J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0154: CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  (G.R. NO. 176740, 22 JUNE 2011,  DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: RAPE, SWEETHEART DEFENSE, CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES,  PENALTY, DAMAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. DUMADAG)

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

 WHEN CREDIBILITY IS THE ISSUE HOW DOES THE SUPREME COURT RULE?

 THE SUPREME COURT  GENERALLY DEFERS TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH HAD THE FIRST HAND OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES AND OBSERVE THEIR DEMEANOR, CONDUCT AND ATTITUDE DURING THEIR PRESENTATION.  HENCE, THE TRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS ESPECIALLY WHEN AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT ARE ACCORDED THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF RESPECT AND ARE CONCLUSIVE AND BINDING ON THIS COURT.

 The improbabilities alluded to by the appellant hinge on the assessment of the credibility of “AAA”.  When credibility is the issue that comes to fore, this Court generally defers to the findings of the trial court which had the first hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude during their presentation.  Hence, the trial court’s factual findings especially when affirmed by the appellate court are accorded the highest degree of respect and are conclusive and binding on this Court.  . . . . .

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WHAT IS THE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE?

WHEN THE COURT’S EVALUATION WAS REACHED ARBITRARILY OR  WHEN THE COURT OVERLOOKED, MISUNDERSTOOD OR MISAPPLIED CERTAIN FACTS WHICH WHEN CONSIDERED WOULD  AFFECT THE RESULT.

. . . . . A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted save upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances “such as when the court’s evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which[, if considered, would] affect the result of the case.”^[1][20] Unfortunately for appellant, none of these recognized exceptions necessitating a reversal of the assailed Decision obtains in this instance.

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WHAT IS THE GRAVAMEN OF THE OFFENSE OF RAPE?

 SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH A WOMAN    AGAINST HER WILL OR WITHOUT HER CONSENT.^[2][21]

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.^[3][21]  On the basis of the records, the Court finds “AAA” candidly and categorically recounted the manner appellant threatened her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her will.  “AAA” consistently testified that while she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass on December 24, 1998, appellant suddenly and unexpectedly grabbed her, placed his right hand around her neck and poked a knife at the left portion of her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she shouts.  He made her walk towards the house of Boyet where she was forced to lie on a bed and with the knife aimed at her side succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.^[4][22]  Reviewing the antecedents of this case, the Court, just as the courts below, is convinced of the truth and sincerity in the account of “AAA”.  It bears to stress that “[a]s a rule, testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight and credit for youth and immaturity are badges of truth.”^[5][23]

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ACCUSED ARGUES THAT THERE WAS NO RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM. IS HIS ARGUMENT VALID?

NO. THE FAILURE OF A VICTIM TO PHYSICALLY RESIST DOES NOT NEGATE RAPE           WHEN INTIMIDATION IS EXERCISED UPON [HER] AND THE LATTER SUBMITS HERSELF, AGAINST HER WILL, TO THE RAPIST’S ASSAULT BECAUSE OF FEAR FOR LIFE AND PHYSICAL SAFETY.”^[6][31]

The fact that there is no evidence of resistance on the part of “AAA” does not cloud her credibility.  “The failure of a victim to physically resist does not negate rape when intimidation is exercised upon [her] and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s assault because of fear for life and physical safety.”^[7][31]  In this case, “AAA” was dragged by appellant with a knife pointed on her neck and warned not to shout or to reveal the incident to anyone or else she would be killed.  That warning was instilled in “AAA’s” mind such that even when appellant was just holding his weapon after the intercourse, she did not attempt to flee.  The intimidations made by the appellant are sufficient since it instilled fear in her mind that if she would not submit to his bestial demands, something bad would befall her.  “Well-settled is the rule that where the victim is threatened with bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a pistol, knife, ice pick or bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist.”^[8][32]

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APPELLANT  ARGUED THAT THEY WERE LOVERS. IS THIS DEFENSE VALID?

NO.  THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THIS.

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BUT WITNESSES SAW THEM TOGETHER AND THAT THEY WERE WRITING TO EACH OTHER. IS THIS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE?

 NO.  THESE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

             There is no question that “AAA” underwent sexual intercourse as admitted by appellant himself and as shown by the medical findings of Dr. Toribio-Berona.^[9][33]  However, appellant denies having raped her and instead, claims that he and “AAA” were lovers and the act of sexual intercourse was a free and voluntary act between them.  In short, he interposes the “sweetheart” theory to exculpate himself from the rape charge filed against him.

            Appellant’s claim that they are lovers is untenable.  For one, such claim was not substantiated by the evidence on the record.  The only evidence adduced by appellant were his testimony and those of his relatives Boyet and Nieves Irish. According to Boyet, he knows of their relationship because they were conversing and writing each other^[10][34] while Nieves Irish saw them once walking in the street.^[11][35]  To the mind of the Court, these are not enough evidence to prove that a romantic relationship existed between appellant and “AAA”.  In People v. Napudo^[12][36]  where the accused likewise invoked the sweetheart defense, this Court held that:

[T]he fact alone that two people were seen seated beside each other, conversing during a jeepney ride, without more, cannot give rise to the inference that they were sweethearts. Intimacies such as loving caresses, cuddling, tender smiles, sweet murmurs or any other affectionate gestures that one bestows upon his or her lover would have been seen and are expected to indicate the presence of the relationship.

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 FOR SWEETHEART DEFENSE TO BE CREDIBLE WHAT MUST BE PROVEN?

 SOME DOCUMENTARY OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF RELATIONSHIP [SUCH AS NOTES, GIFTS, PICTURES, MEMENTOS] AND THE LIKE.^[13][37]

            Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his witnesses which were rightly discredited by the trial court, nothing supports appellant’s claim that he and “AAA” were indeed lovers. “A ‘sweetheart defense,’ to be credible, should be substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of relationship [such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos] and the like.^[14][37] Appellant failed to discharge this burden.

            Besides, even if it were true that appellant and “AAA” were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate rape.  “Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.”^[15][38] But what destroyed the veracity of appellant’s “sweetheart” defense were the credible declaration of “AAA” that she does not love him^[16][39] and her categorical denial that he is her boyfriend.^[17][40]

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WHAT IS THE PROPER PENALTY?

The Proper Penalty

            Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.  At the time of the commission of the offense on December 25, 1998, Republic Act No. 8353 (otherwise known as the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997”) was already in effect.  The amendatory law, particularly Article 266-B thereof, provides an identical provision and imposes the same penalty when the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. In this case, such circumstance was sufficiently alleged in the Information and established during the trial.  In People v. Macapanas,^[18][41] the Court ruled that “[b]eing in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, ‘use of a deadly weapon’ increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty.  This so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.”  Since the Information does not allege and the prosecution failed to prove any other attending circumstance in the commission of the offense, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua^[19][42] conformably with Article 63^[20][43] of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the courts below on appellant.

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WHAT ARE THE DAMAGES DUE THE RAPED VICTIM?

            As to damages, the Court affirms the grant by the appellate court to “AAA” of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and its reduction of the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00 based on prevailing jurisprudence.^[21][44] “Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.”^[22][45]  Moral damages, on the other hand, are automatically granted to the rape victim without presentation of further proof other than the commission of the crime.^[23][46]

            The Court notes that both the courts below failed to award exemplary damages.  Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded by reason of the established presence of the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon as the Court recently ruled in People v. Toriaga.^[24][47]  The Court further held in said case that under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, the rape victim is entitled to recover exemplary damages following the ruling in People v. Catubig.^[25][48]

            In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid likewise pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.^[26][49]

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

            The fact of sexual intercourse in this case is undisputed. What confronts this Court is the question of whether the sexual congress between appellant and the private complainant was done through force and intimidation or was voluntary and consensual.

For review is the July 3, 2006 Decision^[27][1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01843 affirming with modification the Decision^[28][2] dated April 16, 2001^[29][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 08, Aparri, Cagayan, finding Carlo Dumadag y Romio (appellant) guilty of the crime of rape.

Factual Antecedents

            On June 14, 1999, an Information for rape was filed with the RTC against appellant, which contained the following accusations:

            The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO, upon complaint filed by the offended party, “AAA”,^[30][4] in the Municipal Trial Court of “CCC”, “DDD” found on page one (1) of the records of the case and forming an integral part of this Information, of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 [sic], of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, of Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:

                That on or about December 25, 1998, in the Municipality of “CCC”, province of “DDD”, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with lewd design, by use of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party, a woman below eighteen (18) years of age, all against her will and consent.

                                CONTRARY TO LAW.^[31][5]

            During his arraignment on October 26, 1999, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de officio, entered a negative plea to the charge.  At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense made stipulation of facts as to the identities of the private complainant and the appellant and that a medical certificate was issued to the former.  Shortly after termination of the conference, trial on merits commenced.

Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

“AAA”, a young barrio lass, 16 years of age at the time she testified on February 21, 2000, declared that in the early morning of December 25, 1998, she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass at “BBB”, “CCC”, “DDD”.  She was a little bit behind Thelma, Carlos and Clarence, all surnamed Dumadag.  All of a sudden, appellant approached her from behind and poked a Batangas knife on her threatening to stab her if she shouts.  He pulled her towards the house of Joel “Boyet” Ursulum (Boyet).  Once inside, she was forced to remove her pants and panty because of fear.  Appellant also removed his pants and brief and pushed her on a bamboo bed.  Pointing the knife at the left portion of her abdomen, appellant ordered her to hold his penis against her vagina.  Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.  After appellant was through, they stayed inside the house until six o’clock in the morning of December 25, 1998.  All this time, appellant continued to hold the knife.  Pleading that she be allowed to go home, appellant finally let her go after threatening to kill her if she reports the incident to her parents.  “AAA” decided not to disclose what transpired because of fear.  Nevertheless, “AAA’s” uncle, “EEE” learned from appellant himself that the latter had sexual intercourse with her.  Her uncle relayed the information to her father who confronted her about the incident.  After confirming the same from “AAA”, they decided to report the matter to the police where she was investigated and her sworn statement taken.

Dr. Jane Toribio-Berona (Dr. Toribio-Berona) conducted a physical examination on “AAA”.  She identified the medical certificate^[32][6] issued by her wherein it was indicated that there was laceration on “AAA’s” hymen.

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant does not deny having had sexual intercourse with “AAA”.  Instead, he claimed that it was voluntary and without the use of force since they were lovers.  To support his claim that “AAA” was his girlfriend, appellant presented Boyet and Nieves Irish Oandasan (Nieves Irish) who both corroborated his sweetheart defense.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC declared appellant guilty  beyond  reasonable  doubt  of

the charge lodged against him after finding “AAA”’s testimony to be credible^[33][7] as it was given in a candid and straightforward manner.^[34][8] It rejected appellant’s “sweetheart” defense holding that a sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.^[35][9] Consequently he was condemned to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and payment of damages, viz:

                WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay “AAA” the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (p100,000.00) as moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

                SO ORDERED.^[36][10]

            Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal^[37][11] on April 24, 2001 with the trial court. The records of this case were transmitted to this Court.  Both parties filed their respective Briefs.^[38][12]  Consistent however to this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo,^[39][13] the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.^[40][14]

In his brief, appellant assigned the following errors, viz:

            I.      The trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of [the] private complainant that accused poked a knife at the left side of her [abdomen] after she came out from [the] church.

                II.    The trial court erred in not acquitting accused-appellant on [the] ground of reasonable doubt.^[41][15]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Resolving jointly the foregoing imputations against the trial court, the CA affirmed with modification the appealed judgment of conviction. The CA ruled that there is nothing on record which shows that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied a fact or circumstance of weight and substance which would have affected the case.  The CA junked appellant’s contentions that he and “AAA” were lovers; that no force or intimidation was employed on “AAA;” and that there was contradiction as to which of his hands was placed around the neck of “AAA.”  The CA further held that “AAA’s” simple account of her ordeal evinces sincerity and truthfulness.  It disposed of the appeal in its assailed Decision promulgated on July 3, 2006, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision promulgated on April 19, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 08, in Criminal Case No. 08-1157, finding the accused-appellant Carlo Dumadag y Romio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is ordered to pay the victim “AAA” the reduced amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages, in addition to the Php50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.

SO ORDERED.^[42][16]

Aggrieved, appellant is now before this Court submitting anew for resolution the same matters he argued before the CA.  Per Resolution^[43][17] dated June 4, 2007, the parties were notified that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire within 30 days from notice.  Appellant informed the Court that he would no longer file a supplemental brief as all relevant matters were already taken up.^[44][18]  Appellee, for its part, opted not to file any supplemental brief.^[45][19]  Thus, this case was submitted for decision on the basis of their respective briefs filed with the CA.

In his bid for acquittal, appellant points out several circumstances purportedly showing that “AAA’s” testimony is not worthy of credence.  According to appellant, it is highly improbable for him to poke a knife on her without being noticed since the members of his (appellant) family were just a little bit ahead of her.  He claims that from a distance of 200 meters from the church to the house of Boyet, it would be impossible that nobody saw them considering that his right arm was allegedly placed around her neck and at the same time a knife was poked on the left side of her body.  He further asserts that she could have made an outcry considering that she was with his (appellant) parents in going home after the midnight mass.

Our Ruling

            The appeal is bereft of merit.

The improbabilities alluded to by the appellant hinge on the assessment of the credibility of “AAA”.  When credibility is the issue that comes to fore, this Court generally defers to the findings of the trial court which had the first hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude during their presentation.  Hence, the trial court’s factual findings especially when affirmed by the appellate court are accorded the highest degree of respect and are conclusive and binding on this Court.  A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted save upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances “such as when the court’s evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which[, if considered, would] affect the result of the case.”^[46][20] Unfortunately for appellant, none of these recognized exceptions necessitating a reversal of the assailed Decision obtains in this instance.

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.^[47][21]  On the basis of the records, the Court finds “AAA” candidly and categorically recounted the manner appellant threatened her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her will.  “AAA” consistently testified that while she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass on December 24, 1998, appellant suddenly and unexpectedly grabbed her, placed his right hand around her neck and poked a knife at the left portion of her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she shouts.  He made her walk towards the house of Boyet where she was forced to lie on a bed and with the knife aimed at her side succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.^[48][22]  Reviewing the antecedents of this case, the Court, just as the courts below, is convinced of the truth and sincerity in the account of “AAA”.  It bears to stress that “[a]s a rule, testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight and credit for youth and immaturity are badges of truth.”^[49][23]

Neither is it improbable for appellant to employ such criminal design in the presence of his (appellant) own family especially when overcome by lust.  “It is a common judicial experience that rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby.”^[50][24]  “[L]ust is no respecter of time and place.”^[51][25]  As established, “AAA” was silenced by appellant’s threat of killing her with a knife.^[52][26]  Thus, the reason for “AAA’s” failure to shout or cry for help is because she was overcame by fear.  It has been held that minors, like “AAA”, could be easily intimidated and cowed into silence even by the mildest threat against their lives.^[53][27]

Also it is not impossible for them to walk from the church to the house of Boyet unnoticed.  Except for his bare argument, nothing was adduced that church goers passed through that road about the same time as the incident.  In fact, “AAA” testified that she did not encounter other persons on the way to the house of Boyet.^[54][28]

            In trying to discredit further “AAA’s” testimony, appellant assails her behavior before, during and after the rape incident.  He contends that in all these instances, “AAA” had all the chances to escape but she did not.  He argues that “AAA” had the opportunity to run when they were entering the house of Boyet and during their more or less five hours stay inside the house yet she decided to remain.  He claims that such behavior is unnatural, incredible and beyond human experience.

Appellant’s contentions fail to persuade.

The failure of “AAA” to flee despite opportunity does not necessarily deviate from natural human conduct.  It bears emphasis that human reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault.  There is no uniform behavior expected of victims after being raped.^[55][29]  Moreover, “[n]ot all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.”^[56][30]  “AAA”, being then a minor and subjected to a threat to her life, should not be judged by the norms of behavior expected of mature persons.

The fact that there is no evidence of resistance on the part of “AAA” does not cloud her credibility.  “The failure of a victim to physically resist does not negate rape when intimidation is exercised upon [her] and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s assault because of fear for life and physical safety.”^[57][31]  In this case, “AAA” was dragged by appellant with a knife pointed on her neck and warned not to shout or to reveal the incident to anyone or else she would be killed.  That warning was instilled in “AAA’s” mind such that even when appellant was just holding his weapon after the intercourse, she did not attempt to flee.  The intimidations made by the appellant are sufficient since it instilled fear in her mind that if she would not submit to his bestial demands, something bad would befall her.  “Well-settled is the rule that where the victim is threatened with bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a pistol, knife, ice pick or bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist.”^[58][32]

            There is no question that “AAA” underwent sexual intercourse as admitted by appellant himself and as shown by the medical findings of Dr. Toribio-Berona.^[59][33]  However, appellant denies having raped her and instead, claims that he and “AAA” were lovers and the act of sexual intercourse was a free and voluntary act between them.  In short, he interposes the “sweetheart” theory to exculpate himself from the rape charge filed against him.

            Appellant’s claim that they are lovers is untenable.  For one, such claim was not substantiated by the evidence on the record.  The only evidence adduced by appellant were his testimony and those of his relatives Boyet and Nieves Irish. According to Boyet, he knows of their relationship because they were conversing and writing each other^[60][34] while Nieves Irish saw them once walking in the street.^[61][35]  To the mind of the Court, these are not enough evidence to prove that a romantic relationship existed between appellant and “AAA”.  In People v. Napudo^[62][36]  where the accused likewise invoked the sweetheart defense, this Court held that:

[T]he fact alone that two people were seen seated beside each other, conversing during a jeepney ride, without more, cannot give rise to the inference that they were sweethearts. Intimacies such as loving caresses, cuddling, tender smiles, sweet murmurs or any other affectionate gestures that one bestows upon his or her lover would have been seen and are expected to indicate the presence of the relationship.

            Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his witnesses which were rightly discredited by the trial court, nothing supports appellant’s claim that he and “AAA” were indeed lovers. “A ‘sweetheart defense,’ to be credible, should be substantiated by some documentary or other evidence of relationship [such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos] and the like.^[63][37] Appellant failed to discharge this burden.

            Besides, even if it were true that appellant and “AAA” were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate rape.  “Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.”^[64][38] But what destroyed the veracity of appellant’s “sweetheart” defense were the credible declaration of “AAA” that she does not love him^[65][39] and her categorical denial that he is her boyfriend.^[66][40]

            With the credibility of “AAA” having been firmly established, the courts below did not err in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed through force and intimidation. The “sweetheart” theory interposed by appellant was correctly rejected for lack of substantial corroboration.

The Proper Penalty

            Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.  At the time of the commission of the offense on December 25, 1998, Republic Act No. 8353 (otherwise known as the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997”) was already in effect.  The amendatory law, particularly Article 266-B thereof, provides an identical provision and imposes the same penalty when the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. In this case, such circumstance was sufficiently alleged in the Information and established during the trial.  In People v. Macapanas,^[67][41] the Court ruled that “[b]eing in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, ‘use of a deadly weapon’ increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty.  This so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.”  Since the Information does not allege and the prosecution failed to prove any other attending circumstance in the commission of the offense, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua^[68][42] conformably with Article 63^[69][43] of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the courts below on appellant.

            As to damages, the Court affirms the grant by the appellate court to “AAA” of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and its reduction of the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00 based on prevailing jurisprudence.^[70][44] “Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.”^[71][45]  Moral damages, on the other hand, are automatically granted to the rape victim without presentation of further proof other than the commission of the crime.^[72][46]

            The Court notes that both the courts below failed to award exemplary damages.  Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded by reason of the established presence of the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon as the Court recently ruled in People v. Toriaga.^[73][47]  The Court further held in said case that under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, the rape victim is entitled to recover exemplary damages following the ruling in People v. Catubig.^[74][48]

            In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid likewise pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.^[75][49]

            WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01843 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant Carlo Dumadag y Romio is ordered to further pay “AAA” P30, 000.00 as exemplary damages and interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from the date the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

)CASE 2011-0153: RUEL AMPATUAN “ALIAS RUEL” VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 183676, 22 JUNE 2011, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECTS: DANGEROUS DRUGS; BUY BUST OPERATION; CHAIN OF CUSTODY) BRIEF TITLE (AMPATUAN VS. PEOPLE)

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SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS TO PROVE IN THE PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS?

THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS MUST BE PROVEN: (1) THAT THE TRANSACTION OR SALE TOOK PLACE; (2) THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OR THE ILLICIT DRUG WAS PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE; AND (3) THAT THE BUYER AND SELLER WERE IDENTIFIED.

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WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESENT TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED?

 THE PRESENTATION  IN COURT OF THE CORPUS DELICTI — THE BODY OR SUBSTANCE OF THE CRIME – ESTABLISHES THE FACT THAT A CRIME HAS ACTUALLY BEEN COMMITTED.

 In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.^[1][19]  The presence of these elements is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of appellants’ guilt.^[2][20]  What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.^[3][21]  The presentation in court of the corpus delicti — the body or substance of the crime – establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.^[4][22]

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WHAT IS A BUY-BUST OPERATION?

A BUY-BUST  OPERATION IS A FORM OF ENTRAPMENT WHEREBY WAYS AND MEANS ARE RESORTED TO FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRAPPING AND CAPTURING THE LAWBREAKERS IN THE EXECUTION OF THEIR CRIMINAL PLAN.

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IS BUY-BUS OPERATION LEGAL?

 YES PROVIDED THAT DUE REGARD TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SAFEGUARDS IS UNDERTAKEN.

           A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.^[5][24]  In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided that due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.^[6][25]

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HOW MUCH WEIGHT BE GIVEN TO TESTIMONIES OF POLICE OFFICERS?

MUCH CREDENCE BE GIVEN TO THEM UNLESS THERE IS EVIDCENCE TO THE CONTRARY. THEY ARE PRESUMED TO HAVE PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES IN A REGULAR MANNER.

 In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial.^[7][26]

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HOW MUCH WEIGHT IS GIVEN TO TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS?

 ACCORDED RESPECT WHEN NO GLARING ERRORS, GROSS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS OR SPECULATIVE AND ARBITRARY CONCLUSIONS CAN BE GATHERED.

 Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.^[8][27]  It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts, which are factual in nature and which involve credibility, are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.  The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.  The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.^[9][28]

 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

HOW DOES ONE   OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS?

 THERE MUST BE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE POLICE OFFICERS EITHER DID NOT PROPERLY PERFORM THEIR DUTIES OR THAT THEY WERE PROMPTED WITH ILL MOTIVE.

         Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties.  Hence, when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails.^[10][29] In order to overcome the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.^[11][30]

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WHAT IS THE RULE ON THE CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF THE CONFISCATED DRUGS?

 As to the corpus delicti of the case, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated illegal drugs, to wit:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

This rule was elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz:

a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours)^[12][31]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT ARE THE LINKS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN A BUY-BUST OPERATION?

 FIRST: EIZURE OF DRUG BY APPREHENDING OFFICER, SECOND: URNOVER BY APPREHENDING  OFFICER TO INVESTIGATING OFFICER; THIRD: URNOVER BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER TO FORENSIC CHEMIST AND FOURTH: TURNOVER BY THE FORENSIC CHEMIST TO THE COURT.

 The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.^[13][32]

WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SEIZED DRUG?

 Indeed, in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation in evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material.  Thus, it is vital that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty.  The fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same degree of certitude.  It is in this respect that the chain of custody requirement performs its function.  It ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.^[14][36]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PETITIONER DENIES KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRANSACTION AND HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COMPANIONS WERE JUST VISITORS IN THAT HOUSE. IS THIS VALID DEFENSE.

 NO.

 Petitioner likewise asserts denial of any knowledge relating to the transaction and invoked that he and his companions were merely visitors of Ibrahim’s wife. 

Denial and alibi are defenses invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.^[15][37]

Unfortunately, the accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to prove that there was indeed irregularity in the performance of duties or there was an improper motive on the part of the police officers.  His mere testimony alone cannot be considered by this court as a clear and convincing evidence to rule otherwise for the same is self-serving on his part.  This Court finds the version of facts of the prosecution more credible to sustain than the version of facts of the accused-appellant denying any knowledge of the illegal sale. 

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FIRST DIVISION

x  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

         For review through this appeal^[16][1] is the Decision^[17][2] dated 25 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00343 which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant RUEL AMPATUAN “Alias Ruel” under Section 4^[18][3] of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” as amended by Republic Act No. 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”  The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 11^th Judicial Region, Branch 4, Panabo City, in Criminal Case No. 98-76, finding appellant Ruel Ampatuan alias “Ruel” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 (RA 6425), otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by BP 179 and further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659) [as further amended by Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002] is hereby AFFIRMED.^[19][4] 

The facts as presented by the prosecution before the appellate court, follows:

On 13 October 1997, at around 10:00 a.m., police operatives PO1 Arnel Micabalo (PO1 Micabalo) and PO2 Francisco S. Caslib (PO2 Caslib) together with around fifteen (15) to sixteen (16) police members belonging from the Philippine National Police (PNP) Compound in Tagum City and Panabo Police Station were given a briefing by their team leader, a certain SPO1 Derrayal, regarding a buy-bust operation they would later conduct that day against a certain suspected drug pusher by the name of Totong Ibrahim (Ibrahim) who lives near the Coca-Cola warehouse at Barangay Cagangohan, Panabo City, Davao del Norte.^[20][5] 

The buy-bust operation was conducted at around 1:00 p.m. of the same day.  Police officers PO1 Micabalo and PO2 Caslib, prepared marked money in the amount of P500.00^[21][6] and went to the house of Ibrahim posing as buyers.  The rest of the team positioned themselves at the grassy area nearby awaiting for the pre-arranged signal from PO1 Micabalo and PO2 Caslib.  The policemen saw the accused-appellant Ruel Ampatuan (Mr. Ampatuan) and his wife Linda, at the gate of the fence.^[22][7]  They talked to the couple and pretended to buy for a party, marijuana worth P500.00.^[23][8]  The couple told them to wait outside the fence and then went inside the house. Several minutes later, the couple came out with another man identified as Maguid Lumna (Lumna).  Mr. Ampatuan asked for the payment.  The poseur-buyers handed the marked money to Mr. Ampatuan, who in turn handed it to his wife, Linda.  Mr. Ampatuan then showed the police officers the marijuana contained in one pack.  This was placed inside a black bag and given to the poseur-buyers.  The pre-arranged signal of talking aloud was made and the rest of the police officers proceeded to the scene.  The couple and Lumna were arrested and brought to the Panabo Police Station.^[24][9] 

On 23 October 1997, the confiscated object was turned over by the Panabo Police Station to Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero (Austero) of the PNP Crime Laboratory of Davao City.^[25][10]  Upon examination, the sample taken yielded positive result for the presence of marijuana.  The total weight of the confiscated specimen as testified by Austero was approximately 1.3 kilos.^[26][11] 

The version of the defense is:

On 13 October 1997, Mr. Ampatuan, his wife Linda and bodyguard Lumna went to the house of one Arnulfo Morales (Morales) in TagumCityto inquire about reports that the town of Asuncionwas impassable because of flooding.  Mr. Ampatuan explained in his testimony that the alleged flooding was the reason given by his debtor Muker Ganda (Muker) to explain the belated payment of a loan.   Morales advised them that they should go directly to the house of Muker at PanaboCity, Davao del Norte to collect the amount due in his favor.^[27][12] 

Upon boarding a bus going to PanaboCity, the three met Arlene, the wife of Ibrahim.  Arlene, Linda’s classmate in elementary, invited them for lunch at her house, which was near Muker’s residence.  When they reached Muker’s house, the latter was not able to pay for his loan, hence they just acceded to the invitation of Arlene.  While inside the house, they saw Ibrahim outside with two companions.  At that point, five police officers entered the premises where Ibrahim was and one of them fired his gun.  Ibrahim and his companions ran, were chased by the police but were not apprehended.  Failing to capture Ibrahim, the police officers then barged back to the house where the couple, Lumna, and Arlene were.  They accused Mr. Ampatuan to be the owner of the black bag containing marijuana samples carried by the police officers.  Mr. Ampatuan vehemently denied the ownership of the same and his participation in the sale and/or possession of illegal drugs.  He explained that he and his companions were merely visitors of Arlene.  Nevertheless, the police officers insisted that he owned the samples and the black bag and they were eventually brought to the police station.^[28][13]

An Information was filed against Mr. Ruel Ampatuan, Linda Ampatuan and Maguid Lumna dated 17 March 1998 which reads:

The undersigned accuses RUEL AMPATUAN alias “Ruel,” LINDA AMPATUAN alias “LINDA” and MAGUID LUMNA of the crime of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by BP 179 and further amended by Section 13 of Republic Act 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about October 13, 1997, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deal and distribute two (2) packs of dried Marijuana leaves weighing one (1) kilo and three hundred fifty nine & 3/100 grams.^[29][14]

Upon arraignment, the couple and Lumna entered a plea of not guilty.

On 31 January 2002, the trial court found Mr. Ampatuan guilty but acquitted Linda and Lumna of the offense charged.  The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ruel Ampatuan alias “Ruel” “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500, 000.00 pursuant to law.  Accused Linda Ampatuan alias “Linda” and accused Maguid Lumna are ACQUITTED for reasons of reasonable doubt.  The two packs of dried marijuana leaves weighing a total of 1.3 kilos are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and to be destroyed in accordance with law.  Costs de oficio.^[30][15]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the judgment of the trial court.^[31][16]  The appellate court ruled that the prosecution proved the requisites for illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, to wit: (1) that the accused sold and delivered the prohibited drugs to another, and (2) that the accused knew that what was sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.^[32][17]  It noted that the prosecution presented as evidence in court the corpus delicti.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

In this petition, the accused-appellant Mr. Ampatuan raised two assignments of errors:

First, Whether or not there was a correct application of the law and jurisprudence by the lower courts on the matter; and,

Second, Whether or not the conclusions drawn by the lower courts leaning on the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt are correct.^[33][18]

The accused-appellant questions the regularity of the performance of duties of the police officers related to his apprehension.  He likewise invokes denial of any knowledge and ownership of the black bag which contained the marijuana samples and asserts that he was mauled by the police officers to admit the ownership thereof and of the purported illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

The Court’s Ruling

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.^[34][19]  The presence of these elements is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of appellants’ guilt.^[35][20]  What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.^[36][21]  The presentation in court of the corpus delicti — the body or substance of the crime – establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.^[37][22]

As per record of the case, this Court is convinced that there was complete compliance with all the requisites under the law.

The prosecution established that at 1 p.m. of 13 October 1997, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the members of the police force to entrap a drug pusher named Ibrahim.  However, despite his absence in the target area, the entrapment operation ensued within the same place between the police officers who acted as poseur-buyers and the accused-appellant Mr. Ampatuan.  This was shown in the direct testimony^[38][23] of PO2 Caslib:

Q:  So what did you do with the money when they asked for it?

A:  I gave the money personally and then the other person gave to us the marijuana.

Q:  When you said the other person, is that male or female?

A:  He is male, sir.

Q: You said you handed the money, to whom did you hand the money?

A:  I handed it to Ruel.

Q:  Now tell us, if this Ruel and Linda that you mentioned are in court, will you able to identify them?

A:  Yes, sir.

Q:  Please point to the court this Ruel Ampatuan.

A:  That man, sir.

            (Witness is pointing to a person wearing maong pants and maroon long sleeves and when asked, identified himself as Ruel Ampatuan.)

x x x x

Q:  After you handed the money to Ruel Ampatuan, what did you do next, if any?

A:  I handed the money to Ruel and then he gave it to his wife.

Q:  And after he gave the money to his wife, what happened next?

A:  He gave us the item.

Q:  Where did this item come from?

A:  It came from the black bag, from the house of Totong Ibrahim.

Q:  Why, where were you exactly talking with the two accused?

A:  We were in front of the house of Totong Ibrahim.

x x x x

Q:  You mentioned that he got this bag of marijuana, what did the accused do with it?  Where did he bring it?

A:  He brought it outside.

Q:  After bringing it outside, what did he do with it next?

A:  He got some marijuana and gave it to us.

Q:  After getting the marijuana, what did you do, if any?

A:  We identified ourselves that we are police operatives conducting buy-bust operation. 

Q:  What happened next?

A: We apprehended the two (2) and then our back-up companions also identified themselves.

            We find credit to the straight-forward testimony of PO2 Caslib.  Absence of any ill-will on the part of the prosecution witnesses who were the best witnesses in prosecution for illegal sale of drugs, we sustain the findings of the lower courts.

Further, the accused-appellant challenges the regularity of the performance of duties of the police officers in the purported transaction of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.  He argues that the police officers forced him to admit the ownership of the marijuana samples due to their failure to apprehend their real target, Ibrahim. 

          A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.^[39][24]  In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided that due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.^[40][25]

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial.^[41][26]

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.^[42][27]  It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts, which are factual in nature and which involve credibility, are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.  The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.  The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.^[43][28]

        Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties.  Hence, when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails.^[44][29] In order to overcome the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.^[45][30]

As to the corpus delicti of the case, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated illegal drugs, to wit:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

This rule was elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz:

a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours)^[46][31]

The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.^[47][32]

As testified by PO2 Caslib, the marijuana came from the black bag and was handed by Mr. Ampatuan to them.    The marijuana was eventually turned over to the police station.  It was positively identified by PO2 Caslib in open court. 

Q:  After bringing it outside, what did he do with it next?

A:  He got some marijuana and gave it to us.

Q:  After getting the marijuana, what did you do, if any?

A: We identified ourselves that we are police operatives conducting buy- bust operation.^[48][33]

x x x x

Q:  I am showing to you a bag here which was earlier marked as Exhibit “F,” tell us what relation had this to the bag that you mentioned?

A:  That is the bag, sir.

Q:  How do you know that this is the one?

A:  Because it is somewhat an old bag.

Q:  Were you able to look at the contents of this bag on that day?

A:  Yes, during our arrival at the police station.

Q:  Do you mean to say that that was your first time to look at the contents of this bag?

A:  We saw the content of the bag at the house of Totong Ibrahim and we removed everything at the police station.

Q:  Who opened the bag at the house of Totong Ibrahim?

A:  It was Ruel Ampatuan.

Q:  When Ruel opened this, what was the content?

A:  Marijuana, sir.

Q: Can you tell us how they were arranged or how they were packed inside?

A:  They were arranged by files, sir.

Q:  How many files if you can remember?

A:  it is wrapped with cellophane.

Q:  I will open this bag and show its contents to you.  Tell us what relation has this marijuana to the marijuana which you purchased from the accused?

Q:  This is the one, sir.^[49][34]

The corpus delicti of the crime which was the illicit drug was tested by Forensic Chemist Austero who later testified^[50][35] and confirmed that the sales confiscated during the sale was marijuana.

Q: Now, you mentioned that you were the one who conducted the examination, tell us what kind of examination was this?

A: The examination was qualitative, Sir.  That is to determine the presence of the sought for substance.  So in this case, it is alleged to be marijuana.  It is the determination of the presence of marijuana on these specimens submitted.

Q:  Now, briefly, how is your examination done, can you describe it?

A: A sample is treated with a duquenois-levine reagent and if the purple color appears, it indicates the presence of marijuana plant. 

Q:  Now, by the way, how much was the quantity of the marijuana handed to the laboratory?

A:  The first which I marked as “A”, the weight is 774.5 grams and the one which I marked as ‘B,” weighed 584.8 grams.

Q:  Now, how much sample from “A” did you use for your examination?

A:  Sir, I did not weigh the samples that were taken from the specimens.

Q: Now, by the way, what was the result of this examination that you conducted?

A: Both specimens gave positive result to the test for the presence of marijuana, Sir.

Q:  Did you reduce your report into writing?

A:  Yes, Sir.

Q:  Do you have a copy with you.

A:  Yes, Sir.

Q:  Where in your report [indicates] that the result was positive?

A:  Under findings, Sir.

Q: How much, by the way, was the total weight of the entire specimens that were handed to your office?

A:  The total weight of the specimens Sir was 1, 359.3 grams.

Q:  In terms of kilos, how will you convert that?

A:  1.3 kilos.

Q: Now, in this report of yours, there is a signature over the typewritten name on the right side, whose signature is that?

A:  That is my signature, Sir.

Pros. dela Banda:

At this point, Your Honor, may we request that this Chemistry Report No. D-200-97 be marked as Exhibit “J” in accordance with the pre-trial, Your Honor.  This is the original also, Your Honor.

Indeed, in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation in evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material.  Thus, it is vital that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty.  The fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same degree of certitude.  It is in this respect that the chain of custody requirement performs its function.  It ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.^[51][36]

Petitioner likewise asserts denial of any knowledge relating to the transaction and invoked that he and his companions were merely visitors of Ibrahim’s wife. 

Denial and alibi are defenses invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.^[52][37]

Unfortunately, the accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to prove that there was indeed irregularity in the performance of duties or there was an improper motive on the part of the police officers.  His mere testimony alone cannot be considered by this court as a clear and convincing evidence to rule otherwise for the same is self-serving on his part.  This Court finds the version of facts of the prosecution more credible to sustain than the version of facts of the accused-appellant denying any knowledge of the illegal sale. 

          WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.  The 25 June 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00343, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Branch 4, finding accused-appellant Ruel Ampatuan guilty of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425^[53][38], as amended by Section 13, Republic Act No. 7659, as further amended by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.  Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                        RENATO C. CORONA

    Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0152: IN THE MATTER OF THE HEIRSHIP (INTESTATE ESTATES) OF THE LATE HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, MACARIO J. RODRIGUEZ, DELFIN RODRIGUEZ, AND CONSUELO M. RODRIGUEZ AND SETTLEMENT OF THEIR ESTATES, RENE B. PASCUAL VS. JAIME M. ROBLES. (G.R. NO. 182645, 22 JUNE 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: INTERVENTION (BRIEF TITLE: PASCUAL VS. ROBLES).

====================

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST

PETITIONER WAS NOT A PARTY IN THE CASE AT RTC AND CA. CAN BE FILE THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI?

NO. HE MUST BE A PARTY AGRIEVED BY A DECISION. AN AGRIEVED PARTY UNDER SECTION 1, RULE 65 [OF THE RULES OF COURT] IS ONE WHO WAS A PARTY TO THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS THAT GAVE RISE TO THE ORIGINAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.  X X X. A PERSON NOT A PARTY TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT OR IN THE CA CANNOT MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR CERTIORARI IN THE SUPREME COURT TO HAVE THE JUDGMENT REVIEWED.

First, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition. The requirement of personality is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.^[1][8]

          This Court has held that:

                        An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 [of the Rules of Court] is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.  x x x.

            Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a “person aggrieved” by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari.  To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.

            In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the “person aggrieved” referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.^[2][9]

Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.^[3][10] Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.^[4][11]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

BUT PETITIONER ONLY ACQUIRED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN JANUARY 2005 AND HE FILED THE PETITION ONLY AFTER LEARNING OF THE RTC AND CA DECISION. HE COULD NOT HAVE INTERVENED EARLIER. . IS HIS ARGUMENT RIGHT.

NO. HIS SITUATION IS NOT A JUSTIFICATION. TO DO SO WOULD PUT INTO THE HANDS OF THE LITIGANTS IN A CASE THE POWER TO RESURRECT OR TO INTRODUCE ANEW, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF INTERVENORS, ISSUES TO A LITIGATION WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN LONG SETTLED ON APPEAL.

          In the present case, petitioner was never a party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA.  In fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar as the instant case is concerned. There is no dispute that it was only in January 2005 that he acquired interest in a portion of the properties subject of the estate proceedings when he bought a real property located in San Fernando, Pampanga, which belonged to the Rodriguez estate.  Petitioner claims that he filed the instant petition for certiorari only after learning of the assailed Decision of the CA and the Order of the RTC on March 13, 2008, implying that he could not have intervened earlier.  This, however, is not an excuse or justification to allow petitioner to file the instant petition.  To do so would put into the hands of the litigants in a case the power to resurrect or to introduce anew, with the assistance of intervenors, issues to a litigation which have already been long settled on appeal.

          Indeed, petitioner may not be allowed to intervene at this late a stage.  Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

          In The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association,^[5][12] this Court’s disquisition on the significance of the abovementioned Section is instructive, to wit:
                   This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to intervene may be filed “before or during a trial.” Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word “trial,” with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed “at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court,” in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.^[6][13]

          In his book on remedial law, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado explained the rationale behind the amendments introduced in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court as follows:

                        The justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been rendered.^[7][14]

          It is also worthy to note that the disputed Decision was promulgated way back on April 16, 2002.  The respondents in the said case, namely, Henry Rodriguez, Certeza Rodriguez and Rosalina Pellosis, did not appeal. Herein respondent, on the other hand, who was the petitioner in the case, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision.  However, the petition was denied via a Resolution issued by the Court dated August 1, 2005, and that the same had become final and executory on November 10, 2005.  Hence, by the time herein petitioner filed the instant petition on the sole basis that he acquired an interest in a portion of the disputed estate, the assailed CA Decision had long become final and executory.

          In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,^[8][15] this Court reiterated the long-standing rule governing finality of judgments, to wit:

                   A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.  And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law.  The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. x x x

                        The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. x x x^[9][16]

          Unlike the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC,IrigaCity, Branch 34, which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions enumerated above.

====================

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

                                                                        SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

          On December 15, 2010, this Court promulgated a Resolution^[10][1] which set aside its Decision^[11][2] earlier issued on December 4, 2009 on the ground that herein petitioner, Rene B. Pascual failed to implead herein respondent Jaime M. Robles, who is an indispensable party to the present case.

          After receiving respondent’s Comment and Opposition,^[12][3] as well as petitioner’s Reply^[13][4] thereto, the Court will now proceed to determine the merits of the instant petition for certiorari.

          Again, the Court finds it apropros to restate the pertinent antecedent facts and proceedings as set forth in the December 4, 2009 Decision as well as in the December 15, 2010 Resolution, to wit:

                        On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the [Regional Trial Court] RTC [ofIrigaCity]. The petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry), Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza), and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8 February 1981, while Rosalina is the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez (Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960 leaving Macario as her sole heir.

                        Henry, Certeza and Rosalina’s claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, a former gobernadorcillo, is based on the following lineage: that Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his sole heir.

                        At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition. Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Republic of thePhilippines. After presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating the evidence presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in the direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional evidence to establish the alleged fraternal relationship between Antonio and Hermogenes.

                        Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC rendered a Partial Judgment dated 31 May 1990 declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.

                        Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates.

                        Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely:

                        (1) The group of Judith Rodriguez;

                        (2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos;

                        (3) Jaime Robles;

                        (4) Florencia Rodriguez;

                        (5) Victoria Rodriguez; and

                        (6) Bienvenido Rodriguez

                        Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while the rest filed opposing claims to the estate of Hermogenes.

                        In his opposition, Jaime Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan,Pasig, Rizal.

                        After hearing on Jamie Robles’ application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly, the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig Rizal.

                        On 27 April 1999, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the direct descending line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The decision dismissed the oppositions of Jamie Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez, for their failure to substantiate their respective claims of heirship to the late Hermogenes.

                        On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-Santos. This time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez.^[14][5]           

                   Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a notice of appeal, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles’ failure to file a record on appeal.

                        Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

                        In a Resolution dated February 14, 2000, this Court referred the petition to the [Court of Appeals (CA)] for consideration and adjudication on the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court and that no special and important reason was cited for this Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first instance.

                        On April 16, 2002, the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.

                        Henry Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his group moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated January 21, 2004.  Rodriguez and his co-respondents did not appeal the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

                        On the other hand, Robles filed an appeal with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. On August 1, 2005, this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition of Robles and, on November 10, 2005, the said Resolution became final and executory.

                        On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed.^[15][6]

          Petitioner posits the following reasons relied upon for the allowance of his petition:

            I

                        THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DATED APRIL 16, 2002 WAS ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, HENCE, A PATENT NULLITY.

II

                        THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, BASED ON THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APRIL 16, 2002 DECISION WAS ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, HENCE, A PATENT NULLITY.

III

                        THE AFOREMENTIONED COURT OF APPEALS’ APRIL 16, 2002 DECISION AND FEBRUARY 21, 2007 ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, IRIGA CITY, WERE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AS THEY CONTRAVENED, INCONSISTENT WITH AND CONTRADICTORY TO THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH IS IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE RULE THAT ALL COURTS SHOULD TAKE THEIR BEARINGS FROM THE SUPREME COURT.^[16][7]

          The Court finds that there are compelling reasons to dismiss the present petition, as discussed below.

          First, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition. The requirement of personality is sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.^[17][8]

          This Court has held that:

                        An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 [of the Rules of Court] is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65.  x x x.

            Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of by a “person aggrieved” by the orders or decisions of a tribunal, the term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari.  To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.

            In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the “person aggrieved” referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.^[18][9]

Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.^[19][10] Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.^[20][11]

          In the present case, petitioner was never a party to the proceedings in the RTC and the CA.  In fact, he admits that he is a third party insofar as the instant case is concerned. There is no dispute that it was only in January 2005 that he acquired interest in a portion of the properties subject of the estate proceedings when he bought a real property located in San Fernando, Pampanga, which belonged to the Rodriguez estate.  Petitioner claims that he filed the instant petition for certiorari only after learning of the assailed Decision of the CA and the Order of the RTC on March 13, 2008, implying that he could not have intervened earlier.  This, however, is not an excuse or justification to allow petitioner to file the instant petition.  To do so would put into the hands of the litigants in a case the power to resurrect or to introduce anew, with the assistance of intervenors, issues to a litigation which have already been long settled on appeal.

          Indeed, petitioner may not be allowed to intervene at this late a stage.  Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

          In The Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village Association,^[21][12] this Court’s disquisition on the significance of the abovementioned Section is instructive, to wit:
                   This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to intervene may be filed “before or during a trial.” Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word “trial,” with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed “at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court,” in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.^[22][13]

          In his book on remedial law, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado explained the rationale behind the amendments introduced in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court as follows:

                        The justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an overall reassessment of said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already been rendered.^[23][14]

          It is also worthy to note that the disputed Decision was promulgated way back on April 16, 2002.  The respondents in the said case, namely, Henry Rodriguez, Certeza Rodriguez and Rosalina Pellosis, did not appeal. Herein respondent, on the other hand, who was the petitioner in the case, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision.  However, the petition was denied via a Resolution issued by the Court dated August 1, 2005, and that the same had become final and executory on November 10, 2005.  Hence, by the time herein petitioner filed the instant petition on the sole basis that he acquired an interest in a portion of the disputed estate, the assailed CA Decision had long become final and executory.

          In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez,^[24][15] this Court reiterated the long-standing rule governing finality of judgments, to wit:

                   A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.  And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law.  The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. x x x

                        The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. x x x^[25][16]

          Unlike the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC,IrigaCity, Branch 34, which was found by the CA to be a complete nullity, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions enumerated above.

          Considering the foregoing, the Court no longer finds it necessary to address the issues raised by petitioner.

          WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

          SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                                             Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

       PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.                    JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA   

            Associate Justice                                              Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice