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CASE 2011-157: MA. LIGAYA B. SANTOS VS. LITTON MILLS INCORPORATED AND/OR ATTY. RODOLFO MARINO (G.R. NO. 170646, 22 JUNE 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: SUBSEQUENT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE CURES TECHNICAL DEFECTS; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. (BRIEF TITLE: SANTOS VS. LITTON MILLS)

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July 19, 2011

CASE 2011-157: MA. LIGAYA B. SANTOS VS. LITTON MILLS INCORPORATED AND/OR ATTY. RODOLFO MARINO (G.R. NO. 170646, 22 JUNE 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: SUBSEQUENT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE CURES TECHNICAL DEFECTS; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL).

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/ DIGEST:

PETITIONER’S LABOR COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED BY THE LABOR ARBITER FOR LACK OF MERIT. HER APPEAL TO NLRC WAS ALSO DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. C.A. DISMISSED ALSO HER CERTIORARI PETITION FOR FAILURE TO INDICATE THE ADDRESSES OF THE PARTIES AND FOR FAILURE TO STATE WHAT SHOULD BE STATED IN THE CERTIFICATION ON FORUM SHOPPING. WAS C.A. CORRECT.

NO. THERE WAS SUBSEQUENT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IN PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. THERE SHE STATED THE NAMES OF THE PARTIES AND SHE CORRECTED HER CERTIFICATION ON FORUM SHOPPING.

THE CASE WAS REMANDED TO THE CA FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

It is settled that “subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.”^{^[1]}^[33] The Court has time and again relaxed the rigid application of the rules to offer full opportunity for parties to ventilate their causes and defenses in order to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice.^{^[2]}^[34] Because there was substantial and subsequent compliance in this case, we resolve to apply the liberal construction of the rules if only to secure the greater interest of justice. Thus, the CA should have given due course to the petition.

NOTE: REMEMBER THE KEY WORDS: “SUBSEQUENT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.”

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WHAT IS THE RULE ON FILING PETITION FOR CERTIORARI?

SECTION 3, RULE 46 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

Under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, petitions for certiorari shall contain, among others, the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. The petitioner should also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, he must state the status of the same; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall promptly inform the court within five days therefrom. The Rule explicitly provides that failure to comply with these requirements shall be sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.

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PETITIONER, INSTEAD OF STATING THE ADDRESSES OF THE PARTIES STATED THEIR COUNSELS AND THEIR ADDRESSES. IS THERE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES?

YES. IT IS IN ACCORD WITH THE RULE THAT IF PARTIES ARE REPRESENTED BY COUNSELS, NOTICE TO COUNSELS IS NOTICE TO THE PARTIES.

In the petition for certiorari filed before the CA, petitioner indeed failed to indicate the actual addresses of the parties. However, she clearly mentioned that the parties may be served with the Court’s notices or processes through their respective counsels whose addresses were clearly specified, viz:

Petitioner is of legal age, married, Filipino and may be served with notices, resolutions, decisions and other processes at the office address of the undersigned counsel.

Public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is a quasi-judicial government agency clothed by law with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters (Article 217, b, P.D. 442, as amended). Respondent Labor Arbiter Pablo Espiritu, Jr. is a Labor Arbiter at the National Capital Region of the NLRC and clothed by law [with] the authority to hear and decide termination disputes and all claims arising from employer-employee relations (Article 217, Labor Code, as amended). They may be served with notices, resolutions, decisions and other processes atPPSTABuilding,Banawe Street,Quezon City.

Private respondent Litton Mills, Inc. (Company for short) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing textile materials. Individual respondent Atty. Rodolfo Marino is its personnel manager. They may be served with notices, resolutions, decisions and other processes through their counsel, Baizas Magsino Recinto Law Offices, Suite 212 Cityland Pioneer, 128 Pioneer Street, Highway Hills, MandaluyongCity.^{^[3]}^[26]

To us, the mention of the parties’ respective counsel’s addresses constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which provides in part that “[t]he petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents.” Our observation further finds support in Section 2, Rule 13 which pertinently provides that “[i]f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the Court.” As we held in Garrucho v. Court of Appeals,^{^[4]}^[27] “[n]otice or service made upon a party who is represented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record is not notice in law.”

Moreover, in her motion for reconsideration, petitioner explained that she was of the honest belief that the mention of the counsel’s address was sufficient compliance with the rules. At any rate, she fully complied with the same when she indicated in her Motion for Reconsideration the actual addresses of the parties.^{^[5]}^[28] Hence, we are at a loss why the CA still proceeded to deny petitioner’s petition for certiorari and worse, even declared that: “Instead of [rectifying] the deficiencies of the petition, the petitioner chose to avoid compliance, arguing more than revising the mistakes explicitly pointed out.”^{^[6]}^[29]

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PETITIONER IN HER PETITION FAILED TO INDICATE THAT THERE IS NO OTHER PENDING CASES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AT THE FILING THEREOF. WAS HER VERIFICATION DEFECTIVE?

NO. WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTENT OF THE CERTIFICATION THE RULE ON SUBSTANTIVE COMPLIANCE APPLIES.

The second ground for the CA’s denial of petitioner’s petition for certiorari was her alleged failure to indicate in her Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping that there were no other pending cases between the parties at the time of filing thereof. For reference, we reproduce below the pertinent portions of the said petition for certiorari, viz:

Verification With Certification

I, LIGAYA B. SANTOS, subscribing under oath, depose and state:

1. I am the petitioner in the above-entitled case;

2. I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing petition;

3. I have read the contents of the same and declare that they are true and correct of my personal knowledge;

4. I certify that I have not caused the filing to the Court of Appeals, to the Supreme Court or to any other Court or body of a case similar to the instant petition and should I learn that the existence or pendency of a similar case at the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court or any other Court or body, I undertake to inform this Court within five (5) days from knowledge.

(Sgd.) LIGAYA B. SANTOS^{^[7]}^[30]

A reading of said Verification with Certification reveals that petitioner nonetheless certified therein that she has not filed a similar case before any other court or tribunal and that she would inform the court if she learns of a pending case similar to the one she had filed therein. This, to our mind is more than substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules. It has been held that “with respect to the contents of the certification[,] x x x the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of.”^{^[8]}^[31] Besides, in her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner rectified the deficiency in said Verification with Certification, viz:

VERIFICATION & CERTIFICATION

OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

I, LIGAYA SANTOS, resident of261 B Rodriguez Avenue, Manggahan,PasigCity, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state:

I am the petitioner in the above-entitled case;

I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration;

I have read the contents of the same and declare that they are true and correct of my personal knowledge;

I certify that I have not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and to the best of my knowledge, no such other action is pending therein and should I learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, I [shall] immediately inform this Honorable Court within five (5) days from knowledge or notice.

(Sgd.) LIGAYA B. SANTOS

Affiant^{^[9]}^[32]

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FIRST DIVISION

MA. LIGAYA B. SANTOS,		G.R. No. 170646
Petitioner,
		Present:

		CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
– versus –		LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
		DELCASTILLO,
		PEREZ, and
		MENDOZA,^⃰ JJ.
LITTON MILLS INCORPORATED
and/or ATTY. RODOLFO MARIÑO,^{⃰ ⃰}		Promulgated:
Respondents.		June 22, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“Once again, we must stress that the technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, the cause of justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable aim, the just resolution of cases on their merits, however, cannot be sacrificed merely in order to achieve that objective. Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal course.”^{^[10]}^[1]

This Petition for Review on Certiorari^{^[11]}^[2] assails the March 10, 2005 Resolution^{^[12]}^[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88601, which dismissed petitioner Ma. Ligaya B. Santos’ (petitioner) Petition for Certiorari filed therewith for being defective in form, as well as the November 29, 2005 Resolution^{^[13]}^[4] which denied her Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise sought to be set aside are the August 27, 2004 and November 30, 2004 Resolutions^{^[14]}^[5] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the November 28, 2003 Decision^{^[15]}^[6] of Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01560-2003, which dismissed petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents Litton Mills, Inc. (respondent Litton Mills) and/or Atty. Rodolfo Mariño (respondent Atty. Mariño).

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner was hired on December 5, 1989 by respondent Litton Mills, a company engaged in the business of manufacturing textile materials. It used to sell its used sludge oil and other waste materials through its Plant Administration and Services Department, wherein petitioner was assigned as clerk.

On September 28, 2002,^{^[16]}^[7] respondent Atty. Mariño, personnel manager of respondent Litton Mills, directed petitioner to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be imposed on her after having been caught engaging in an unauthorized arrangement with a waste buyer. Allegedly, petitioner has been demanding money from a certain Leonardo A. Concepcion (Concepcion) every time he purchases scrap and sludge oil from the company and threatening to withhold the release of the purchased materials by delaying the release of official delivery receipt and gate pass if he would not oblige. Respondent Atty. Mariño also informed petitioner that she will be placed under preventive suspension for 15 days pending investigation of her case.

In her letter-reply,^{^[17]}^[8] petitioner denied the accusation and explained that her

job is merely clerical in nature and that she has no authority to hold the release of purchased waste items. Petitioner averred that the P2,000.00 she obtained fromConcepcion was in payment for the loan she had extended toConcepcion’s wife; and, that her practice of lending money to increase her income cannot be considered as an irregularity against her employer.

Meanwhile, a criminal complaint for robbery/extortion was lodged before the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioner which was eventually filed in court.^{^[18]}^[9]

On October 1, 2002, respondent Atty. Mariño notified petitioner that an administrative investigation is scheduled on October 4, 2002 and requested her to appear and present her defenses on the charges. During the hearing, petitioner, represented by three officers of the union of which she was a member, submitted a Motion for Reinvestigation^{^[19]}^[10] (which she also filed in the criminal case for extortion), with a Counter-Affidavit^{^[20]}^[11] attached therein. She pointed out that it is not within her power to intimidate or threaten any buyer regarding the release of the company’s waste items. Petitioner also presented a copy of her handwritten notes^{^[21]}^[12] showing a list of entries representing the debts owed to her by different debtors includingConcepcion’s wife.

On October 11, 2002, petitioner received a Letter of Termination^{^[22]}^[13] from respondents for obtaining or accepting money as a result of an unauthorized arrangement with a waste buyer, an act considered as affecting company interests, in violation of Section 2.04 of the company’s Code of Conduct for Employee Discipline.^{^[23]}^[14] On February 4, 2003, petitioner filed a Complaint^{^[24]}^[15] for illegal dismissal against respondents which was later amended to include a prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In a Decision dated November 28, 2003, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint after finding that there was just cause for dismissal and proper observance of due process. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the pendency of the criminal case for extortion is an indication that there is sufficient evidence that petitioner is responsible for the offense charged, and that only substantial evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary for a valid dismissal. The Labor Arbiter was not convinced that the money which petitioner received fromConcepcionwas intended as payment for a loan and even if it was, it is still unauthorized and prohibited by the company rules. The claim for damages was likewise dismissed for lack of merit.

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

On appeal, petitioner argued that the Labor Arbiter erred in relying on the pending criminal case in finding her dismissal as valid and claimed that the charge should first be proven. She thereafter filed an Urgent Manifestation^{^[25]}^[16] to inform the tribunal that on April 20, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 has rendered a Decision^{^[26]}^[17] acquitting her of the criminal charge and declaring that she merely demanded payment for a loan and thus did not illegally exact money from Concepcion.

The NLRC, however, affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter in its Resolution dated August 27, 2004.^{^[27]}^[18] It held that petitioner’s acquittal in the criminal case has no bearing on the illegal dismissal case since she was dismissed for accepting money by reason of an unauthorized arrangement with a client. This, according to the NLRC, is an infraction of the company’s Code of Conduct for employees punishable by dismissal even for the first violation.

In its Resolution dated November 30, 2004,^{^[28]}^[19] the NLRC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari^{^[29]}^[20] with the CA. However, in a Resolution dated March 10, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioner to indicate in the petition the actual addresses of the parties and to state in the Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping that there were no other pending cases between the parties at the time of filing. The March 10, 2005 Resolution reads:

Petition is hereby DISMISSED due to the following jurisdictional flaws:

1. Actual addresses of the parties were not disclosed in the petition in contravention of Sec. 3, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;

2. Non-conformity to the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping by failure to state that there were no other pending cases between the parties at the time of filing (See Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 1, Rule 65 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Deficiency is equivalent to the non-filing thereof.

SO ORDERED.^{^[30]}^[21]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration^{^[31]}^[22] explaining that her petition substantially complied with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court because it indicated that the parties may be served with notices and processes of the Court through their respective counsels whose addresses were specifically mentioned therein. She also insisted that although the Verification and Certification attached to the petition was an abbreviated version, the same still substantially complied with the Rules. Nonetheless, she submitted her faithful compliance with the Rules by indicating the complete addresses of the parties and of their counsels and submitting a revised Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping. At the same time, she contended that her excusable lapse is not enough reason to dismiss her meritorious petition.

On November 29, 2005,^{^[32]}^[23] the CA rendered its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The said Resolution reads:

Instead of [rectifying] the deficiencies of the petition, the petitioner chose to avoid compliance, arguing more than revising the mistakes explicitly pointed out.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, petitioner’s March 31, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.^{^[33]}^[24]

Issues

Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD SHOWN HOSTILITY AGAINST THE PETITIONER AND ACTED DESPOTICALLY BECAUSE THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE PETITION WERE DULY CORRECTED AND THE EXPLANATION MADE FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION IS MERELY TO POINT OUT THAT THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT HAD SHOWN LENIENCY EVEN IN MORE SERIOUS CASES AND THAT PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS CASE.

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR AND ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER OBTAINED OR ACCEPTED MONEY CONSEQUENT OF AN UNAUTHORIZED ARRANGEMENT WITH A WASTE BUYER DESPITE CLEAR EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY AND THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE P2,000.00 DEMANDED BY THE PETITIONER IS FOR THE PAYMENT OF A LOAN.^{^[34]}^[25]

Petitioner questions the propriety of the CA’s dismissal of her petition despite correction of the deficiencies in faithful compliance with the rules. She prays for liberality and leniency for the minor lapses she committed so that substantial justice would not be sacrificed at the altar of technicalities.

Petitioner also questions the propriety of the labor tribunals’ declaration that her dismissal from employment was legal. She contends that her act of extending a loan to a person and consequently demanding payment for the same should not be considered as sufficient ground for the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal.

Our Ruling

We partly grant the petition.

Rules of procedure should be relaxed when there is substantial and subsequent compliance.

Petitioner is of legal age, married, Filipino and may be served with notices, resolutions, decisions and other processes at the office address of the undersigned counsel.

To us, the mention of the parties’ respective counsel’s addresses constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which provides in part that “[t]he petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents.” Our observation further finds support in Section 2, Rule 13 which pertinently provides that “[i]f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the Court.” As we held in Garrucho v. Court of Appeals,^{^[36]}^[27] “[n]otice or service made upon a party who is represented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record is not notice in law.”

Moreover, in her motion for reconsideration, petitioner explained that she was of the honest belief that the mention of the counsel’s address was sufficient compliance with the rules. At any rate, she fully complied with the same when she indicated in her Motion for Reconsideration the actual addresses of the parties.^{^[37]}^[28] Hence, we are at a loss why the CA still proceeded to deny petitioner’s petition for certiorari and worse, even declared that: “Instead of [rectifying] the deficiencies of the petition, the petitioner chose to avoid compliance, arguing more than revising the mistakes explicitly pointed out.”^{^[38]}^[29]

Verification With Certification

I, LIGAYA B. SANTOS, subscribing under oath, depose and state:

1. I am the petitioner in the above-entitled case;

2. I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing petition;

3. I have read the contents of the same and declare that they are true and correct of my personal knowledge;

(Sgd.) LIGAYA B. SANTOS^{^[39]}^[30]

A reading of said Verification with Certification reveals that petitioner nonetheless certified therein that she has not filed a similar case before any other court or tribunal and that she would inform the court if she learns of a pending case similar to the one she had filed therein. This, to our mind is more than substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules. It has been held that “with respect to the contents of the certification[,] x x x the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of.”^{^[40]}^[31] Besides, in her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner rectified the deficiency in said Verification with Certification, viz:

VERIFICATION & CERTIFICATION

OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

I, LIGAYA SANTOS, resident of261 B Rodriguez Avenue, Manggahan,PasigCity, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state:

I am the petitioner in the above-entitled case;

I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration;

I have read the contents of the same and declare that they are true and correct of my personal knowledge;

(Sgd.) LIGAYA B. SANTOS

Affiant^{^[41]}^[32]

It is settled that “subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.”^{^[42]}^[33] The Court has time and again relaxed the rigid application of the rules to offer full opportunity for parties to ventilate their causes and defenses in order to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice.^{^[43]}^[34] Because there was substantial and subsequent compliance in this case, we resolve to apply the liberal construction of the rules if only to secure the greater interest of justice. Thus, the CA should have given due course to the petition.

Anent the arguments raised by petitioner pertaining to the merits of the case, we deem it proper to remand the adjudication thereof to the CA.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed March 10, 2005 and November 29, 2005 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88601, are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is directed to give due course to the petition and adjudicate the same on the merits with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][33] Security Bank Corporation v. Indiana Aerospace University, 500 Phil. 51, 60 (2005).

[2][34] Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 487 Phil. 412, 426 (2004).

[3][26] CA rollo, pp. 4-5.

[4][27] 489 Phil. 150, 156 (2005).

[5][28] CA rollo, p. 154.

[6][29] See Resolution of November 29, 2005, id. at 177.

[7][30]Id. at 16.

[8][31] Ching v. The Secretary of Justice, 517 Phil. 151, 166 (2006). See also Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, 497 Phil. 635, 646 (2005); MC Engineering Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 412 Phil. 614, 622 (2001).

[9][32] CA rollo, p. 157.

⃰ Per Special Order No. 1022 dated June 10, 2011.

⃰ ⃰ Also referred as Atty. Rodolfo Marino in some parts of the records.

[10][1] Fiel v. Kris Security Systems, Inc., 448 Phil.657, 662 (2003).

[11][2] Rollo, pp. 10-25.

[12][3] CA rollo, pp. 148-149; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.

[13][4]Id. at 159.

[14][5]Id. at 18-27 and 28-29, respectively; penned by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and concurred in by Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay and Angelita A. Gacutan.

[15][6]Id. at 30-41.

[16][7]Id. at 94.

[17][8] Dated September 29, 2002, id. at 95-96.

[18][9] See Investigation Report of Police dated September 30, 2002, id. at 97.

[19][10] Id at 107-109.

[20][11] Id. at 110-112.

[21][12] Id. at 113-115.

[22][13] Id. at 117.

[23][14] Id. at 121.

[24][15] Id. at 119-120.

[25][16] Id. at 143-146.

[26][17] Id. at 142-146.

[27][18] Id. at 18-27.

[28][19] Id. at 28-29.

[29][20] Id. at 2-17.

[30][21] Id. at 148.

[31][22] Id. at 152-158.

[32][23] Id. at 159.

[33][24] Id.

[34][25] Rollo, p. 19.

[35][26] CA rollo, pp. 4-5.

[36][27] 489 Phil. 150, 156 (2005).

[37][28] CA rollo, p. 154.

[38][29] See Resolution of November 29, 2005, id. at 177.

[39][30] Id. at 16.

[40][31] Ching v. The Secretary of Justice, 517 Phil. 151, 166 (2006). See also Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, 497 Phil. 635, 646 (2005); MC Engineering Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 412 Phil. 614, 622 (2001).

[41][32] CA rollo, p. 157.

[42][33] Security Bank Corporation v. Indiana Aerospace University, 500 Phil. 51, 60 (2005).

[43][34] Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 487 Phil. 412, 426 (2004).

Comment

CASE 2011-0156: ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 170658, 22 JUNE 2011) SUBJECT: SUMMARY JUDGMENT (BRIEF TITLE: CALUBAQUIB VS. REPUBLIC)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — 2 Comments

CASE 2011-0156: ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 170658, 22 JUNE 2011) SUBJECT: SUMMARY JUDGMENT (BRIEF TITLE: CALUBAQUIB VS. REPUBLIC)

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

PETITIONERS WERE IN POSSESSION OF A PARCEL OF LAND DECLARED AS MILITARY RESERVATION BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 80. PRIOR TO SUCH PROCLAMATION, PETITIONERS HAD ALREADY TITLE TO THE LAND. THE REPUBLIC FILED A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION. PETITIONERS RAISE THE DEFENSE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED AND THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 80 STATES IT RESPECTS EXISTING PRIVATE RIGHTS. RTC, WITHOUT HEARING, ISSUED A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE REPUBLIC. CA CONFIRMED. WAS THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPER?

NO. PRIOR TO RENDERING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT THERE MUST BE MOTION AND HEARING. HERE, THERE WAS NONE.

The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.^{^[1]}^[41] The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.^{^[2]}^[42]

In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of the parties filing a motion therefor. In fact, the respondent itself filed an opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for summary judgment. Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact. Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have persisted in rendering summary judgment. Considering that the remedy of summary judgment is in derogation of a party’s right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial court cannot railroad the parties’ rights over their objections.

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WHEN IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PERMITTED?

ONLY IF THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND [THE] MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.”^{^[3]}^[36] THE TEST OF THE PROPRIETY OF RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IS THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT,^{^[4]}^[37] “AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A SHAM, FICTITIOUS, CONTRIVED OR FALSE CLAIM.”^{^[5]}^[38]

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WHEN IS A FACTUAL ISSUE CONSIDERED AS SHAM?

WHEN BY ITS NATURE IT IS EVIDENT THAT IT CANNOT BE PROVEN OR IT IS SUCH THAT THE PARTY TENDERING THE SAME HAS NEITHER ANY SINCERE INTENTION NOR ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO PROVE IT.

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WHEN DO PARTIES USUALLY RAISE SHAM ISSUES?

THIS USUALLY HAPPENS IN DENIALS MADE BY DEFENDANTS MERELY FOR THE SAKE OF HAVING AN ISSUE AND THEREBY GAINING DELAY, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THEIR ANSWERS ARE NOT UNDER OATH ANYWAY.”^{^[6]}^[39]

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HOW DOES A COURT DETERMINE THE GENUINESS OF THE ISSUES AND PROPRIETY OF RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT?

THE COURT IS OBLIGED TO CAREFULLY STUDY AND APPRAISE, NOT THE TENOR OR CONTENTS OF THE PLEADINGS, BUT THE FACTS ALLEGED UNDER OATH BY THE PARTIES AND/OR THEIR WITNESSES IN THE AFFIDAVITS THAT THEY SUBMITTED WITH THE MOTION AND THE CORRESPONDING OPPOSITION. THUS, IT IS HELD THAT, EVEN IF THE PLEADINGS ON THEIR FACE APPEAR TO RAISE ISSUES, A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SO LONG AS “THE AFFIDAVITS, DEPOSITIONS, AND ADMISSIONS PRESENTED BY THE MOVING PARTY SHOW THAT SUCH ISSUES ARE NOT GENUINE.”^{^[7]}^[40]

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IN THIS CASE WHAT WAS THE ERROR OF THE COURT?

THE COURT PRESUMED THAT THE DEFENSES OF PETITIONERS CANNOT BE PROVEN. THIS IS PREMATURE AND UNFAIR. THE GUIDELINES ON RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE IGNORED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.

More importantly, by proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial, the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an assumption that petitioners’ defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all. This assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair. No reason was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial. The lower courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so.

It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary judgment were all ignored by the trial court. The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners’ due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and prove their defense.

============================

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB,		G.R. No. 170658 Present: CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Petitioners,		DELCASTILLO,
		PEREZ, and
– versus –		MENDOZA,^⃰ JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,		Promulgated:
Respondent.		June 22, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary judgment.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari^{^[8]}^[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 21, 2005 Decision,^{^[9]}^[2] as well as the November 30, 2005 Resolution,^{^[10]}^[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83073. The two issuances of the appellate court ruled against petitioners and ordered them to reconvey the subject properties to respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic). The CA upheld the April 26, 2004 Decision^{^[11]}^[4] of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, the dispositive portion of which decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court declares that the Republic of the Philippines is the owner of that certain property denominated as Lot No. 2470 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao with an area of three hundred ninety two thousand nine hundred ninety six (392,996) square meters which is registered in its name as evidenced by Original Certificate No. 13562, and as such, is entitled to the possession of the same, and that the defendants illegally occupied a five (5) hectare portion thereof since 1992.

Defendants are then ordered to vacate the portion so occupied by them, and pay to the national government the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) per year of occupancy, from 1992 up to the time the property is vacated by them.

Defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed.

No pronouncement as to cost.

IT IS SO ORDERED.^{^[12]}^[5]

Factual Antecedents

On August 17, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 80,^{^[13]}^[6] which declared a 39.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay Caggay, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military reservation site. The proclamation expressly stated that it was being issued “subject to private rights, if any there be.” Accordingly, the respondent obtained an Original Certificate of Title No. 13562^{^[14]}^[7] over the property, which is more particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 2470 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao), situated in the barrio of Caggay,Municipality ofTuguegarao. Bounded on the E. by Lot No. 2594: on the SE, by theProvincial Road: on the SW by Lot Nos. 2539, 2538, and 2535: and on NW, byLot Nos. 2534, 2533, 2532, 2478 and 2594.

On January 16, 1995, respondent^{^[15]}^[8] filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan a complaint for recovery of possession^{^[16]}^[9] against petitioners alleging that sometime in 1992, petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare portion (subject property) thereof. Petitioners allegedly refused to vacate the subject property despite repeated demands to do so.^{^[17]}^[10] Thus, respondent prayed that the petitioners be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay rentals computed from the time that they unlawfully withheld the same from the respondent until the latter is restored to possession.^{^[18]}^[11]

Petitioners filed an answer denying the allegation that they entered the subject property through stealth and strategy sometime in 1992.^{^[19]}^[12] They maintained that they and their predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Calubaquib (Antonio), have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the early 1900s.^{^[20]}^[13] Their occupation of the subject property led the latter to be known in the area as the Calubaquib Ranch. When Antonio died in 1918, his six children acknowledged inheriting the subject property from him in a private document entitled Convenio. In 1926, Antonio’s children applied for a homestead patent but the same was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands.^{^[21]}^[14] Nevertheless, these children continued cultivating the subject property.

Petitioners acknowledged the issuance of Proclamation No. 80 on August 17, 1936, but maintained that the subject property (the 5-hectare portion allegedly occupied by them since 1900s) was excluded from its operation. Petitioners cite as their basis a proviso in Proclamation No. 80, which exempts from the military reservation site “private rights, if any there be.”^{^[22]}^[15] Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against them.

The pre-trial conference conducted on August 21, 1995 yielded the following admissions of fact:

1. Lot No. 2470 of the Tuguegarao Cadastre is a parcel of land situated in Alimanao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with an area of 392,996 square meters. On August 17, 1936, the President of thePhilippinesissued Proclamation No. 80 reserving the lot for military purposes. On the strength of this Proclamation, OCT No. 13562 covering said lot was issued in the name of the Republic of thePhilippines.

2. The defendants are in actual possession of a 5-hectare portion of said property.

3. The Administrator of the Camp Marcelo Adduru Military Reservation demanded the defendants to vacate but they refused.

4. The defendants sought presidential assistance regarding their status on the land covered by the title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The Office of the President has referred the matter to the proper administrative agencies and up to now there has been no definite action on said request for assistance.^{^[23]}^[16]

Given the trial court’s opinion that the basic facts of the case were undisputed, it advised the parties to file a motion for summary judgment.^{^[24]}^[17] Neither party filed the motion. In fact, respondent expressed on two occasions^{^[25]}^[18] its objection to a summary judgment. It explained that summary judgment is improper given the existence of a genuine and vital factual issue, which is the petitioners’ claim of ownership over the subject property. It argued that the said issue can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits.

On January 31, 2001, the RTC issued an Order thus:

The Court noticed that the defendants in this case failed to raise any issue. For this reason, a summary judgment is in order.

Let this case be submitted for summary judgment.

SO ORDERED.^{^[26]}^[19]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court^{^[27]}^[20]

Subsequently, without any trial, the trial court rendered its April 26, 2004 Decision^{^[28]}^[21] dismissing petitioners’ claim of possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. The trial court held that while Proclamation No. 80 recognized and respected the existence of private rights on the military reservation, petitioners’ position could “not be sustained, as there was no right of [petitioners] to speak of that was recognized by the government.”^{^[29]}^[22]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals^{^[30]}^[23]

Petitioners appealed^{^[31]}^[24] to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision, in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed decision dated April 26, 2004 of theRegionalTrialCourtofTuguegaraoCity, Cagayan Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4846 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.^{^[32]}^[25]

The CA explained that, in order to segregate the subject property from the mass of public land, it was imperative for petitioners to prove their and their predecessors-in-interest’s occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than 30 years prior to the issuance of the proclamation.^{^[33]}^[26] There must be clear, positive and absolute evidence that they had complied with all the requirements of the law for confirmation of an imperfect title before the property became a military reservation site.^{^[34]}^[27] Based on these standards, petitioners failed to establish any vested right pertaining to them with respect to the subject property.^{^[35]}^[28] The CA further held that petitioners did not say what evidence they had of an imperfect title under the Public Land Act.^{^[36]}^[29]

The CA denied reconsideration of its Decision, hence petitioners’ appeal to this Court.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners maintain that the subject property was alienable land when they, through their ancestors, began occupying the same in the early 1900s. By operation of law, they became owners of the subject parcel of land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Thus, when Proclamation No. 80 declared that “existing private rights, if there be any” are exempt from the military reservation site, the subject property remained private property of the petitioners.

Petitioners then ask that the case be remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence. They maintain that the case presents several factual issues, such as the determination of the nature of the property (whether alienable or inalienable) prior to 1936 and of the veracity of petitioners’ claim of prior and adverse occupation of the subject property.^{^[37]}^[30]

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that petitioners were not able to prove that they had a vested right to the subject property prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 80. As petitioners themselves admit, their application for homestead patent filed in 1926 was not acted upon, hence they did not acquire any vested right to the subject property. Likewise, petitioners did not prove their occupation and cultivation of the subject property for more than 30 years prior to August 17, 1936, the date when Proclamation No. 80 took effect.^{^[38]}^[31]

Issue^{^[39]}^[32]

The crux of the case is the propriety of rendering a summary judgment.

Our Ruling

The petition has merit.

Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.^{^[40]}^[33] A deeper understanding of summary judgments is found in Viajar v. Estenzo:^{^[41]}^[34]

Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.

An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other documents x x x. In spite of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party’s right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.^{^[42]}^[35]

“A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”^{^[43]}^[36] The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact,^{^[44]}^[37] “as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.”^{^[45]}^[38] “[A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its nature it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers are not under oath anyway.”^{^[46]}^[39]

In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is proper so long as “the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.”^{^[47]}^[40]

The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.^{^[48]}^[41] The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.^{^[49]}^[42]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2004 summary judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 1, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the RegionalTrialCourtofTuguegaraoCity, Branch 1, for trial. The Presiding Judge is directed to proceed with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][41] Estrada v. Consolacion, supra note 37 at 550.

[2][42] Caridao v. Hon. Estenzo, 217 Phil. 93, 101-102 (1984).

[3][36] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010, 613 SCRA 66, 81-82.

[4][37] Estrada v. Consolacion, 163 Phil. 540, 549 (1976).

[5][38] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, supra at 88.

[6][39] Concurring Opinion of Justice Barredo in Estrada v. Consolacion, supra at 554. Emphasis supplied.

[7][40] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, surpa at 82. Emphasis supplied.

⃰ Per Special Order No. 1022 dated June 10, 2011.

[8][1] Rollo, pp. 18- 37.

[9][2] Id. at 45-56; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao.

[10][3] Id. at 57.

[11][4] Id. at 39-44; penned by Judge Jimmy H.F. Luczon, Jr.

[12][5] RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; id. at 43-44.

[13][6] Records, pp. 50-51.

[14][7] Id. at 2.

[15][8] The Republic was represented by Commander Abelardo Arugay, who was appointed as Administrator of Camp Marcelo Adduru Military Reservation on April 15, 1994 (id. at 49).

[16][9] Id. at 1-6. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4846 (95-Tug.) and raffled to Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

[17][10] Id. at 3.

[18][11] Id. at 4.

[19][12] Answer, pp. 1-2; id. at 17-18.

[20][13] Id. at 2; id. at 18.

[21][14] Id. at 3; id. at 19.

[22][15] Id. at 1; id. at 17.

[23][16] Records, pp. 58-59.

[24][17] Id. at 61.

[25][18] Manifestation and Compliance dated July 28, 1999 (id. at 95) and Plaintiff’s Memorandum dated November 18, 1999 (id. at 111-112).

[26][19] Id. at 124.

[27][20] Id. at 125-130.

[28][21] Rollo, pp. 39-44.

[29][22] Id. at 42.

[30][23] Rollo, pp. 45-56.

[31][24] CA rollo, pp. 18-21.

[32][25] CA Decision, p. 11; rollo, p. 55.

[33][26] Id. at 7-8; id. at 51-52.

[34][27] Id. at 10; id. at 54.

[35][28] Id.; id.

[36][29] Id. at 9; id. at 53.

[37][30] Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 27-31; id. at 141-145.

[38][31] Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 5-8; id. at 100-103.

[39][32] Petition for Review, pp. 8-9; id. at 25-26.

[40][33] Rules of Court, Rule 35.

[41][34] 178 Phil. 561 (1979).

[42][35] Id. at 572-573. Citations omitted.

[43][36] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010, 613 SCRA 66, 81-82.

[44][37] Estrada v. Consolacion, 163 Phil. 540, 549 (1976).

[45][38] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, supra at 88.

[46][39] Concurring Opinion of Justice Barredo in Estrada v. Consolacion, supra at 554. Emphasis supplied.

[47][40] Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, surpa at 82. Emphasis supplied.

[48][41] Estrada v. Consolacion, supra note 37 at 550.

[49][42] Caridao v. Hon. Estenzo, 217 Phil. 93, 101-102 (1984).

Comment

CASE 2011-0155: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHITO GRATIL Y GUELAS, (G.R. NO. 182236, 22 JUNE 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECTS: SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS; INSTANCE WHEN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURE WAS NOT CONSIDERED; ALIBI; FRAME UP. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. GRATIL).

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment

July 18, 2011

CASE 2011-0155: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHITO GRATIL Y GUELAS, (G.R. NO. 182236, 22 JUNE 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECTS: SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS; INSTANCE WHEN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURE WAS NOT CONSIDERED; ALIBI; FRAME UP. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. GRATIL).

========================

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/ DIGEST:

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS FOR CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS?

1) THE IDENTITIES OF THE BUYER AND THE SELLER, THE OBJECT, AND THE CONSIDERATION; AND (2) THE DELIVERY OF THE THING SOLD AND THE PAYMENT FOR IT.^{^[1]}^[9]

In prosecutions involving the illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug as evidence. For conviction of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.^{^[2]}^[9]

A perusal of the records would reveal that the foregoing requisites are present in the case at bar. The proof of the shabu transaction was established by prosecution witness Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 William Manglo, the poseur-buyer, who made a positive identification of the appellant as the one who gave him the “Mercury Drug” bag and to whom he gave the marked money during the buy-bust operation. . .

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ACCUSED ARGUES THAT THE POLICE AUTHORITIES DID NOT FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE LAID OUT BY LAW AND REGULATIONN: THAT ALL PROHIBITED AND REGULATED DRUGS SHALL BE PHYSICALLY INVENTORIED AND PHOTOGRAPHED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED WHO SHALL BE REQUIRED TO SIGN THE COPIES OF THE INVENTORY AND BE GIVEN A COPY THEREOF. IS HIS DEFENSE VALID?

NO. THE ALLEGED PROCEDURAL INFIRMITY POINTED OUT BY APPELLANT DOES NOT PROVE FATAL TO THE PROSECUTION’S CASE.

Furthermore, the alleged procedural infirmity pointed out by appellant does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. Section 1 of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which was cited by appellant as the rule of procedure which the arresting police officers did not strictly observe, provides that all prohibited and regulated drugs shall be physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof, to wit:

Section 1. All prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses and articles specially designed for the use thereof when unlawfully used or found in the possession of any person not authorized to have control and disposition of the same, or when found secreted or abandoned, shall be seized or confiscated by any national, provincial or local law enforcement agency. Any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Thereafter, the seized drugs and paraphernalia shall be immediately brought to a properly equipped government laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.

The apprehending team shall: (a) within forty-eight (48) hours from the seizure inform the Dangerous Drugs Board by telegram of said seizure, the nature and quantity thereof, and who has present custody of the same, and (b) submit to the Board a copy of the mission investigation report within fifteen (15) days from completion of the investigation.^{^[3]}^[12]

However, the failure to conduct an inventory and to photograph the confiscated items in the manner prescribed under the said provision of law applicable at the time of appellant’s arrest and which is now incorporated as Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)^{^[4]}^[13] that repealed Republic Act No. 6425 cannot be used as a ground for appellant’s exoneration from the charge against him.

In People v. De Los Reyes,^{^[5]}^[14] a case which also involved an objection regarding the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, we held that:

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established (People v. Santiago, 206 SCRA 733[1992]) and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.^{^[6]}^[15]

Moreover, in People v. Agulay,^{^[7]}^[16] we held that:

Non-compliance with [Section 21, 19 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165] is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. In People v. Del Monte, this Court held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x.^{^[8]}^[17]

The ponente of Agulay would further observe in a separate opinion that the failure by the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165,^{^[9]}^[18] which replicated Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165, did not overcome the presumption of regularity accorded to police authorities in the performance of their official duties, to wit:

First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure by the buy-bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying.

Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21(a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such presumption. x x x.^{^[10]}^[19] (Citations omitted.)

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WHY WAS THERE CONVICTION DESPITE THE NON-OBSERVANCE OF SUCH PROCEDURE?

BECAUSE THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE EVIDENCE WAS NEVER PUT INTO SERIOUS DOUBT IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THIS CASE.

Notwithstanding the minor lapse in procedure committed by the police officers in the handling of the illegal drugs taken from appellant, the identity and integrity of the evidence was never put into serious doubt in the course of the proceedings of this case. In fact, SPO2 Manglo categorically testified that the confiscated plastic sachets of “shabu” were marked, turned- over to the police headquarters for investigation, and subjected to laboratory examination. . .

ANOTHER DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED WAS DENIAL AND FRAME UP. WAS THIS A VALID DEFENSE?

NO. THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL OR FRAME-UP, LIKE ALIBI, HAS BEEN INVARIABLY VIEWED WITH DISFAVOR FOR IT CAN EASILY BE CONCOCTED AND IS A COMMON DEFENSE IN MOST PROSECUTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT.^{^[11]}^[23]

In response to the accusation leveled against him, appellant only managed to set up the defense of bare denial. According to his version of the story, appellant maintains that he was forcibly abducted while on his way to a cousin’s house and was later thrown inside a vehicle where he was beaten up and threatened with execution before he was brought to the police station. In short, appellant insists that he was a victim of frame-up.

As we have time and again held, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.^{^[12]}^[23] Charges of extortion and frame-up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus, cautious in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duties. To substantiate such defense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.^{^[13]}^[24]

In the case at bar, no clear and convincing evidence to support the defense of frame-up was put forward by appellant. Neither was there any imputation or proof of ill motive on the part of the arresting police officers. Even the testimony of defense witness Imelda Revoldina failed to establish any irregularity in the conduct of the apprehending police officers in this case. In fact, her neutral testimony that she saw the police officers hold the collar of appellant while leading him into a vehicle tended to support the prosecution’s assertion that appellant was arrested in plain view as a consequence of his act of selling illegal drugs.

As appellant failed to show any reversible error on the part of the lower courts in the resolution of this case, his conviction must be upheld.

========================

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

– versus –

CHITO GRATIL y GUELAS,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 182236

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DELCASTILLO,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA,^* JJ.

Promulgated:

June 22, 2011

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision^{^[14]}^[1] dated October 15, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02338, entitled People of the Philippines v. Chito Gratil y Guelas, which affirmed with modification the Decision^{^[15]}^[2] dated September 25, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 53, in Criminal Case No. 97-159609, finding appellant Chito Gratil y Guelas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article II in relation to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The conflicting versions of the events which led to the arrest and detention of the appellant were summarized by the trial court, to wit:

Culled from the prosecution’s evidence, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning of said day, a confidential informant arrived at the PNP Central Narcotics Office at EDSA, Quezon City and talked to P/Insp. Nolasco Cortez in the presence of SPO2 Manglo, SPO2 Welmer Antonio, and PO1 Roger Molino regarding the alleged illegal drug activity of one Chito Gratil who is a resident of 765 Agno Bataan, Malate, Manila. Immediately, P/Insp. Cortez formed a team for the purpose of conducting a buy bust operation. SPO2 Manglo was designated as poseur buyer and was given a P500 bill the serial number of which he took and which he also marked with his initial on the side of the face of the person on the bill and also a dot on the nose (Exh. K, K-1, K-2 and K-3). The genuine P500 bill was put on top of boodle money.

At 11:40 o’clock of that same morning, SPO2 Manglo and the confidential informant proceeded to the house of accused Chito Gratil at Agno Bataan, Malate, Manila. The informant entered the house of accused Gratil while SPO2 Manglo waited outside. When the informant emerged from the house, they proceeded to McDonald’s at HarrisonPlazawhere, according to the informant, they would meet with accused Gratil for the final arrangement. After about 5 or 10 minutes, or at around noontime, accused Gratil arrived at the McDonald’s HarrisonPlazaand talked to the confidential informant. The confidential informant told accused Gratil that the money for the purchase of shabu was already available. Accused Gratil instructed the confidential informant to go to Gratil’s house at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon so that the transaction on the shabu could be completed and that it should be fast because after the transaction he would be going to Bulacan. After the meeting at McDonald’sHarrisonPlaza, SPO2 Manglo and the informant returned to the Central Narcotics Office and reported to P/Insp. Cortez.

That afternoon, the team composed of P/Insp. Cortez, PO1 Molina, SPO2 Antonio, and SPO2 Manglo together with the confidential informant proceeded to the house of accused Gratil on board a vehicle. At around 4:30 p.m. they reached the vicinity of Bataan, Malate, Manilaand the vehicle was parked a distance away from the house of accused Gratil. SPO2 Manglo who was in T-shirt and maong pants and the confidential informant went to the two-storey house of accused Gratil on foot while the three (3) other policemen who were to act as back up stayed behind. At the ground floor, accused Gratil was waiting. The confidential informant introduced SPO2 Manglo as the buyer to accused Gratil. Upon learning that SPO2 Manglo was the buyer of the 400 grams of shabu which the confidential informant earlier confirmed that morning to be available, accused Gratil begged leave to get the stuff outside: “Saglit lang at kukunin ko” and then left SPO2 Manglo and the confidential informant in the sala of the groundfloor. Ten minutes after, more or less, accused returned and handed over a white plastic bag with the Mercury Drug label to SPO2 Manglo which the latter verified if it contained shabu. He found four heat sealed plastic bags containing crystalline substance. When accused Gratil asked for the money, SPO2 Manglo opened the black clutch bag wherein the boodle money which was about 5 to 6 inches thick with the P500 bill on top was put in and showed it and then handed it to the accused. After accused Gratil received the bag and before he could start counting the money, SPO2 Manglo introduced himself as a NARCOM policeman and then he pulled out his Icom radio which was tucked behind his back and called for back up. Accused Gratil was momentarily shocked by the disclosure of the poseur buyer’s true identity and when he recovered his wits and attempted to escape, the back up police officers who were positioned just 15 meters away from the house had arrived in response to the radio call of SPO2 Manglo. Accused Gratil was arrested for selling shabu to a poseur buyer by the team of policemen and in the process SPO2 Antonio recovered from the accused the marked money. SPO2 Manglo turned over the Mercury Bag containing the four heat sealed plastic bags with crystalline substance to P/Insp. Cortez even before they left the house of the accused. From there, they brought the accused together with the shabu and the marked money back to the Central Narcotics Command where the apprehending policemen executed their affidavit of arrest and other related documents in relation to the apprehension of the accused as a consequence of the buy bust operation. To identify the shabu that he purchased from the accused, SPO2 Manglo placed his initials on the plastic bags and after which the letter request for laboratory examination was prepared. The specimen were immediately forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination on the same day.

P/Insp. Mary Leocy Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory atCampCrametestified that on August 25, 1997, she performed a laboratory examination of specimen submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory by way of a letter request dated August 24, 1997 from the Central Narcotics District, PNP NARC GRP, QC (Exh. B). The specimen was contained in One (1) white plastic bag with the “Mercury Drug” label and inside were contained four (4) heatsealed transparent plastic bags with crystalline substance. After a visual examination of the specimen, P/Insp. Jabonillo weighed the four crystalline substance contained in each of the heat sealed plastic bags and came out with the following results:

Exh. ‘A-1a’ – 96.82 grams;

Exh. ‘A-1b’ – 97.02 grams;

Exh. ‘A-1c’ – 96.49 grams;

Exh. ‘A-1d’ – 97.21 grams.

(Exhibit C)

After weighing the specimen, she proceeded to take representative samples from each of the plastic bags which she used in performing a Chemical examination, otherwise known as the color test or screening test. Using the representative samples which she treated with an organic solvent, the specimen reacted with a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. After conducting the chemical examination, she performed the Confirmatory examination using the Chromatographic technique. Again, the Confirmatory examination showed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Immediately after conducting the aforedescribed examinations, she reduced the results into writing which are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-2182-97 (Exh. C) and in the Physical Sciences Report (Exh. G).

On the other hand, accused Gratil and Imelda Redolvina testified for the defense. In his defense, accused Gratil gave this version. On August 24, 1997 as early as 8:00 o’clock in the morning, he and his brothers Ricardo, Victor, Norberto, and Armando Gratil were repairing their mother’s house at 765 Agno Bataan, Malate, Manila. In the afternoon of the same day, at around 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock, accused Gratil was on his way to his cousin’s house to claim a bareta which was borrowed by said cousin. As he walked towards his cousin’s house, he saw people running at an alley (eskinita) going towards him. Suddenly someone grabbed him by the collar and told accused Gratil: “Putangina mo sama ka.” Accused Gratil asked: “Bakit po?” And the man holding him said: “Doon ka sa presinto magpaliwanag.” He could not do anything and so he was boarded on a vehicle which was parked about a hundred meters away from where he was picked up (nadakma). Inside the vehicle, accused Gratil was threateningly ordered: “Magturo ka!” He answered: “Sino po ang ituturo ko?” He was given a blow to the chest and then threatened: “Isasalvage kita!” Then, he, together with four other persons who were already inside the vehicle before he was boarded were brought to the Narcotics Office at Kamuning,Quezon City.

Imelda Revoldina testified that on August 24, 1997 between the hours of 4:00 and 5:00 in the afternoon she and others were undergoing training for soap making business in front of the Alay Kapwa center. The center was located at the corner of Agno Bataan, Malate, Manilawhere the house of the accused was also located. At around that time, there was an unusual incident that she witnessed. There were people shouting and running towards them. After the first group of people passed by her, she saw Chito Gratil collared and held by the police. The three policemen who were with accused Gratil were in white T-shirts and dark pants and brought him to a vehicle. Imelda went to the mother of Chito Gratil and told her: “Aling Pasit baka hindi ninyo alam, si Chito nahuli.” Chito’s mother talked to the policemen but she was told that she can just follow her son to the police station.^{^[16]}^[3]

The Information^{^[17]}^[4] dated August 27, 1997 charging appellant with violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (m), and (o), Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, reads:

That on or about August 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell or offer for sale One (1) white bag labeled Mercury Drug containing four (4) heatsealed transparent plastic bags each weighing ninety[-]six point eighty[-]two (96.82) grams, ninety[-]seven point zero two (97.02) grams, ninety[-]six point forty[-]nine (96.49) grams and ninety[-]seven point twenty[-]one (97.21) grams, respectively, or a total of three hundred eighty[-]seven point fifty[-]four (387.54) grams of white crystalline substance known as “SHABU” containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.

Upon arraignment on October 23, 1997, appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the charge leveled against him.^{^[18]}^[5] Thereafter, trial commenced.

In its Decision dated September 25, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant of violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 21, Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Chito Gratil GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 21, Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00.

Costs against the accused.^{^[19]}^[6]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 15, 2007 affirmed the ruling of the trial court but modified the incorrect reference to Section 21, Article I in the dispositive portion of the trial court decision, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated September 25, 2003 is affirmed, subject to the correction of the cited Section of RA 6425 as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Chito Gratil GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00.

Costs against the accused.^{^[20]}^[7]

Hence, the present appeal where appellant puts forward a single assignment of error, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.^{^[21]}^[8]

Appellant argues that the evidence on record does not fully sustain the trial court’s findings and conclusions. He maintains that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because of the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the charges against him, since the proper procedure for taking custody of the seized prohibited drugs was not faithfully followed.

The argument fails to persuade.

q: Will you tell us how did you happen to have buy bust operation against Chito Gratil on August 24, 1997?

a: On August 24, 1997 according to a confidential agent at 8:00 in the morning the confidential agent told us that he has a contact with alias Chito who is residing at 765 Agno Bataan, Malate, Manila, sir.

Court

q: This is the residence of Chito Gratil?

a: Yes, sir.

Fiscal Formoso

q: You said that it was Pol. Inspector Nolasco who receive the claim from the confidential informant?

a: We were present when he was about to receive that message, sir.

q: How was that received?

a: He came personally in the office, sir.

q: And when he went did he talk personally with Nolasco Cortez with

the presence of who?

a: SPO2 Welmer Antonio, PO1 Roger Molino and myself, sir.

q: What time was that when your confidential informant went to your

office and talk to Cortez?

a: August 24 at 8:00 in the morning, sir.

q: After your confidential informant told Police Inspector Cortez that there is a certain person by the name of Chito Gratil to sell shabu, what did he do?

a: Chief Nolasco organized a team for operation to conduct operation against Chito Gratil, sir.

q: What is your specific role as member of the team?

a: As poseur buyer, sir.

q: What did you do as poseur buyer?

a: I was given money to use for our operation, sir.

q: What is the denomination of that money?

a: P500.00 bill, sir.

q: What did you do with the money?

a: I kept it with me together with the original of the boodle money, sir.

q: I made a mark on the original of the P500.00 bill, sir.

q: What part of the P5[0]0.00 bill?

a: I affixed initial on the side of the face of the person and a dot on the nose, sir.

q: Aside from making this point on the nose and initial on the face of the person, what else did you do?

a: I took the serial number, sir.

q: You took the serial number?

a: Yes, sir.

q: If you will see that money again, will you be able to recognize it?

a: Yes, sir.

x x x x

q: You said you place a mark or point on the nose, will you tell us where is that point or “tuldok”?

Interpreter

Witness pointing at the tip of the nose of the person and also the initial near the collar of the person.

x x x x

q: Where is the initial that you placed?

a: Here it is, sir.

q: What is the initial?

a: WEM, sir.

x x x x

q: After you were able to mark this money, what else did you do?

a: At about 11:50 in the morning the confidential informant and myself went to the house of the accused, sir.

q: You and the confidential informant were the one who went to the house of Gratil?

a: Yes, sir.

x x x x

q: When you reached the place what did you do there?

a: We proceeded at Bataan, Malate,Manila, sir.

Court

q: Did you find him there?

a: Our confidential informant went inside the house and he was just standing at the street, sir.

Fiscal Formoso

q: What happened after that?

a: My confidential informant told me that we will be meeting at Mcdonald’sHarrisonPlazathat is the place where our final transaction took place, sir.

q: What time did you report by the way at Mcdonald Harrison?

a: Almost 11:40 or 11:45 a.m., sir.

q: What time did this Chito Gratil arrive?

a: After five minutes about 11:50 a.m., sir.

q: When Chito Gratil arrived, what happened?

a: Our confidential informant and this alias Chito were talking to each other that the money to buy shabu is available, sir.

q: Were you present when this Chito Gratil were talking?

a: I was about 2 ½ meters, sir.

q: Were you able to hear what these two (2) were talking about?

a: Yes, sir.

q: What did you hear?

a: Our confidential informant said that the money is ready, sir for shabu and alias Chito Gratil said that you come to my house at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon and to get avail of the shabu because at that time he will be going to Bulacan, sir.

q: After this was told by Chito that you have to go in his house did you go there?

a: After that conversation she went back to our office and I reported them to our team leader P/Insp. Nolasco Cortez, sir.

x x x x

q: What happened next?

a: He told me that it is first class shabu and he told me to wait for a while because he will get the shabu and he returned for around 10 minutes, sir.

q: Where did he go?

a: He went out of the house, sir.

q: Were there other persons present when you talked to the accused?

a: No, sir.

q: You mean to say that only the three (3) of you went inside the house?

a: Yes, sir.

q: After 10 minutes he returned?

a: Yes, sir, and he has with him with the logo of Mercury and handed to me and told me that that is the 400 grams of shabu, sir.

q: Then what did you do?

a: So, when I opened the mercury bag I noticed that there is something that is wrapped in a Chinese newspaper and I opened and examined the contents and I found that it is shabu, sir.

Court

q: What did you see when you opened the newspaper?

a: Shabu in four (4) plastic bag and wrapped in a Chinese newspaper, sir.

q: How big is this?

a: Ordinary about 3 by 5 inches, sir.

q: How many bags?

a: Four (4), sir.

q: And these bags are transparent?

a: Yes, sir.

q: So, it was handed to you this shabu by the accused, what did you do next?

a: He asked for the payment, so, what I did is to open the bag and handed to him the money, sir.^{^[23]}^[10]

A comparison with the Joint Affidavit of Arrest^{^[24]}^[11] executed earlier by SPO2 Manglo, SPO2 Wilmer Antonio and Police Officer (PO) 1 Roger R. Molino and the foregoing testimony, would reveal that both aver the same narrative with regard to the arrest of appellant. The pertinent portions of the said affidavit read as follows:

That on 24 Aug 97, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, our male Confidential Informant appeared in our Office and reported to POL INSPECTOR NOLASCO V. CORTEZ PNP that he was able to get in contact with a certain Alyas “CHITO” of 765 Agnoo-Bataan, Malate, Manila and managed to order four hundred (400) grams of shabu in the amount of four hundred thousand (P400,000.00) pesos. That he further stressed that the stuff will be available in the afternoon of the same date. That relative to this report, POL INSP NOLASCO V. CORTEZ PNP organized a team composed of herein affiants with SPO2 Wilmer G. Antonio PNP and PO1 Roger R. Molino PNP as back-up/arresting officer and SPO2 William E. Manglo PNP as the poseur-buyer and furnished with one (1) five hundred (P500.00) peso bill (marked money) with serial number AT485382 and the rest as boodle money representing the amount of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) pesos to be used in the buy-bust operation;

x x x x

x x x That upon arrival at the house of Alyas “CHITO”, I (SPO2 Manglo) was introduced by our CI as the buyer of shabu. Aka “CHITO” then asked me how much quantity of shabu I am going to purchase. That I told him that I am in need of at least four hundred (400) grams of shabu. That Aka “CHITO” told me that the price of 400 grams of shabu is four hundred thousand (P400,000.00) pesos. That I acknowledged his offer and informed him that I am willing to purchase only 400 grams of shabu, if it is already available. That Aka “CHITO” stated that he had 400 grams of shabu available and he asked me if I have with me the money as payment for said stuff, that at this juncture, I opened my bag and showed to him the bundle of buy-money (boodle money) consisting of one (1) genuine five hundred (P500.00) peso bill placed at the top of the bundle of boodle money. When Aka “CHITO” saw the said bundle of purported money, I asked him if I could also examine the shabu before I made the payment and he gave me assurance that his stuff was of good quality, then Aka “Chito” went out of his house to get the stuff while SPO2 Manglo together with the CI stayed inside of the house and after a few minutes, Aka “CHITO” returned back to his house and immediately without further hesitation, handed one (1) white bag (labeled Mercury Drug) containing four (4) heatsealed transparent plastic bag each with brownish crystalline substance wrapped in a Chinese newsprint and informed the undersigned poseur-buyer that the content of said heatsealed transparend plastic bag is 400 grams of shabu and after examining the content of it, which turn out to be shabu, I took hold of it and Aka “CHITO” demanded the payment. That I handed the buy-bust money (boodle) to him and at this juncture, I introduced to him that I am a Police Officer and before he could get outside of the house in attempting to elude arrest, I called the back-up/arresting officer thru a handheld who responded and effected the arrest of the suspect and SPO2 Antonio recovered from him (Aka “CHITO”) custody/possession and control the buy-bust/boodle money.

x x x x

x x x That the suspect was brought to our Office together with the confiscated/seized evidence for proper disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)

However, the failure to conduct an inventory and to photograph the confiscated items in the manner prescribed under the said provision of law applicable at the time of appellant’s arrest and which is now incorporated as Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)^{^[26]}^[13] that repealed Republic Act No. 6425 cannot be used as a ground for appellant’s exoneration from the charge against him.

In People v. De Los Reyes,^{^[27]}^[14] a case which also involved an objection regarding the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, we held that:

Moreover, in People v. Agulay,^{^[29]}^[16] we held that:

The ponente of Agulay would further observe in a separate opinion that the failure by the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165,^{^[31]}^[18] which replicated Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165, did not overcome the presumption of regularity accorded to police authorities in the performance of their official duties, to wit:

q: Kindly examine carefully these separate plastic sachet containing shabu if that is the plastic sachet containing shabu that you bought from the accused Chito Gratil?

a: Yes, this is the plastic of shabu that I bought from the accused, sir.

q: Kindly tell us your distinguishing mark?

a: My initial, sir.

q: Kindly point to us you initial in these four (4) plastic bags?

Interpreter

Witness pointing to his initial appearing in each four (4) bags which previously marked as Exhibits A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4.

x x x x

q: What did you do then in order to identify the shabu the subject of your sale and in order to identify the seller of the shabu?

a: What we [did] after the sale consummated we placed the marking our initial on the shabu that we bought and we made the corresponding request for the examination in the laboratory where we indicate the name and source of the shabu or the name of the one selling the shabu.

q: Aside from this referral letter where else did you place the name of the accused?

a: In the documents prepared by our investigator such as the Booking sheet and Arrest Report, sir.^{^[33]}^[20]

The marking, turn-over, and laboratory examination of the evidence of illegal drugs were all done on the same day the “shabu” transaction at issue occurred, as indicated in the Memorandum^{^[34]}^[21] dated August 24, 1997 signed by Police Superintendent Pedro Ongsotto Alcantara PNP who was then the Chief of the Central Narcotics District Office, EDSA, Quezon City. The said memorandum contained a request by P/Supt. Alcantara to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Criminal Investigation Service inCampCrame,Quezon City for laboratory examination of the items seized from appellant.

Likewise, SPO2 Manglo’s testimony was corroborated by Police Inspector Mary Leocy Jabonillo, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office inCampCrame,Quezon City, who testified that when she received the “Mercury Drug” bag containing four plastic bags filled with white crystalline substance, they were already marked and that she also later marked them. Her account on this matter follows:

q: Will you tell us if what is that specimen which was referred to you for examination?

a: We received a plastic bag labeled Mercury Drug, sir, containing newspaper and four (4) plastic with white bags containing yellowish substance with the following weights:

Exhibit A-1-A 96.82 grams

Exhibit A-1-B 97.02 grams

Exhibit A-1-C 96.49 grams

Exhibit A-1-D 97.21 grams

with a total of 387.54 grams, sir.

Fiscal Formoso

q: How was this specimen referred to you for examination?

a: There was a letter request from the Chief of Narcotics Drug Division, Office,Quezon City, sir.

x x x x

Fiscal Formoso

q: Now, will you tell this Honorable Court if what did you do after you received the specimen?

a: I put my markings on the specimen, sir.

q: Where is that specimen that you received?

Interpreter

Witness is opening the mercury bag and brings out specimen in four (4) separate plastic bags and wrapped in Chinese newspaper.

Fiscal Formoso

q: Will you tell this honorable court if that was the very condition of this specimen when you received it?

a: Yes, sir.

q: And it was already marked when you received it?

a: Yes, sir, and I have also my own markings.

x x x x

Fiscal Formoso

q: Now, when you received these four (4) plastic bags, what did you do then?

a: After putting my marking, I got a sample and proceeded to physical examination, Your Honor, and after conducting that physical examination all specimen gave positive result, sir, for methamphetamine hydrochloride.^{^[35]}^[22]

As we have time and again held, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.^{^[36]}^[23] Charges of extortion and frame-up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus, cautious in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duties. To substantiate such defense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.^{^[37]}^[24]

As appellant failed to show any reversible error on the part of the lower courts in the resolution of this case, his conviction must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 15, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02338 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice	JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice




JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][9] People v. Ventura, G.R. No. 184957, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 543, 554-555.

[2][9] People v. Ventura, G.R. No. 184957, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 543, 554-555.

[3][12] Cited in People v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 184952, October 11, 2010; People v. Kimura, 471 Phil. 895, 918 (2004).

[4][13] (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

[5][14] G.R. No. 106874, January 21, 1994, 229 SCRA 439.

[6][15] Id. at 447.

[7][16] G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571.

[8][17] Id. at 595.

[9][18] (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

[10][19] People v. Agulay, supra note 16 at 622-623.

[11][23] People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 390.

[12][23] People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 390.

[13][24] People v. Capalad, G.R. No. 184174, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 717, 727.

* Per Special Order No. 1022 dated June 10, 2011.

[14][1] Rollo, pp. 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring.

[15][2] CA rollo, pp. 17-21.

[16][3] Id. at 17-20.

[17][4] Id. at 8.

[18][5] Records, p. 28.

[19][6] CA rollo, p. 21.

[20][7] Rollo, p. 15.

[21][8] CA rollo, p. 78.

[22][9] People v. Ventura, G.R. No. 184957, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 543, 554-555.

[23][10] TSN, April 15, 1998, pp. 6-24.

[24][11] Records, pp. 9-10.

[25][12] Cited in People v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 184952, October 11, 2010; People v. Kimura, 471 Phil. 895, 918 (2004).

[26][13] (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

[27][14] G.R. No. 106874, January 21, 1994, 229 SCRA 439.

[28][15] Id. at 447.

[29][16] G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571.

[30][17] Id. at 595.

[31][18] (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

[32][19] People v. Agulay, supra note 16 at 622-623.

[33][20] TSN, August 29, 2001, pp. 6-16.

[34][21] Records, p. 192.

[35][22] TSN, April 2, 1998, pp. 3-7.

[36][23] People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 390.

[37][24] People v. Capalad, G.R. No. 184174, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 717, 727.

Comment

J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

Category: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES

CASE 2011-157: MA. LIGAYA B. SANTOS VS. LITTON MILLS INCORPORATED AND/OR ATTY. RODOLFO MARINO (G.R. NO. 170646, 22 JUNE 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: SUBSEQUENT AND SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE CURES TECHNICAL DEFECTS; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. (BRIEF TITLE: SANTOS VS. LITTON MILLS)

CASE 2011-0156: ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 170658, 22 JUNE 2011) SUBJECT: SUMMARY JUDGMENT (BRIEF TITLE: CALUBAQUIB VS. REPUBLIC)

CASE 2011-0155: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHITO GRATIL Y GUELAS, (G.R. NO. 182236, 22 JUNE 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECTS: SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS; INSTANCE WHEN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURE WAS NOT CONSIDERED; ALIBI; FRAME UP. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. GRATIL).

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