J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GILBERT CASTRO Y AGUILAR (G.R. NO. 188901, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. PEREZ) SUBJECTS: RAPE OF A MENTAL RETARDATE IS STATUTORY RAPE; INCONCISTENCIES IN TESTIMONY; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS. BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. CASTRO.

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DOCTRINES:

INCONCISTENCIES ON MINOR DETAILS DO NOT LESSEN VICTIM’S CREDIBILITY; ARE COMMON AND MAY BE EXPECTED FROM AN UNCOACHED WITNESS.

Appellant’s contention which essentially assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses’ testimony is untenable.   It was observed that on the witness stand AAA remained steadfast and never wavered in her testimony.  She maintained even on cross-examination that it was appellant who defiled her.  The inconsistencies raised by appellant are insignificant matters which are not material ingredients of the crime of rape.  We maintain that inconsistencies on minor details do not lessen a victim’s credibility; are common and may be expected from an uncoached witness.^[1][19]

BARE DENIAL AND ALIBI ARE INHERENTLY WEAK DEFENSES BECAUSE THESE ARE SELF-SERVING AND EASY TO FABRICATE.

On the other hand, We give scant consideration on the defenses proffered by appellant.  This Court has consistently ruled that bare denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses because these are self-serving and easy to fabricate.  For not being substantiated by sufficient evidence, appellant’s defenses failed to overcome or undermine the positive and categorical declarations of AAA.  Notably, appellant contended that on 27 November 2002 at 12 in the afternoon, he was having lunch with his sister.  He, however, failed to present his sister to testify on the truthfulness of his allegation.  Moreover, the incident in question occurred in a place which was just a few meters from his house.  Thus, it was not impossible for him to be at the crime scene during the period alleged by the prosecution witnesses. 

TRIAL COURT IS IN BETTER POSITION TO DECIDE QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS

We must reiterate that, ultimately, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the finding of the trial court unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.  This is so because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.^[2][20]

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DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

          Before this Court is an Appeal,^[3][1] seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision^[4][2] dated 11 May 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision^[5][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 12 convicting appellant Gilbert Castro y Aguilar (Castro) of the crime of rape, with modification as to the amount of damages awarded to the victim.

          In line with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,^[6][4] the real name and identity of the rape victim, is withheld and, instead, fictitious initials are used to represent her.  Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, are not disclosed in this decision.  Instead, the rape victim shall herein be referred to as AAA; her mother XYZ; and her uncle, BBB.

THE FACTS

          The victim in this case is an 18-year old lass with a mental capacity akin to a 5-year old child.  Due to her poor learning capacity, she has not even finished Grade 1 and is unable to read and write. 

          The accused, on the other hand, was then 22 years old and a second cousin of the victim. He testified that he has known the victim for 3 years prior to 5 February 2002, the alleged first rape incident.^[7][5]  They are neighbors whose residences are just two meters apart.^[8][6]

          On 14 February 2003, Castro was charged with two counts of rape before the RTC in informations^[9][7] the accusatory portions of which read:     

Criminal Case No. 771-M-2003

               That on or about the 5^th day of February, 2002, in the municipality of San Ildefonso, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with the use of bladed weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of the said AAA, a mentally retarded, a fact known to the accused, against her will and without her consent.

                        CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 772-M-2003

               That on or about the 27^th day November, 2002, in the municipality of San Ildefonso, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of the said AAA, a mentally retarded, a fact known to the accused, against her will and without her consent.

                        CONTRARY TO LAW.

          Upon arraignment, Castro, with the assistance of counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, the cases were consolidated and trial on the merits ensued.  In the course of the trial, two versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

          As summarized by the RTC and adopted for the most part by the CA, the version of the prosecution^[10][8] is as follows:

       This resolves the alleged rape committed twice on an 18-year old woman named AAA whose IQ & Projected Test concluded at the National Center for Mental Health by psychologist Nimia C. de Guzman resulted to a finding that “Level of intelligence is appraised under the Moderate Level of Mental Retardation (Imbecile) with a numerical IQ of 43 and mental age of 5 years 6 months. xxx Personality profile pictures an immature and inadequate person who has not achieved full development of her learning and social skills.” xxx (See Exh. “D,” Psychological Report) (at pp. 6-20; TSN, April 14, 2005).

        The medico-legal examination conducted on November 29, 2002, to determine the presence of physical signs of sexual abuse has shown that she “is in non-virgin state, physically,” although “there are no signs of application of any form of trauma at the time of examination” (See Exh. “A,” Medico-Legal Report) (at pp. 2-10; TSN, June 26, 2003).

               xxx

        The accused, Gilbert Castro y Aguilar, then 22 years old, single, was AAA’s neighbor whose house was just more than two (2) meters away.  Despite that proximity between their houses and knowing her for years, he denied on the witness stand ever talking to her or to any member of her family.  He was arrested at his house on November 28, 2002, where he contended to be on those dates and time he allegedly had carnal knowledge of the mentally retarded victim (at pp. 3-5, TSN, March 23, 2006; pp. 4-7, TSN, June 22, 2006).

         From the witness stand AAA pointed to accused Castro as the man who raped her for two times, first, during the wake for a deceased neighbor or supposedly on February 5, 2002, when he brought her under a mango tree where he made her lie down on banana leaves and stripped her off her clothings before inserting his penis inside her vagina, and, second, on November 27, 2002, when he did same things to her at the same place under the mango tree.  She said that before that happened the accused used to frequent her place, giving her peanuts and some money (at pp. 2-7, TSN, April 20, 2004).

        What they did on November 27, 2002, was discovered when prosecution witness BBB, their 55-year old neighbor who claimed on the stand to be their uncle and that the two of them were second cousins, caught them in the act of sexual intercourse behind the unoccupied house of her parents at that time under a mango tree, both fully naked.  He had been watching them for three (3) days before, suspicious that they were up to doing something bad.  So when he saw them from his house by the door outside, he approached them making the accused run off away as soon as he saw him coming.  Left behind in her nakedness AAA admitted that she was doing the act with the accused.  So, he covered her with her clothings and walked her to her house and left her parents at the market where they were vegetable vendors.  As soon as told of what he discovered, her parents went home with him and, together that afternoon of the following day, they reported their complaint to the local police where AAA and witness BBB gave their respective statements on the incident (Exhs. “C” and “E”) (at pp. 2-6, TSN, September 29, 2005; pp. 2-13, TSN, October 13, 2005).

Version of the Defense

          To exculpate himself from liability, accused Castro offered both denial and alibi as his defense.  He denied raping the private complainant.  He averred that on 5 February 2002, between 5:00 in the afternoon to 12:00 in the morning, he was attending a funeral wake of a neighbor.  During the alleged second rape, he contended that he was inside their house having lunch with his sister.  After lunch at around 2:00 in the afternoon, he allegedly went to the field to harvest palay.^[11][9]

Ruling of the RTC

          On 2 January 2007, the RTC rendered a decision acquitting Castro in Criminal Case No. 771-M-2003 for failure of the prosecution to clearly establish that accused, with the use of a bladed weapon, assaulted and had carnal knowledge of AAA on 5 February 2002.  The trial court, however, found Castro guilty of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 772-M-2003.  The dispositive portion of the latter decision reads:

       WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Gilbert Castro y Aguilar guilty as principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 772-M-2003, without any circumstance, aggravating or mitigating, found attendant in its commission, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify victim AAA in the amount of P50,000.00, plus another P50,000.00 as moral damages subject to the corresponding filing fees as a first lien, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

   xxx

          Aggrieved, Castro appealed to the CA,^[12][10] assigning the following error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

          Accused-appellant argued that the lower court failed to appreciate the fact that the testimony of private complainant was full of contradictions.  The trial court allegedly gave credence to the inconsistent statements made by AAA which when analyzed are highly illogical. 

          Accused Castro averred that the inconsistent statements of AAA were made apparent during the cross-examination.  She allegedly denied that the accused was courting her despite her previous statement in court that she was being courted by accused-appellant.   Accused also submitted that the failure of AAA to offer any resistance when she was allegedly being sexually molested belies the charge of rape.

 Ruling of the CA

         In its decision dated 11 May 2009, the CA affirmed with modification the findings of the RTC, to wit:

      WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated January 2, 2007 and its subsequent Order dated March 2, 2007 finding accused-appellant Gilbert Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the damages awarded.  Accordingly, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.^[13][11]

          Hence, this appeal.

          In a resolution dated 1 February 2010, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file their supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty (30) days from notice.  In their respective pleadings, both the appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and the appellant, represented by the Public Attorney’s Office, manifested that they will no longer be filing any supplemental briefs in support of their respective positions.  The appellant merely repleaded and adopted all the defenses and arguments raised in his Appellant’s Brief.

          The vital issue before this Court is whether the pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to convict Castro beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA.  In fine, assailed in this recourse are the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and the adequacy of its evidence. 

          This Court has painstakingly perused over the records as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and found no reason to reverse and set aside the findings of the trial court and the CA.  We affirm Castro’s conviction.

          Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that rape is committed:

1)      By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a)      Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b)      When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c)      By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d)     When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

          xxx      

          Clearly, “sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a child below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape.”^[14][12]  Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act.  What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.^[15][13]

          In the case before us, the prosecution was able to establish through clinical and testimonial evidence that AAA is a mental retardate.  It presented and offered the psychological report of Dr. Nimia de Guzman of the National Center for Mental Health stating that AAA was suffering from moderate mental retardation (imbecile) with an IQ of 43 and a mental age equivalent to that of a five and a half year old child.^[16][14]  Likewise, the testimonies of XYZ^[17][15] and the psychologist^[18][16] confirmed the victim’s mental retardation.  

          The aforesaid facts support the allegation in the information that AAA is a mental retardate.  It was even noted by the appellate court that the defense admitted the fact that the victim is suffering from mental retardation, as stated in the accused-appellant’s Kontra Salaysay.^[19][17]

          The prosecution has likewise established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.  We have thoroughly examined the testimony of AAA and found no reason to cast doubt on her categorical and positive declarations of the sexual assault committed against her.   Her narration of the sexual act was straightforward and categorical.  We quote the pertinent portion of her testimony:

          Direct examination by Fiscal Geronimo

          Q:        Do you recall when was the first time that he raped you?

            A:         Yes, sir.

            Q:        Tell us.

            A:         Long time ago, sir.

            Q:        And immediately prior to that incident when you said he raped                                       you, tell us what did Castro do?

                                    xxx

            A:         He laid me down on a banana leaves (sic) on the ground under a                                               mango tree, sir.

                                    xxx

            Q:        Do you recall when was the second time that you said Castro                                        raped you?

            A:         I do not know, sir.

            Q:        When Castro raped you the second time around, before that                                         rape took place, what did Castro do to you?      

            A:         I was stripped of my clothes, sir. (Hinubuan)

            Q:        And where was that?  What place was that?

            A:         The same place, Your Honor.

            Q:        And after Castro stripped of your clothes, what did Castro do?

            A:         Hinipuan po.

            Q:        What part of your body was touched by Castro?
            A:         On my breast and my private organ, sir.

            Q:        After that, what did Castro do?

            A:         He laid down, sir.

            Q:        At that time were you also laying down?

            A:         Yes, sir.

            Q:        That is also under the mango tree?

            A:         Yes, sir.

            Q:        When Castro laid down, what did Castro do?

            A:         He came on top of me, sir.

            Q:        Was Castro at that time without clothes?          

            A:         He was wearing his short, sir.

            Q:        Was that short removed from his body when he went on top of             

                        you?

            A:         Yes, sir.

            Q:        When he came on top of you, what did you feel?

            A:         I feel pain, sir.

            Court:   Are you saying he again inserted his penis inside your                                                     vagina?

            A:         Yes, Your Honor.

            Fiscal:   After that, what did you do?     

            A:         I was the one who is being pushed, sir.

            Q:        Would you please show us the manner by which you were                                

                        pushed by Castro?

            A:         His body is being press (sic) over my body, sir.

            Q:        When you felt pain, after that, what transpired?

            A:         He left me, sir.

            Q:        What about you, what did you do?

            A:         I went home, sir.

            Q:        After that you said, was that after two days you reported the                                         two incidents to your mother?

            A:         Two days after I was raped, the second time, I reported the                             

                        matter to my mother and to the police, sir.^[20][18]

          Appellant’s contention which essentially assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses’ testimony is untenable.   It was observed that on the witness stand AAA remained steadfast and never wavered in her testimony.  She maintained even on cross-examination that it was appellant who defiled her.  The inconsistencies raised by appellant are insignificant matters which are not material ingredients of the crime of rape.  We maintain that inconsistencies on minor details do not lessen a victim’s credibility; are common and may be expected from an uncoached witness.^[21][19]

          On the other hand, We give scant consideration on the defenses proffered by appellant.  This Court has consistently ruled that bare denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses because these are self-serving and easy to fabricate.  For not being substantiated by sufficient evidence, appellant’s defenses failed to overcome or undermine the positive and categorical declarations of AAA.  Notably, appellant contended that on 27 November 2002 at 12 in the afternoon, he was having lunch with his sister.  He, however, failed to present his sister to testify on the truthfulness of his allegation.  Moreover, the incident in question occurred in a place which was just a few meters from his house.  Thus, it was not impossible for him to be at the crime scene during the period alleged by the prosecution witnesses. 

          We must reiterate that, ultimately, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the finding of the trial court unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.  This is so because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.^[22][20]

          This Court likewise affirms the CA’s ruling on the penalty to be imposed on appellant Castro. 

          Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 provides:

          xxx

                        The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is    committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying    circumstances:

            xxx

                        10.       When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

          The information in this case alleges that AAA is a mental retardate and such fact was known to the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime.  These allegations were duly established by the prosecution during trial.  The trial court which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses during the trial ratiocinated the conviction of the accused with the following statement:

            The Court is convinced that indeed herein accused on 27 November 2002, had carnal knowledge of AAA, an 18-year-old woman with a weak mind that her mental age was only that of a five and a half (5 ½) year old child. Her abnormality as a retardate was known to their neighborhood, including the accused, an immediate neighbor. His obstinate denial of ever talking to her and her family is, therefore, a lie.^[23][21]

          We affirm the trial and appellate court’s findings that it was highly improbable for Castro not to have known that AAA was a mental retardate considering that they were cousins and their residences were just two meters apart.   The cause of the prosecution was further strengthened by the testimony of XYZ, the uncle of AAA and appellant.  Unlike other rape cases where the Court’s evaluation is limited to the testimony of the victim and the accused, the instant case had a witness who testified that he personally saw the commission of the crime.  Thus, the imposition of the death penalty would have been proper.

          With the enactment of R.A. 9346^[24][22] on 24 June 2006, however, the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited. Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the property penalty to be imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua.  RA 9346 should  be applied even if the crime was committed prior to the enactment of the law in view of the principle in criminal law that favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda.  Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.^[25][23]           

          In addition, appellant shall not be eligible for parole.  Under Section 3 of RA 9346, “persons convicted with reclusion perpetua, or those whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”

          We likewise affirm the CA’s ruling with regard to the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded.  We sustain the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity despite the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant from death to reclusion perpetua.   As explained by this Court in People v. Victor,^[26][24] the said award does not depend upon the imposition of the death penalty; rather, it is awarded based on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.^[27][25]

          We also find proper the CA’s ruling increasing the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.  Moral damages are awarded without need of proof for mental, physical and psychological suffering undeniably sustained by a rape victim because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.^[28][26] 

          We, however, increase the amount of exemplary damages awarded from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence^[29][27] on the matter.  The Court, in the case of People v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr.,^[30][28] awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders

who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse. 

          WHEREFORE, the 11 May 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02733 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.   Appellant Gilbert A. Castro is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape committed against AAA for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.  He is further ordered to pay AAA the amounts of  P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

          SO ORDERED.

SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION and GAUVAIN J. BENZONAN  vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ROLANDO FABRIGAR, MERLYN VELARDE, VINCE LAMBOC, FELIPE GALINDO, LEONARDO MIGUEL, JULIUS RUBIN, EDEL RODEROS, MERLYN COLIAO and EDGAR JOPSON (G.R. NO. 173326, 15 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECT: CERTIFICATION ON FORUM SHOPPING. (BRIEF TITLE: SOUTH COTABATO COMMUNICATIONS CORP ET AL VS. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS ET AL.)

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DOCTRINES

CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT OF A CORPORATION DOES NOT NEED SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE RE PERTINENT BOARD RESOLUTION

Anent the first procedural issue, the Court had summarized the jurisprudential principles on the matter in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.^[1][15]  In said case, we held that a President of a corporation, among other enumerated corporate officers and employees, can sign the verification and certification against of non-forum shopping in behalf of the said corporation without the benefit of a board resolution.  We quote the pertinent portion of the decision here:

It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.”^[2][16] (Emphases supplied.)

REQUIRED CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING NOT JURISDICTIONAL

Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it bears reiterating that the requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.  However, the Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that, although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.  Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.^[3][18]

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D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to set aside the Resolution^[4][1] dated July 20, 2005 as well as its related Resolution^[5][2] dated May 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN.  In essence, the same petition likewise seeks to set aside the Order^[6][3] dated November 8, 2004 and the Order^[7][4] dated February 24, 2005 of public respondent Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) as well as the Order^[8][5] dated May 20, 2004 of the Regional Director, DOLE Regional XII Office.

The facts of this case, as culled from the Order dated November 8, 2004 of DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas, are as follows:

On the basis of a complaint, an inspection was conducted at the premises of appellant DXCP Radio Station on January 13, 2004, where the following violations of labor standards laws were noted:

1.      Underpayment of minimum wage;

2.      Underpayment of 13^th month pay;

3.      Non-payment of five (5) days service incentive leave pay;

4.      Non-remittance of SSS premiums;

5.      Non-payment of rest day premium pay of some employee;

6.      Non-payment of holiday premium pay; and

7.      Some employees are paid on commission basis aside from their allowances.

A copy of the Notice of Inspection Results was explained to and received by Tony Ladorna for appellants. Later on, or on January 16, 200[4], another copy of the Notice of Inspection Results was received by Felipe S. Galindo, Technical Supervisor of appellant DXCP. The Notice of Inspection Results required the appellants to effect restitution and/or correction of the above violations within five (5) calendar days from receipt of the Notice. Likewise, appellants were informed that any questions on the findings should be submitted within five (5) working days from receipts of the Notice.

A summary investigation was scheduled on March 3, 2004, where only appellees appeared, while appellants failed to appear despite due notice. Another hearing was held on April 1, 2004, where appellees appeared, while a certain Nona Gido appeared in behalf of Atty. Thomas Jacobo. Ms. Gido sought to re-schedule the hearing, which the hearing officer denied.

On May 20, 2004, the Regional Director issued the assailed Order, directing appellants to pay appellees the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Two Pesos (Php759,752.00).^[9][6]

The dispositive portion of the Order dated May 20, 2004 of the Regional Director of the DOLE Region XII Office reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent DXCP Radio Station and/or Engr. Gauvain Benzonan, President, is hereby ordered to pay the seven (7) affected workers of their Salary Differential, Underpayment of 13^th Month Pay, Five (5) days Service Incentive Leave Pay, Rest Day Premium Pay and Holiday Premium Pay in the total amount of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS (P759,752.00), Philippine Currency as indicated in the Annex “A” hereof and to submit proof of compliance to the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of this Order.^[10][7]

Petitioners appealed their case to then DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas. However, this appeal was dismissed in an Order dated November 8, 2004 wherein the Secretary ruled that, contrary to their claim, petitioners were not denied due process as they were given reasonable opportunity to present evidence in support of their defense in the administrative proceeding before the Regional Director of DOLE Region XII Office.  The dispositive portion of the said Order follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal by DXCP Radio Station and Engr. Gauvain Benzonan is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order dated May 24, 2004 of the Regional Director, directing appellants to pay the nine (9) appellees the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos (Php759,752.00), representing their claims for wage differentials, 13^th month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday premium and rest day premium, is AFFIRMED.^[11][8]

Undeterred, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary but this was denied in an Order dated February 24, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by DXCP Radio Station and Engr. Gauvain Benzonan, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Our Order dated November 8, 2004, affirming the Order dated May 20, 2004 of the OIC-Director, Regional Office No. 12, directing appellants to pay Rolando Fabrigar and eight (8) others, the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos (Php759,752.00), representing their claims for wage and 13^th month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and rest day premium, is AFFIRMED.^[12][9]

In light of this setback, petitioners elevated their case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed in the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dated July 20, 2005 because of several procedural infirmities that were explicitly cited in the same, to wit:

1.         The petition was not properly verified and the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was not executed by the plaintiff or principal party in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the affiant therein was not duly authorized to represent the corporation. Such procedural lapse renders the entire pleading of no legal effect and is dismissible. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

            A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

            A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on “information and belief” or upon “knowledge, information and belief” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. x x x.

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:

x x x x

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. x x x.

2.         Annexes A, B, C, E and its attachments and F are not certified true copies contrary to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – x x x

            x x x x

            The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. x x x.

3.         Petitioner’s counsel failed to indicate the date of issue of his IBP Official Receipt. As provided for under Bar Matter 287 dated September 26, 2000:

“All pleadings, motions and papers filed in court whether personally or by mail shall bear counsel’s current IBP official receipt number and date of issue otherwise, such pleadings, motions and paper may not be acted upon by the court, without prejudice to whatever disciplinary action the court may take against the erring counsel who shall likewise be required to comply with the such (sic) requirement within five (5) days from notice. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be ground for further disciplinary sanction and for contempt of court.” x x x.^[13][10]

Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the Court of Appeals ruled in its assailed Resolution dated May 22, 2006 that petitioners’ subsequent submission made them substantially comply with the second and third procedural errors that were mentioned in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated July 20, 2005.  However, the Court of Appeals also ruled that, with regard to the first procedural error, petitioners’ justification does not deserve merit reasoning that “[w]hile it may be true that there are two (2) petitioners and that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan signed the verification and the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition, the records show that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan did not initiate the petition in his own capacity to protect his personal interest in the case but was, in fact, only acting for and in the corporation’s behalf as its president.”^[14][11]  Thus, the Court of Appeals noted that “[h]aving acted in the corporation’s behalf, petitioner Benzonan should have been clothed with the corporation’s board resolution authorizing him to institute the petition.”^[15][12]

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that petitioners’ attachment of a “Secretary’s Certificate” to their Motion for Reconsideration (purportedly to remedy the first procedural mistake in their petition for certiorari under Rule 65) was insufficient since their submission merely authorized petitioner Benzonan “to represent the corporation and cause the preparation and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.”^[16][13]

Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition wherein they raised the following issues:

a.                   Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and denied the Motion for Reconsideration on its finding that the petition was not properly verified and the certification of non-forum shopping was not executed by the principal party allegedly in violation of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?

b.                  Whether petitioners were denied due process of law in the proceedings before the Regional Director and the Office of the Secretary, both of the Department of Labor and Employment?

c.                   Whether there was sufficient basis in the Order issued by the Regional Director, DOLE, Regional Office No. XII, dated May 20, 2004?^[17][14]

Anent the first procedural issue, the Court had summarized the jurisprudential principles on the matter in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.^[18][15]  In said case, we held that a President of a corporation, among other enumerated corporate officers and employees, can sign the verification and certification against of non-forum shopping in behalf of the said corporation without the benefit of a board resolution.  We quote the pertinent portion of the decision here:

It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.”^[19][16] (Emphases supplied.)

It must be stressed, however, that the Cagayan ruling qualified that the better procedure is still to append a board resolution to the complaint or petition to obviate questions regarding the authority of the signatory of the verification and certification.^[20][17]

Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it bears reiterating that the requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.  However, the Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that, although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.  Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.^[21][18]

In the case at bar, the Court holds that there has been substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure on the petitioners’ part in consonance with our ruling in the Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International PTY LTD.^[22][19] that we laid down in 2003 with the rationale that the President of petitioner-corporation is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.  Petitioner Benzonan clearly satisfies the aforementioned jurisprudential requirement because he is the President of petitioner South Cotabato Communications Corporation. Moreover, he is also named as co-respondent of petitioner-corporation in the labor case which is the subject matter of the special civil action for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.   

Clearly, it was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to dismiss petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari despite substantial compliance with the rules on procedure. For unduly upholding technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case, normal procedure dictates that the Court of Appeals should be tasked with properly disposing the petition, a second time around, on the merits.

The Court is mindful of previous rulings which instructs us that when there is enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits can be made, we may dispense with the time-consuming procedure in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case.^[23][20]  However, based on the nature of the two remaining issues propounded before the Court which involve factual issues and given the inadequacy of the records, pleadings, and other evidence available before us to properly resolve those questions, we are constrained to refrain from passing upon them.

After all, the Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the findings of fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts.^[24][21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN.

SO ORDERED.

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

FERNANDO P. CHAN VS. JOVEN T. OLEGARIO (A.M. NO. P-09-2714, 06 DECEMBER 2010, J. ABAD) SUBJECTS: NON-SETTLEMENT OF DEBT BY COURT EMPLOYEE; SETTLEMENT OF DEBT NOT GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.

x  –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

CASE STORY

OLEGARIO BORROWED CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS FROM CHAN WHO OWNS A HARDWARE. OLEGARIO WAS NOT ABLE TO PAY. ADMIN CASE WAS BROUHT AGAINST OLEGARIO. IN THE COURSE OF THE CASE OLEGARIO PAID CHAN AND CHAN MANIFESTED HE IS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE CASE.

CAN THE CASE NOW BE DISMISSMED? IF NOT WHAT CRIME DID OLEGARIO COMMIT?

SC RULED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINTS CANNOT DIVEST THE COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION NOR STRIP IT OF ITS POWER TO DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF THE CHARGES MADE AND TO DISCIPLINE, SUCH AS THE RESULTS OF ITS INVESTIGATION MAY WARRANT, AN ERRING RESPONDENT.

OLEGARIO IS GUILTY OF WILLFUL FAILURE TO PAY JUST DEBT AND CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A COURT EMPLOYEE.

DOCTRINES:

CONDUCT OF COURT EMPLOYEES MUST  AT ALL TIMES BE CHARACTERIZED BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, UPRIGHTNESS, PROPRIETY AND DECORUM.^[1][1]

The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper behavior on the part of court employees. While it may be just for an individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of the public office. Employees of the court should always keep in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect. Consequently, the conduct of each court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of onus and must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and decorum.^[2][1]

CASE CANNOT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT THE CIVIL ASPECT IS ALREADY SETTLED.

Furthermore, the fact that Chan, on December 12, 2009, manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the instant administrative case since he and Olegario have already agreed to settle their dispute amicably would not render this case moot. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Court’s interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary, inasmuch as the various programs and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the parties as in the instant case.^[3][2]

x  –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

                              D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a criminal complaint dated July 30, 2007 filed by Fernando P. Chan (Chan) against respondent Joven Olegario (Olegario), Process Server of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 6, Iligan City, for Estafa. The complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, however, Olegario being a court employee, the instant complaint was forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for administrative disciplinary action.

The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Complainant Chan is the owner/proprietor of XRG Hardware and Construction Supply located at Tibanga Highway, Iligan City.

On February 3, 2001, Olegario went to Chan’s hardware to obtain construction materials which will be utilized for the construction of his house. He introduced himself to Chan as a court process server at the RTC of Iligan, Branch VI, and showed certain documents as proof. Olegario  explained then to Chan that he was short of funds for the construction of his house and that he had applied for a loan at GSIS. He then asked Chan for construction materials and promised that he will pay his loan as soon as he received the proceeds of his GSIS loan as well as an interest of 20% per annum.

Banking on the words of Olegario and his being a government employee, Chan agreed to his request and delivered to him construction materials, to wit: (1) 10 bags of cement; (2) 10 pcs. of Plywood; and (3) 10 pcs. of corrugated G.I. sheet. The total cost of the construction materials amounted to Four Thousand Five Hundred Ten Pesos (P4,510.00).

Three months after, Chan demanded payment from Olegario, but the latter told him that his loan has yet to be released. He promised though that he will pay his obligation with interest. His promise to pay his obligation went on and on.

Chan averred that for seven years, Olegario has not paid him even a single centavo.

On June 15, 2007, Chan sent another demand letter to Olegario to pay his obligation. Again, Olegario merely promised him that he will pay his obligation within 15 days, but he never did.

On October 16, 2007, the Court directed Olegario to submit his comment on the instant complaint against him.

In his Comment dated March 4, 2008, Olegario denied that he had been evading his obligation to pay his debts to Chan. He alleged that his wife died on February 6, 2008 after a month of fighting a massive stroke, thus, he had to attend to the needs of his wife.

Olegario likewise manifested that he attempted to tender partial payment to Chan, but the latter refused it.  He asked the Court to give him more time to settle his obligation to Chan.

Subsequently, in its Memorandum dated September 23, 2009, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint. It further found Olegario guilty of willful failure to pay just debt and conduct unbecoming of a court employee, thus, also recommended the imposition of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper behavior on the part of court employees. While it may be just for an individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of the public office. Employees of the court should always keep in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect. Consequently, the conduct of each court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of onus and must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and decorum.^[4][1]

There is no question as to the existence of the debt and its justness as Olegario himself admitted them.  Likewise, Olegario’s allegation of financial difficulties is not a sufficient excuse for failing to pay his debt to Chan. He claimed that he had no intention of evading his obligation, but we are unconvinced. The fact that it took more than seven years before he attempted to pay his obligation clearly negated his claim.

Moreover, we also take note that it was Olegario’s pronouncement that he is a court employee which induced Chan to trust him and extend a loan to him. Thus, Olegario’s non-payment of his debt for more than 7 years not only tainted his name but the court’s image as well. This we will not tolerate.

Furthermore, the fact that Chan, on December 12, 2009, manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the instant administrative case since he and Olegario have already agreed to settle their dispute amicably would not render this case moot. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The Court’s interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary, inasmuch as the various programs and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the parties as in the instant case.^[5][2]

Likewise, the fact that Olegario settled his obligation with complainant during the pendency of the present complaint does not exculpate him from administrative liability. Willful failure to pay just debt amounts to conduct unbecoming a court employee.^[6][3]

We cannot overlook the fact that Olegario’s unethical conduct has diminished the honor and integrity of his office and stained the image of the judiciary. Certainly, to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. Like all other court personnel, Olegario is expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all his official conduct but also in his personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming his court’s albatross of infamy.^[7][4] The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at Olegario’s private life, but at his actuation unbecoming a public official.^[8][5]           

WHEREFORE, the Court finds JOVEN T. OLEGARIO, Process Server, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, GUILTY of CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF COURT EMPLOYEE for which he is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

                                                                                                                                                            DIOSDADO M. PERALTA  

                                                                        Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA              ROBERTO A. ABAD

               Associate Justice                                          Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice