Archive for May, 2017


CASE 2017-0012: KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, VS. DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA\., NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL MUSEUM, and NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES,  (G.R. No. 213948  25 APRIL 2017, CARPIO, J.:) (SUBJECTS: MANDAMUS; DEFINITION OF NUISANCE; NUISANCE PER SE; NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS)

 

 DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

 SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

CAN THE COURT ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS AGAINST THE OFFICIALS OF THE CITY OF MANILA TO STOP THE CONSTRUCTION OF DMCI-PDI’S TORRE DE MANILA PROJECT?

 

NO.

 

BECAUSE THERE IS NO LAW PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TORRE DE MANILA.

 

WHAT IS NOT EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY PROHIBITED BY LAW MAY BE DONE, EXCEPT WHEN THE ACT IS CONTRARY TO MORALS, CUSTOMS AND I PUBLIC ORDER.

 

THIS PRINCIPLE IS FUNDAMENTAL IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, TO PROTECT THE  WEAK AGAINST THE STRONG, THE MINORITY AGAINST THE MAJORITY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

 

IN ESSENCE, THIS PRINCIPLE, WHICH IS THE FOUNDATION OF A CIVILIZED SOCIETY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW, PRESCRIBES THAT THE FREEDOM TO ACT CAN BE CURTAILED ONLY THROUGH LAW.

 

WITHOUT THIS PRINCIPLE, THE RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF CITIZENS CAN BE ARBITRARILY AND WHIMSICALLY TRAMPLED UPON BY THE SHIFTING PASSIONS OF THOSE WHO CAN SPOUT THE LOUDEST, OR THOSE WHO CAN GATHER THE BIGGEST CROWD OR THE MOST NUMBER OF INTERNET TROLLS.

 

IN THIS  CASE, THERE IS NO ALLEGATION OR PROOF THAT THE TORRE DE MANILA PROJECT IS !”CONTRARY TO MORALS, CUSTOMS, AND PUBLIC ORDER” OR THAT IT BRINGS HARM, DARIGER, OR HAZARD TO THE COMMUNITY.

 

THERE IS NO LAW PROHIBITING  THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TORRE DE MANILA DUE TO ITS EFFECT ON THE BACKGROUND “VIEW, VISTA, SIGHTLINE, OR SETTING” OF THE RIZAL MONUMENT.

 

WHAT IS NUISANCE?

 

ARTICLE 694 OF THE CIVIL CODE DEFINES A NUISANCE AS ANY ACT, OMISSION, ESTABLISHMENT, BUSINESS, CONDITION OF PROPERTY, OR ANYTHING ELSE WHICH: (1) INJURES OR ENDANGERS THE HEALTH OR SAFETY OF OTHERS; (2) ANNOYS OR OFFENDS THE SENSES; (3) SHOCKS, DEFIES OR DISREGARDS DECENCY OR MORALITY; (4) OBSTRUCTS OR INTERFERES WITH THE FREE PASSAGE OF ANY PUBLIC HIGHWAY OR STREET, OR ANY BODY OF WATER; OR (5) HINDERS OR IMPAIRS THE USE OF PROPERTY. I

 

WHAT ARE THE TWO KINDS OF NUISANCE?

 

NUISANCE PER SE AND NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS.

 

WHAT IS NUISANCE PER SE?

 

IT IS  “RECOGNIZED AS A NUISANCE UNDER ANY AND ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, BECAUSE IT CONSTITUTES A DIRECT MENACE TO PUBLIC HEALTH OR SAFETY, AND, FOR THAT REASON, MAY BE ABATED SUMMARILY UNDER THE UNDEFINED LAW OF NECESSITY.”

 

WHAT IS NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS?

 

THAT  WHICH “DEPENDS UPON CERTAIN CONDITIONS. AND CIRCUMSTANCES, AND ITS EXISTENCE BEING A QUESTION OF FACT, IT CANNOT DECLARED  WITHOUT DUE HEARING THEREON IN A TRIBUNAL AUTHORIZED TO DECIDE WHETHER  SUCH A THING IN LAW CONSTITUTES A NUISANCE. ”

 

IS TORRE DE MANILA A NUISANCE PER SE?

 

NO.

 

THE TORRE DE MANILA PROJECT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A “DIRECT MENACE TO  PUBLIC HEALTH OR SAFETY.”

 

FIRST, CONDOMINIUM PROJECT IS  COMMONPLACE IN THE CITY OF MANILA.

 

SECOND, DMCI-PDI HAS COMPLIED WITH HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS SET BY LAW. DMCI-PDI HAS BEEN GRANTED THE FOLLOWING PERMITS AND CLEARANCES PRIOR TO STARTING THE PROJECT: (1) HEIGHT CLEARANCE PERMIT FROM THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIP¥NES;91 (2) DEVELOPMENT PERMIT FROM THE HLURB;92 (3) ZONING CERTIFICATI<;M FROM THE HLURB;93 ( 4) CERTIFICATE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANQE COMMITMENT FROM THE ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES;94 (5) BARANGAY CLEARANCER ( 6) ZONING PERMIT;96 (7) BUILDING PERMIT;97 (8) AND ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL PERMIT.98 I

 

LATER, DMCI-PDI ALSO OBTAINED THE RIGHT TO BUILD UNDER A VARIANCE RECOMMENDED BY THE MZBAA AND GRANTED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA. THUS, THETE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE TORRE DE MANILA PROJECT IS NOT A NUISANCE PER SE.

 

IS TORRE DE MANILA A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS?

 

IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT TORRE DE MANILA IS A NUISANCE BY ACCIDENS.

 

BY IDEFINITION, A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS IS DETERMINED BASED ON ITS SURROUNDITJG CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. THESE CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE WELL ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY ALLEGED.

 

THE COURT CANNOT SIMPLY  ACCEPT THESE CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AS ESTABLISHED FACTS.

 

THE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE WHEN A NUISANCE EXISTS IS AN AUTHORITY TO FIND FACTS, TO ESTIMATE THEIR FORCE, AND TO APPLY RULES OF LAW TO THE CASE THUS MADE.

 

THE SUPREME COURT IS NO SUCH AUTHORITY. IT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.

 

THE TASK TO RECEIVE AND EVALUATE EVIDENCE IS LODGED WITH THE TRIAL COURTS. THE QUESTION, THEN, OF WHETHER THE TORRE DE MANILA PROJECT IS A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS MUST BE SETTLED AFTER DUE PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BEFORE THE PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. THE KOR CANNOT CIRCUMVENT THE PROCESS IN THE GUISE OF PROTECTING NATIONAL CULTURE AND HERITAGE.

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW. THEN GO TO YOUR DOWNLOADED FILES, LOCATE THE CASE FILE AND OPEN IT.

 

SCD-2017-0012-KNIGHTS OF RIZAL VS. DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL MUSEUM, A 

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CASE 2017-0011: ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) AND ATTY. MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, ET AL.J VS. HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, ET AL. MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, ET AL. VS. HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 217872, ETC., 26 APRIL 2017, MENDOZA, J. (BRIEF TITLE: ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION ET AL VS HON. GARIN ET AL AND RELATED CASES)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the August 24, 2016 Decision is MODIFIED. Accordingly, the Food and Drug Administration is ordered to consider the oppositions filed by the petitioners with respect to the listed drugs, including Implanon and Implanon NXT, based on the standards of the Reproductive Health Law, as construed in lmbong v. Ochoa, and to decide the case within sixty (60) days from the date it will be deemed submitted for resolution.

 

After compliance with due process and upon promulgation of the decision of the Food and Drug Administration, the Temporary Restraining Order would be deemed lifted if the questioned drugs and devices are found not abortifacients.

 

After the final resolution by the Food and Drug Administration, any appeal should be to the Office of the President pursuant to Section 9 of E.O. No. 247.

 

As ordered in the August 24, 2016 Decision, the Food and Drug Administration is directed to amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 10354 so that it would be strictly compliant with the mandates of the Court in lmbong v. Ochoa.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

ARE COURTS OUSTED OF THEIR JURISDICTION WHENEVER ISSUES INVOLVE QUESTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC NATURE?

 

 NO.

 

A COURT IS NOT CONSIDERED INCOMPETENT EITHER IN REVIEWING THE FINDINGS OF THE FDA SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WILL BE WEIGHING THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY BOTH THE FDA AND ITS OPPOSITORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG OR DEVICE HAS COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW.

 

IS FDA EXCUSED FROM COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS BECAUSE IT IS NOT STRICTLY BOUND BY THE TECHNICAL RULES ON EVIDENCE?

 

NO.

 

DUE PROCESS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE FDA CONDUCT TRIAL-TYPE HEARING TO SATISFY ITS REQUIREMENTS. ALL THAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IS THAT THE FDA AFFORD THE PEOPLE THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DECIDE ON THE APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE MAHS AFTER AFFORDING THE OPPOSITORS, LIKE THE PETITIONERS, A GENUINE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR SCIENCE BASED EVIDENCE.

 

WILL THE FINDINGS OF FDA BE APPEALABLE TO  THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH?

 

NO BECAUSE THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH IS A PARTY IN THE CASE. IT SHOULD BE APPEALABLE TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

 

 TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2017-0011-ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) AND ATTY. MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, ET AL.J VS. HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, ET AL. MARIA CONC

 

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CASE 2017-0010: PHILIPPINE STEEL COATING CORP., VS. EDUARD QUIÑONES, (G.R. No. 194533 19 APRIL 2017, SERENO, CJ:) (SUBJECTS: EXPRESS WARRANTY; NEGLIGENCE; OPTIONS OF A BUYER WHEN WARRANTY IS BREACHED; PRESCRIPTION IN CASE OF WARRANTIES; DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF FAMILY DEFINED; ATTORNEY’S FEES CANNOT BE BASED ONLY ON AGREEMENT WITH LAWYER;)  (BRIEF TITLE:: PHILIPPINE STEEL VS. QUIÑONES)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 March 2010 and Resolution dated 19 November 20 l 0 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED, except for the award of attorney’s fees, which is hereby DELETED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

THE BASIC FACTS:

 

RESPONDENT WAS PRODUCING BUSES. PETITIONER WAS SELLING G.I. COATED SHEETS. RESPONDENT WANTED TO BUT G.I. COATED SHEETS FROM PETITIONER. PETITIONER  EXPRESSLY REPRESENTED TO RESPONDENT THAT THE PRIMER-COATED G .I. SHEETS WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ACRYLIC PAINT PROCESS USED BY THE LATTER ON HIS BUS UNITS. THIS REPRESENTATION WAS MADE IN THE FACE OF RESPONDENT’S EXPRESS CONCERNS REGARDING INCOMPATIBILITY. RESPONDENT BOUGHT G.I. SHEETS AND MADE THEM INTO BUSES. HOWEVER, THE PAINTS PEELED 0FF AND CUSTOMERS COMPLAINED. RESPONDENT SUED FOR DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF EXPRESS WARRANTY. RTC AWARDED DAMAGES. C.A. AFFIRMED.

 

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES TO BE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THERE IS AN EXPRESS WARRANTY IN A CONTRACT OF SALE?

 

THERE ARE THREE REQUISITES:

 

( 1) THE EXPRESS WARRANTY MUST BE AN AFFIRMATION OF FACT OR ANY PROMISE BY THE SELLER RELATING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SALE;

 

(2) THE NATURAL EFFECT OF THE AFFIRMATION OR PROMISE IS TO INDUCE THE BUYER TO PURCHASE THE THING; AND

 

(3) THE BUYER PURCHASES THE THING RELYING ON THAT AFFIRMATION OR PROMISE.

 

PETITIONER ARGUES THAT THE PURPORTED WARRANTIES ARE VAGUE ORAL STATEMENTS AND THEREFORE CANNOT CONSTITUTE AS GROUND FOR DAMAGES. IS THIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

 A WARRANTY IS NOT NECESSARILY WRITTEN.

 

IT MAY BE ORAL AS LONG AS IT IS NOT GIVEN AS A MERE OPINION OR JUDGMENT. IT MUST BE A POSITIVE AFFIRMATION OF A FACT THAT BUYERS RELY UPON, AND THAT INFLUENCES OR INDUCES  THEM TO PURCHASE THE PRODUCT.

 

THE  ORAL STATEMENTS OF ANGBENGCO CREATED AN EXPRESS WARRANTY. THEY WERE POSITIVE AFFIRMATIONS OF FACT THAT THE BUYER RELIED ON, AND THAT INDUCED HIM TO BUY PETITIONER’S PRIMER-COATED G .I. SHEETS.

 

IS SELLER’S OPINION A WARRANTY?

 

NO UNLESS THE SELLER MADE SUCH AFFIRMATION OR STATEMENT AS AN EXPERT AND IT WAS RELIED UPON BY THE BUYER.

 

WAS PETITIONER AN EXPERT ON WHAT THEY ADVISE RESPONDENT?

 

YES, TO THE EYES OF RESPONDENT.

 

“Despite its claims to the contrary, petitioner was an expert in the eyes of the buyer Quinones. The latter had asked if the primer-coated G.I. sheets were compatible with Amianan Motors’ acrylic painting process. Petitioner’s former employee, Lopez, testified that he had to refer Quinones to the former’s immediate supervisor, Angbengco, to answer that question. As the sales manager of PhilSteel, Angbengco made repeated assurances and affirmations and even invoked laboratory tests that showed compatibility.13 In the eyes of the buyer Quinones, PhilSteel -through its representative, Angbengco -was an expert whose word could be relied upon.”

 

PETITIONER ARGUED THAT WHAT THEY TOLD RESPONDENT WAS MERE DEALER’S TALK OR EXAGERATION. IS THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

NO.

 

THE COURT SAID:

 

“Contrary however to petitioner’s position, the so-called dealer’s or trader’s talk cannot be treated as mere exaggeration in trade as defined in A1iicle 1340 of the Civil Code.16 Quinones did not talk to an ordinary sales clerk such as can be found in a department store or even a sari-sari store. If Lopez, a sales agent, had made the assertions of Angbengco without true knowledge about the compatibility or the authority to wanant it, then his would be considered dealer’s talk. But sensing that a person of greater competence and knowledge of the product had to answer Quinones’ concerns, Lopez wisely deferred to his boss, Angbengco.

 

Angbengco undisputedly assured Quinones that laboratory tests had been undertaken, and that those tests showed that the acrylic paint used by Quinones was compatible with the primer-coated G.I. sheets of Philsteel. Thus, Angbengco was no longer giving a mere seller’s opinion or making an exaggeration in trade. Rather, he was making it appear to Quinones that Phil Steel had already subjected the latter’s primed G .I. sheets to product testing. PhilSteel, through its representative, was in effect inducing in the mind of the buyer the belief that the former was an expert on the primed G.I. sheets in question; and that the statements made by petitioner’s representatives, particularly Angbengco (its sales manager), 17 could be relied on. Thus, petitioner did induce the buyer to purchase the former’s G .I. sheets.”

 

RESPONDENT ARGUES THAT THE CASE ALREADY PRESCRIBED. IT IS CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

NO, BECAUSE IT WAS FILED WITHIN THE 4 YEAR PRESCRITION PERIOD.

 

WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN CASE OF AN EXPRESS WARRANTY?

 

IT IS THAT SPECIFIED IN THE CONTRACT.

 

IN  ITS ABSENCE, THAT PERIOD SHALL BE BASED ON THE GENERAL RULE ON THE RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS: FOUR YEARS (SEE ARTICLE 1389, CIVIL CODE).

 

WHAT IS NEGLIGENCE?

 

IT IS THE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE CARE AND CAUTION THAT AN ORDINARILY PRUDENT PERSON WOULD HAVE USED IN A GIVEN SITUATION.

 

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF NEGLIGENCE?

 

THAT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED BY LAW OR THE CONTRACT.

 

IF NOT SPECIFIED BY LAW OR CONTRACT THEN IT IS COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS PATERFAMILIAS  OR  AS BONOS PATERFAMILIAS OR “A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY.”

 

A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY MEANS A PERSON OF ORDINARY OR AVERAGE DEIGENCE.

 

TO DETERMINE THE PRUDENCE AND DILIGENCE THAT MUST BE REQUIRED OF ALL PERSONS, WE MUST USE AS BASIS THE ABSTRACT AVERAGE STANDARD CORRESPONDING TO A NORMAL ORDERLY PERSON.

 

ANYONE WHO USES DILIGENCE BELOW THIS STANDARD IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.

 

PETITIONER ACCUSED RESPONDENT OF NEGLIGENCE. IT SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT BY APPLYING ACRYLIC OVER EPOXY PRIMER USED ON THE G.I. SHEETS, THE LATTER PRIMER WOULD BE DISSOLVED OR STIPPED OFF. WAS PETITIONER’S CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

NO.

 

THE SUPREME COURT POINTED OUT THAT:

 

“It bears reiteration that Quinones had already raised the compatibility issue at the outset. He relied on the manpower and expertise of PhilSteel, but at the same time reasonably asked for more details regarding the product. It was not an impulsive or rush decision to buy. In fact, it took 4 to 5 meetings to convince him to buy the primed G .I. sheets. And even after making an initial order, he did not make subsequent orders until after a painting test, done upon the instructions of Angbengco proved successful. The test was conducted using their acrylic paint over PhilSteel’s primer-coated G.I. sheets. Only then did Quinones make subsequent orders of the primer-coated product, which was then used in the mass production of bus bodies” by Respondent.

 

WAS NON-PAYMENT OF THE UNPAID PRICE JUSTIFIED?

 

YES BECAUSE AN EXPRESS BREACH OF WARRANTY WAS PROVEN.

 

IN CASE OF BREACH OF WARRANTY BY THE SELLER, WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS OF THE BUYER?

 

( 1) ACCEPT OR KEEP THE GOODS AND SET UP AGAINST THE SELLER, THE BREACH OF WAITANTY BY WAY OF RECOUPMENT IN DIMINUTION OR EXTINCTION OF THE PRICE;

 

(2) ACCEPT OR KEEP THE GOODS AND MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST THE SELLER FOR DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF WARRANTY;

 

(3) REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE GOODS, AND MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST THE SELLER FOR DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF WARRANTY;

 

( 4) RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE AND REFUSE TO RECEIVE THE GOODS OR IF THE GOODS HAVE ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED, RETURN THEM OR OFFER TO RETURN THEM TO THE SELLER AND RECOVER THE PRICE OR ANY PART THEREOF WHICH HAS BEEN PAID.

 

THE SUPREME COURT AMPLIFIED:

 

“When the buyer has claimed and been granted a remedy in anyone of these ways, no other remedy can thereafter be granted, without prejudice to the provisions of the second paragraph of article 1191.

 

Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer, he cannot rescind the sale if he knew of the breach of waITanty when he accepted the goods without protest, or if he fails to notify the seller within a reasonable time of the election to rescind, or if he fails to return or to offer to return the goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as they were in at the time the ownership was transferred to the buyer. But if deterioration or injury of the goods is due to the breach or warranty, such deterioration or injury shall not prevent the buyer from returning or offering to return the goods to the seller and rescinding the sale.

 

Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale and elects to do so, he shall cease to be liable for the price upon returning or offering to return the goods. If the price or any part thereof has already been paid, the seller shall be liable to repay so much thereof as has been paid, concurrently with the return of the goods, or immediately after an offi:r io return the goods in exchange for repayment of the price.

 

Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale and elects to do so, if the seller refoscs to accept an offer of the buyer to return the goods, the buyer shall thereafter be deemed to hold the goods as bailee for the seller, but subject to a lien to secure the payment 31 387 Phil. 216 (2000) of any portion of the price which has been paid, and with the remedies for the enforcement of such lien allowed to an unpaid seller by article 1526.

 

In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such loss, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount, is the difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty.”

 

THE RTC AND CA AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE GROUND THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND HIS LAWYER SPECIFIED ATTORNEY’S FEES. IT THIS CORRECT?


THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES MUST BE DELETED.

 

ATTORNEY’S FEE CANNOT BE BASED ON A MERE ALLEGATION OR TESTIMONY THAT A PARTY HAS AGREED TO PAY A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES.

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2017-0010-PHILIPPINE STEEL COATING CORP. VS. EDUARD QUINONES 

 

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