J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

RENATO REYES, REPRESENTED BY RAMON REYES VS. LEOPOLDO BARRIOS, SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIA MANALUS-BARRIOS (G.R. NO. 172841, 15 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECTS: TECHNICAL RULES NOT FOLLOWED IN DARAB PROCEEDINGS; PROCEDURE FOR GRANT OF EMANCIPATION PROCEEDINGS; ISSUE ON RIGHT OVER RETAINED AREA UNDER SOLE JURISDICTION OF DAR SECRETARY. BRIEF TITLE: REYES VS. BARRIOS.

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 CASE STORY

REYES FILED A CASE TO OUST BARRIOS FROM HIS FARM ON THE GROUND THAT HIS FARM IS A RETAINED LANDHOLDING. BARRIOS COUNTERED THAT HE IS A TENANT AND LATER IN THE CASE HE WANTED AN EMANCIPATION PATENT IN HIS NAME. HE PRESENTED AFFIDAVITS AS PROOF HE IS TENANT. BUT THE AFFIANTS WERE NOT PRESENTED. SC RULED THAT REYES HAS TO PROVE THAT HIS FARM IS A RETAINED LANDHOLDING AND THAT THE DAR SECRETARY HAS THE SOLE JURISDICTION OVER SUCH ISSUE. AND EVEN IF HIS FARM IS A RETAINED LANDHOLDING HE CANNOT ON THAT GROUND EJECT THE TENANT. THE LAW SPECIFIES THE GROUNDS FOR EJECTING A TENANT AND TILLING A RETAINED FARM HOLDING IS NOT ONE OF THEM. BARRIOS IS A TENANT BASED ON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED INCLUDING AFFIDAVITS WHOSE AFFIANTS WERE NOT PRESENTED. TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE NOT FOLLOWED IN DARAB PROCEEDINGS.  BUT HE CANNOT BE ISSUED AN EMANCIPATION PATENT BECAUSE HE HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS. THERE IS A PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED AND REQUIREMENTS TO BE COMPLIED.

DOCTRINES:

DARAB IS NOT BOUND BY TECHNICAL RULES.

Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 3, Rule I of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure²⁶), the Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, thus:

SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

x x x

c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution of the Board. However, due process of law shall be observed and followed in all instances.

Section 1, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 1, Rule X of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure²⁷) reiterates the non-applicability of technical rules regarding the admission and sufficiency of evidence, thus:

SECTION 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicators shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedures and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. x x x

Thus, in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,²⁸ the Court held:

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes “B” and “C”) although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that ‘Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.’ The same provision states that ‘In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.’²⁹

Besides, the DARAB Rules should be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of agrarian reform and to promote just, expeditious, and inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.³⁰

STEPS FOR ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENT

The Primer on Agrarian Reform³² enumerates the steps in transferring the land to the tenant-tiller, thus:

a. First step: the identification of tenants, landowners, and the land covered by OLT.

b. Second step: land survey and sketching of the actual cultivation of the tenant to determine parcel size, boundaries, and possible land use;

c. Third step: the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). To ensure accuracy and safeguard against falsification, these certificates are processed at the National Computer Center (NCC) at Camp Aguinaldo;

d. Fourth step: valuation of the land covered for amortization computation;

e. Fifth step: amortization payments of tenant-tillers over fifteen (15) year period; and

f. Sixth step: the issuance of the Emancipation Patent.³³

Thus, there are several steps to be undertaken before an Emancipation Patent can be issued. As regards respondent, the records are bereft of evidence indicating that this procedure has been followed.

DOCUMENTS TO BE SUBMITTED SO ONE CAN BE ENTITLED TO  EMANCIPATION PATENT

Furthermore, there are several supporting documents which a tenant-farmer must submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent, such as:

a. Application for issuance of Emancipation Patent;

b. Applicant’s (owner’s) copy of Certificate of Land Transfer.

c. Certification of the landowner and the Land Bank of the Philippines that the applicant has tendered full payment of the parcel of land as described in the application and as actually tilled by him;

d. Certification by the President of the Samahang Nayon or by the head of farmers’ cooperative duly confirmed by the municipal district officer (MDO) of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) that the applicant is a full-fledged member of a duly registered farmers’ cooperative or a certification to these effect;

e. Copy of the technical (graphical) description of the land parcel applied for prepared by the Bureau of Land Sketching Team (BLST) and approved by the regional director of the Bureau of Lands;

f. Clearance from the MAR field team (MARFT)or the MAR District Office (MARDO) legal officer or trial attorney; or in their absence, a clearance by the MARFT leader to the effect that the land parcel applied for is not subject of adverse claim, duly confirmed by the legal officer or trial attorney of the MAR Regional Office or, in their absence, by the regional director;

g. Xerox copy of Official Receipts or certification by the municipal treasurer showing that the applicant has fully paid or has effected up-to-date payment of the realty taxes due on the land parcel applied for; and

h. Certification by the MARFT leader whether applicant has acquired farm machineries from the MAR and/or from other government agencies.³⁴

DAR SECRETARY HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ISSUE  ON WHETHER ONE IS ENTITLED TO A RETENTION AREA.

