy). Section 16.1 of the 2018 DOE CSP Policy expressly repealed Section 4 of the 2015 DOE Circular authorizing ERC to issue supplemental guidelines to implement CSP.

In short, the DOE revoked the authority it delegated to the ERC to issue supplemental guidelines to implement CSP, and the DOE itself issued its own guidelines, the 2018 DOE CSP Policy, to implement CSP under the 2015 DOE Circular. This means that the CSP Guidelines issued by the ERC have become functus officio and have been superseded by the 2018 DOE CSP Policy. Under its Section 15, the 2018 DOE CSP Policy is expressly made to apply to “all prospective PSAs.” The 2018 DOE Circular, including its Annex “A,” took effect upon its publication on 9 February 2018. Thus, the 90 PSAs mentioned in this present case must undergo CSP in accordance with the 2018 DOE Circular, in particular the 2018 DOE CSP Policy prescribed in Annex “A” of the 2018 DOE Circular.”

 

 TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SC-2019-0016-G.R. N0. 227670-03 MAY 2019- ALYANSA PARA SA BAGONG PILIPINAS, INC. VS ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ET AL

 

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CASE 2019-0015: JOAQUINA ZAMBALES ET AL VS SALVACION VILLON ZAMBALES (G.R. No. 216878, 03 April 2019, PERALTA, J) (SUBJECT/S: FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS GENERALY CONCLUSIVE; EVIDENCE NOT OFFERED CANNOT BE CONSIDERED) (BRIEF TITLE: ZAMBALES VS ZAMBALES)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The September 30, 2013 Decision and the December 12, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97079 are AFFIRMED.



SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

LIMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE SC:

 

REVIEW OF ERRORS OF LAW ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE APPELLATE COURT.

 

“It bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.[19]E As a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. It is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.”

 

EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE RULE:

 

“In several cases, however, it has been repeatedly held that the rule that factual findings of the appellate are binding on the Court are subject to the following exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

 

WHY IS EVIDENCE NOT FORMALLY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED?

 

 

BECAUSE THE COURT CANNOT DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF THE CLAIMS OF THE WITNESSES.

 


“In this case, the records show that apart from the fact that the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Sale sought to be annulled and the titles sought to be cancelled were not offered in evidence,[26] the Extrajudicial Settlement itself alluded to in the testimonial evidence presented was not offered in order to allow the trial court to determine the veracity of the claims of the witnesses.

 

 

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