LEGAL NOTE 0069: WHY DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS ALWAYS AFFIRMED?

 SOURCE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GONZALO BALDOGO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT (G.R. NO. 128106-07, 24 JANUARY 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J) SUBJECT: MURDER. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. BALOGO)

 

WHY IS THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT  ALWAYS AFFIRMED?

 BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE UNIQUE ADVANTAGE OF MONITORING AND OBSERVING AT CLOSE RANGE THE ATTITUDE, CONDUCT AND DEPORTMENT OF WITNESSES.

 In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close range the attitude, conduct and deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies before said court. 

 

IN PLEADINGS, LAWYERS USUALLY CITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF OBSERVING THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES IN CONVINCING THE APPELLATE COURT THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE UPHELD. IS THERE A “SUAVE”, MORE CONVINCING,  AUTHORITATIVE,  AND POETIC WAY  OF STATING THE ABOVE?

YES. THE FOREIGN DECISION CITED IN SUPPORT OF THE ABOVE WHICH READS:

 

To him (THE JUDGE)  appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.  The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him.

………..Echoing a foreign court’s observation, this Court declared:

“Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a court of last resort.  She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind’s eye of the judge who tries the case.  To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.  The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him.”[15] (PEOPLE V. DELOVINO, 247 SCRA 637, 647 (1995).

 

ARE  THERE  EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE JUDGE IS ABLE TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES?

YES. THE EXCEPTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WHEN PATENT INCONSISTENCIES IN THE STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES ARE IGNORED BY THE TRIAL COURT; 

(B) WHEN THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT ARE CLEARLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE;  AND

(C) WHEN THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED, MISUNDERSTOOD, MISINTERPRETED AND/OR MISCONSTRUED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBSTANCE WHICH, IF CONSIDERED, WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE

The rule, however, is not iron clad.  This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto, namely:  (a) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court;  (b) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence;  (c) when the trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[16]  In this case, the trial court found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled to full probative weight.  Accused-appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the aforestated exceptions.

[1]  Original records, p. 1.

[2] Id.at 15.

[3] Id.at 21.

[4] Id.at 65.

[5]  Exhibit “E.”

[6]  Exhibit “A.”

[7]  Ibid.

[8]   Exhibit “B.”

[9]  TSN, Joaquin, August 20, 1996, pp. 13-14.

[10]  Exhibit “A.”

[11]  Exhibit “D.”

[12]  Records, pp. 74-76.

[13]  Rollo, pp. 44-45.

[14]  People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637, 647 (1995).

[15]  Ibid.

[16]  People v. Garcia, et al., 361 SCRA 598 (2001); People v. De losSantos, 314 SCRA 303 (1999).

[17]  People v. Dramayo, et al., 42 SCRA 59 (1971).

[18]  25 L.Ed. 368.

[19]  People v. Landicho, et al., 258 SCRA 1 (1996).

[20]  People v. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79 (1996).

[21]  People v. Lopez, et al., 249 SCRA 610 (1995).

[22]  People v. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693 (1996).

[23]  People v. Abendan, 360 SCRA 106 (2001).

[24]  TSN, Camacho, pp. 8-13, July 25, 1996.

[25] Id.at 13-14.

[26] Id.at 15-17.

[27] Id.at 45-46.

[28] Id.at 20-21.

[29] Id.at 25-26.

[30]  TSN, Baldogo, September 17, 1996, pp. 19-20.

[31]  TSN, Baldogo, September 19, 1996, pp. 17-19.

[32]  People v. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397 (2001).

[33]  People v. Salvatierra, 257 SCRA 489 (1996).

[34]  People v. Garcia, 361 SCRA 598 (2001).

[35]  Wharton, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, pp. 514-515.

[36]  State v. Nargashian, 106AmericanStateReports, 715, 58 Atl. 953.

[37]  8 Car. & P. (Eng) 616 (1838).

[38]  TSN, Baldogo, September 19, 1996, p. 15.

[39]  Marco v. Court of Appeals, et al., 273 SCRA 276 (1997).

[40]  People v. Sulplito, 314 SCRA 493 (2001).

[41]  The crimes were committed after the effectivity of Republic Act 7659:

            Article 267.  Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

            1.   If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

            2.   If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

            3.   If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

            4.  If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

            The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

            When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

[42]  Rollo, pp. 70-71.

[43] Id.at 71-72.

[44]  People v. Sison, 312 SCRA 792, 804 (1999).

[45]  People v. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577 (1999); People v. Deopante, 263 SCRA 691 (1996).

[46]  People v. Patrolla, Jr., 254 SCRA 467 (1996).

[47]  People v. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655 (1999).

[48]  People v. Lumacang, et al., 324 SCRA 254 (2000).

[49]  People v. Abuyen, 213 SCRA 569 (1992).

[50]  People v. Cabarrubias, 223 SCRA 363 (1993).

[51]  Article 63, Revised Penal Code.

[52]  Velasquez, Revised Spanish-English Dictionary (Revised, 1959).

[53]  Third New International Dictionary, p. 2071.

[54]  People v.Santos, 283 SCRA 443 (1997).

[55] Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo V, pp. 639-640, cited in People vs. Marasigan, et al., 55 O.G. 8297 (1959).

[56]  Derecho Penal, Novena Edicion, Tomo II, pp. 700-701.

[57]  People v. Caber, Sr., 346 SCRA 166 (2000); People v. Berzuela, 341 SCRA 46 (2000).

[58]  People v. Gallego, 338 SCRA 21 (2000).

[59]  ART. 160.  Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense.—Penalty.—Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

      Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.

[60]  Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance. (People v. Pereto, 111 Phil. 943).

[61]  People v. Gaorana, 289 SCRA 665 (1998).

[62]  People v. Compendio, Jr., 258 SCRA 254, 268 (1996).

[63]  Exhibit “D.”

[64]  Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

     (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

     (b)  When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

     (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;

     (d)  When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

[65]  People v. Gaorana, supra.

[66]  Vide note 70 infra.

[67]  Article 2219, paragraph 5, New Civil Code; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 133489 and 143970, January 15, 2002.

[68]  People v. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2000).

[i]  Penned by Judge Felomino A. Vergara.