Archive for June, 2012


LEGAL NOTE 0129: ARE TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX PAYMENTS CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF OWNERSHIP? CAN AN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE BE ATTACKED, REPEALED OR AMENDED? WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?

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June 12, 2012

LEGAL NOTE 0129: ARE TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX PAYMENTS CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF OWNERSHIP? CAN AN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE BE ATTACKED, REPEALED OR AMENDED? WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?

 

SOURCE: SPOUSES NICANOR MAGNO AND CARIDAD MAGNO VS. HEIRS OF PABLO PARULAN, REPRESENTED BY EMILIANO PARULAN, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, BALIUAG, BULACAN, OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GUIGUINTO, BULACAN (G. R. NO. 183916, APRIL 25, 2012, SERENO, J.) SUBJECT/S: TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX PAYMENTS NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP; OCT IS IMPRESSED WITH PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY; WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES MAGNO VS. HEIRS OF PARULAN)

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DISPOSITIVE:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The 16 April 2008 Decision and 17 July 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100781 are AFFIRMED.

 

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

 

PETITIONERS PURCHASED A FENCED PROPERTY WITH TAX DECLARATION. LATER THEY DISCOVERED THAT PORTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS INCLUDED IN THE PROPERTY OF RESPONDENTS WHICH HAS AN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT). PETITIONERS THEN FILED A PETITION TO CORRECT THE OCT. THEIR PROOF CONSISTED OF TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS? ARE THESE SUFFICIENT PROOFS?

 

 

NO. THEY ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE. WELL SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OR OF THE RIGHT TO POSSESS LAND WHEN NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE. THE FACT THAT THE DISPUTED PROPERTY MAY HAVE BEEN DECLARED FOR TAXATION PURPOSES IN THE NAMES OF THE APPLICANTS FOR REGISTRATION OR OF THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST DOES NOT NECESSARILY PROVE OWNERSHIP. THEY ARE MERELY INDICIA OF A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP.

 

 

However, the DARAB and the CA were not swayed by these tax declarations, and rightly so. As we held in Republic v. dela Paz,[1][33]

Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

CAN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) BE ATTACKED AND  REVISED OR AMENDED?

 

 

THE OCT COVERING THE CONTESTED LOT CARRIES WITH IT A PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY.[2][30]  THE PETITION TO CORRECT/CANCEL THE OCT  CAN PROSPER ONLY IF PETITIONERS ARE ABLE TO PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT A PORTION OF THEIR LOT WAS ERRONEOUSLY COVERED BY THE PATENT. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REFERS TO SUCH RELEVANT EVIDENCE AS A REASONABLE MIND MIGHT ACCEPT AS ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A CONCLUSION.[3][31]

 

However, the DAR’s issuance of an Emancipation Patent and the corresponding OCT covering the contested lot carries with it a presumption of regularity.[4][30]  The Petition to correct/cancel Pablo’s Emancipation Patent can prosper only if petitioners are able to present substantial evidence that a portion of their lot was erroneously covered by the patent. Substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[5][31]

 

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?

 

 

ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION REQUIRES PUBLIC, PEACEFUL, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.[6][32] 

 

                Petitioners claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Emilia, became the owner of the lot in question by virtue of acquisitive prescription.  Acquisitive prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner.[7][32]  To prove this, petitioners offered in evidence two tax declarations in the name of Emilia declaring her ownership of a 1.552 ha. riceland in Biñang 1st Bocaue, Bulacan for tax purposes.

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 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
BaguioCity

 

SECOND DIVISION

 

SPOUSES NICANOR MAGNO and CARIDAD MAGNO,                                           Petitioners,

                     – versus –

HEIRS OF PABLO PARULAN, represented by EMILIANO PARULAN, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, BALIUAG, BULACAN, OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GUIGUINTO, BULACAN,

                                      Respondents.           

 

 G. R. No. 183916 

Present:

 

CARPIO,

  BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

 

Promulgated:

April 25, 2012

 

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – — – x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

SERENO, J.:

For resolution is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the 16 April 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100781,[8][1] which affirmed the dismissal by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of the petitioners’ Petition for Correction and/or Cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of  private  respondents’ predecessor-in-interest.    Also assailed  in
this petition is the CA Resolution dated 17 July 2008, which denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

On 17 January 1972, petitioner spouses Nicanor and Caridad Magno (petitioners) bought a 1.5520 hectare (or 15,520 sq. m.) riceland at Biñang 1st, Bocaue, Bulacan from Emilia de Guzman (Emilia), as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale.[9][2]  According to the Deed of Sale, the purchased lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 2386 and is bounded by lots owned by the following persons:  in the north, by Apolonio Santos; in the east, by Apolonio Santos and Eleuterio Santiago; in the south, by Eleuterio Santiago; and in the west, by Apolonio Santos. Petitioners further allege that the purchased lot is also described in the year 2000 Tax Declaration/Property Index Number 020-04-006-03-010[10][3]  in the name of Emilia de Guzman, with the following boundaries: lots 1468 and 1469 in the north; Lots 1303 and 1304 in the south; Lot 1306 in the east; and Lot 1301 in the west.

The property was enclosed within concrete posts and barbed wires when it was sold to petitioners.  From the time of purchase, they occupied the lot without interruption and devoted it to rice cultivation.  In 1995, they filed before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an Application for Free Patent, as well as a Petition with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) to rectify the Cadastral Survey of Lot 1306, Cad 332, Bocaue Cadastre, for the purpose of excluding a portion of their land from Lot 1306-B, which was then being claimed by Pedro Lazaro’s heirs.

Subsequently, petitioners’ tenant and hired laborers were prevented from working on the subject land by Emiliano Parulan (Emiliano), son of Pablo Parulan (Pablo), whose heirs are named respondents herein. Petitioners discovered that a 2,171 square meter portion of their land was included in the 5,677 square meter lot registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669)[11][4] issued in the name of Pablo on 17 December 1999 and registered with the Register of Deeds on              5 January 2000.

Petitioners referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) Legal Officer I of Baliuag, Bulacan, Homer Abraham, Jr. The latter issued a Report and Recommendation[12][5] dated 26 October 2000 to Miguel Mendoza, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of PARO, Baliuag, Bulacan, recommending the filing by the Magno spouses of a necessary petition for cancellation/correction of Pablo’s Emancipation Patent (EP) before the DARAB. 

Hence, on 15 December 2000, petitioners filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan a Petition[13][6] for Correction of OCT No. T-048-EP, (EP No. 189669) issued in the name of Pablo Parulan.  Apart from the Deed of Sale and the two Tax Declarations, petitioners adduced as documentary evidence the questioned EP/OCT,[14][7] photographs of the property,[15][8] as well as the Report and Recommendation of PARO Legal Officer I Abraham.

Presented by petitioners as witnesses during the hearing before the PARAD were Cynthia Mariano (Mariano), an Agrarian Reform Program Technologist (ARPT) of Bocaue, Bulacan; and Fe Jacinto (Jacinto), the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of the same area. Mariano testified that she had been instructed by Jacinto to conduct an investigation of petitioners’ landholding.  On 3 May 2000, she, together with Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairperson Ricardo Benedicto, conducted an ocular inspection of the lot, with farmers from adjacent lots as witnesses.  She thereafter prepared a report, which stated that the subject lot
was fenced and  that  the  actual  tiller  was Renato de Guzman.  Renato informed her that his father, Mariano de Guzman, was the original tenant of the land; and that the adjacent lot outside the fenced lot was being tilled by Emiliano Parulan. According to ARPT Mariano, her ocular inspection yielded the finding that since 1976, the subject lot which has an area of 2,162 sq. m., had actually been tilled by Renato de Guzman, who had been paying lease rentals to spouses Nicanor and Caridad Magno. MARO Jacinto testified by identifying the report she had prepared on the matter.

On the other hand, private respondents presented the Kasunduan sa Pamumuwisan between Pedro and Pablo;[16][9] Pablo’s request for a survey of Pedro’s land;[17][10] an endorsements to survey Pedro’s property issued by ARPT Mariano,[18][11] MARO Jacinto[19][12] and PARO Linda Hermogino (Hermogino);[20][13] DAR Regional Director Renato Herrera’s grant of Pablo’s request for survey;[21][14] the Approved Subdivision Plan of Lot 1306, Cad 332, Bocaue Cadastre;[22][15] and the accompanying Lot Data Computation for the land of Pedro Lazaro[23][16] and Emilia de Guzman.[24][17]

Private respondents argued that the June 1973 Kasunduan sa Pamumuwisan between Pablo and Pedro Lazaro showed that the former was the agricultural lessee of the latter. In January 1999, Pablo requested the MARO for authority to survey the property of Pedro pursuant to his EP Application over the land he was then tenanting. On 1 February 1999, Bocaue ARPT Mariano reported to Bocaue MARO Jacinto that, based         on the former’s investigation/ocular inspection, Pedro’s 15,178 sq. m. property was covered by the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree  27.    Since   Pablo  was   the actual  tiller  of   the  land,  the  ARPT recommended the grant of a Survey Authority and Approval as requested. This recommendation was endorsed by MARO Jacinto to PARO Hermogino, who in turn endorsed it to DAR Regional Director Renato Herrera.  Director Herrera granted Pablo’s request for a survey pursuant to the latter’s EP application.

As indicated in the resulting Approved Subdivision Plan (of Lot1306, Cad 332 Bocaue Cadastre),[25][18] it was based on the Original Survey of Lot 1306 in May 1960. The Lot Data Computation accompanying the Subdivision Plan denominated Emilia’s lot as Lot 1302 with an area of 9,604.82 sq. m.,[26][19] while that of Pedro was Lot 1306 with an area of 15,171.85 sq. m.[27][20] The Subdivision Plan also showed that Lot 1306 was subdivided into Lot 1306-A (or Lot 4557) containing an area of 7,601 sq. m.; Lot 1306-B (or Lot 4558) which had 5,677 sq. m.; and Lot 1306-C (or Lot 4559) with 1,900 sq. m.  It appears that Lot 1306-B or Lot 4558 was further subdivided into Lot 4558-A with an area of 2,162 sq. m. andLot 4558-B with an area of 3,508 sq. m. The contested lot isLot 4558-A.  Clearly, private respondents argued, OCT No. T-048-EP(M), EP No. 189669, was properly issued to Pablo for his 5,677 sq. m. lot in Biñang, which encompassed the contested 2,162 sq. m. lot.

After the parties filed their respective pleadings with the attached Affidavits of witnesses and other evidence, the PARAD issued a Decision[28][21] dated 26 February 2003 granting the Petition. Relying on the Tax Declarations in the name of Emilia, the PARAD noted that Emilia had owned a 1.5 ha. riceland in Biñang 1st, which she sold to petitioners. Meanwhile, the Rice and Corn Production Survey and the report of ARPT Mariano showed that the contested lot was actually being tilled by Renato de Guzman, the son of Mariano de Guzman, who was the registered tenant of Emilia.  Thus, the PARAD concluded that in the EP issued in favor of Pablo, there were technical errors that encroached upon petitioners’ property.  The dispositive portion of the PARAD Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:

1.  Ordering the correction and cancellation of OCT No. T-048-EP in the name of Pablo Parulan;

2.  Ordering the correction of the approved subdivision plan ofLot1306; Cad. 322, Bocaue, Cadastre Cad-03-012347-AR;

3.  Ordering the DAR to conduct the necessary subdivision survey ofLot4558 in the presence of both party-claimants to coincide with the actual and real possession and status of actual claimants of the two adjacent lots;

4.  Ordering the Register of Deeds of Guiginto, Bulacan, to effect the correction and cancellation of EP No. 048 and register of the correct EP that will be issued by the DAR covering the corrected lot.

All other claims and counter claims by the parties are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondents appealed[29][22] the PARAD Decision to the DARAB.

On 22 February 2007, the DARAB issued a Decision[30][23] reversing the PARAD, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated February 26, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new Judgment rendered:

1.  DISMISSING the instant petition for correction and/or cancellation of OCT No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669) for lack of merit;

2.  DECLARING the lot in question as part and parcel of lot 1306 as surveyed for Pablo Parulan (“Annex I”);

3.  MAINTAINING and AFFIRMING the validity and integrity of OCT No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669) in the name of the late Pablo Parulan;

4.  ORDERING petitioners-appellees to vacate the premises in question and surrender the possession and cultivation thereof to herein private respondent heirs of the late Pablo Parulan. Moreover, petitioners-appellees are likewise ordered to remove the fence they have constructed on the lot in question at their own expense.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the DARAB in its Resolution[31][24] dated 2 July 2007.

Undaunted, petitioners appealed the DARAB Decision and Resolution to the CA.

In its 16 April 2008 Decision,[32][25] the CA affirmed in toto the assailed Decision and Resolution of the DARAB.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its 17 July 2008 Resolution.[33][26]  Hence, petitioners filed with this Court the present Petition for Review under Rule 45.

The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the DARAB’s dismissal of petitioners’ Petition for Cancellation and/or Correction of OCT No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189969).

We deny the Petition.

Under DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994, emancipation patents may be cancelled by the PARAD or the DARAB for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. [34][27] The same administrative order further states that “administrative corrections may include non-identification of spouse, correction of civil status, corrections of technical descriptions and other matters related to agrarian reform;”[35][28] and that the DARAB’s decision “may include cancellation of registered EP/CLOA, reimbursement of lease rental as amortization to ARBs, reallocation of the land to qualified beneficiary, perpetual disqualification to become an ARB, and other ancillary matters related to the cancellation of the EP or CLOA.”[36][29]

        However, the DAR’s issuance of an Emancipation Patent and the corresponding OCT covering the contested lot carries with it a presumption of regularity.[37][30]  The Petition to correct/cancel Pablo’s Emancipation Patent can prosper only if petitioners are able to present substantial evidence that a portion of their lot was erroneously covered by the patent. Substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[38][31]

        As correctly held by the DARAB and the CA, petitioners have failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that the contested lot was part of their property.

        Petitioners claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Emilia, became the owner of the lot in question by virtue of acquisitive prescription.  Acquisitive prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner.[39][32]  To prove this, petitioners offered in evidence two tax declarations in the name of Emilia declaring her ownership of a 1.552 ha. riceland in Biñang 1st Bocaue, Bulacan for tax purposes.

        However, the DARAB and the CA were not swayed by these tax declarations, and rightly so. As we held in Republic v. dela Paz,[40][33]

Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

        A further examination of the tax declarations further confirms their lack of probative value.

As observed by the CA, Tax Declaration No. 2386 for the year 1967, like the 1972 Deed of Sale between petitioners and Emilia, did not contain any technical description of the property. Hence, these documents fail to establish ownership over the contested lot by Emilia or petitioners.

On the other hand, the Tax Declaration for the year 2000 with Property Index Number 020-04-006-03-010 showed that petitioners’ land is bound on the east by lot 1306. Hence, the DARAB logically concluded that lot 1306, of which the contested lot is a part of, is outside the boundaries of petitioners’ land. Notably too, both the DARAB and the CA found it curious that the 2000 Tax Declaration was still in the name of Emilia, considering that petitioners were supposed to have bought the land from her 27 years ago. If petitioners exercise ownership over the land since 1972 when they purchased the same, it is they who should have been paying the realty tax thereon.

Also, we do not lose sight of the fact that the 2000 Tax Declaration was made only after the subject EP/OCT had already been issued. A mere tax declaration cannot defeat a certificate of title.[41][34]

Petitioners also presented ARPT Mariano and MARO Jacinto to prove their claim that they were the owners of the contested lot. However, as noted by the PARAD, ARPT Mariano’s report relied only on the allegations of petitioners, and her ocular inspection was made in the absence of private respondents. Meanwhile, MARO Jacinto never verified ARPT Mariano’s ocular inspection.

In contrast to the evidence adduced by petitioners, the EP /OCT they sought to impugn contained a technical description of the metes and bounds of Pablo’s  property.  Moreover,  that  technical description was  based on a

1999 Approved Subdivision Plan following the original May 1960 Cadastral Survey of Lot 1306, Cad 332, Bocaue Cadastre. The process by which this subdivision plan came into existence was also established by the documents showing the series of endorsements by the various government officials who acted on Pablo’s application and request.

We therefore affirm the CA ruling that the evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient to controvert the accuracy of the technical description of the land properly covered by the subject EP/OCT.  As pointed out by the DARAB, petitioners should have presented expert witnesses or initiated a relocation survey ofLot1306 to establish the alleged errors in the technical description of the subject EP.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The 16 April 2008 Decision and 17 July 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100781 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

     Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

       ARTURO D. BRION                              JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                 

         Associate Justice                                                Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

 

 

 

A T T E S T A T I O N

 

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

                                                    ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                        Associate Justice

                                                          Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                 Chief Justice

[1][33] G.R. No. 171631, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 610.

[2][30] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m).

[3][31] Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

[4][30] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m).

[5][31] Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

[6][32] Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 423.

[7][32] Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 423.

[8][1]           The assailed Court of Appeals (CA) Fifth Division Decision was penned by Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a Member of this Court) and Arturo G. Tayag, rollo, pp. 35-45.

[9][2]  Rollo, pp. 82-83.

[10][3] Id. at 81. 

[11][4] Id. at  84-85.

[12][5] Id. at 90-91.

[13][6]  The petition was docketed as DARAB Case No. 12275 (Regular Case No. R-03-02-2318-00).

[14][7]  Rollo, pp. 84-85.

[15][8] Id. at 86-89.

[16][9] Id. at 109.

[17][10]Id. at 110.

[18][11]Id. at 111.

[19][12]Id. at 112.

[20][13]Id. at 113.

[21][14]Id. at 114.

[22][15] Id. at 97, 115-117.

[23][16] Id. at 120-121.

[24][17]Id. at 119.

[25][18]Id. at 97, 115-117.

[26][19]Id. at 119.

[27][20]Id. at 121.

[28][21]Id. at 143-153. The Decision was rendered by Provincial Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr.

[29][22] Private respondents’ appeal to the DARAB was docketed as DCN R-03-02-2318’00.

[30][23] The DARAB Decision was penned by Assistant Secretary/Vice Chairperson Augusto P. Quijano and concurred in by Nasser C. Pangandaman, Nestor R. Acosta and Narciso B. Nieto, rollo, pp. 64-72.

[31][24] Rollo, pp. 75-76.

[32][25] See note 1.  

[33][26] Rollo, p. 47.

[34][27] DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994 [Rules Governing the Correction and Cancellation of Unregistered Emancipation Patents (EPs), and Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) due to Unlawful Acts and Omissions or Breach of Obligations of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs) and for Other Causes], Part IV, A.

[35][28]Id. at Part IV, C.

[36][29]Id. at Part IV, D.

[37][30] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m).

[38][31] Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

[39][32] Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 423.

[40][33] G.R. No. 171631, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 610.

[41][34] Hemedes v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 692 (1999).

Comment

CASE 2012-0059: SPOUSES NICANOR MAGNO AND CARIDAD MAGNO VS. HEIRS OF PABLO PARULAN, REPRESENTED BY EMILIANO PARULAN, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, BALIUAG, BULACAN, OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GUIGUINTO, BULACAN (G. R. NO. 183916, APRIL 25, 2012, SERENO, J.) SUBJECT/S: TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX PAYMENTS NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP; OCT IS IMPRESSED WITH PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY; WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES MAGNO VS. HEIRS OF PARULAN)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment

CASE 2012-0059: SPOUSES NICANOR MAGNO AND CARIDAD MAGNO VS. HEIRS OF PABLO PARULAN, REPRESENTED BY EMILIANO PARULAN, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, BALIUAG, BULACAN, OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GUIGUINTO, BULACAN (G. R. NO. 183916, APRIL 25, 2012, SERENO, J.) SUBJECT/S: TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX PAYMENTS NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP; OCT IS IMPRESSED WITH PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY; WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES MAGNO VS. HEIRS OF PARULAN)

 

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DISPOSITIVE:

 

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The 16 April 2008 Decision and 17 July 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100781 are AFFIRMED.

 

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

 

PETITIONERS PURCHASED A FENCED PROPERTY WITH TAX DECLARATION. LATER THEY DISCOVERED THAT PORTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS INCLUDED IN THE PROPERTY OF RESPONDENTS WHICH HAVE OCT. PETITIONERS THEN FILED A PETITION TO CORRECT THE OCT. THEIR PROOF CONSISTED OF TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS? ARE THESE SUFFICIENT PROOFS?

 

 

NO. THEY ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE. WELL SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OR OF THE RIGHT TO POSSESS LAND WHEN NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE. THE FACT THAT THE DISPUTED PROPERTY MAY HAVE BEEN DECLARED FOR TAXATION PURPOSES IN THE NAMES OF THE APPLICANTS FOR REGISTRATION OR OF THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST DOES NOT NECESSARILY PROVE OWNERSHIP. THEY ARE MERELY INDICIA OF A CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP.

 

 

However, the DARAB and the CA were not swayed by these tax declarations, and rightly so. As we held in Republic v. dela Paz,[1][33]

 

Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

 

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

CAN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) BE ATTACKED AND  REVISED OR AMENDED  BE ATTACKED?

 

 

THE OCT COVERING THE CONTESTED LOT CARRIES WITH IT A PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY.[2][30]  THE PETITION TO CORRECT/CANCEL THE OCT  CAN PROSPER ONLY IF PETITIONERS ARE ABLE TO PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT A PORTION OF THEIR LOT WAS ERRONEOUSLY COVERED BY THE PATENT. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REFERS TO SUCH RELEVANT EVIDENCE AS A REASONABLE MIND MIGHT ACCEPT AS ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A CONCLUSION.[3][31]

 

 

However, the DAR’s issuance of an Emancipation Patent and the corresponding OCT covering the contested lot carries with it a presumption of regularity.[4][30]  The Petition to correct/cancel Pablo’s Emancipation Patent can prosper only if petitioners are able to present substantial evidence that a portion of their lot was erroneously covered by the patent. Substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[5][31]

 

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?

 

 

ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION REQUIRES PUBLIC, PEACEFUL, UNINTERRUPTED AND ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.[6][32] 

 

 

                Petitioners claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Emilia, became the owner of the lot in question by virtue of acquisitive prescription.  Acquisitive prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner.[7][32]  To prove this, petitioners offered in evidence two tax declarations in the name of Emilia declaring her ownership of a 1.552 ha. riceland in Biñang 1st Bocaue, Bulacan for tax purposes.

 

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 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
BaguioCity

 

SECOND DIVISION

 

SPOUSES NICANOR MAGNO and CARIDAD MAGNO,

                                           Petitioners,

 

 

                     – versus –

 

 

HEIRS OF PABLO PARULAN, represented by EMILIANO PARULAN, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, BALIUAG, BULACAN, OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GUIGUINTO, BULACAN,

                                      Respondents.           

 

 G. R. No. 183916

 

Present:

 

CARPIO,

  BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

 

 

 

Promulgated:

 

April 25, 2012

 

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – — – x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

SERENO, J.:

 

For resolution is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the 16 April 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100781,[8][1] which affirmed the dismissal by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of the petitioners’ Petition for Correction and/or Cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of  private  respondents’ predecessor-in-interest.    Also assailed  in
this petition is the CA Resolution dated 17 July 2008, which denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

 

On 17 January 1972, petitioner spouses Nicanor and Caridad Magno (petitioners) bought a 1.5520 hectare (or 15,520 sq. m.) riceland at Biñang 1st, Bocaue, Bulacan from Emilia de Guzman (Emilia), as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale.[9][2]  According to the Deed of Sale, the purchased lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 2386 and is bounded by lots owned by the following persons:  in the north, by Apolonio Santos; in the east, by Apolonio Santos and Eleuterio Santiago; in the south, by Eleuterio Santiago; and in the west, by Apolonio Santos. Petitioners further allege that the purchased lot is also described in the year 2000 Tax Declaration/Property Index Number 020-04-006-03-010[10][3]  in the name of Emilia de Guzman, with the following boundaries: lots 1468 and 1469 in the north; Lots 1303 and 1304 in the south; Lot 1306 in the east; and Lot 1301 in the west.

 

The property was enclosed within concrete posts and barbed wires when it was sold to petitioners.  From the time of purchase, they occupied the lot without interruption and devoted it to rice cultivation.  In 1995, they filed before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an Application for Free Patent, as well as a Petition with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) to rectify the Cadastral Survey of Lot 1306, Cad 332, Bocaue Cadastre, for the purpose of excluding a portion of their land from Lot 1306-B, which was then being claimed by Pedro Lazaro’s heirs.

 

Subsequently, petitioners’ tenant and hired laborers were prevented from working on the subject land by Emiliano Parulan (Emiliano), son of Pablo Parulan (Pablo), whose heirs are named respondents herein. Petitioners discovered that a 2,171 square meter portion of their land was included in the 5,677 square meter lot registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669)[11][4] issued in the name of Pablo on 17 December 1999 and registered with the Register of Deeds on              5 January 2000.

 

Petitioners referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) Legal Officer I of Baliuag, Bulacan, Homer Abraham, Jr. The latter issued a Report and Recommendation[12][5] dated 26 October 2000 to Miguel Mendoza, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of PARO, Baliuag, Bulacan, recommending the filing by the Magno spouses of a necessary petition for cancellation/correction of Pablo’s Emancipation Patent (EP) before the DARAB. 

 

Hence, on 15 December 2000, petitioners filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan a Petition[13][6] for Correction of OCT No. T-048-EP, (EP No. 189669) issued in the name of Pablo Parulan.  Apart from the Deed of Sale and the two Tax Declarations, petitioners adduced as documentary evidence the questioned EP/OCT,[14][7] photographs of the property,[15][8] as well as the Report and Recommendation of PARO Legal Officer I Abraham.

 

Presented by petitioners as witnesses during the hearing before the PARAD were Cynthia Mariano (Mariano), an Agrarian Reform Program Technologist (ARPT) of Bocaue, Bulacan; and Fe Jacinto (Jacinto), the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of the same area. Mariano testified that she had been instructed by Jacinto to conduct an investigation of petitioners’ landholding.  On 3 May 2000, she, together with Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairperson Ricardo Benedicto, conducted an ocular inspection of the lot, with farmers from adjacent lots as witnesses.  She thereafter prepared a report, which stated that the subject lot
was fenced and  that  the  actual  tiller  was Renato de Guzman.  Renato informed her that his father, Mariano de Guzman, was the original tenant of the land; and that the adjacent lot outside the fenced lot was being tilled by Emiliano Parulan. According to ARPT Mariano, her ocular inspection yielded the finding that since 1976, the subject lot which has an area of 2,162 sq. m., had actually been tilled by Renato de Guzman, who had been paying lease rentals to spouses Nicanor and Caridad Magno. MARO Jacinto testified by identifying the report she had prepared on the matter.

 

On the other hand, private respondents presented the Kasunduan sa Pamumuwisan between Pedro and Pablo;[16][9] Pablo’s request for a survey of Pedro’s land;[17][10] an endorsements to survey Pedro’s property issued by ARPT Mariano,[18][11] MARO Jacinto[19][12] and PARO Linda Hermogino (Hermogino);[20][13] DAR Regional Director Renato Herrera’s grant of Pablo’s request for survey;[21][14] the Approved Subdivision Plan of Lot 1306, Cad 332, Bocaue Cadastre;[22][15] and the accompanying Lot Data Computation for the land of Pedro Lazaro[23][16] and Emilia de Guzman.[24][17]

 

Private respondents argued that the June 1973 Kasunduan sa Pamumuwisan between Pablo and Pedro Lazaro showed that the former was the agricultural lessee of the latter. In January 1999, Pablo requested the MARO for authority to survey the property of Pedro pursuant to his EP Application over the land he was then tenanting. On 1 February 1999, Bocaue ARPT Mariano reported to Bocaue MARO Jacinto that, based         on the former’s investigation/ocular inspection, Pedro’s 15,178 sq. m. property was covered by the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree  27.    Since   Pablo  was   the actual  tiller  of   the  land,  the  ARPT recommended the grant of a Survey Authority and Approval as requested. This recommendation was endorsed by MARO Jacinto to PARO Hermogino, who in turn endorsed it to DAR Regional Director Renato Herrera.  Director Herrera granted Pablo’s request for a survey pursuant to the latter’s EP application.

 

As indicated in the resulting Approved Subdivision Plan (of Lot1306, Cad 332 Bocaue Cadastre),[25][18] it was based on the Original Survey of Lot 1306 in May 1960. The Lot Data Computation accompanying the Subdivision Plan denominated Emilia’s lot as Lot 1302 with an area of 9,604.82 sq. m.,[26][19] while that of Pedro was Lot 1306 with an area of 15,171.85 sq. m.[27][20] The Subdivision Plan also showed that Lot 1306 was subdivided into Lot 1306-A (or Lot 4557) containing an area of 7,601 sq. m.; Lot 1306-B (or Lot 4558) which had 5,677 sq. m.; and Lot 1306-C (or Lot 4559) with 1,900 sq. m.  It appears that Lot 1306-B or Lot 4558 was further subdivided into Lot 4558-A with an area of 2,162 sq. m. andLot 4558-B with an area of 3,508 sq. m. The contested lot isLot 4558-A.  Clearly, private respondents argued, OCT No. T-048-EP(M), EP No. 189669, was properly issued to Pablo for his 5,677 sq. m. lot in Biñang, which encompassed the contested 2,162 sq. m. lot.

 

After the parties filed their respective pleadings with the attached Affidavits of witnesses and other evidence, the PARAD issued a Decision[28][21] dated 26 February 2003 granting the Petition. Relying on the Tax Declarations in the name of Emilia, the PARAD noted that Emilia had owned a 1.5 ha. riceland in Biñang 1st, which she sold to petitioners. Meanwhile, the Rice and Corn Production Survey and the report of ARPT Mariano showed that the contested lot was actually being tilled by Renato de Guzman, the son of Mariano de Guzman, who was the registered tenant of Emilia.  Thus, the PARAD concluded that in the EP issued in favor of Pablo, there were technical errors that encroached upon petitioners’ property.  The dispositive portion of the PARAD Decision reads:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:

 

1.  Ordering the correction and cancellation of OCT No. T-048-EP in the name of Pablo Parulan;

2.  Ordering the correction of the approved subdivision plan ofLot1306; Cad. 322, Bocaue, Cadastre Cad-03-012347-AR;

3.  Ordering the DAR to conduct the necessary subdivision survey ofLot4558 in the presence of both party-claimants to coincide with the actual and real possession and status of actual claimants of the two adjacent lots;

4.  Ordering the Register of Deeds of Guiginto, Bulacan, to effect the correction and cancellation of EP No. 048 and register of the correct EP that will be issued by the DAR covering the corrected lot.

 

All other claims and counter claims by the parties are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

Private respondents appealed[29][22] the PARAD Decision to the DARAB.

 

On 22 February 2007, the DARAB issued a Decision[30][23] reversing the PARAD, to wit:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated February 26, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new Judgment rendered:

 

1.  DISMISSING the instant petition for correction and/or cancellation of OCT No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669) for lack of merit;

2.  DECLARING the lot in question as part and parcel of lot 1306 as surveyed for Pablo Parulan (“Annex I”);

3.  MAINTAINING and AFFIRMING the validity and integrity of OCT No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189669) in the name of the late Pablo Parulan;

4.  ORDERING petitioners-appellees to vacate the premises in question and surrender the possession and cultivation thereof to herein private respondent heirs of the late Pablo Parulan. Moreover, petitioners-appellees are likewise ordered to remove the fence they have constructed on the lot in question at their own expense.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the DARAB in its Resolution[31][24] dated 2 July 2007.

 

Undaunted, petitioners appealed the DARAB Decision and Resolution to the CA.

 

In its 16 April 2008 Decision,[32][25] the CA affirmed in toto the assailed Decision and Resolution of the DARAB.

 

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its 17 July 2008 Resolution.[33][26]  Hence, petitioners filed with this Court the present Petition for Review under Rule 45.

 

The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the DARAB’s dismissal of petitioners’ Petition for Cancellation and/or Correction of OCT No. T-048-EP (EP No. 189969).

 

We deny the Petition.

 

 

Under DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994, emancipation patents may be cancelled by the PARAD or the DARAB for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. [34][27] The same administrative order further states that “administrative corrections may include non-identification of spouse, correction of civil status, corrections of technical descriptions and other matters related to agrarian reform;”[35][28] and that the DARAB’s decision “may include cancellation of registered EP/CLOA, reimbursement of lease rental as amortization to ARBs, reallocation of the land to qualified beneficiary, perpetual disqualification to become an ARB, and other ancillary matters related to the cancellation of the EP or CLOA.”[36][29]

 

        However, the DAR’s issuance of an Emancipation Patent and the corresponding OCT covering the contested lot carries with it a presumption of regularity.[37][30]  The Petition to correct/cancel Pablo’s Emancipation Patent can prosper only if petitioners are able to present substantial evidence that a portion of their lot was erroneously covered by the patent. Substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[38][31]

 

        As correctly held by the DARAB and the CA, petitioners have failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that the contested lot was part of their property.

 

        Petitioners claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Emilia, became the owner of the lot in question by virtue of acquisitive prescription.  Acquisitive prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner.[39][32]  To prove this, petitioners offered in evidence two tax declarations in the name of Emilia declaring her ownership of a 1.552 ha. riceland in Biñang 1st Bocaue, Bulacan for tax purposes.

 

        However, the DARAB and the CA were not swayed by these tax declarations, and rightly so. As we held in Republic v. dela Paz,[40][33]

 

Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

 

 

        A further examination of the tax declarations further confirms their lack of probative value.

 

As observed by the CA, Tax Declaration No. 2386 for the year 1967, like the 1972 Deed of Sale between petitioners and Emilia, did not contain any technical description of the property. Hence, these documents fail to establish ownership over the contested lot by Emilia or petitioners.

 

On the other hand, the Tax Declaration for the year 2000 with Property Index Number 020-04-006-03-010 showed that petitioners’ land is bound on the east by lot 1306. Hence, the DARAB logically concluded that lot 1306, of which the contested lot is a part of, is outside the boundaries of petitioners’ land. Notably too, both the DARAB and the CA found it curious that the 2000 Tax Declaration was still in the name of Emilia, considering that petitioners were supposed to have bought the land from her 27 years ago. If petitioners exercise ownership over the land since 1972 when they purchased the same, it is they who should have been paying the realty tax thereon.

 

Also, we do not lose sight of the fact that the 2000 Tax Declaration was made only after the subject EP/OCT had already been issued. A mere tax declaration cannot defeat a certificate of title.[41][34]

 

Petitioners also presented ARPT Mariano and MARO Jacinto to prove their claim that they were the owners of the contested lot. However, as noted by the PARAD, ARPT Mariano’s report relied only on the allegations of petitioners, and her ocular inspection was made in the absence of private respondents. Meanwhile, MARO Jacinto never verified ARPT Mariano’s ocular inspection.

 

In contrast to the evidence adduced by petitioners, the EP /OCT they sought to impugn contained a technical description of the metes and bounds of Pablo’s  property.  Moreover,  that  technical description was  based on a

1999 Approved Subdivision Plan following the original May 1960 Cadastral Survey of Lot 1306, Cad 332, Bocaue Cadastre. The process by which this subdivision plan came into existence was also established by the documents showing the series of endorsements by the various government officials who acted on Pablo’s application and request.

 

We therefore affirm the CA ruling that the evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient to controvert the accuracy of the technical description of the land properly covered by the subject EP/OCT.  As pointed out by the DARAB, petitioners should have presented expert witnesses or initiated a relocation survey ofLot1306 to establish the alleged errors in the technical description of the subject EP.

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The 16 April 2008 Decision and 17 July 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100781 are AFFIRMED.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

     Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

       ARTURO D. BRION                              JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                 

         Associate Justice                                                Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

A T T E S T A T I O N

 

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

                                                    ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                        Associate Justice

                                                          Chairperson, Second Division

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                 Chief Justice

 

 

[1][33] G.R. No. 171631, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 610.

[2][30] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m).

[3][31] Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

[4][30] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m).

[5][31] Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

[6][32] Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 423.

[7][32] Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 423.

[8][1]           The assailed Court of Appeals (CA) Fifth Division Decision was penned by Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a Member of this Court) and Arturo G. Tayag, rollo, pp. 35-45.

[9][2]  Rollo, pp. 82-83.

[10][3] Id. at 81. 

[11][4] Id. at  84-85.

[12][5] Id. at 90-91.

[13][6]  The petition was docketed as DARAB Case No. 12275 (Regular Case No. R-03-02-2318-00).

[14][7]  Rollo, pp. 84-85.

[15][8] Id. at 86-89.

[16][9] Id. at 109.

[17][10]Id. at 110.

[18][11]Id. at 111.

[19][12]Id. at 112.

[20][13]Id. at 113.

[21][14]Id. at 114.

[22][15] Id. at 97, 115-117.

[23][16] Id. at 120-121.

[24][17]Id. at 119.

[25][18]Id. at 97, 115-117.

[26][19]Id. at 119.

[27][20]Id. at 121.

[28][21]Id. at 143-153. The Decision was rendered by Provincial Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr.

[29][22] Private respondents’ appeal to the DARAB was docketed as DCN R-03-02-2318’00.

[30][23] The DARAB Decision was penned by Assistant Secretary/Vice Chairperson Augusto P. Quijano and concurred in by Nasser C. Pangandaman, Nestor R. Acosta and Narciso B. Nieto, rollo, pp. 64-72.

[31][24] Rollo, pp. 75-76.

[32][25] See note 1.  

[33][26] Rollo, p. 47.

[34][27] DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994 [Rules Governing the Correction and Cancellation of Unregistered Emancipation Patents (EPs), and Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) due to Unlawful Acts and Omissions or Breach of Obligations of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs) and for Other Causes], Part IV, A.

[35][28]Id. at Part IV, C.

[36][29]Id. at Part IV, D.

[37][30] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m).

[38][31] Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

[39][32] Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 423.

[40][33] G.R. No. 171631, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 610.

[41][34] Hemedes v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 692 (1999).

Comment

LEGAL NOTE 0128: WHAT IS SUPERVISION? WHAT IS CONTROL? WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION? WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?

Filed under: LEGAL NOTES — Leave a comment
June 11, 2012

LEGAL NOTE 0128: WHAT IS SUPERVISION? WHAT IS CONTROL? WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE  OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION? WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?

 

 

SOURCE: SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, COMPOSED OF DEBORAH T. MARCO (IMMEDIATE PAST PRESIDENT), ATTY. MEDINO L. ACUBA, ENGR. MANUEL C. OREJOLA, ALFONSO F. QUILAPIO, RAUL DE GUZMAN AND PONCIANO R. ROSALES (GENERAL MANAGER AND EX OFFICIO DIRECTOR) VS. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR. (G.R. NO. 173840, APRIL 25, 2012, PERALTA, J.:) SUBJECT/S: MEANING OF SUPERVISION; MEANING OF CONTROL; PRIMARY JURISDICTION; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. (BRIEF TITLE: SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOP VS. SELUDO, JR.

==================

 

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

 

        WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated  January 26, 2006 and July 12, 2006, respectively, as well as the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, dated May 6, 2005 and September 15, 2005, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Urgent Petition for Prohibition (Special Civil Action No. C-2005-1085) filed by respondent Ananias D. Seludo, Jr.

 

        SO ORDERED.

 

 

==================

 

 

PD NO. 1645 EXPRESSLY PROVIDES AUTHORITY TO NEA TO EXERCISE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER ELECTRIC COOPRATIVES. WHAT DOES SUPERVISION MEAN?

 

 

IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, SUPERVISION MEANS OVERSEEING OR THE POWER OR AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER TO SEE THAT SUBORDINATE OFFICERS PERFORM THEIR DUTIES.[1][5]  IF THE LATTER FAIL OR NEGLECT TO FULFILL THEM, THE FORMER MAY TAKE SUCH ACTION OR STEP AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW TO MAKE THEM PERFORM THEIR DUTIES.[2][6]

 

 

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WHAT DOES CONTROL MEAN?

 

 

CONTROL, ON THE OTHER HAND, MEANS THE POWER OF AN OFFICER TO ALTER OR MODIFY OR NULLIFY OR SET ASIDE WHAT A SUBORDINATE OFFICER HAD DONE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AND TO SUBSTITUTE THE JUDGMENT OF THE FORMER FOR THAT OF THE LATTER.[3][7] 

 

 

A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric cooperatives. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.[4][5]  If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.[5][6] Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.[6][7] 

 

Section 38 (1), Chapter 7, Book 4 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 provides, thus:

 

                                Supervision and control shall  include the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

            The Court, therefore, finds it erroneous on the part of the CA to rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply in the present case. It is true that the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent.[7][8] However, the basic issue in the present case is not whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent; rather, the issue is who between the RTC and the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II. A careful reading of the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant to its power of supervision and control, the NEA is granted  the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations  with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645.

 

            In this regard, the Court agrees with petitioners’ argument that to sustain the petition for prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC would constitute an unnecessary intrusion into the NEA’s power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives.

 

            Based on the foregoing discussions, the necessary conclusion that can be arrived at is that, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, the NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution.

 

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THE SAMAR ELECTRIC COOP BOARD ISSUED A RESOLUTION BARRING RESPONDENT FROM PARTICIPATING IN MEETINGS. RESPONDENT FILED CASE FOR PROHIBITION. RTC GRANTED PROHIBITION. WAS RTC CORRECT?

 

 

NO BECAUSE NEA HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE COOP. PD 1645 PROVIDES THAT NEA HAS SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER THE ELECTRIC COOP.

 

 

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WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION?

 

 

IT APPLIES WHERE A CLAIM IS ORIGINALLY COGNIZABLE IN THE COURTS BUT UNDER A REGULATORY SCHEME SUCH CLAIM HAS BEEN PLACED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. IN SUCH A CASE, THE COURT MAY SUSPEND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS PENDING REFERRAL OF THE CLAIM TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. THE COURT MAY ALSO DISMISS THE CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE IF THE PARTIES WOULD NOT BE UNFAIRLY DISADVANTAGED.

 

 

          It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.[8][9]  In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.[9][10]

 

 

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WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?

 

 

IF A REMEDY WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY CAN BE RESORTED TO BY GIVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO DECIDE ON A MATTER THAT COMES WITHIN HIS JURISDICTION, THEN SUCH REMEDY MUST BE EXHAUSTED FIRST BEFORE THE COURT’S POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW CAN BE SOUGHT.[10][12]

 

 

        Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The Court, in a long line of cases,[11][11] has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him.  Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought.[12][12] The premature resort to the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.[13][13] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.[14][14]

 

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WHAT ARE  THE REASONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?

 

 

THE AVAILMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY ENTAILS LESSER EXPENSES.

 

 

IT PROVIDES FOR A SPEEDIER DISPOSITION OF CONTROVERSIES.[15][16

 

 

IT GIVES THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONCERNED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT ITS ERROR AND DISPOSE OF THE CASE.[16][17]

 

 

 

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.[17][15] The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.[18][16] Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.[19][17]

 

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WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?

 

 

(A) WHERE THERE IS ESTOPPEL ON THE PART OF THE PARTY INVOKING THE DOCTRINE;

 

 

(B) WHERE THE CHALLENGED ADMINISTRATIVE ACT IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION;

 

 

(C) WHERE THERE IS UNREASONABLE DELAY OR OFFICIAL INACTION THAT WILL IRRETRIEVABLY PREJUDICE THE COMPLAINANT;

 

 

 (D) WHERE THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IS RELATIVELY SO SMALL AS TO MAKE THE RULE IMPRACTICAL AND OPPRESSIVE;

 

 

 (E) WHERE THE QUESTION INVOLVED IS PURELY LEGAL AND WILL ULTIMATELY HAVE TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURTS OF JUSTICE;

 

 

(F) WHERE JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IS URGENT;

 

 

(G) WHERE THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE MAY CAUSE GREAT AND IRREPARABLE DAMAGE;

 

 

(H) WHERE THE CONTROVERTED ACTS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS;

 

 

(I) WHERE THE ISSUE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES HAS BEEN RENDERED MOOT;

 

 

(J) WHERE THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY;

 

 

(K) WHERE STRONG PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED; AND

 

 

(L) IN QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS.[20][18]

 

 

True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[21][18]

 

        Respondent, however, failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the above-enumerated exceptions. While respondent alleged in his Urgent Petition for Prohibition that the subject resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of his right to due process, mere allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been specifically granted by law to special government agencies.[22][19] Moreover, the issues raised in the petition for prohibition, particularly the issue of whether or not there are valid grounds to disallow respondent from attending SAMELCO’s Board meetings and to disqualify him from running for re-election as a director of the said Board, are not purely legal questions. Instead, they involve a determination of factual matters which fall within the competence of the NEA to ascertain.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT OTHER GROUND FOR DENYING THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION?

 

 

ONE OF THE REQUISITES FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION TO ISSUE IS THAT THERE IS NO PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.[23][20]

 

 

 

        Finally, the Court agrees with petitioners’ contention that the availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint filed before the NEA precludes respondent from filing a petition for prohibition before the court. It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ of prohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[24][20] In order that prohibition will lie, the petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies.[25][21]  Thus, respondent’s failure to file a complaint before the NEA prevents him from filing a petition for prohibition before the RTC.

 

===================

 

 

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

BaguioCity

 

THIRD DIVISION

 

SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, composed of DEBORAH T. MARCO (Immediate Past President), ATTY. MEDINO L. ACUBA, ENGR. MANUEL C. OREJOLA, ALFONSO F. QUILAPIO, RAUL DE GUZMAN and PONCIANO R. ROSALES (General Manager and Ex Officio Director),

                                    Petitioners,

 

                – versus –

 

ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR.,

                                      Respondent.

 G.R. No. 173840

 

 

Present:

 

VELASCO, J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,

ABAD,

MENDOZA, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

 

 

Promulgated:

 

 

      April 25, 2012

x—————————————————————————————–x

 

 

DECISION

 

PERALTA, J.:

 

        Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision[26][1] and Resolution[27][2] dated January 26, 2006 and July 12, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 01175. The CA Decision dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari and affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbiga,Samar, Branch 33, dated May 6, 2005 and September 15, 2005, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

        Herein petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) was organized under the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269, otherwise known as the “National Electrification Administration Decree,” as amended by P.D. No. 1645. The individual petitioners are members of SAMELCO II’s Board of Directors.  Respondent was also a member of the SAMELCO II Board of Directors having been elected thereto in 2002 and whose term of office expired in May 2005.

 

        The antecedent facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II), an electric cooperative providing electric service to all members-consumers in all municipalities within the Second Congressional District of theProvinceofSamar, individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005 on January 22, 2005.

 

                   The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same resolution also disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district elections.

 

                   Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had been curtailed by the subject board resolution, private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against petitioner SAMELCO II, impleading individual petitioners as directors thereof, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga,Samar. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. C-2005-1085 and was raffled to Branch 33 of the said court x x x.

 

                   In his petition, private respondent prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 5, [Series] of 2005, contending that it was issued without any legal and factual bases. He likewise prayed that a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the individual petitioners from enforcing the assailed board resolution.

 

                   Granting private respondent’s prayer for a TRO, the public respondent issued one, effective for seventy-two (72) hours which effectivity was later on extended for another seventeen (17) days.

 

                   In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Individual petitioners assert that, since the matter involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II, primary jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification Administration (NEA).

 

                   In her assailed Order dated May 6, 2005, [the RTC judge] sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petition for prohibition and barred the petitioners and/or their representatives from enforcing Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005.

 

                   x x x[28][3]

 

        Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in its September 15, 2005 Order.

 

        Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing its assailed Orders.

 

        On January 26, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and affirming the assailed Orders of the RTC.

 

        Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its July 12, 2006 Resolution.

 

        Hence, the instant petition with the following assigned errors:

 

          (1)

IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED LEGAL ERRORS IN LIMITING THE DOCTRINE TO “CERTAIN MATTERS IN CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING SPECIALIZED DISPUTES” AND IN UPHOLDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT OVER THE URGENT PETITION FOR PROHIBITION FILED BY RESPONDENT SELUDO ON THE GROUND THAT THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN “DO NOT REQUIRE THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE OF THE NEA”

 

(2)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN SUSTAINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT, COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY HOLDING THAT “A PERUSAL OF THE LAW CREATING THE NEA DISCLOSES THAT THE NEA WAS NOT GRANTED THE POWER TO HEAR AND DECIDE CASES INVOLVING THE VALIDITY OF BOARD RESOLUTIONS UNSEATING ANY MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS” AND THAT “NEITHER WAS IT GRANTED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS.”

 

(3)

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE JURISDICTION OF [THE] TRIAL COURT OVER THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF APPEAL OR OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THEREIN PETITIONER SELUDO.[29][4]

 

 

        In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the CA erred in interpreting the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in a very limited sense. Petitioners aver that in a number of cases, this Court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction even in cases where the issues involved do not require the technical expertise of administrative bodies.

 

        Petitioners also argue, in their second assignment of error, that it is wrong for the CA to rule that there is nothing under the law creating the National Electrification Administration (NEA), which grants the said administrative body the power to ascertain the validity of board resolutions unseating any member of the Board of Directors of an electric cooperative. Citing the provisions of P.D. Nos. 269 and 1645, petitioners aver that the NEA is empowered to determine the validity of resolutions passed by electric cooperatives.

 

        In their third assigned error, petitioners assert that respondent is precluded from filing a petition for prohibition considering that, under the applicable laws, it has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

 

        The Court finds the petition meritorious. As the assigned errors are interrelated, the Court will discuss them jointly.

 

        Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1645, provides:

 

Section 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows:

 

Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. − In the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.

If the electric cooperative concerned or other similar entity fails after due notice to comply with NEA orders, rules and regulations and/or decisions, or with any of the terms of the Loan Agreement, the NEA Board of Administrators may avail of any or all of the following remedies:

 

                             x x x x.

 

          (e) Take preventive and/or disciplinary measures including suspension and/or removal and replacement of any or all of the members of the Board of Directors, officers or employees of the Cooperative, other borrower institutions or supervised or controlled entities as the NEA Board of Administrators may deem fit and necessary and to take any other remedial measures as the law or the Loan Agreement may provide.

 

          x x x x  (Emphasis supplied.)

 

 

        In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 7 of P.D. No. 1645, states:

 

Section 7. Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows:

 

Section 24. Board of Directors. − (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions.

 

The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of vacancies, the procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall be defined in the by-laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and regulations.

 

          x x x.  (Emphasis supplied.)

 

 

        A comparison of the original provisions of Sections 10 and 24 of P.D. No. 269 and the amendatory provisions under Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645 would readily show that the intention of the framers of the amendatory law is to broaden the powers of the NEA.

 

        A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric cooperatives. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.[30][5]  If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.[31][6] Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.[32][7]     Section 38 (1), Chapter 7, Book 4 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 provides, thus:

 

                                Supervision and control shall  include the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

            The Court, therefore, finds it erroneous on the part of the CA to rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply in the present case. It is true that the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent.[33][8] However, the basic issue in the present case is not whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent; rather, the issue is who between the RTC and the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II. A careful reading of the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant to its power of supervision and control, the NEA is granted  the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations  with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645.

 

            In this regard, the Court agrees with petitioners’ argument that to sustain the petition for prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC would constitute an unnecessary intrusion into the NEA’s power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives.

 

            Based on the foregoing discussions, the necessary conclusion that can be arrived at is that, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, the NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution.

 

          It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.[34][9]  In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.[35][10]

 

        Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The Court, in a long line of cases,[36][11] has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him.  Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought.[37][12] The premature resort to the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.[38][13] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.[39][14]

 

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.[40][15] The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.[41][16] Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.[42][17]

 

True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[43][18]

 

        Respondent, however, failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the above-enumerated exceptions. While respondent alleged in his Urgent Petition for Prohibition that the subject resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of his right to due process, mere allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been specifically granted by law to special government agencies.[44][19] Moreover, the issues raised in the petition for prohibition, particularly the issue of whether or not there are valid grounds to disallow respondent from attending SAMELCO’s Board meetings and to disqualify him from running for re-election as a director of the said Board, are not purely legal questions. Instead, they involve a determination of factual matters which fall within the competence of the NEA to ascertain.

 

        Finally, the Court agrees with petitioners’ contention that the availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint filed before the NEA precludes respondent from filing a petition for prohibition before the court. It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ of prohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[45][20] In order that prohibition will lie, the petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies.[46][21]  Thus, respondent’s failure to file a complaint before the NEA prevents him from filing a petition for prohibition before the RTC.

 

        WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated  January 26, 2006 and July 12, 2006, respectively, as well as the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33, dated May 6, 2005 and September 15, 2005, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Urgent Petition for Prohibition (Special Civil Action No. C-2005-1085) filed by respondent Ananias D. Seludo, Jr.

 

        SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                        Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

        ROBERTO A. ABAD                        JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

            Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

 

      ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

                                                  Associate Justice

 

 

ATTESTATION

 

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

 

 

                                        PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

             Associate Justice

            Third Division, Chairperson

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

 

                                                        RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                  Chief Justice

 

 

[1][5]           Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92, 152; Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 526, 564; Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 147-148 (1955).

[2][6]           Id.

[3][7]           Id.

[4][5]           Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92, 152; Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 526, 564; Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 147-148 (1955).

[5][6]           Id.

[6][7]           Id.

[7][8]           Section 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance, among others, of a writ of prohibition.

[8][9]           Rosito Bagunu v. Spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011; Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. and Pfizer (Phil.) Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 140, 153; Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. The Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 301, 305.

[9][10]          Id.

[10][12]         Id.

[11][11]         City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008, 571 SCRA 617, 627-628; Buston-Arendain v. Gil, G.R. No. 172585, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 561, 572; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109853, October 11, 2000, 342 SCRA 549, 557.

[12][12]         Id.

[13][13]         Id.

[14][14]         Id.

[15][16]         Id.

[16][17]         Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., supra, at 79-80; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), supra, at 230-231.

[17][15]         Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 73, 79; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), G.R. No. 183142, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 217, 230.

[18][16]         Id.

[19][17]         Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., supra, at 79-80; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), supra, at 230-231.

[20][18]         Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 772, 777, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255, 265-266.

[21][18]         Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 772, 777, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255, 265-266.

[22][19]         Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10, at 559.

[23][20]         Hon. Eduardo Ermita, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary v. Hon. Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino, Presiding Judge, Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines, representing JG Summit Petrochemical Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011; Yusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA 269, 283-284; Ongsuco v. Malones, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 499, 515.

[24][20]         Hon. Eduardo Ermita, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary v. Hon. Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino, Presiding Judge, Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines, representing JG Summit Petrochemical Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011; Yusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA 269, 283-284; Ongsuco v. Malones, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 499, 515.

[25][21]         Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 712, citing Cebedo, et. al. v. Director of Lands, et al., 111 Phil. 1049, 1053 (1961).

[26][1]          Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.., concurring; rollo, pp. 50-55.

[27][2]          Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, Jr., with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring, id. at 56-57.

[28][3]          Rollo, pp. 51-52.

[29][4]          Id. at 30, 36 and 40.

[30][5]         Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92, 152; Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 526, 564; Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 147-148 (1955).

[31][6]          Id.

[32][7]          Id.

[33][8]          Section 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance, among others, of a writ of prohibition.

[34][9]          Rosito Bagunu v. Spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011; Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. and Pfizer (Phil.) Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 140, 153; Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. The Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 301, 305.

[35][10]         Id.

[36][11]         City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued, G.R. No. 150270, November 26, 2008, 571 SCRA 617, 627-628; Buston-Arendain v. Gil, G.R. No. 172585, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 561, 572; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109853, October 11, 2000, 342 SCRA 549, 557.

[37][12]         Id.

[38][13]         Id.

[39][14]         Id.

[40][15]         Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 73, 79; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), G.R. No. 183142, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 217, 230.

[41][16]         Id.

[42][17]         Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., supra, at 79-80; Montanez v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), supra, at 230-231.

[43][18]         Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 772, 777, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 255, 265-266.

[44][19]         Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10, at 559.

[45][20]         Hon. Eduardo Ermita, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary v. Hon. Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino, Presiding Judge, Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines, representing JG Summit Petrochemical Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011; Yusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011, 647 SCRA 269, 283-284; Ongsuco v. Malones, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 499, 515.

[46][21]         Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 712, citing Cebedo, et. al. v. Director of Lands, et al., 111 Phil. 1049, 1053 (1961).

Comment