J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

RAMON B. BRITO SR. VS. SEVERINO D. DIANALA, VIOLETA DIANALA SALES, JOVITA DIANALA DEQUINTO, ROSITA DIANALA, CONCHITA DIANALA and JOEL DEQUINTO (G.R. NO. 171717, 15 DECEMBER 2010,  PERALTA, J.)

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D E CI S I O N

PERALTA, J.

          Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision^[1][1] dated January 12, 2005 and Resolution^[2][2] dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70009. The assailed Decision set aside the Joint Orders^[3][3] dated June 29, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, Cadiz City, while the questioned Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

          The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

          Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental.   The said tract of land is a portion of Lot No. 1536-B, formerly known as Lot No. 591-B, originally owned by a certain Esteban Dichimo and his wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of whom are already deceased.

          On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Ramon Brito, Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo, Edito Dichimo, Maria Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Angelino Mission, Leonora Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Fausto Dolleno,  filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros Occidental,  against a certain Jose Maria Golez.  The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 12887.

          Petitioner’s wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged that they are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo; that Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban and Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon their death Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and Eusebio, and their respective spouses, also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.

          On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein respondents are the heirs of Esteban and Francisca’s children; that they are in open, actual, public and uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30 years; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his co-heirs; that, in fact, petitioner and his co-heirs have already disposed of their shares in the said property a long time ago.

          On November 26, 1986, the trial court issued an Order dismissing without prejudice respondents’ Answer-in-Intervention for their failure to secure the services of a counsel despite ample opportunity given them.

          Civil Case No. 12887 then went to trial.

          Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a Compromise Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely: Margarita, Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other.   It was stated in the said agreement that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot to the mother of Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 45 rendered a decision approving the said Compromise Agreement.

          Thereafter, TCT No. T-12561 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City in the name of Margarita, Bienvenido and Francisco.

          On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another  Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages, this time against herein respondents. The case, filed with the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60, was docketed as Civil Case No. 548-C.  Herein respondents, on the other hand, filed with the same court, on August 18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner and his co-heirs. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 588-C.

          The parties filed their respective Motions to Dismiss. Thereafter, the cases were consolidated.

          On June 29, 2000, the RTC issued Joint Orders, disposing as follows:

                        WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders the following:

1.                 The Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 548-C is hereby GRANTED and Civil Case No. 548[-C] is hereby ordered DISMISSED for violation of the rule on forum shopping;

                        2. The Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 588-C is likewise hereby GRANTED and the Complaint dated August 13, 1999 is hereby DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

                        3. All counterclaims in both cases, Civil Case No. 548-C and 588-C are likewise ordered DISMISSED.

                        SO ORDERED.^[4][4]

          The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but both were denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 5, 2000.

          Herein respondents then appealed the case to the CA praying that the portion of the RTC Joint Orders dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C be declared null and void and that the case be decided on the merits.

          On January 12, 2005, the CA rendered judgment disposing as follows:

                        WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the appeal filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE, as we hereby set aside, the Joint Order[s] dated June 29, 2000 of the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60, dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C. Further, let the entire records of this case be remanded to the court a quo for the trial and hearing on the merits of Civil Case No. 588-C.

                        SO ORDERED.^[5][5]

          Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution dated February 13, 2006.

          Hence, the instant petition with the following assigned errors:

I.              THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE RECONVEYANCE CASE OF THE HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS BEFORE THE  REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 60, CADIZ CITY.

II.           THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AMENDMENT OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 12887 IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO ANNULMENT OF THE SAID DECISION. THE HONORABLE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE.^[6][6]

          In his first assigned error, petitioner claims that the CA erred in holding that respondents are not parties in Civil Case No. 12887 contending that, since their Answer-in-Intervention was admitted, respondents should be considered parties in the said case. Petitioner also avers that, being parties in Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are bound by the judgment rendered therein.

          The Court is not persuaded.

          It is true that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.^[7][7] In the present case, when respondents filed their Answer-in-Intervention they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Respondents, thus, became parties to the action. Subsequently, however, respondents’ Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed without prejudice. From then on, they ceased to be parties in the case so much so that they did not have the opportunity to present evidence to support their claims, much less participate in the compromise agreement entered into by and between herein petitioner and his co-heirs on one hand and the defendant in Civil Case No. 12887 on the other. Stated differently, when their Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed, herein respondents lost their standing in court and, consequently, became strangers to Civil Case No. 12887. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.^[8][8] Thus, being strangers to Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are not bound by the judgment rendered therein.

          Neither does the Court concur with petitioner’s argument that respondents are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly committed by petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four years, which period is reckoned from the discovery of the fraud.

          In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud.

          Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.^[9][9] Thus, in Caro v. Court of Appeals,^[10][10] this Court held as follows:

                        x x x The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261, September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396, illuminated what used to be a gray area on the prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to real property and, corollarily, its point of reference:

x x x It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:

SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods after the right of action accrues:

x x x                           x x x                              x x x

3.                 Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;

x x x                          x x x                                x x x

            In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.

            Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1)              Upon a written contract;

(2)              Upon an obligation created by law;

(3)              Upon a judgment.

x x x     x x x     x x x. (Italics supplied.)

            An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that article 1144 and article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.

                        An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides:

            In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, x x x.

                        This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, x x x

                                    x x x x                           

            The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. x x x^[11][11]

          In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by petitioner and his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint for reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year prescriptive period has not yet expired.

          The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioner’s contention that respondents are guilty of laches and are already estopped from questioning the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 on the ground that they slept on their rights and allowed the said decision to become final.

          In the first place, respondents cannot be faulted for not appealing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 simply because they are no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to assail the said judgment.

          Secondly, respondents’ act of filing their action for reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting their right. The Court has ruled that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar relief.^[12][12] Laches is recourse in equity.^[13][13] Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of statutory law.^[14][14]

            Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession thereof.^[15][15] Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against him.^[16][16] Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.^[17][17] The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by the one who is in possession.^[18][18]

          In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate action against respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents’ possession of the disputed property, it follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more reason should respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.

          In his second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the objective of respondents in filing Civil Case No. 588-C with the RTC of Cadiz City was to have the decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 12887 amended, which is tantamount to having the same annulled. Petitioner avers that the RTC of Cadiz City has no jurisdiction to act on Civil Case No. 588-C, because it cannot annul the decision of the RTC of Bacolod City which is a co-equal court.

          The Court does not agree.

          The action filed by respondents with the RTC of Cadiz City is for reconveyance and damages. They are not seeking the amendment nor the annulment of the Decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 12887. They are simply after the recovery of what they claim as their rightful share in the subject lot as heirs of Esteban Dichimo.

          As earlier discussed, respondents’ Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed by the RTC of Bacolod City without prejudice. This leaves them with no other option  but  to institute a separate action for the protection and enforcement of their rights and interests. It will be the height of inequity to declare herein petitioner and his co-heirs as exclusive owners of the disputed lot without giving respondents the opportunity to prove their claims that they have legal interest over the subject parcel of land, that it forms part of the estate of their deceased predecessor and that they are in open, and uninterrupted possession of the same for more than 30 years. Much more, it would be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.^[19][19]

          WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January 12, 2005 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70009 are AFFIRMED.

          SO ORDERED.

     DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA              ROBERTO A. ABAD

                   Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

    Associate Justice

    Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EFREN DITONA y MONTEFALCON,BERNARD FERNANDEZ AND ERNESTO EMNAS, ACCUSED AND EFREN DITONA Y MONTEFALCON, APPELLANT (G.R. NO. 189841, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. ABAD)

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DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need for the prosecution to show proof that the integrity of seized prohibited drugs has been preserved from the moment of seizure to the moment they are presented in court.

The Facts and the Case

The prosecution evidence shows that the Drug Enforcement Group of the Olongapo City Police had received reports of rampant selling of illegal drugs at Compound 7-9^th Street, Barangay Ilalim, Olongapo City.

On July 19, 2002, within the election period, the police conducted a buy-bust operation at the place.  SPO1 Alfredo Flores, acting as a poseur-buyer, and an informer met the accused Efren M. Ditona in front of the latter’s house.  SPO1 Flores gave Ditona the marked money consisting of two P100 bills in exchange for one plastic sachet of shabu.

At a signal, PO3 Norberto Ventura and PO2 Allan Delos Reyes rushed towards the gate of the compound to make the apprehension but, before they could reach SPO1 Flores and Ditona, the latter noticed their movement and ran into his house.  The officers arrested him there and four others who were then sniffing shabu and preparing aluminum tin foils.

The police frisked them and found the marked money on Ditona’s person together with transparent plastic sachets containing what appeared to be shabu substance and one cal. 22 magnum revolver with six live ammunitions.  They confiscated the marked money, the suspected shabu substance in sachets, the gun, and the ammunitions.^[1][1]  Upon laboratory examination, the substance proved positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.^[2][2]

The City Prosecutor of Olangapo City filed four separate informations against Ditona before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City for selling and possessing illegal drugs^[3][3] in Criminal Cases 436-2002^[4][4] and 437-2002;^[5][5] violation of the Omnibus Election Code^[6][6] in Criminal Case 438-2002;^[7][7] and illegal possession of firearms^[8][8] in Criminal Case 466-2002.^[9][9]  The RTC tried all four cases jointly.

On July 11, 2007 the RTC^[10][10] found Ditona guilty of all the charges and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) in Criminal Case 436-2002; imprisonment from 12 years and one day to 20 years in Criminal Case 437-2002; imprisonment from one year to six years in Criminal Case 438-2002; and imprisonment from four years, two months, and one day to six years of prision correccional and a fine of P15,000.00 in Criminal Case 466-2002.  Ditona’s denial, said the RTC, cannot prevail over the police officers’ positive declarations considering that the latter did not have any motive to concoct a false charge against him and presumably performed their official duties regularly.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)^[11][11] affirmed the conviction for the crimes relating to the prohibited drugs but modified the RTC ruling with respect to the other charges after observing that it erred in convicting Ditona separately for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue for resolution is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt Ditona’s guilt for illegal possession and sale of shabu.

The Court’s Ruling

To successfully prosecute an accused for selling illegal drugs, the prosecution has to prove: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.^[12][12]  On the other hand, for an accused to be convicted of possession of illegal drugs, the prosecution is required to prove that: (1) the accused was in possession of prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.^[13][13]

In both instances, the State has to prove as well the corpus delicti, the body of the crime.^[14][14]  It must be shown that the suspected substance the police officers seized from the accused is the same thing presented in court during the trial.  Thus, the chain of custody rule is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.^[15][15]  The witnesses should be able to describe these movements to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and that no one who did not belong in the chain had access to the same.^[16][16]

Here, the prosecution dismally failed to prove the corpus delicti since there were substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which raised doubts on the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.

To begin with, SPO1 Flores, PO3 Ventura, and PO2 Delos Reyes executed a Joint Affidavit,^[17][17] which formed part of their direct testimonies, in which they narrated the details of the buy-bust operation.  Yet, they did not say how they handled the seized drugs from the time they frisked Ditona until they brought him to the police station.  They also omitted these important points in their testimonies on direct and cross-examination.

PO2 Delos Reyes testified on the details of the seized drugs, the gun, and the ammunitions taken from the persons in the house but he did not specify what things he confiscated from Ditona.  PO3 Ventura, on the other hand, merely testified that he issued a receipt for the things the police seized, thus:^[18][18]

PROSECUTOR:

As regards the shabu, we will maintain it to be collectively marked as Exhibit “B.”  Now…will you tell us briefly your participation in this police operation?

A:         I was tasked as back-up together with PO3 [sic] Allan Delos Reyes. It was SPO1 Alfredo Flores who acted as poseur-buyer.

Q:        After the consummation, Alfredo Flores gave his pre-arranged signal and when Ditona saw it, and sensed the presence the other members of the team he tried to ran inside his house and that’s the time we gave chase upon which we saw another person inside the sala?

A:         Yes Sir.

Q:        By the way, what was the lighting condition when this incident transpired?

A:         From the light post, it is well-lighted…near the house at No. 7-9^th St.

Q:        In connection with this drug operation, do you recall having prepared a receipt of evidence or property seized?

A:         Yes Sir.

Q:        If you see this again, will you be able to recognize it?

A:         Yes Sir.

Q:        I am showing to you a document which we request to be marked as Exhibit “L,” please go over this and tell if this is the receipt of property seized you are referring to?

A:         Yes Sir, this is it.

Q:        Can you identify the signatures indicated below?

A:         This is Alfredo Flores, this is my signature and this is Allan Delos Reyes’ signature.

Finally, SPO1 Flores testified only that he was the one who bought the shabu from Ditona, thus:^[19][19]

Q:        You said you were able to buy shabu on July 19, 2002, from whom were you able to buy shabu?

A:         From Efren Ditona, Sir.

Q:        Will you tell the Court the quantity of shabu you were able to purchase?

A:         One sachet of shabu containing 0.2 grams.

Q:        If you see the stuff you were able to buy, will you be able to recognize this?

ATTY. COLOMA:

            We stipulate that the witness can identify the stuff.

Quite clearly, the prosecution failed to establish the required chain of custody of the prohibited drugs through the testimonies of the police officers.  While the RTC noted that SPO1 Flores and PO3 Ventura placed their initials, “AF” and “NV,” on the seized drugs, they did not identify the markings as theirs during their direct testimonies nor did they testify when and where they made such markings.  Moreover, they failed to show how the seized drugs reached the laboratory technician who examined it and how the same were stored pending turnover to the court.^[20][20]

Indeed, there is no room to apply the presumption of regularity in the police officers’ performance of official duty.  While the testimonies of the police officers who apprehended the accused are generally accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly, such presumption is effectively destroyed where the performance of their duties is tainted with failure to comply with the prescribed procedure and guidelines.^[21][21]

The drug enforcement agencies of the government and the prosecution should put their acts together to ensure that the guilty are punished and the innocent absolved.  Poor handling and preservation of the integrity of evidence show lack of professionalism and waste the time that the courts could use for hearing and adjudicating other cases.  Prosecutors ought not to file drugs cases in court unless the law enforcement agencies are able to show documented compliance with every requirement of Section 21 of Republic Act 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.  Likewise prosecutors ought to have a checklist of the questions they should ask their witnesses in drugs cases that would elicit the required proof. 

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and MODIFIES the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03095 dated July 31, 2009 in that accused-appellant Efren Ditona y Montefalcon is ACQUITTED with respect to the crimes charged in Criminal Cases 436-2002, 437-2002, and 466-2002.  The Court, however, AFFIRMS the finding of the Court of Appeals of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt with respect to the charge of violation of Section 261(q) in relation to Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code in Criminal Case 438-02 and the corresponding penalty of imprisonment from one (1) year to six (6) years meted out to him.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                              Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA    MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

                  Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                  

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

ATTY. NORLINDA R. AMANTE-DESCALLAR VS. HON. REINERIO (ABRAHAM) B. RAMAS, A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2015, 15 DECEMBER 2010, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO)

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D e c i s I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This case stemmed from Administrative Case No. 05-222-P instituted by Judge Reinerio (Abraham) B. Ramas (Judge Ramas) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC-Branch 18) of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur, against Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar (Atty. Descallar), Clerk of Court of the same court, for Grave Misconduct.  Atty. Descallar allegedly showed the unopened ballot boxes inside Judge Ramas’ chambers to a certain Allan Singedas (Singedas).  The ballot boxes were in Judge Ramas’ custody in relation to Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4 pending before his court. 

          In a Verified Comment/Counter-Complaint^[1][1] dated August 11, 2005, Atty. Descallar vehemently denied the accusations against her and countercharged Judge Ramas of bringing home a complete set of computer, which was submitted as evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 5294 and 5295, entitled People v. Tesoro, Jr., for Theft.  She also accused Judge Ramas of dishonesty when the latter did not reflect in his Certificates of Service for May and June 2005 his absences on May 12 and 13, 2005; for several more days after promulgation of the decision in Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4 on May 16, 2005; and from June 1 to 21, 2005.

          On June 13, 2006, the Court Administrator submitted the following recommendations to this Court:

Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation:

            1.  that the instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

            2.  that respondent judge be found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using and bringing a piece of evidence to his residence, and should be FINED in the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely; and

            3.  that the charges of absenteeism and falsification of certificate of service for the months of May and June 2005 be REFERRED to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.^[2][2]

          In a Resolution^[3][3] dated August 14, 2006, the Second Division of this Court adopted the foregoing recommendations of the Court Administrator. It referred the charges of absenteeism and falsification of certificates of service against Judge Ramas to Justice Renato C. Dacudao (Justice Dacudao) of the Court of Appeals, Manila, for investigation, report, and recommendation, to be completed within 60 days from receipt of the record.

On October 2, 2006, Justice Dacudao set^[4][4] the case for hearing at his chambers on October 12 and 13, 2006, for the reception of Atty. Descallar’s evidence; and on October 23 and 24, 2006, for the reception of Judge Ramas’ evidence.

Atty. Descallar, along with her counsel and husband Atty. Romeo Y. Descallar, and witness Atty. Vicente Madarang Cerilles (Atty. Cerilles), testified during the hearings held on October 12 and 13, 2006.  Judge Ramas failed to appear on said dates.  Instead, he filed a Motion to Admit Memorandum with his Memorandum appended thereto.

In his testimony,^[5][5] Atty. Cerilles claimed to know Judge Ramas very well since the latter is his godfather and wedding sponsor.  Atty. Cerilles admitted that he had many pending cases before Judge Ramas’ sala, including Criminal Case No. 04-7003, entitled People v. Dizon, for Slight Illegal Detention, which involved his grandnephews.  On May 12, 2005, Atty. Cerilles went to the RTC-Branch 18 to find out if his grandnephews’ Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation could be heard.  However, upon inquiry, he was told that Judge Ramas was not around because his estranged wife arrived.  When Atty. Cerilles returned to the RTC-Branch 18 the following day, May 13, 2005, he was informed that Judge Ramas was still absent.

Atty. Descallar testified^[6][6] that Judge Ramas failed to indicate his absences on May 12, 13, 24, and 27 to 30, 2005, and June 1 to 21, 2005 in his Certificates of Service for the months of May and June 2005.  The absence of Judge Ramas can be gleaned from the court calendar of hearings and his failure to attend the raffle of cases done every Thursday of the week.  Also, the Omnibus Order^[7][7] dated May 23, 2005 issued by Judge Ramas manifested his momentary desistance from performing judicial functions from May 24, 2005 onwards, to wit:

In view of the precarious situation with which the undersigned presiding judge has been despicably subjected to, which incidentally has been caused by a detestable betrayal, his continued active participation in the administration of justice would be far too risky – for him, for the Court and for the entire judiciary.

Upon such ground, he has to momentarily cease from performing judicial functions until after the present and real threat on his own life shall have been properly resolved.

Atty. Descallar was not able to finish her testimony on October 12, 2006, and she asked for continuance as her testimony would still cover several documents.

Judge Ramas refuted the charges against him in his Memorandum,^[8][8] in which he averred that:

On May 12, 2005, he was late in coming to the office because he has to make the draft decision of the much awaited election protest case at home.  It was very lengthly as it involved several precincts. In fact, on the same date, May 12, 2005, he was still able to officiate a marriage.

On May 13, 2005, the undersigned did go to the office and issued an order setting the promulgation of the decision to May 16, 2005.  Such order is a part of the record of Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4.

If her only evidence of my absences on those days (May 12 & 13, 2005) was the Affidavit of Atty. Vicente M. Cerilles then surely it would not be sufficient. Atty. Cerilles has no knowledge whether or not I reported to office after he left.

My good complainant should have extended her understanding that making a decision, especially of a much controversial case, entails a very careful evaluation of all evidences at hand. She knows that volumes upon volumes of records have to be seriously scrutinized. The 8-12 and 1-5 official office hours would not be enough, hence, the Judge even has to utilize all his waking hours just to comply with the mandate of the law that Election Protest Case should be disposed of in the earliest possible time as it partakes the nature more important than a criminal case.

The undersigned submits that he has rendered services for the month of May 2005, in accordance with law.

On May 16, 2005, the decision in Election Protest Case No. 0001-2K4 was promulgated. The undersigned wore a bullet proof vest when the decision was read. Threats in Pagadian City and Zamboanga del Sur could just not be taken lightly. Under tight security escorts, the undersigned had to stay in a safehouse. Meanwhile, masked riders passed by his residence even in the wee hours of the night.

It was not cowardice to shy away from imminent danger [;] it was the best thing to do under the circumstances. He was betrayed by his own Clerk of Court. Such betrayal is the subject of the Administrative Complaint ( AM No. P-06-2149, for Gross Misconduct). x x x.

x x x x

On May 23, 2005, the undersigned issued an Omnibus Order expressing his intention to momentarily cease hearing cases until after the threat on his life is resolved. Every now and then he reports to the office and continued to exercise administrative functions. Fortunately, the person hired to execute him was discovered to be a distant relative, a hatchet man of the dreaded Kuratong Baleleng Gang, and after negotiations, the contract was called off. He then continued his usual judicial and administrative functions. 

To prove that the threats to the life of the herein respondent was indeed real, on November 19, 2005, the brother of the protestant, Sultan Abdul Marcaban, the strongest supporter of the protestant, together with five (5) of his escorts were ambushed and brutally killed.

Clearly, it is not difficult to see that the complainant was motivated with the desire to get even with your respondent after the filing of the administrative case against her. Such spite and anger only serve as factors that work against her.

Under his oath as a judge, he has rendered service for the month of June 2005. The self-serving and ill-motivated declaration of the Clerk of Court cannot be made basis to find him absent.

In a letter dated October 16, 2006,^[9][9] Atty. Descallar requested for the transfer of the investigation to the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, because of financial constraints.  She was not financially prepared to attend the hearings in Manila, and she had to resort to borrowing money from her relatives to defray her expenses.  Cagayan de Oro City is more accessible to the parties and the travel thereto more economical. 

The request was granted by then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (Court Administrator Lock) in a Memorandum^[10][10] dated November 16, 2006.  Court Administrator Lock believed that the administration of justice would be better served by the transfer since it would minimize Judge Ramas’ absence from his regular station considering the proximity of Pagadian City to Cagayan de Oro City.  Thus, Court Administrator Lock recommended:

In view of the foregoing, respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court recommending that:

a)                  The letter dated October 16, 2006 of Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar be NOTED;

b)                  The Justice Renato C. Dacudao be RELIEVED of his authority to conduct an investigation on the instant matter; and

c)                  The subject administrative matter be REFERRED to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro Station, for raffling among the justices thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation on the charges of absenteeism and falsification of the certificate of service for the months of May and June 2005 against respondent within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.

The Court approved Court Administrator Lock’s recommendation in a Resolution dated February 28, 2007.  Per raffle dated March 22, 2007, the case was assigned to Justice Mario Lopez (Justice Lopez) of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.

Upon receipt of the records of the case, Justice Lopez set the case for continuance of hearing and reception of evidence on May 7, 8, and 22, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. at the Hearing Room, Court of Appeals, YMCA Building, Cagayan de Oro City.

Only Atty. Descallar and her counsel appeared at the hearing held on May 7, 2007.  During said hearing, Justice Lopez denied Judge Ramas’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings since the investigation is an administrative matter and not an action governed by the Rules of Court.  Justice Lopez also noted Judge Ramas’ manifestation, in which the latter waived his rights to cross-examine Atty. Descallar and to present evidence in his defense.

The hearings for the reception of Atty. Descallar’s evidence proceeded.  Atty. Descallar submitted several documents to prove that Judge Ramas was absent on May 12, 13, 24, and 27 to 30, 2005, and June 1 to 21, 2005, including documents that were not acted upon due to the absence of Judge Ramas.

On July 31, 2007, Justice Lopez submitted his Report,^[11][11] with the following findings and recommendation –

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned Investigating Justice finds respondent Judge Reinerio (Abraham) Ramas of Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Pagadian City GUILTY of untruthful statements in his Certificate of Service, and recommends that respondent judge be FINED in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) with a WARNING that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.^[12][12]

          Justice Lopez’s Report was noted by the Court in a Resolution dated October 1, 2007.

After reviewing the Report, the Court agrees with Justice Lopez’s conclusion that Judge Ramas is guilty of declaring untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service for May and June 2005.  As Justice Lopez detailed in his Report:

By his own admission, beginning 23 May 2005, when respondent Judge issued an Order that “he has to momentarily cease from performing judicial functions until after the present and real threat on his own life shall have been properly resolved”, he reported for work intermittently or did not report at all. x x x

x x x x

Based on records, he only reported for work on May 12, 2005 to solemnize marriage; May 13, 2005 to issue an Order setting the date of promulgation of the Election Protest No. 0001-2K4 on 16 May 2005; and June 8, 2005 to sign his Certificate of Service for the month of May.  For the period of May 24, 27 until June 7 and 9 until 20, there is no showing that he reported for duty and performed his judicial functions.  There were no evidence, documentary or otherwise, adduced by the respondent judge to prove that he had rendered services for the said period in compliance with his Certification of Service for the months of May and June.^[13][13]

Judge Ramas cannot escape liability by raising the defense of threat to his life to justify his absences on May 24, May 27 to June 7, and June 9 to June 20, 2005.  The Court quotes with approval Justice Lopez’s commentary on this regard:

Indeed, there may be threats to his life as alleged and indicated in his Order, and which claim was not refuted by the complainant. But such threats do not justify his cessation from performing judicial functions. Threats are concomitant peril in public office especially in the judiciary, where magistrates decide and determine sensitive issues that normally generate or provoke reprisals from losing litigants. This is a consequence that judges should be prepared of. Their exalted position entails a great responsibility unyielding to one’s personal convenience.

To be sure, “it was not cowardice to shy away from imminent danger [;] it was the best thing to do under the circumstances.”  But then, the most prudent thing that respondent judge should have done was to secure protection from local police force or from the Supreme Court. Respondent judge may had also requested from the Supreme Court to hold office elsewhere, or change of venue, whichever is appropriate under the circumstances, but not motu proprio issue an Order for him to desist temporarily from performing judicial functions. At the very least, he could have filed a leave of absence informing the Supreme Court of his predicament, thereby not subjecting his actions in serious doubts for dereliction of duty. It must be stressed that judges should be imbued with a lofty sense of responsibility in the discharge of their duties for the proper administration of justice. One who occupies an exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his official conduct which must at all times be free from the appearance of propriety. Respondent judge was oblivious of the demands of his official duties which require sacrifice of one’s personal interest and convenience for the public good.^[14][14]

All told, the Court views Judge Ramas’ conduct as inexcusable. 

Judge Ramas is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Canon 3 generally mandates that a judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.  Rule 3.01 requires that a judge be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence, while Rule 3.09 commands a judge to observe high standards of public service and fidelity at all times.  Judge Ramas irrefragably failed to observe these standards by making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service to cover up his absences.  

The Court has previously held that a judge’s submission of false certificates of service seriously undermines and reflects on the honesty and integrity expected of an officer of the court.  This is so because a certificate of service is not merely a means to one’s paycheck but is an instrument by which the Court can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people ‘ s right to a speedy disposition of cases.^[15][15] 

Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, making untruthful statements in the certificate of service is categorized as a less serious offense and punishable by suspension without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.  Considering that this is Judge Ramas’ second offense in his almost 12 years in the Judiciary, the Court adopts Justice Lopez’s recommendation of imposing on the erring judge a fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

WHEREFORE, Judge Reinerio (Abraham) B. Ramas is hereby found GUILTY of making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service for the months of May and June 2005 and is hereby FINED in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00), with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED. 

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson