J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2014-0013: EMILIO A. GONZALES III, , Petitioner, -versus- OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE – OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURIN GAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATA YONG, Respondents. (G.R. NO. 196231);WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner, -versus- ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY. FROILAND. MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents (G.R. NO. 196232) ( 28 JANUARY 2014, BRION, J.)

DISPOSITIVE:

“III. SUMMARY OF VOTING

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7, 108 the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

However, by another vote of 8-7, 109 the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

SO ORDERED.”

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SCD-2014-0013-JAN 2014-TRO-EMILIO GONZALES AND WENDELL SULIT

SC-2014-0012: EXTENSION OF TRO RE POWER RATE HIKE (G.R. No. 210245 (Bayan Muna Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares and Carlos lsagani Zarate, et al. vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.); G~R. No. 210255 (National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, represented by Petronilo L. Ilagan, et al. vs. Manila Electric Company, et al.); and G.R. No. 210502 (Manila Electric Company vs. Philippine Electricity Market Corporation, et al.) (18 FEBRUARY 2014, EN BANC)

DISPOSITIVE:

“Acting on the Urgent Motion for Extension of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction dated February 12, 2014 filed by counsel for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 210245 and 210255 and the Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated February 14, 2014 filed by counsel for MERALCO, the Court Resolved to

(a)               EXTEND the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issued on December 23, 2013 for another period of sixty ( 60) days or until April 22, 2014;

(b)               GRANT a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and for a period ending on April · 22, 2014, enjoining the generating companies, specifically Masinloc Power Partners Co. Ltd. c/o AES Philippines, San Miguel Energy Corporation, South’ Premiere Power Corporation, First Gas Power Corporation and National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, from demanding and collecting the deferred amounts representing the affected costs based on the matters raised in MERALCO’s December 5, 2013 letter; and

(c)               GRANT a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and for a period ending on April 22, 2014, enJommg the Philippine Electricity Market Corporation from demanding and collecting the deferred amounts representing the affected costs based on the matters raised in MERALCO’s December 5, 2013 letter.”

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SCD-2014-0012-JAN 2014-TRO-POWER RATE HIKE

CASE 2014-0011: A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, – versus – EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent. (G.R. No. 200804, 22 JANUARY 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) SUBJECT: SMALL CLAIMS (BRIEF TITLE: L.A. ANG NETWORK VS. MONDEJAR)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23, 2011 and Resolution dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

“Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that: 

SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.   The decision shall be final and unappealable. 

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:  

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that “the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:  x x x  Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when “there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law,” this rule is not without exception.  The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient.  It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.   This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:   Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so defined as a “remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal” concerned.  x x x (Emphasis supplied)” 

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SCD-2014-0011-JAN 2014-A.L. ANG NETWORK