J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2017-0018: ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS VS. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. (SODACO), ET AL. (G.R. NO. 198209, 22 MARCH, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (QUESTION OF LAW VS QUESTION OF FACT; MODES OF  APPEAL RE RTC DECISION; HEIRARCHY OF COURTS) (BRIEF TITLE: ALMENDRAS VS SODACO)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.

The Resolution dated August 27, 2014 directing petitioner to file a
Consolidated Reply is RECALLED and SET ASIDE.

The Motion for Leave to Enter Appearance as Collaborating Counsel with
Manifestation filed by Atty. Edgar Y. T01res, Jr. which did not bear the
conformity of petitioner is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 AND PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65?

PETITION FOR REVIEW IS LIMITED TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND ERRORS OF JUDGMENT. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CONCERNS ERRORS OF JURISDICTION INCLUDING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

IN THIS CASE PETITIONER RAISED THE ISSUE ON WHETHER A COPY OF A MOTION WAS DULY SERVED TO HIM. THIS IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE RAISED IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED WITH THE SUPREME COURT UNDER RULE 45.

HOW TO DETERMINE QUESTION OF LAW FROM QUESTION OF FACT?

A QUESTION OF LAW ARISES WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE LAW IS ON A CERTAIN STATE OF FACTS. A QUESTION OF FACT ARISES WHEN DOUBT ARISES AS TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF THE ALLEGED FACTS.

THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER AN ISSUE INVOLVES A QUESTION OF LAW OR QUESTION OF FACT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN REPUBLIC V. MALABANAN 18 WHERE THIS COURT EXPLAINED:

A QUESTION OF LAW ARISES WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE LAW IS ON A CERTAIN STATE OF FACT; WHILE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHEN THE DOUBT ARISES AS TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF THE ALLEGED FACTS.

FOR A QUESTION TO BE ONE OF LAW, THE SAME MUST NOT INVOLVE AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE LITIGANT OR ANY OF THEM. THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE MUST REST SOLELY ON WHAT THE LAW PROVIDES ON THE GIVEN SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT MODES OF APPEALING AN RTC DECISION?

THEY ARE:

A) ORDINARY APPEAL OR APPEAL BY WRIT OF ERROR, WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED IN A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION BY THE RTC IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION;

B) PETITION FOR REVIEW, WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED BY THE RTC IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION;

AND  C) PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE SUPREME COURT.

THE FIRST MODE OF APPEAL IS GOVERNED BY RULE 41, AND IS TAKEN TO THE CA ON QUESTIONS OF FACT OR MIXED  QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

THE SECOND MODE, COVERED BY RULE 42, IS BROUGHT TO THE CA ON QUESTIONS OF FACT, OF LAW, OR MIXED QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

THE THIRD MODE, PROVIDED FOR BY RULE 45, IS ELEVATED TO THIS COURT ONLY ON QUESTIONS OFLAW.

SUPPOSE A WRONG MODE OF APPEAL IS RESORTED TO, WHAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE?

THE APPEAL WILL BE DISMISSED.

Section 4 of Circular 2-90 in effect provides that an appeal taken either to this Court or to the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE RULE ON HEIRARCHY OF COURTS?

DIRECT RESORT FROM LOWER COURT TO THE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT BE ENTERTAINED UNLESS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY CANNOT BE OBTAINED IN THE LOWER TRIBUNALS.

Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court departs from the hierarchy of courts. Normally,  direct resort from the lower courts to this Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2017-0008-ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS VS. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. (SODACO), ET AL.

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CASE 2017-0007: JONATHAN Y. DEE, VERSUS HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., (G.R. NO. 224834);  HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., VERSUS ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS,  (G.R. NO. 224871  15 MARCH 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM’L. CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOC. TRINES/DIGEST:

THERE IS A GENERAL RULE THAT STATUTES ARE PROSPECTIVE AND AND NOT RETROACTIVE. IS THIS RULE APPLICABLE TO PROCEDURAL LAWS?

NOT APPLICABLE. A RETROACTIVE LAW TAKES AWAY OR IMPAIRED VESTED RIGHTS UNDER EXISTING  LAWS. PROCEDURAL LAW DOES NOT CREATE  CREATE OR TAKE AWAY VESTED RIGHTS. IT OPERATES IN FURTHERANCE OF REMEDY OR CONFIRMATION OF RIGHTS ALREADY EXISTING. NO VESTED RIGHT MAY ATTACH TO NOR RISE FROM PROCEDURAL LAWS.

“The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that “a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.” The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are pending.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” 40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.’ s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R TC in order:

(a) to first determine if Harvest, et al.’ s payment of filing fees in the amount of P8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;

(b) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.’ s payment of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or

(c) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of ?8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.”

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 SCD-2017-0007-JONATHAN Y. DEE VS. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL.HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL. VS. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

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CASE 2017-0006: WILLIAM C. LOUH, JR. and IRENE L. LOUH, V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, (G.R. No. 225562, 08 MARCH 2017, REYES,J.:) (SUBJECT: INTERESTS AND PENALTIES IMPOSED BY BANKS ON CREDIT CARD DEBTS SHALL BE REDUCED WHEN EXCESSIVE, INIQUITOUS, UNCONSCIONABPE AND EXORBITANT; PRINCIPAL AMOUNT MUST BE THAT IN THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT WHEN CARDHOLDER BECOMES INITIALLY REMISS IN PAYING THEIR OBLIGATION; ATTORNEY’S FEES REDUCED TO 5% OF AMOUNTS DUE FROM 25%; TECHNICAL RULES ON DEFAULT MUST BE FOLLOWED; (BRIEF TITLE: LOUH VS PBI)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution, dated August 11, 2015 and May 23, 2016, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100754, finding the Spouses William and Irene Louh liable to the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the payment of their past credit availments, plus finance and late payment charges of 12% each per annum, PS,064.00 as filing or docket fees, and costs of suit, are AFFIRMED. The principal amount due, reckoning period of the computation of finance and late payment charges, and attorney’s fees are, however, MODIFIED as follows:

(1)    the principal amount due is Pl 13,756.83 as indicated in the

        Statement of Account dated October 14, 2009;

(2)    finance and late payment charges of twelve percent ( 12%) each

per annum shall be computed from October 14, 2009 until full

         payment; and

(3)     five percent (5%) of the total amount due is to be paid as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.”

 SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

BPI IMPOSED INTEREST OF 3.5% PER MONTH? IS THIS LEGAL?

NO. IT IS EXCESSIVE, INIQUITOUS, UNCONSCIONABPE AND EXORBITANT. IT IS VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO MORALS, IF NOT AGAINST THE LAW.

“We held in Chua vs. Timan:

The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on respondents’ loans must be equitably reduced to 1 % per month or 12% per annum. We need not unsettle· the principle we had affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. x x x

Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract thereon. Hence, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand.”

BPI IMPOSED FINANCE CHARGE OR PENALTY OF 6% PER MONTH ON THE ARREARS OF LOUH SPOUSES. IS THIS LEGAL?

NO. IT IS INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE. IF THERE IS PARTIAL OR IRREGULAR PERFORMANCE BY THE DEBTOR, COURTS MAY REDUCE THE PENALTY. BUT EVEN IF THERE IS NO PERFORMANCE, THE PENALTY MAY BE REDUCED BY THE COURTS IF IT IS INIQUITOUS OR UNCONSCIONABLE.

“The same is true with respect to the penalty charge. x x x Pertinently, Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.”

THE LOWER COURTS IMPOSED ATTORNEY’S FEE 0F 25% OF AMOUNTS DUE? IS THIS LEGAL?

NO. IT IS INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE. ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE IN THE NATURE OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES WHICH UNDER ARTICLE 2227 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE SHALL BE EUITABLY REDUCED IF THEY ARE INIQUITOUS OR UNCONSCIONABLE.

THE SUPREME COURT IMPOSED ATTORNEY’S FEES OF 5%.

BPI FIXED THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF P533,836.27, THE AMOUNT DUE WHEN THE CASE WAS FILED. IS THIS CORRECT?

NO. THE PRINCIPAL IS P113,756.83, THE AMOUNT INDICAGTED IN THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT DATED 14 OCTOBER 2009 WHEN LOUH SPOUSES BECAME INITIALLY REMISS IN THE PAYMENT OF THEIR OBLIGATION.

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2017-0006-WILLIAM C. LOUH, JR. AND IRENE L. LOUH VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

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