On the issue of petitioner’s claim that the subject landholding forms part of the retained area awarded to him and his sisters, the Court notes that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s claim. Furthermore, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a retention area.³⁸ Indeed, under Section 3 (3.5), Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, the exercise of the right of retention by the landowner is under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR. Besides, even if the subject landholding forms part of petitioner’s retained area, petitioner landowner may still not eject respondent tenant absent any of the causes provided under the law. The landowner cannot just terminate the leasehold relationship without valid cause.

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D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review¹ assails the 8 February 2006 Decision² and the 29 May 2006 Resolution³ of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90212. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 29 June 1998 Decision and the 7 December 2004 Resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 5504, declaring Leopoldo Barrios as bona fide tenant of the subject landholding. The DARAB reversed the 31 October 1996 Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Board (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga.

The Facts

On 26 September 1995, petitioner Renato Reyes (petitioner) filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform, Region III, PARAD of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint for ejectment against respondent Leopoldo Barrios (respondent). The case was docketed as DARAB CASE No. 1089-P’95.

The case involves a parcel of land measuring approximately 3.6 hectares (landholding)⁴ which forms part of the property with an aggregate area of 527,695 square meters (property)⁵ located at Mapaniqui, Candaba, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14488.⁶ The property was co-owned by petitioner and his four sisters.⁷ Petitioner claimed that the property became subject of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27), except the 3.6‒hectare landholding which was allegedly retained. In his Memorandum⁸ dated 18 September 2007, petitioner averred that he and his sister Leticia V. Reyes are the co-owners of the landholding. Petitioner hired respondent as the overseer of the farm and piggery on the landholding. However, petitioner contended that respondent never remitted the proceeds from the piggery business and the fruits from the landholding.⁹

On the other hand, respondent alleged that he was a tenant of the landholding since 1972 and he even built his house on the subject landholding. Respondent also acted as the caretaker of the piggery business on the landholding. Contrary to petitioner’s allegations, respondent stated that petitioner’s wife took all the proceeds from the piggery business, which later ceased operation due to an epidemic.

When respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearings, petitioner moved to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Respondent alleged that his failure to attend the scheduled hearings was because he received the Notice for the 29 February 1996 hearing only on 6 March 1996. Respondent moved for the postponement of the hearing because he was bedridden due to hypertension and heart ailment.¹⁰ However, the PARAD again heard the case ex-parte on 28 March 1996, of which respondent alleged that he was still not notified.

On 31 October 1996, the PARAD rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office renders judgment declaring that herein plaintiff [Renato Reyes] is entitled to recover the possession of the property subject of this present litigation; ordering the defendant [Leopoldo Barrios] or anyone claiming any right or authority under him to vacate the premises in question and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff; and ordering the defendant to pay the sum of P3,000.00 to the plaintiff as attorney’s fees.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.¹¹

Respondent appealed to the DARAB. Meanwhile, respondent passed away on 13 February 1997¹² and was substituted by his spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios.¹³

On 29 June 1998, the DARAB reversed the PARAD decision and held that respondent is a bona fide tenant of the landholding and that he cannot be ejected from the landholding absent any justifiable cause. The DARAB held:

It appears that Respondent-Appellant is listed as farmer-beneficiary of the land transfer program, as evidenced by the Certification issued by the Officer-in-charge of Arayat-Sta. Ana-Candaba Agrarian Reform Team. The fact of tenancy is buttressed by the joint statement dated March 5, 1989 of residents of neighboring lots who attest to Respondent-Appellant’s cultivation of subject lot. As tenant thereon, Respondent-Appellant, therefore, cannot just be ejected. The causes for extinguishment of Leasehold Relation pursuant to Section 36, Republic Act No. 6657 are:

1. Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the lessor;

2. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the lessee, written notice of which shall be served three (3) months in advance;

3. Absence of successor or qualified heir, in case of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee;

4. Judicial ejectment of the lessee for causes provided under Sec. 36 of the Code;

5. Acquisition by the lessee of the landholding;

6. Termination of the leasehold under Sec. 38;

7. Mutual consent of the parties; and

8. Conversion of the landholding for non-agricultural purposes subject to the conditions required by law.

The records are bereft of evidence showing the existence of any of the above-quoted circumstances to justify ejectment of Respondent-Appellant from said landholding.

Under the prevailing circumstances, we hold that Respondent-Appellant Barrios is a bona fide tenant of the landholding.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE, and a new one entered:

1.      Declaring Respondent-Appellant Leopoldo Barrios a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding. However, due to his death during the pendency of this case, the surviving spouse, if qualified, shall succeed; if not, the eldest descendant will succeed or the descending descendant in the order of their age;

2.      Directing the plaintiff-landowner Renato Reyes to reinstate the qualified heir of Respondent-Appellant and to maintain him in peaceful possession as cultivator thereof; and

3.      Directing the DAR Regional Office, through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) to issue Certificate of Agricultural Lease (CAL) after fixing the lease rental therefor.

SO ORDERED.¹⁴

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking for the reversal of the DARAB decision and the reinstatement of the PARAD decision. Respondent, substituted by his spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios, also filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, asking for the modification of the decision by declaring respondent as a beneficiary under PD 27 and to issue an Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent’s surviving spouse Lucia Manalus-Barrios.

In its 7 December 2004 Resolution, the DARAB denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and granted respondent’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration, thus:

In the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, Movant alleged that this Board in its decision has declared that the deceased Defendant-Appellant Leopoldo Barrios is a bona fide tenant on the subject landholding. Moreover, Plaintiff-Appellee maintains that page three (3) of the decision rendered by this Board finds and provides that “Operation Land Transfer (OLT) or Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till and providing the instruments and mechanisms therefore.” Hence, movant prayed that an Emancipation Patent be issued in lieu of the Certificate of Agricultural Lease in consonance with the findings of this Board and DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1988.

Acting on said motion, this Board finds that the appealed decision shows substantial appreciation that deceased Defendant-Appellant was a bona fide tenant on the subject landholding. Likewise, this Board, in the assailed decision sustained the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27, providing “the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil . . .”

From the foregoing findings, the pronouncement of this Board specifically paragraph three (3) of the decision seeks modification. In finding that deceased Defendant-Appellant was a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding and declaring the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, the subsequent issuance of a Certificate of Agricultural Lease as provided in the assailed decision is not in consonance with the findings of the Board. Hence, this Board is constrained to modify or apply the correct conclusions drawn from the facts of the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Motion for Reconsideration dated September 30, 1995 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Whereas, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated October 5, 1998 is GRANTED and a new judgment is rendered, as follows:

1.      Paragraph three (3) of the decision dated June 29, 1998 is hereby modified;

2.      Directing the DAR Regional Director, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), to issue Emancipation Patent in favor of Defendant-Appellant or his heir, herein substitute Defendant-Appellant Lucia Manalus-Barrios;

3.      Directing Plaintiff-Appellee’s successors, co-owners, and the alleged former tenants and all those persons acting on their behalf to vacate the subject landholding and to immediately reinstate the substitute Defendant-Appellant thereto and to maintain her in peaceful possession thereof;

4.      Declaring the landholding fully paid by the defendant-appellant;

5.      Directing the Plaintiff-Appellee’s successors and co-owners to reimburse 75% of palay harvest, of its cash equivalent, on the remaining 12½ croppings to the Defendant-Appellant and deducting therefrom the amount of the expenses incurred by the Plaintiff-Appellee’s successors and co-owners in the present planting season.

Let records of this case be remanded to the Sala of the Honorable Provincial Adjudicator of Pampanga for the immediate issuance of a writ of execution.

SO ORDERED.¹⁵

Petitioner filed another Motion for Reconsideration, which the DARAB denied in its Resolution dated 5 May 2005.¹⁶ Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied the petition for review in its 8 February 2006 Decision. The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its 29 May 2006 Resolution.

Hence, this petition for review.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of the DARAB, thus:

But the petitioner insists that public respondent decided the case at bench against him in defiance of the evidence on record. We do not agree. The DARAB based its findings on the certification dated December 7, 1982 of then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now Department of Agrarian Reform) of Sta. Ana, Pampanga finding Leopoldo Barrios as legitimate farmer-beneficiary over a four (4) hectare unirrigated land owned by Renato Reyes, located at Mapaniqui, Candaba, Pampanga; on the certification issued by the Officer-in-charge of Arayat-Sta. Ana-Candaba Agrarian Reform Team listing respondent-appellant as farmer-beneficiary; and on the joint statement dated March 5, 1989 of residents of neighboring lots who attested to respondent-appellant’s cultivation and occupation of the subject lot.

It bears stressing that in administrative proceedings, as in the case at bench, the quantum of evidence required to sustain a judgment is only substantial evidence. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine differently. Thus, findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded respect, and even finality, by the appellate tribunal, if supported by substantial evidence, this in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration.¹⁷

The Issues

In his petition, petitioner submits that:

1.      THE COURT OF APPEALS BY RULING IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX “A”) THAT THE DARAB WAS CORRECT IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST HIM AS THIS IS SUPPORTED BY THE CERTIFICATIONS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM TEAM OF ARAYAT-STA. ANA-CANDABA, PAMPANGA DENIED PETITIONER HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT NOT ONLY ARE THE EVIDENCE OF BARRIOS IRRELEVANT BUT THEY [ARE] ALSO MERE MACHINE COPIES WHICH WERE NEVER PRESENTED IN A PROPER HEARING WHERE THE PETITIONER CAN SCRUTINIZE THEM AND CROSS-EXAMINE PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THEM.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS LEGAL ERROR AND/OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY FAILING TO CORRECT THE DARAB IN NOT RECOGNIZING PETITIONER’S RIGHT OVER HIS RETAINED AREA WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AWARD IN CLAIM 83-144 OF LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES.¹⁸

The Ruling of the Court

We partially grant the petition. We hold that respondent is a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding, as stated in the 29 June 1998 DARAB Decision in DARAB Case No. 5504. However, the 7 December 2004 DARAB Resolution, modifying the 29 June 1998 DARAB Decision and directing the DAR Regional Director to issue Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent or his heirs, should be set aside.

In this case, the DARAB ruling that respondent is a bona fide tenant is supported by evidence submitted by respondent, which included: (1) certification dated 7 December 1982 of the Arayat-Sta. Ana-Candaba Agrarian Reform Team, Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Region III, Pampanga District, stating that respondent is a bona fide farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer of the four (4)-hectare farmholding owned by petitioner;¹⁹ (2) joint statement (“Salaysay”) dated 5 March 1989 of the former farmworkers of the neighboring farmlots attesting to respondent’s occupation and cultivation of the subject landholding;²⁰ (3) pictures of the subject landholding which was planted with palay crops;²¹ and (4) picture of respondent’s house constructed on the subject landholding.²²

Furthermore, in compliance with the Order²³ dated 30 September 2002 of the DARAB, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Pampanga forwarded to the DARAB the status report on the subject landholding,²⁴ which states:

Republic of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Region III

Municipal Agrarian Reform Office

Candaba, Pampanga

Engr. Rodolfo S. Pangilinan

OIC-PARO

DARPO-Del Pilar,

City of San Fernando Pampanga

Sir:

This refers to the Order dated September 30, 2002 issued by DARCO Appeal Board with the instruction to submit status report of the subject landholding owned by Renato Reyes located at Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga.

That the undersigned conducted ocular inspection/verification and reveal the following finding to wit:

1.      That Renato Reyes the landowner and Leopoldo Barrios tenant are both deceased.

2.      That the subject landholding was taken over by Renato Reyes since 1996 and it is being administered by Antonio Manalus.

3.      That at present the land in question is planted to palay by the administrator Antonio Manalus with the used (sic) of farm labor and 30 mango tree[s] are existing of the subject landholding.

4.      That the house of Lucia Vda. De Barrios was constructed to the subject landholding with an area of 450 square meters more or less.

5.      That the qualified tenant beneficiaries [are] among the surviving heirs of Leopoldo Barrios is the wife of (sic) Lucia Vda. M. Barrios.

In view of the foregoing facts and base[d] on the Order dated September 30, 2002[,] [t]he undersigned schedule[d] mediation conference on November 18, 2002 in preparation of the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold.

Very truly yours,

(signed)

SALVADOR S. TOTAAN

M.A.R.O.²⁵

Under Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 3, Rule I of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure²⁶), the Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, thus:

SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

x x x

c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution of the Board. However, due process of law shall be observed and followed in all instances.

Section 1, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure (now Section 1, Rule X of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure²⁷) reiterates the non-applicability of technical rules regarding the admission and sufficiency of evidence, thus:

SECTION 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicators shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedures and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply. x x x

Thus, in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,²⁸ the Court held:

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes “B” and “C”) although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that ‘Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.’ The same provision states that ‘In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.’²⁹

Besides, the DARAB Rules should be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of agrarian reform and to promote just, expeditious, and inexpensive adjudication and settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.³⁰

Although we affirm the ruling of the DARAB that respondent is a bona fide tenant, we disagree with its order for the issuance of an Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent’s heir, as provided in its Resolution dated 7 December 2004. The records show that when the property was placed under the Operation Land Transfer, respondent was not included in the list of tenant beneficiaries who were issued Emancipation Patents, as noted on the title of the property, TCT No. 14488, which was partially canceled in view of the issuance of the new TCTs in favor of the tenant beneficiaries.³¹

The Primer on Agrarian Reform³² enumerates the steps in transferring the land to the tenant-tiller, thus:

a. First step: the identification of tenants, landowners, and the land covered by OLT.

b. Second step: land survey and sketching of the actual cultivation of the tenant to determine parcel size, boundaries, and possible land use;

c. Third step: the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). To ensure accuracy and safeguard against falsification, these certificates are processed at the National Computer Center (NCC) at Camp Aguinaldo;

d. Fourth step: valuation of the land covered for amortization computation;

e. Fifth step: amortization payments of tenant-tillers over fifteen (15) year period; and

f. Sixth step: the issuance of the Emancipation Patent.³³

Thus, there are several steps to be undertaken before an Emancipation Patent can be issued. As regards respondent, the records are bereft of evidence indicating that this procedure has been followed.

Furthermore, there are several supporting documents which a tenant-farmer must submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent, such as:

a. Application for issuance of Emancipation Patent;

b. Applicant’s (owner’s) copy of Certificate of Land Transfer.

c. Certification of the landowner and the Land Bank of the Philippines that the applicant has tendered full payment of the parcel of land as described in the application and as actually tilled by him;

d. Certification by the President of the Samahang Nayon or by the head of farmers’ cooperative duly confirmed by the municipal district officer (MDO) of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) that the applicant is a full-fledged member of a duly registered farmers’ cooperative or a certification to these effect;

e. Copy of the technical (graphical) description of the land parcel applied for prepared by the Bureau of Land Sketching Team (BLST) and approved by the regional director of the Bureau of Lands;

f. Clearance from the MAR field team (MARFT)or the MAR District Office (MARDO) legal officer or trial attorney; or in their absence, a clearance by the MARFT leader to the effect that the land parcel applied for is not subject of adverse claim, duly confirmed by the legal officer or trial attorney of the MAR Regional Office or, in their absence, by the regional director;

g. Xerox copy of Official Receipts or certification by the municipal treasurer showing that the applicant has fully paid or has effected up-to-date payment of the realty taxes due on the land parcel applied for; and

h. Certification by the MARFT leader whether applicant has acquired farm machineries from the MAR and/or from other government agencies.³⁴

Majority of these supporting documents are lacking in this case. Hence, it was improper for the DARAB to order the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in favor of respondent without the required supporting documents and without following the requisite procedure before an Emancipation Patent may be validly issued.

Moreover, there was no sufficient evidence to prove that respondent has fully paid the value of the subject landholding. As held in Mago v. Barbin,³⁵ the laws mandate full payment of just compensation for the lands acquired under PD 27 prior to the issuance of Emancipation Patents, thus:

In the first place, the Emancipation Patents and the Transfer Certificates of Title should not have been issued to petitioners without full payment of the just compensation. Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 266, the DAR will issue the Emancipation Patents only after the tenant-farmers have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under PD 27. Although PD 27 states that the tenant-farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, it is understood that full payment of the just compensation has to be made first before title is transferred to them. Thus, Section 6 of EO 228 provides that ownership of lands acquired under PD 27 may be transferred only after the agrarian reform beneficiary has fully paid the amortizations.³⁶

Clearly, respondent is not entitled to be issued an Emancipation Patent considering that he has not fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under PD 27.³⁷

On the issue of petitioner’s claim that the subject landholding forms part of the retained area awarded to him and his sisters, the Court notes that there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s claim. Furthermore, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a retention area.³⁸ Indeed, under Section 3 (3.5), Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, the exercise of the right of retention by the landowner is under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR. Besides, even if the subject landholding forms part of petitioner’s retained area, petitioner landowner may still not eject respondent tenant absent any of the causes provided under the law. The landowner cannot just terminate the leasehold relationship without valid cause.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 8 February 2006 Decision and the 29 May 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90212. We REINSTATE the 29 June 1998 Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 5504.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2Rollo, pp. 8-21. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now SC Associate Justice) and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring.

3Id. at 23.

4The Certification dated 7 December 1982 of the Arayat-Sta. Ana-Candaba Agrarian Reform Team states that the land owned by petitioner is a 4-hectare unirrigated farmholding, id. at 250. Petitioner’s complaint states that the retained area is 3.6 hectares. However, in his petition for review, petitioner stated that the retained property is a 3.5 hectare orchard farm which is part of the estate covered by TCT No. 14488 with a total area of 527,695 square meters.

5The property covered under TCT No. 14488 consists of five (5) parcels of land with a total aggregate area of 527,695 square meters.

6Rollo, pp. 355-363.

7TCT No. 14488 states that the property is owned by Maria Pilar Dolores V. Reyes, Consolacion V. Reyes, Renato V. Reyes, Leticia V. Reyes, and Martina V. Reyes, id. at 355.

8Id. at 530-541.

9Id. at 97-100.

10Manifestations & Motion to Postpone Hearing, dated 25 March 1996, CA rollo, pp. 191-192.

11Rollo, pp. 110-111.

12Id. at 243.

13Id. at 388.

14 Id. at 84-85.

15Id. at 90-92.

16Id. at 94-95.

17Id. at 54.

18Id. at 33-34.

19Id. at 250.

20Id. at 254.

21Id. at 314.

22Id. at 315.

23Id. at 399-400.

243^rd Indorsement dated 30 October 2002 signed by the OIC-PARO Engr. Rodolfo S. Pangilinan of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Region III, San Fernando City.

25Rollo, p. 401. Emphasis supplied.

26SECTION 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. ‒ The Board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudication Offices shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.

x x x

c. The provision of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution of the Board.

27SECTION 1. Nature of Proceedings. ‒ The proceedings before the Adjudicator shall be non-litigious in nature.

Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedures and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence obtained in the courts of law shall not apply.

The Adjudicator shall employ reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy including a thorough examination or re-examination of witnesses and the conduct of ocular inspection of the premises in question, if necessary.

28G.R. No. 96492, 26 November 1992, 216 SCRA 25.

29 Id. at 32.

30Rule I, Section 2 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure.

31TCT No. 14488, rollo, pp. 355-363.

32Produced by the Agrarian Reform Communication Unit, National Media Production Center for the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (1979) and prepared in consultation with the Bureau of Land Tenure Improvement, Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Bureau of Resettlement, Center for Operation Land Transfer and the Public Information Division of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, id. at 377-384.

33Id. at 380.

34Primer on Agrarian Reform, id. at 383.

35G.R. No. 173923, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 383.

36Id. at 393.

37Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE) provides that: “After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under P.D. No. 27, an Emancipation Patent which may cover previously titled or untitled property shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.”

38CA Decision, p. 13; rollo, p. 20.

PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (PFDA) VS. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LUCENA CITY, CITY OF LUCENA, LUCENA CITY ASSESSOR AND LUCENA CITY TREASURER (G.R. NO. 178030, 15 DECEMBER 2010). SUBJECTS: GOVT INSTRUMENTALITY NOT SUBJECT TO REAL PROPERTY TAX AND ITS PROPERTY CANT BE AUCTIONED TO PAY FOR TAX DILINQUENCY; WHY PFDA IS NOT A GOCC; BRIEF TITLE: PHIL FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS ET AL.

x – – – – – – – – – – – – –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

DIGEST:

PFDA WHICH MANAGED THE LUCENA FISHING PORT COMPLEX WAS ORDERED  BY LUCENA CITY TO PAY REAL PROPERTY TAX ON THE FISHING PORT. LBAA, CBAA AND CTA ALL AFFIRMED THE ORDER OF LUCENA CITY. SC RULED THAT PFDA IS EXEMPT BECAUSE IT IS A GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY NOT A GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION. BUT PORTIONS OF THE PORT LEASED TO PRIVATE ENTITIES NOT EXEMPT FROM REAL PROPERTY TAX.

DOCTRINES:

PFDA, NOT BEING A GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION IS NOT SUBJECT TO REAL PROPERTY TAX.

The ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals is anchored on the wrong premise that the PFDA is a government-owned or controlled corporation. On the contrary, this Court has already ruled that the PFDA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation.

WHY PFDA IS NOT A GOCC; PROPERTY OF GOVT INSTRUMENTALITY CANNOT BE SOLD AT PUBLIC AUCTION TO SATISFY TAX DILINQUENCY; 

In the 2007 case of Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,⁶ the Court resolved the issue of whether the PFDA is a government-owned or controlled corporation or an instrumentality of the national government. In that case, the City of Iloilo assessed real property taxes on the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex (IFPC), which was managed and operated by PFDA. The Court held that PFDA is an instrumentality of the government and is thus exempt from the payment of real property tax, thus:

The Court rules that the Authority [PFDA] is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government which is generally exempt from payment of real property tax. However, said exemption does not apply to the portions of the IFPC which the Authority leased to private entities. With respect to these properties, the Authority is liable to pay property tax. Nonetheless, the IFPC, being a property of public dominion cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.

x x x

Indeed, the Authority is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the government. The Authority has a capital stock but it is not divided into shares of stocks. Also, it has no stockholders or voting shares. Hence it is not a stock corporation. Neither is it a non-stock corporation because it has no members.

The Authority is actually a national government instrumentality which is defined as an agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.⁷ (Emphasis supplied)

BUT PORTIONS OF THE PORT BEING LEASED TO PRIVATE ENTITIES ARE SUBJECT TO REAL ESTATE TAX.

The exercise of the taxing power of local government units is subject to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the Local Government Code.⁹ Under Section 133(o)¹⁰ of the Local Government Code, local government units have no power to tax instrumentalities of the national government like the PFDA. Thus, PFDA is not liable to pay real property tax assessed by the Office of the City Treasurer of Lucena City on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex, except those portions which are leased to private persons or entities. (UNDERSCORING SUPPLIED).

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review¹ assails the 9 May 2007 Decision² of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. EB No. 193, affirming the 5 October 2005 Decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) in CBAA Case No. L-33. The CBAA dismissed the appeal of petitioner Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) from the Decision of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) of Lucena City, ordering PFDA to pay the real property taxes imposed by the City Government of Lucena on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex.

The Facts

The facts as found by the CBAA are as follows:

The records show that the Lucena Fishing Port Complex (LFPC) is one of the fishery infrastructure projects undertaken by the National Government under the Nationwide Fish Port-Package. Located at Barangay Dalahican, Lucena City, the fish port was constructed on a reclaimed land with an area of 8.7 hectares more or less, at a total cost of PHP 296,764,618.77 financed through a loan (L/A PH-25 and 51) from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan, dated November 9, 1978 and May 31, 1978, respectively.

The Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) was created by virtue of P.D. 977 as amended by E.O. 772, with functions and powers to (m)anage, operate, and develop the Navotas Fishing Port Complex and such other fishing port complexes that may be established by the Authority. Pursuant thereto, Petitioner-Appellant PFDA took over the management and operation of LFPC in February 1992.

On October 26, 1999, in a letter addressed to PFDA, the City Government of Lucena demanded payment of realty taxes on the LFPC property for the period from 1993 to 1999 in the total amount of P39,397,880.00. This was received by PFDA on November 24, 1999.

On October 17, 2000 another demand letter was sent by the Government of Lucena City on the same LFPC property, this time in the amount of P45,660,080.00 covering the period from 1993 to 2000.

On December 18, 2000 Petitioner-Appellant filed its Appeal before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Lucena City, which was dismissed for lack of merit. On November 6, 2001 Petitioner-Appellant filed its motion for reconsideration; this was denied by the Appellee Local Board on December 10, 2001.³

PFDA appealed to the CBAA. In its Decision dated 5 October 2005, the CBAA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The CBAA ruled:

Ownership of LFPC however has, before hand, been handed over to the PFDA, as provided for under Sec. 11 of P.D. No. 977, as amended, and declared under the MCIAA case [Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, 11 September 1996, 261 SCRA 667]. The allegations therefore that PFDA is not the beneficial user of LFPC and not a taxable person are rendered moot and academic by such ownership of PFDA over LFPC.

x x x

PFDA’s Charter, P.D. 977, provided for exemption from income tax under Par. 2, Sec. 10 thereof: “(t)he Authority shall be exempted from the payment of income tax”. Nothing was said however about PFDA’s exemption from payment of real property tax: PFDA therefore was not to lay claim for realty tax exemption on its Fishing Port Complexes. Reading Sec. 40 of P.D. 464 and Sec. 234 of R.A. 7160 however, provided such ground: LFPC is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, PFDA is only tasked to manage, operate, and develop the same. Hence, LFPC is exempted from payment of realty tax.

x x x

The ownership of LFPC as passed on by the Republic of the Philippines to PFDA is bourne by Direct evidence: P.D. 977, as amended (supra). Therefore, Petitioner-Appellant’s claim for realty tax exemption on LFPC is untenable.

WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing, the herein Appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.⁴

PFDA moved for reconsideration, which the CBAA denied in its Resolution dated 7 June 2006.⁵ On appeal, the Court of Tax Appeals denied PFDA’s petition for review and affirmed the 5 October 2005 Decision of the CBAA.

Hence, this petition for review.

The Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals

The Court of Tax Appeals held that PFDA is a government-owned or controlled corporation, and is therefore subject to the real property tax imposed by local government units pursuant to Section 232 in relation to Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code. Furthermore, the Court of Tax Appeals ruled that PFDA failed to prove that it is exempt from real property tax pursuant to Section 234 of the Local Government Code or any of its provisions.

The Issue

The sole issue raised in this petition is whether PFDA is liable for the real property tax assessed on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

In ruling that PFDA is not exempt from paying real property tax, the Court of Tax Appeals cited Sections 193, 232, and 234 of the Local Government Code which read:

Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. ‒ Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Section 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. ‒ A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted.

Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. ‒ The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;

(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes;

(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts and government-owned or -controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;

(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938; and

(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.

Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or -controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

The Court of Tax Appeals held that as a government-owned or controlled corporation, PFDA is subject to real property tax imposed by local government units having jurisdiction over its real properties pursuant to Section 232 of the Local Government Code. According to the Court of Tax Appeals, Section 193 of the Local Government Code withdrew all tax exemptions granted to government-owned or controlled corporations. Furthermore, Section 234 of the Local Government Code explicitly provides that any exemption from payment of real property tax granted to government-owned or controlled corporations have already been withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code.

The ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals is anchored on the wrong premise that the PFDA is a government-owned or controlled corporation. On the contrary, this Court has already ruled that the PFDA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation.

In the 2007 case of Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,⁶ the Court resolved the issue of whether the PFDA is a government-owned or controlled corporation or an instrumentality of the national government. In that case, the City of Iloilo assessed real property taxes on the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex (IFPC), which was managed and operated by PFDA. The Court held that PFDA is an instrumentality of the government and is thus exempt from the payment of real property tax, thus:

The Court rules that the Authority [PFDA] is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government which is generally exempt from payment of real property tax. However, said exemption does not apply to the portions of the IFPC which the Authority leased to private entities. With respect to these properties, the Authority is liable to pay property tax. Nonetheless, the IFPC, being a property of public dominion cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.

x x x

Indeed, the Authority is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the government. The Authority has a capital stock but it is not divided into shares of stocks. Also, it has no stockholders or voting shares. Hence it is not a stock corporation. Neither is it a non-stock corporation because it has no members.

The Authority is actually a national government instrumentality which is defined as an agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.⁷ (Emphasis supplied)

This ruling was affirmed by the Court in a subsequent PFDA case involving the Navotas Fishing Port Complex, which is also managed and operated by the PFDA. In consonance with the previous ruling, the Court held in the subsequent PFDA case that the PFDA is a government instrumentality not subject to real property tax except those portions of the Navotas Fishing Port Complex that were leased to taxable or private persons and entities for their beneficial use.⁸

Similarly, we hold that as a government instrumentality, the PFDA is exempt from real property tax imposed on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex, except those portions which are leased to private persons or entities.

The exercise of the taxing power of local government units is subject to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the Local Government Code.⁹ Under Section 133(o)¹⁰ of the Local Government Code, local government units have no power to tax instrumentalities of the national government like the PFDA. Thus, PFDA is not liable to pay real property tax assessed by the Office of the City Treasurer of Lucena City on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex, except those portions which are leased to private persons or entities.

Besides, the Lucena Fishing Port Complex is a property of public dominion intended for public use, and is therefore exempt from real property tax under Section 234(a)¹¹ of the Local Government Code. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.¹² Thus, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lucena Fishing Port Complex, which is one of the major infrastructure projects undertaken by the National Government under the Nationwide Fishing Ports Package, is devoted for public use and falls within the term “ports.” The Lucena Fishing Port Complex “serves as PFDA’s commitment to continuously provide post-harvest infrastructure support to the fishing industry, especially in areas where productivity among the various players in the fishing industry need to be enhanced.”¹³ As property of public dominion, the Lucena Fishing Port Complex is owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 9 May 2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. EB No. 193. We DECLARE the Lucena Fishing Port Complex EXEMPT from real property tax imposed by the City of Lucena. We declare VOID all the real property tax assessments issued by the City of Lucena on the Lucena Fishing Port Complex managed by Philippine Fisheries Development Authority, EXCEPT for the portions that the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority has leased to private parties.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2Rollo, pp. 65-90. Penned by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., with Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, and Olga Palanca-Enriquez, concurring.

3Id. at 215-216.

4CTA rollo, pp. 60-62.

5Id. at 68-71.

6G.R. No. 169836, 31 July 2007, 528 SCRA 706.

7Id. at 710, 712-714.

8Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150301, 2 October 2007, 534 SCRA 490.

9Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 163072, 2 April 2009, 583 SCRA 234.

10Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code reads:

SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of the Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:

x x x

(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.

11Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. ‒ The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;

12Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006, 495 SCRA 591, 644.

13Lucena Fish Port Complex, <http://www.pfda.da.gov.ph/lfpc.html> (visited 13 December 2010).

CHERRYL B. DOLINA VS. GLENN D. VALLECERA (G.R. NO. 182367, 15 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECTS: FILIATION; REMEDIES FOR CHILD SUPPORT.

DOCTRINES:

REMEDY FOR OBTAINING SUPPORT FOR CHILD IF FATHER DENIES HE IS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD.

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support.  Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.^[1][11]

WHY PATERNITY MUST BE ESTABLISHED FIRST.

. . . If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. . . .

xxxxxx

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.^[2][12]  Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth.  This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case. 

x ———————————————————————————— x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed father.

The Facts and the Case

In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-07^[3][1] for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.^[4][2]  In filling out the blanks in the pro-forma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial support^[5][3] from Vallecera for their supposed child.  She based her prayer on the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the child’s father.  The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.

Vallecera opposed the petition.  He claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the child’s father; that the signature appearing on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.

On March 13, 2008^[6][4] the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support.  Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,^[7][5] with an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support.  Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with this Court.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child.

The Court’s Ruling

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child.  The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence.^[8][6]  Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. 

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.  But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera.  As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father.  He of course vigorously denied this.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged.  Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.^[9][7]  The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.^[10][8]  If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.^[11][9]  In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.^[12][10]

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support.  Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.^[13][11]

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled to protection.  But of course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review.  This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.   

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.^[14][12]  Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth.  This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case. 

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City’s Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008. 

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD 

                                                              Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA      DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                  Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                  

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice