J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2017-0007: JONATHAN Y. DEE, VERSUS HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., (G.R. NO. 224834);  HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., VERSUS ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS,  (G.R. NO. 224871  15 MARCH 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM’L. CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOC. TRINES/DIGEST:

THERE IS A GENERAL RULE THAT STATUTES ARE PROSPECTIVE AND AND NOT RETROACTIVE. IS THIS RULE APPLICABLE TO PROCEDURAL LAWS?

NOT APPLICABLE. A RETROACTIVE LAW TAKES AWAY OR IMPAIRED VESTED RIGHTS UNDER EXISTING  LAWS. PROCEDURAL LAW DOES NOT CREATE  CREATE OR TAKE AWAY VESTED RIGHTS. IT OPERATES IN FURTHERANCE OF REMEDY OR CONFIRMATION OF RIGHTS ALREADY EXISTING. NO VESTED RIGHT MAY ATTACH TO NOR RISE FROM PROCEDURAL LAWS.

“The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that “a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.” The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are pending.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” 40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.’ s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R TC in order:

(a) to first determine if Harvest, et al.’ s payment of filing fees in the amount of P8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;

(b) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.’ s payment of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or

(c) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of ?8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.”

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 SCD-2017-0007-JONATHAN Y. DEE VS. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL.HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL. VS. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

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CASE 2017-0006: WILLIAM C. LOUH, JR. and IRENE L. LOUH, V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, (G.R. No. 225562, 08 MARCH 2017, REYES,J.:) (SUBJECT: INTERESTS AND PENALTIES IMPOSED BY BANKS ON CREDIT CARD DEBTS SHALL BE REDUCED WHEN EXCESSIVE, INIQUITOUS, UNCONSCIONABPE AND EXORBITANT; PRINCIPAL AMOUNT MUST BE THAT IN THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT WHEN CARDHOLDER BECOMES INITIALLY REMISS IN PAYING THEIR OBLIGATION; ATTORNEY’S FEES REDUCED TO 5% OF AMOUNTS DUE FROM 25%; TECHNICAL RULES ON DEFAULT MUST BE FOLLOWED; (BRIEF TITLE: LOUH VS PBI)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution, dated August 11, 2015 and May 23, 2016, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100754, finding the Spouses William and Irene Louh liable to the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the payment of their past credit availments, plus finance and late payment charges of 12% each per annum, PS,064.00 as filing or docket fees, and costs of suit, are AFFIRMED. The principal amount due, reckoning period of the computation of finance and late payment charges, and attorney’s fees are, however, MODIFIED as follows:

(1)    the principal amount due is Pl 13,756.83 as indicated in the

        Statement of Account dated October 14, 2009;

(2)    finance and late payment charges of twelve percent ( 12%) each

per annum shall be computed from October 14, 2009 until full

         payment; and

(3)     five percent (5%) of the total amount due is to be paid as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.”

 SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

BPI IMPOSED INTEREST OF 3.5% PER MONTH? IS THIS LEGAL?

NO. IT IS EXCESSIVE, INIQUITOUS, UNCONSCIONABPE AND EXORBITANT. IT IS VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO MORALS, IF NOT AGAINST THE LAW.

“We held in Chua vs. Timan:

The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on respondents’ loans must be equitably reduced to 1 % per month or 12% per annum. We need not unsettle· the principle we had affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. x x x

Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no express contract thereon. Hence, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity demand.”

BPI IMPOSED FINANCE CHARGE OR PENALTY OF 6% PER MONTH ON THE ARREARS OF LOUH SPOUSES. IS THIS LEGAL?

NO. IT IS INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE. IF THERE IS PARTIAL OR IRREGULAR PERFORMANCE BY THE DEBTOR, COURTS MAY REDUCE THE PENALTY. BUT EVEN IF THERE IS NO PERFORMANCE, THE PENALTY MAY BE REDUCED BY THE COURTS IF IT IS INIQUITOUS OR UNCONSCIONABLE.

“The same is true with respect to the penalty charge. x x x Pertinently, Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.”

THE LOWER COURTS IMPOSED ATTORNEY’S FEE 0F 25% OF AMOUNTS DUE? IS THIS LEGAL?

NO. IT IS INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE. ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE IN THE NATURE OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES WHICH UNDER ARTICLE 2227 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE SHALL BE EUITABLY REDUCED IF THEY ARE INIQUITOUS OR UNCONSCIONABLE.

THE SUPREME COURT IMPOSED ATTORNEY’S FEES OF 5%.

BPI FIXED THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF P533,836.27, THE AMOUNT DUE WHEN THE CASE WAS FILED. IS THIS CORRECT?

NO. THE PRINCIPAL IS P113,756.83, THE AMOUNT INDICAGTED IN THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT DATED 14 OCTOBER 2009 WHEN LOUH SPOUSES BECAME INITIALLY REMISS IN THE PAYMENT OF THEIR OBLIGATION.

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SCD-2017-0006-WILLIAM C. LOUH, JR. AND IRENE L. LOUH VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

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CASE 2017-0004: DASMARINAS T. ARCAINA AND MAGNANI T. BANTA,   V. NOEMI L. INGRAM, REPRESENTED BY MA. NENETTE L. ARCHINUE, (G.R. NO. 196444, 15 FEBRUARY 2017,  JARDELEZA, J.:) (BRIEF TITLE: ARCAINA ET AL VS INGRAM)

 DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The October 26, 2010 Decision and March 1 7, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107997 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 31, 2008 Order of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sto. Domingo-Manito, dismissing Civil Case No. S-241 for insufficiency of evidence, and ordering Ingram to pay Pl45,000.00 to petitioners, is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. Ingram is ordered to pay petitioners the amount of Pl45,000.00 to earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from July 31, 200856 until the finality of this Decision. Thereafter, the total amount due shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum 57 until fully paid

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

“In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated to deliver all the land covered within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed.49 However, in case there is conflict between the area actually covered by the boundaries and the estimated area stated in the contract of sale, he/she shall do so· only when the excess or deficiency between the fonner and the latter is reasonable.50

Applying Del Prado to the case before us, we find that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. is too substantial to be considered reasonable. We note that only 6,200 sq. m. was agreed upon between petitioners and Ingram. Declaring Ingram as the owner of the whole 12,000 sq. m. on the premise that this is the actual area included in the boundaries would be ordering the delivery of almost twice the area stated in the deeds of sale. Surely, Article 1542 does not contemplate such an unfair situation to befall a vendor-that he/she would be compelled to deliver double the amount that he/she originally sold without a corresponding increase in price. In Asiain v. Jalandoni,51 we explained that “[a] vendee of a land when it is sold in gross or with the description ‘more or less’ does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land. The use of ‘more or less’ or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency.”52 Therefore, we rule that Ingram is entitled only to 6,200 sq. m. of the property. An area of 5,800 sq. m. more than the area intended to be sold is not a reasonable excess that can be deemed included in the sale.53”

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SCD-2017-0004-DASMARINAS T. ARCAINA AND MAGNANI T. BANTA VS. NOEMI L. INGRAM, REPRESENTED BY MA. NENETTE L. ARCHINUE

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