CASE 2017-0007: JONATHAN Y. DEE, VERSUS HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., (G.R. NO. 224834);  HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., VERSUS ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS,  (G.R. NO. 224871  15 MARCH 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:)


DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM’L. CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.

 

SO ORDERED.”


SUBJECTS/DOC. TRINES/DIGEST:

 

THERE IS A GENERAL RULE THAT STATUTES ARE PROSPECTIVE AND AND NOT RETROACTIVE. IS THIS RULE APPLICABLE TO PROCEDURAL LAWS?

NOT APPLICABLE. A RETROACTIVE LAW TAKES AWAY OR IMPAIRED VESTED RIGHTS UNDER EXISTING  LAWS. PROCEDURAL LAW DOES NOT CREATE  CREATE OR TAKE AWAY VESTED RIGHTS. IT OPERATES IN FURTHERANCE OF REMEDY OR CONFIRMATION OF RIGHTS ALREADY EXISTING. NO VESTED RIGHT MAY ATTACH TO NOR RISE FROM PROCEDURAL LAWS.

“The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that “a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.” The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are pending.

 

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” 40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

 

In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.’ s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R TC in order:

 

(a) to first determine if Harvest, et al.’ s payment of filing fees in the amount of P8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;

 

(b) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.’ s payment of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or

 

(c) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of ?8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.”


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 SCD-2017-0007-JONATHAN Y. DEE VS. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL.HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL. VS. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

 

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