J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

SPOUSES VIRGILIO AND ANGELINA ARANDA VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA (A.C. NO. 7907, 15 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECT: LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER MUST OBSERVE DILIGENCE) BRIEF TITLE: ARANDA VS. ELAYDA

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DIGEST

ATTY. ELAYDA FAILED TO ATTEND A HEARING AND THUS HIS OPPOSING COUNSEL ASKED THAT CASE BE SUBMITTED FOR DECISION. WHEN ADVERSE DECISION WAS RENDERED, ATTY. ELAYDA DID NOT MOVE TO RECONSIDER. HE DID NOT APPEAL THE DECISION. HE DID NOT NOTIFY HIS CLIENT OF THE DECISION. HIS CLIENT LEARNED OF THE DECISION WHEN THERE WAS ALREADY A WRIT OF EXECUTION. ATTY. ELAYDA’S DEFENSE IS THAT THE CLIENT IS NOT COMMUNICATING WITH HIM. DURING THAT SUBJECT HEARING DATE HE HAS CONFLICT OF SCHEDULE AND WAS EXPECTING HIS CLIENT TO ATTEND.

IS ATTY. ELAYDA REMISSED IN HIS DUTY AS LAWYER?

YES. HE MUST GIVE FULL ATTENTION TO HIS CLIENT’S CASE. HE MUST COMMUNICATE WITH HIS CLIENT EVEN IF THE LATTER IS NOT COMMUNICATING WITH HIM. HE SHOULD HAVE ANTICIPATED HIS CONFLICT OF SCHEDULE.

DOCTRINES:

LEGAL PROFESSION IS INVESTED WITH PUBLIC TRUST. ITS GOAL IS TO RENDER PUBLIC SERVICE AND SECURE JUSTICE.

        In Abay v. Montesino,^[1][10] this Court held:

The legal profession is invested with public trust.  Its goal is to render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid.  Thus, the practice of law is considered a privilege, not a right, bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications required for the conferment of such privilege.

Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and of morality – which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing.  They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Any conduct found wanting in these considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action.  In the present case, the failure of respondent to file the appellant’s brief was a clear violation of his professional duty to his client.^[2][11]

DUTIES OF LAWYER TO HIS CLIENT: HE OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT; HE MUST SERVE WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE; AND HE MUST REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL.

The Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

          x x x x

Rule 18.02 – A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

        From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of his clients.  He should be conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his clients’ cases.  Atty. Elayda should give adequate attention, care, and time to all the cases he is handling.  As the spouses Aranda’s counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said spouses’ case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the spouses Aranda. 

LAWYER MUST COMMUNICATE WITH HIS CLIENT EVEN IF CLIENT DOES NOT COMMUNICATE WITH HIM.

        Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these.  Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda never knew of the scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the spouses’ whereabouts.  While it is true that communication is a shared responsibility between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the status of their case and the orders which have been issued by the court.  He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the developments in their case.  Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.  Besides, it is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant communication with each other.  Again, Atty. Elayda’s excuse that he did not have the spouses Aranda’s contact number and that he did not know their address is simply unacceptable.

WHEN LAWYER ACCEPTS CASE IT DESERVES HIS FULL ATTENTION.

        On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a fee or free.^[3][14]  Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas,^[4][15] the Court held:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.  He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.  Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.  This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.  If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.  A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.^[5][16]

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D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The instant case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by the spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda (spouses Aranda) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, charging their former counsel, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda (Atty. Elayda), with gross negligence or gross misconduct in handling their case. The spouses Aranda were the defendants in Civil Case No. 232-0-01, entitled Martin V. Guballa v. Spouses Angelina and Virgilio Aranda, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72. 

          In the Complaint dated August 11, 2006,^[6][1] the spouses Aranda alleged that Atty. Elayda’s handling of their case was “sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence,”^[7][2] to wit:

4.  That on February 14, 2006 hearing of the said case, the case was ordered submitted for decision [the spouses Aranda] and [Atty. Elayda] did not appear; certified copy of the order is attached as Annex “C”;

5.  That the order setting this case for hearing on February 14, 2006 was sent only to [Atty. Elayda] and no notice was sent to [the spouses Aranda] that is they were unaware of said hearing and [Atty. Elayda] never informed them of the setting;

6.  That despite receipt of the order dated February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda] never informed them of such order notwithstanding the follow-up they made of their case to him;

7.  That [Atty. Elayda] did not lift any single finger to have the order dated February 14, 2006 reconsidered and/or set aside as is normally expected of a counsel devoted to the cause of his client;

8.  That in view of the inaction of [Atty. Elayda] the court naturally rendered a judgment dated March 17, 2006 adverse to [the spouses Aranda] which copy thereof was sent only to [Atty. Elayda] and [the spouses Aranda] did not receive any copy thereof, certified xerox copy of the decision is attached as Annex “D”;

9.  That they were totally unaware of said judgment as [Atty. Elayda] had not again lifted any single finger to inform them of such adverse judgment and that there is a need to take a remedial recourse thereto;

10.  That [Atty. Elayda] did not even bother to file a notice of appeal hence the judgment became final and executory hence a writ of execution was issued upon motion of the plaintiff [Martin Guballa] in the said case;

11. That on July 18, 2006 Sheriff IV Leandro R. Madarag implemented the writ of execution and it was only at this time that [the spouses Aranda] became aware of the judgment of the Court, certified xerox copy of the writ of execution is attached as Annex “E”;

12. That on July 19, 2006, they wasted no time in verifying the status of their case before Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Olongapo City and to their utter shock, dismay and disbelief, they found out that they have already lost their case and worst the decision had already become final and executory;

13. That despite their plea for a reasonable period to take a remedial recourse of the situation (the Sheriff initially gave them fifteen (15) days), Sheriff Madarag forcibly took possession and custody of their Mitsubishi Pajero with Plate No. 529;

14.  That they were deprived of their right to present their evidence in the said case and of their right to appeal because of the gross negligence of respondent.”^[8][3]

          In its Order^[9][4] dated August 15, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed Atty. Elayda to submit his Answer to the complaint with a warning that failure to do so will result in his default and the case shall be heard ex parte. 

          Atty. Elayda filed his Answer^[10][5] dated September 1, 2006, in which he narrated:

7.  That this case also referred to [Atty. Elayda] sometime December 2004 after the [spouses Aranda] and its former counsel failed to appear in court on February 7, 2005;

8.  That from December 2004, the [spouses Aranda] did not bother to contact [Atty. Elayda] to prepare for the case and in fact on May 30, 2005, [Atty. Elayda] had to ask for postponement of the case for reason that he still have to confer with the [spouses Aranda] who were not around;

9.  That contrary to the allegations of the [spouses Aranda], there was not a single instance from December 2004 that the [spouses Aranda] called up [Atty. Elayda] to talk to him regarding their case;

10.  That the [spouses Aranda] from December 2004 did not even bother to follow up their case in court just if to verify the status of their case and that it was only on July 19, 2006 that they verified the same and also the only time they tried to contact [Atty. Elayda];

11.  That the [spouses Aranda] admitted in their Complaint that they only tried to contact [Atty. Elayda] when the writ of execution was being implemented on them; 

12.  That during the scheduled hearing of the case on February 14, 2006, [Atty. Elayda] was in fact went to RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City and asked Mrs. Edith Miano to call him in Branch 73 where he had another case if the [spouses Aranda] show up in court so that [Atty. Elayda] can talk to them but obviously the [spouses Aranda] did not appear and Mrs.  Miano did not bother to call [Atty. Elayda]; 

13.  That [Atty. Elayda] was not at fault that he was not able to file the necessary pleadings in court because the [spouses Aranda] did not get in touch with him;

14.  That [Atty. Elayda] cannot contact the [spouses Aranda] for the latter failed to give their contact number to [Atty. Elayda] nor did the [spouses Aranda] go to his office to leave their contact number;

14.      That the [spouses Aranda] were negligent in their “I don’t care attitude” towards their case and for this reason that they alone should be blamed for what happened to their case x x x.”

          At the mandatory conference hearing held on March 14, 2007, all the parties appeared with their respective counsels.  The parties were then given a period of 10 days from receipt of the order within which to submit their position papers attaching therewith all documentary exhibits and affidavits of witnesses, if any.

          After the submission of the parties’ position papers, Investigating Commissioner Jordan M. Pizarras came out with his Decision^[11][6] finding Atty. Elayda guilty of gross negligence, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, which shall take effect from the date of notice of receipt of the finality of this DECISION.  He is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty.^[12][7]

          Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-128^[13][8] dated March 6, 2008, adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Pizarras’ report, to wit: 

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondent’s negligence and unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients, Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with Warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty.^[14][9]

          Aggrieved, Atty. Elayda filed with this Court a Petition for Review maintaining that he was not negligent in handling the spouses Aranda’s case as to warrant suspension, which was too harsh a penalty under the circumstances. 

          After a careful review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Elayda was negligent and unmindful of his sworn duties to his clients.

          In Abay v. Montesino,^[15][10] this Court held:

The legal profession is invested with public trust.  Its goal is to render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid.  Thus, the practice of law is considered a privilege, not a right, bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications required for the conferment of such privilege.

Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and of morality – which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing.  They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Any conduct found wanting in these considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action.  In the present case, the failure of respondent to file the appellant’s brief was a clear violation of his professional duty to his client.^[16][11]

          The Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

            x x x x

Rule 18.02 – A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

          From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of his clients.  He should be conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his clients’ cases.  Atty. Elayda should give adequate attention, care, and time to all the cases he is handling.  As the spouses Aranda’s counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said spouses’ case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the spouses Aranda. 

          Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these.  Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda never knew of the scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the spouses’ whereabouts.  While it is true that communication is a shared responsibility between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the status of their case and the orders which have been issued by the court.  He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the developments in their case.  Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.  Besides, it is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant communication with each other.  Again, Atty. Elayda’s excuse that he did not have the spouses Aranda’s contact number and that he did not know their address is simply unacceptable.

          Furthermore, this Court will not countenance Atty. Elayda’s explanation that he cannot be faulted for missing the February 14, 2006 hearing of the spouses Aranda’s case.  The Court quotes with approval the disquisition of Investigating Commissioner Pizarras:

Moreover, his defense that he cannot be faulted for what had happened during the hearing on February 14, 2006 because he was just at the other branch of the RTC for another case and left a message with the court stenographer to just call him when [the spouses Aranda] come, is lame, to say the least.  In the first place, the counsel should not be at another hearing when he knew very well that he has a scheduled hearing for the [spouses Aranda’s] case at the same time.  His attendance at the hearing should not be made to depend on the whether [the spouses Aranda] will come or not.  The Order submitting the decision was given at the instance of the other party’s counsel mainly because of his absence there.  Again, as alleged by the [the spouses Aranda] and as admitted by [Atty. Elayda] himself, he did not take the necessary remedial measure in order to ask that said Order be set aside.^[17][12]

          It is undisputed that Atty. Elayda did not act upon the RTC order submitting the spouses Aranda’s case for decision.  Thus, a judgment was rendered against the spouses Aranda for a sum of money.  Notice of said judgment was received by Atty. Elayda who again did not file any notice of appeal or motion for reconsideration and thus, the judgment became final and executory.  Atty. Elayda did not also inform the spouses Aranda of the outcome of the case.  The spouses Aranda came to know of the adverse RTC judgment, which by then had already become final and executory, only when a writ of execution was issued and subsequently implemented by the sheriff. 

          Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal profession.  His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling his clients’ case but in fact abandoned his clients’ cause.  He proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his helpless clients.  Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients, but also to the Court of which he is an officer.^[18][13]

          On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a fee or free.^[19][14]  Verily, in Santiago v. Fojas,^[20][15] the Court held:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.  He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.  Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.  This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.  If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.  A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.^[21][16]

          WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.  Accordingly, respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. 

          Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Elayda’s personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance. 

          SO ORDERED.

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES VS. HON. REINERIO (ABRAHAM) B. RAMAS, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 29, 9^TH JUDICIAL REGION, SAN MIGUEL, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR AND VILMA V. MINOR (G.R. NO. 157852, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. LEONARDO- DE CASTRO) SUBJECTS: QUIETING OF TITLE; LACHES. BRIEF TITLE: HEIRS OF VALIENTES VS. HON. RAMAS ET AL.

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DIGEST

VALIENTES FILED A CASE TO CANCEL TCT OF MINOR ON GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS CONVEYED BY A FRAUDULENT DEED. MINOR MOVED TO DISMISS ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION. RTC DENIED. MINOR MOVED FOR RECON ON GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING SINCE EARLIER VALIENTES FILED A CASE FOR CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE. RTC DISMISSED CASE. VALIENTES FILED PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AT CA. CA DISMISSED ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES. THESE GROUNDS WERE NEVER RAISED BY ON APPEAL IN APPELLEES BRIEF.

IS THE DISMISSAL PROPER. IS PRESCRIPTION A VALID GROUND.

SC RULED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN DISMISS THE PETITION MOTU PROPIO BASED ON GROUNDS IT CONSIDER PROPER.

PRESCRIPTION IS PROPER. PETITIONER WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND. THEREFORE HIS ACTION IS NOT QUIETING TITLE WHICH DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. HIS ACTION IS BASED ON IMPLIED TRUST (HE WHO BY FRAUD OR MISTAKE POSSESS THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER KEEPS THE SAME IN TRUST FOR THE LATTER) AND THEREFORE PRESCIBES IN 10 YEARS. ACTION WAS BROUGHT ONLY AFTER 28 YEARS.

DOCTRINES

COURT OF APPEALS CAN DISMISS A CASE MOTU PROPIO

Petitioners further argue that the consideration by the Court of Appeals of grounds not assigned as errors in the Appellee’s Brief runs contrary to the precepts of fair play, good taste and estoppel.^[1][14]  

We rule in favor of private respondent Minor on this issue.

Firstly, it stretches the bounds of credulity for petitioners to argue that a defendant in a case should appeal the dismissal order she prayed for just because other grounds for dismissal were not considered by the court.   

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds – (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription – provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.

We therefore rule that private respondent Minor cannot be deemed to have waived the defense of prescription, and that the Court of Appeals may consider the same motu proprio.  Furthermore, as regards the pronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 is likewise heavily infirmed with laches, we rule that the Court of Appeals is not in error when it considered the same motu proprio.  While not included in the above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we have ruled in previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and may be considered by the court on its own initiative in determining the rights of the parties.^[2][15]

IN CASE OF FORGED SALE, DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE. IF THE PARTY IS NOT IN POSESSION OF THE PROPERTY, THE ACTION IS BASED ON IMPLIED TRUST AND PRESCRIPTION SETS IN AFTER 10 YEARS FROM ISSUANCE OF TITLE. IF PARTY IS IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY THEN IT IS AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE AND DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. IN THIS CASE PETITIONER IS NOT IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY.

Petitioners claim that although the complaint was captioned for “CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP, AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES,” the complaint is substantially in the nature of an action to quiet title which allegedly does not prescribe.  Petitioners also allege that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in ruling that prescription has set in, particularly that of Declaro v. Court of Appeals,^[3][17] which in turn cites Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,^[4][18] are inapplicable to the case at bar since neither fraud nor forgery was attendant in said cases.

As regards petitioners’ claim that the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-021 is really one of quieting of title which does not prescribe, it appears that petitioners are referring to the doctrine laid down in the often-cited case of Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals,^[5][19] wherein we held:

With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178).  But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.^[6][20]

The cause of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-021, wherein they claim that private respondent Minor’s predecessor-in-interest acquired the subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust.  In particular, Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1456.  If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff in such action is not in possession of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten years from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.  When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.  In the case at bar, petitioners (who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-021) are not in possession of the subject property.  Civil Case No. 98-021, if it were to be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been filed within ten years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.  Civil Case No. 98-021 was, however, filed on August 20, 1998, which was way beyond the prescriptive period. 

UNDER THE CIVIL CODE PRESCRIPTION IS 30 YEARS. THIS IS A GENERAL PROVISION. PD 1529 APPLIES. IT PROVIDES 1 YEAR PRESCRIPTION ONLY. BUT JURISPRUDENCE EXTENDS THIS TO 10 YEARS UNDER THE PROVISION ON IMPLIED TRUST.

As an alternative argument, petitioners claim that the prescriptive period for filing their complaint is thirty years, pursuant to Article 1141 of the Civil Code, in connection with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, which respectively provide:

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137.  Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

The theory of petitioners is that the Motion to Dismiss hypothetically admits the allegations of the complaint, including the allegations thereon that the spouses Belen were successful in fraudulently acquiring TCT No. T-5,427 in their favor by means of the forged VENTA DEFINITIVA.  Thus, for purposes of ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, it is hypothetically admitted that private respondent Minor’s predecessors-in-interest are in bad faith.  The applicable prescriptive period, therefore, is that provided in Article 1141 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, which is thirty years.  Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed on August 20, 1998, 28 years and eight months from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.

Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however, are general rules on prescription which should give way to the special statute on registered lands, Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.  Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.^[7][21] 

As previously discussed, however, we have allowed actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts even beyond such one-year period, for such actions respect the decree of registration as incontrovertible.  We explained this in Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.^[8][22]: 

We have ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.^[9][23]

As discussed above, Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed more than 28 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427.  This period is unreasonably long for a party seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus, petitioners’ claim that they had not slept on their rights is patently unconvincing. 

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D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision^[1][1] of the Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2002 and the subsequent Resolution denying reconsideration dated January 16, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68501.

Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who, before his death, was the owner of a parcel of land in Gabay, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur then covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-18,208 of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur.    In 1939, Domingo Valientes mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan to the spouses Leon Belen and Brigida Sescon (spouses Belen).  In the 1950s, the Valientes family purportedly attempted, but failed, to retrieve the subject property from the spouses Belen.  Through an allegedly forged document captioned VENTA DEFINITIVA purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject property between Domingo Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter obtained Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5,427 in their name.  On February 28, 1970, Maria Valientes Bucoy and Vicente Valientes, legitimate children of the late Domingo Valientes, had their Affidavit of Adverse Claim^[2][2] duly entered in the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back of TCT No. T-5,427.  Upon the death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs Brigida Sescon Belen and Maria Lina Belen executed an extra-judicial settlement with partition and sale in favor of private respondent Vilma Valencia-Minor, the present possessor of the subject property. 

On June 20, 1979, herein private respondent Minor filed with the then Court of First Instance of Pagadian City a “PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF MEMORANDUM OF ENCUMBRANCE APPEARING IN TCT NO. T-5,427 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR,” which was docketed as SPL Case No. 1861.^[3][3]  On July 31, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Minor’s prayer to allow the Register of Deeds to have the title to the subject property transferred to her name.

In the meantime, on August 20, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint before the RTC of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur for the “CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES.”  The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-021.^[4][4]

Private respondent Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 98-021 on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia.  On August 3, 2000, the RTC issued an order in open court ruling that forum shopping does not apply.  On September 22, 2000, private respondent Minor filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[5][5] of the August 3, 2000 Order.  On May 7, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration by dismissing Civil Case No. 98-021 on the ground of forum shopping.^[6][6]  Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[7][7] on May 30, 2001, but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order^[8][8] dated September 18, 2001.

On November 12, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari^[9][9] assailing the RTC Orders dated May 7, 2001 and September 18, 2001.  Petitioners raised the sole issue of whether the trial court was correct in finding that Civil Case No. 98-021 constitutes forum shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata with SPL Case No. 186.  The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68501.

The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision on said petition on August 16, 2002.  Despite agreeing with petitioners that there was no forum shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata in the filing of Civil Case No. 98-021, the Court of Appeals, asserting that it has the discretion to review matters not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal if it finds that their consideration is necessary at arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case,^[10][10] held that Civil Case No. 98-021 cannot prosper on the grounds of prescription and laches.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, wherein petitioners raised the following grounds for assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT APPLIED PRESCRIPTION IN THE PRESENT PETITION, AFTER ALL, WHEN SHE DID NOT APPEAL THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE SOLE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA, PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS DEEMED TO HAVE ALREADY WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION, THE PRESENT ACTION, ALTHOUGH CAPTIONED FOR CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE AND ETC., SUBSTANTIALLY, IS FOR QUIETING OF TITLE, HENCE, PRESCRIPTION WILL NOT LIE.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPLYING THE CASES OF TENIO-OBSEQUIO VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS, 330 SCRA 88, AND DECLARO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 346 SCRA 57 WHEN FACTS OBTAINING IN SAID CASES ARE NOT ATTENDANT IN THE PRESENT CASE FOR CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427 ON THE GROUND OF FORGERY OR BY REASON OF FORGED DOCUMENT CAPTIONED VENTA DEFINITIVA.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT [RENEGED] FROM ITS SOLEMN DUTY TO RENDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DUE THE PARTIES RATHER THAN THE SANCTIFICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES OR EQUITY ON PRESCRIPTION.^[11][11]

Authority of the Court of Appeals to Dismiss the Complaint on the Grounds of Prescription and Laches Despite Respondent’s Failure to Appeal the Dismissal Order

Petitioners recount that private respondent Minor interposed prescription as one of her grounds for the dismissal of the case in her Answer with Affirmative Defenses.   When private respondent Minor’s Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC in open court, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration dwelling on forum shopping, litis pendentia and/or res judicata.^[12][12]  The trial court proceeded to dismiss the case on the ground of forum shopping.^[13][13]  Petitioners now claim before us that private respondent Minor’s failure to appeal the RTC’s dismissal of the complaint on the sole ground of forum shopping constituted a waiver of the defense of prescription.  Petitioners further argue that the consideration by the Court of Appeals of grounds not assigned as errors in the Appellee’s Brief runs contrary to the precepts of fair play, good taste and estoppel.^[14][14]  

We rule in favor of private respondent Minor on this issue.

Firstly, it stretches the bounds of credulity for petitioners to argue that a defendant in a case should appeal the dismissal order she prayed for just because other grounds for dismissal were not considered by the court.   

Secondly, and more importantly, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds – (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription – provided that the ground for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.

We therefore rule that private respondent Minor cannot be deemed to have waived the defense of prescription, and that the Court of Appeals may consider the same motu proprio.  Furthermore, as regards the pronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 is likewise heavily infirmed with laches, we rule that the Court of Appeals is not in error when it considered the same motu proprio.  While not included in the above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we have ruled in previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and may be considered by the court on its own initiative in determining the rights of the parties.^[15][15]

Having thus determined the authority of the Court of Appeals to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of prescription and laches despite private respondent Minor’s failure to appeal the dismissal Order, We shall now proceed to determine whether or not prescription or laches has already set in to bar the filing of Civil Case No. 98-021.

Imprescriptibility of Quieting of Title

After the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of petitioners on the issue of whether Civil Case No. 98-021 is already barred by forum shopping, res judicata or litis pendentia, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal order, but on the grounds of prescription and laches:

Be that as it may, this Court is imbued with sufficient discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case (Heirs of Ramon Durano, Sr. vs. Uy, 344 SCRA 238).

The case cannot prosper because an action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, which must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title since such issuance operates as a constructive notice (Declaro vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 57).  Where a party has neglected to assert his rights over a property in question for an unreasonably long period, he is estopped from questioning the validity of another person’s title to the property (Ibid.)  Long inaction and passivity in asserting one’s rights over a disputed property precludes him from recovering said property (Po Lam vs. Court vs. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 86).

In conclusion, petitioners’ cause of action has already prescribed and now heavily infirmed with laches.^[16][16]

Petitioners claim that although the complaint was captioned for “CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP, AND APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES,” the complaint is substantially in the nature of an action to quiet title which allegedly does not prescribe.  Petitioners also allege that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals in ruling that prescription has set in, particularly that of Declaro v. Court of Appeals,^[17][17] which in turn cites Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,^[18][18] are inapplicable to the case at bar since neither fraud nor forgery was attendant in said cases.

As regards petitioners’ claim that the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-021 is really one of quieting of title which does not prescribe, it appears that petitioners are referring to the doctrine laid down in the often-cited case of Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals,^[19][19] wherein we held:

With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178).  But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.^[20][20]

The cause of action of petitioners in Civil Case No. 98-021, wherein they claim that private respondent Minor’s predecessor-in-interest acquired the subject property by forgery, can indeed be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust.  In particular, Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1456.  If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

However, the Court made a clear distinction in Olviga: when the plaintiff in such action is not in possession of the subject property, the action prescribes in ten years from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.  When the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.  In the case at bar, petitioners (who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 98-021) are not in possession of the subject property.  Civil Case No. 98-021, if it were to be considered as that of enforcing an implied trust, should have therefore been filed within ten years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.  Civil Case No. 98-021 was, however, filed on August 20, 1998, which was way beyond the prescriptive period. 

As an alternative argument, petitioners claim that the prescriptive period for filing their complaint is thirty years, pursuant to Article 1141 of the Civil Code, in connection with Articles 1134 and 1137 thereof, which respectively provide:

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137.  Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

The theory of petitioners is that the Motion to Dismiss hypothetically admits the allegations of the complaint, including the allegations thereon that the spouses Belen were successful in fraudulently acquiring TCT No. T-5,427 in their favor by means of the forged VENTA DEFINITIVA.  Thus, for purposes of ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, it is hypothetically admitted that private respondent Minor’s predecessors-in-interest are in bad faith.  The applicable prescriptive period, therefore, is that provided in Article 1141 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, which is thirty years.  Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed on August 20, 1998, 28 years and eight months from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427 on December 22, 1969.

Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code, however, are general rules on prescription which should give way to the special statute on registered lands, Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.  Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.^[21][21] 

As previously discussed, however, we have allowed actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts even beyond such one-year period, for such actions respect the decree of registration as incontrovertible.  We explained this in Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.^[22][22]: 

We have ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.^[23][23]

As discussed above, Civil Case No. 98-021 was filed more than 28 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-5,427.  This period is unreasonably long for a party seeking to enforce its right to file the appropriate case. Thus, petitioners’ claim that they had not slept on their rights is patently unconvincing.

As a final note, it should be pointed out that in choosing to file a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, petitioners are required to prove nothing less than grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.  We have consistently held that “certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.”^[24][24]  In the case at bar, petitioners proved neither grave abuse of discretion, nor even a simple error of judgment on the part of the Court of Appeals.  The present petition should, therefore, fail.

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 16, 2002 and the Resolution dated January 16, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68501 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 

                                             TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ROMER SY TAN VS. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN SY LIM (G.R. NO. 174570, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. PERALTA) SUBJECTS: SEARCH WARRANT; ROBBERY. BRIEF TITLE: TAN VS. GUE ET AL. 

x——————————————————————-x

DOCTRINES:

RTC ALLOWED WITHDRAWAL OF INFORMATION IN A ROBBERY CASE FILED ON THE BASIS OF SEARCH WARRANT. THE ISSUE RAISED AT SC ON WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT BECAME MOOT

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance  by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents’ alleged acts of robbery has been rendered moot and academic.  Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.^[1][8]

IF A CASE FOR QUALIFIED THEFT IS FILED THE  EVIDENCE OBTAINED THE ROBBERY CASE  BY VIRTUE OF A SEARCH WARRANT CANNOT BE USED.

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein.  Contrary to petitioner’s contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued.  Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 4.  Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her witnesses.  Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident.

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R E S O L U T I O N

PERALTA, J.:

          On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision^[2][1] in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.  The Decision and Resolution dated December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED.  The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.

          On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[3][2] wherein respondents informed this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375.  As such, respondents prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case.

          In his Comment^[4][3] dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which have been passed upon by this Court in the subject decision.  Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants will be used as evidence therein.

          On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.

On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution^[5][4] wherein respondents were required to submit a certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated November 14, 2008, which granted their motion to withdraw the information.

On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Court’s directive and submitted a certified true copy of the Order.^[6][5] 

In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August 29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e., unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Thus, there was lack of probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the Information.^[7][6]  The RTC also considered that the said pronouncements of the CA were affirmed by no less than this Court in G.R. No. 177829 in the Resolution^[8][7] dated November 12, 2007.  

Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents’ motion to withdraw the information without prejudice, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance  by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents’ alleged acts of robbery has been rendered moot and academic.  Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.^[9][8]

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein.  Contrary to petitioner’s contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued.  Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 4.  Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her witnesses.  Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident.

Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on the findings of the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed, much more, prosper.

Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.  The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.

                                                          DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                                                                  Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.     ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

               Associate Justice                                          Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice