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FORM 0020: AFFIDAVIT OF DISCREPANCY IN NAME

Filed under: PHILIPPINE LEGAL FORMS — 250 Comments
December 21, 2010

SAMPLE FORM

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

Makati City                                 ) SS.

AFFIDAVIT OF DISCREPANCY

IN NAME

I, JUAN DE B. LA CRUZ,  of legal age, married, and with address at ______________________________________________________, under oath, state:

1.    THAT  my name is JUAN B. DE LA CRUZ  as stated and registered in my birth certificate issued by office of  the Civil Registry of ______________________. A copy of my birth certificate is hereto attached as ANNEX “A”;

2.    THAT the name JUAN B. DE LA CRUZ also appears in my passport which was issued based on the data appearing in my birth certificate. A copy of the  page of my passport where my name and picture appears is hereto attached as ANNEX “B”;

3.    THAT since childhood, my friends and acquaintances call me JOHN and thus since then I have been accustomed to using the name JOHN B. DE LA CRUZ in my personal records, transactions and communications;

4.    THAT the name JUAN B. DE LA CRUZ  and JOHN B. DE LA CRUZ refer to one and the same person, the herein Affiant;

5.    THAT I am executing this Affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and to use the same for whatever legal purpose it may serve.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto affix my signature this _________________ at Makati City.

                                                                             JUAN B. DE LA CRUZ

                                                                                          Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _______________ at Makati City, Affiant exhibiting to me his Passport bearing No. ______________________________ issued at ______________ on _________________.

Doc No. ________;

Page No. _______ ;

Book No. _______;

Series of ________.

Comment

LEGAL NOTE 0003: JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUB JUDICE RULE

Filed under: LEGAL NOTES — 2 Comments
December 20, 2010

SOURCE: SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION OF JUSTICE BRION: G.R. NO. 176389 – ANTONIO LEJANO, PETITIONER, -VERSUS- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 176864 – PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, -VERSUS- HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ET AL., APPELLANTS.

 

IN ESSENCE WHAT IS THE SUB JUDICE RULE?

In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. 

 

TO WHOM DOES IT APPLY?

 

The restriction applies not only to participants in the pending case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and witnesses, but also to the public in general, which necessarily includes the media. 

 

WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE SUB JUDICE RULE?

 

Although the Rules of Court does not contain a specific provision imposing the sub judice rule, it supports the observance of the restriction by punishing its violation as indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71:

Section 3.  Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. –  x  x  x  a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

x  x  x  x

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]

 

WHAT IS THE USUAL DEFENSE OF PERSONS FACING CHARGES FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF THE SUB JUDICE RULE?

Persons facing charges for indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule often invoke as defense their right to free speech and claim that the citation for contempt constitutes a form of impermissible subsequent punishment. 

 

IS THIS A VALID DEFENSE?

We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of speech under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution is not absolute.  A very literal construction of the provision, as espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black,[1][1] may lead to the disregard of other equally compelling constitutional rights and principles.  In Vicente v. Majaducon,[2][2] this Court declared that “[the freedom of speech] needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.”  Courts, both within and outside this jurisdiction, have long grappled with the dilemma of balancing the public’s right to free speech and the government’s duty to administer fair and impartial justice.  While the sub judice rule may be considered as a curtailment of the right to free speech, it is “necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice and the right of an accused to a fair trial.”[3][3]   Both these latter concerns are equally paramount and cannot lightly be disregarded. 

 

IS THE SUB JUDICE RULE IMPOSED ON ALL FORMS OF SPEECH?

No. Only on publicized speech. The Constitution simply gives the citizens the right to speech, not the right to unrestricted publicized speech.

 

WHAT IS PUBLICIZED SPEECH?

Publicized speech should be understood to be limited to those aired or printed in the various forms of media such as television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and internet, and excludes discussions, in public or in private, between and among ordinary citizens.

 

IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WHAT ARE PROHIBITED PUBLICIZED SPEECH?

In so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, two classes of publicized speech made during the pendency of the proceedings can be considered as contemptuous:

first, comments on the merits of the case, and

second, intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case. 

 

WHAT IS MEANT BY COMMENTS ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE?

Comments on the merits of the case may refer to the credibility of witnesses, the character of the accused, the soundness of the alibis offered, the relevance of the evidence presented, and generally any other comment bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused.[4][4]  The danger posed by this class of speech is the undue influence it may directly exert on the court in the resolution of the criminal case, or indirectly through the public opinion it may generate against the accused and the adverse impact this public opinion may have during the trial.  The significance of the sub judice rule is highlighted in criminal cases, as the possibility of undue influence prejudices the accused’s right to a fair trial.  “The principal purpose of the sub judice rule is to preserve the impartiality of the judicial system by protecting it from undue influence.”[5][5]  Public opinion has no place in a criminal trial. We ruled that –

it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.[6][6] 

The right to a fair trial is an adjunct of the accused’s right to due process which “guarantees [him] a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial  x  x  x  where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.”[7][7] 

In foreign jurisdictions, the courts do not hesitate to exercise their power to punish for contempt where necessary to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications that tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts.[8][8]

If the media publish prejudicial material, they can appear to urge, or may in fact be urging, a particular finding: the media can “wage a campaign” against one of the parties to proceedings. If the jury decides in accordance with an outcome promoted by the media, it will appear as if the jurors were swayed by the media. By the same token, if the jury’s decision does not accord with media opinion, it may appear as if they were deliberately reacting against it. Either way, it may appear that the jury’s decision was not impartial and based on the evidence presented in court, even if it was.[9][9]

The accused must be assured of a fair trial notwithstanding the prejudicial publicity;[10][10] he has a constitutional right to have his cause tried fairly by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor.[11][11] “The sub judice doctrine protects against the appearance of decisions having been influenced by published material.”[12][12]

As may be observed from the cited material, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts to insulate members of the jury from being influenced by prejudicial publicity.  But the fact that the jury system is not adopted in this jurisdiction is not an argument against our observance of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are no different from members of the jury, they are not immune from the pervasive effects of media.   “It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.”[13][13]  As I said in another case, in a slightly different context, even those who are determined, in their conscious minds, to avoid bias may be affected.[14][14]

Also, it is not necessary that the publicity actually influenced the court’s disposition of the case; “the actual impact of prejudicial publicity is not relevant to liability for sub judice contempt.”[15][15]  In several cases, the Court has noted the

enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience  x  x  x  Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on [witnesses and judges] directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.[16][16]

 

WHAT IS MEANT BY COMMENT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE COURTS WITH RESPECT TO THE CASE?

Comment on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case becomes subject to a contempt proceeding when it is intemperate, is contumacious, and unduly impairs upon the dignity of the court.  A comment that impairs of the dignity of the court “excites in the mind of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them[.]”[17][17]  If the speech tends to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the court and its members, and lowers or degrades the administration of  justice, then the speech constitutes contempt.[18][18]  “Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein.”[19][19]  Without the sub judice rule and the contempt power, the courts will be powerless to protect their integrity and independence that are essential in the orderly and effective dispensation and administration of justice.

This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of criticism against the court.  As the third branch of the government, the courts remain accountable to the people.  The people’s freedom to criticize the government includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions.  This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental to our democratic society and ensures that (a) there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the public’s confidence in the administration of justice is maintained.[20][20]  The criticism must, however, be fair, made in good faith, and “not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.”[21][21]  And to enhance the open court principle and allow the people to make fair and reasoned criticism of the courts, the sub judice rule excludes from its coverage fair and accurate reports (without comment) of what have actually taken place in open court. 

In sum, the court, in a pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment or influence in its all-important duty of deciding the case.[22][22] Any publication pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.  The resulting (but temporary) curtailment of speech because of the sub judice rule is necessary and justified by the more compelling interests to uphold the rights of the accused and promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.

[1][1]  See Justice Black’s concurring opinion in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), part of which reads:

                Certainly the First Amendment’s language leaves no room for inference that abridgments of speech and press can be made just because they are slight. That Amendment provides, in simple words, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” I read “no law . . . abridging” to mean no law abridging. The First Amendment, which is the supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own value on freedom of speech and press by putting these freedoms wholly “beyond the reach” of federal power to abridge.  No other provision of the Constitution purports to dilute the scope of these unequivocal commands of the First Amendment.  Consequently, I do not believe that any federal agencies, including Congress and this Court, have power or authority to subordinate speech and press to what they think are “more important interests.”  The contrary notion is, in my judgment, court-made, not Constitution-made. (361 U.S. 147, 157-159).

[2][2]  A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 12, 24-25, citing Choa v. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063, August 9, 1996, 260 SCRA 477, 484-485.

[3][3]  Law Reform Commission – New South Wales, Discussion Paper 43 (2000) – Contempt by Publication, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/dp43chp02, last visited December 9, 2010.

[4][4]  Ibid.; the Discussion Paper 43 (2000) of the Law Reform Commission of New South Wales has identified some “high-risk publications” against which the sub judice rule applies.  These include:

a. A photograph of the accused where identity is likely to be an issue;

b. Suggestions that the accused has previous criminal convictions, has been previously charged for committing an offense and/or previously acquitted, or has been involved in other criminal activity;

c.  Suggestions that the accused has confessed to committing the crime in question;

d. Suggestions that the accused has confessed to committing the crime in question;

e.  Suggestions that the accused is guilty or innocent of the crime for which he or she is charged, or that the jury should convict or acquit the accused; and

f.  Comments which engender sympathy or antipathy for the accused and/or which disparage the prosecution, or which make favorable or unfavorable references to the character or credibility of the accused or a witness.

[5][5]  Ibid.

[6][6]  Nestle v. Sanchez, Nos. L-75209 and 78791, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 542, 546.

[7][7]  Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former   President Joseph E. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 248, 259-260.

[8][8]  People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, March 29, 1995, 243 SCRA 64, 81, citing U.S. v. Sullen, 36 F. 2d 220.

[9][9]  Supra note 3.

[10][10] See Wayne Overbeck, Major Principles in Media Law, p. 298.

[11][11] Supra note 6, at 546.

[12][12] Supra note 3.

[13][13] Supra note 7, at 260.

[14][14] Separate Opinion of the author in Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010, part of which reads:

                Where the government simply wants to tell its story, already labeled as true, well ahead of any court proceedings, and judicial notice is taken of the kind of publicity and the ferment in public opinion that news of government scandals generate, it does not require a leap of faith to conclude that an accused brought to court against overwhelming public opinion starts his case with less than equal chance of acquittal.  The presumption of innocence notwithstanding, the playing field cannot but be uneven in a criminal trial when the accused enters trial with a government-sponsored badge of guilty on his forehead.  The presumption of innocence in law cannot serve an accused in a biased atmosphere pointing to guilt in fact because the government and public opinion have spoken against the accused. [Citations omitted]

[15][15] Supra note 3.

[16][16] Supra note 7, at 259-260.

[17][17] Supra note 8, at 82, citing J. Perfecto’s dissenting opinion in In re Francisco Brillantes, 42 O.G. 59.

[18][18] Id. at 94.

[19][19] In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, August 8, 2008, 561 SCRA 395, 448, citing Roxas v. Zuzuarregui, G.R. Nos. 152072 & 152104, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 446.

[20][20] Id.at 434.

[21][21] Tiongco v. Savillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1719, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 48, 64, citing In re Almacen, infra note 22.

[22][22] In re Almacen, No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.

Comment

CASE 0017: CARMEN EDANO VS. JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA, RTC BRANCH 87, QUEZON CITY (A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2007, 06 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECT: DEADLINE OF JUDGES FOR RENDERING DECISIONS; DECISIONS NOT SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS;

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment
December 19, 2010

CARMEN EDANO VS. JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA, RTC BRANCH 87, QUEZON CITY (A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2007, 06 DECEMBER 2010) SUBJECT: DEADLINE OF JUDGES FOR RENDERING DECISIONS; DECISIONS NOT SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS;

 

DOCTRINES:

 

JUDGES MUST DECIDE ALL CASES WITHIN 3 MONTHS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION

 

“. . . Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires judges to decide all cases within three (3) months from the date of submission. This Constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay; and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the same Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

ACTS OF JUDGE PERTAINING TO HIS JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION UNLESS THEY ARE TAINTED WITH FRAUD, DISHONESTY, CORRUPTION OR BAD FAITH.

“. . The respondent judge’s dismissal of the civil case for Support and her denial of the notice of appeal were done in the discharge of her judicial functions. Time and again, we have ruled that the acts of a judge, pertaining to his judicial functions, are not subject to disciplinary action, unless they are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.[1][10] As we explained in Jabon v. Usman:[2][11]

It must be stressed that an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty.  The remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction.  Thus, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against magistrates do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their civil, criminal and/or administrative liability may be made only after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with finality. In fine, only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.  To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.”

x————————————————————————————-x

D E C I S I O N

 

BRION, J.:

 

 

          We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaint for violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, misconduct, rendering an erroneous decision, and rendering a decision beyond the 90-day reglementary period filed by Carmen Edaño (complainant) against Judge Fatima G. Asdala (respondent judge).

          In her letter-complaint,[3][1] the complainant alleged that she was the plaintiff in a civil case for Support with prayer for Support Pendente Lite (Civil Case No. Q-97-30576), entitled “Carlo Edaño and Jay-ar Edaño, represented by Carmen Edano v. George F. Butler,” pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Quezon City, presided over by the respondent judge.

The complainant claimed that the respondent judge made it appear that Civil Case No. Q-97-30576 was decided on March 22, 2005, although the records show that she (respondent judge) still ruled on several motions relating to this case even after that date. The complainant further alleged that the respondent judge erred in denying her notice of appeal.

          The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required the respondent judge to comment on the complaint. In her comment,[4][2] the respondent judge maintained that she had rendered the decision on March 22, 2005, although it was mailed on a later date. Even assuming that there was delay in rendering the decision, the delay was not deliberate. She added that the complainant was not prejudiced by the delay as she continuously received support pendente lite from the defendant.

          The respondent judge likewise explained that the orders she issued after March 22, 2005 did not touch on the merits of the case; they were orders directing the release of money deposited by the defendant as support pendente lite. According to her, she denied the complainant’s notice of appeal because Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. Finally, she explained that her dismissal of the subject civil case and the denial of the notice of appeal are not the proper subjects of an administrative case as they are acts pertaining to her judicial functions.

          In her reply,[5][3] complainant maintained that the respondent judge violated the 90-day reglementary period for rendering decisions. She also revealed that the respondent judge made her sign a complaint against a Public Attorneys Office lawyer, to force the said lawyer to stay in her (respondent judge’s) sala.

          The OCA, in its Report[6][4] dated April 18, 2006, recommended that the respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for undue delay in rendering a decision, with a stern warning that a commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

THE COURT’S RULING

 

          We agree with the finding of the OCA that the respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision. Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires judges to decide all cases within three (3) months from the date of submission. This Constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay; and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the same Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco,[7][5] the Court held that the 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay. We explained the raison d’etre behind the rule on mandatory compliance with the constitutionally prescribed periods in Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes:[8][6]

The honor and integrity of the judiciary is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official duties. 

In the present case, Civil Case No. Q-97-30576 had been submitted for decision on December 9, 2004; the decision was, therefore, due on March 9, 2005.  The records do not show that the respondent judge asked for an extension to decide this case.  Thus, when she decided the case on March 22, 2005, the 90-day reglementary period had already lapsed. The respondent judge’s explanation that the complainant was not prejudiced by the delay is immaterial, as it is her constitutional duty to decide the case within three months from the date of submission.

Under Rule 140, Section 9(1) of the Rules of Court,[9][7] as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-8-10-SC,[10][8] the respondent judge’s undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious offense. It is punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.  The OCA’s recommendation of P10,000.00 fine is, therefore, in order.

We point out that the respondent judge, in Edaño v. Asdala,[11][9] had been dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which she may be entitled. The Court, in its resolution of September 11, 2007, modified the dispositive portion of this decision and exempted from forfeiture her accrued leave credits. The Court, in another Resolution dated January 15, 2008, directed the Financial Management Office to release and pay the money value of the accrued leave credits of Judge Fatima G. Asdala, subject to the retention of P80,000.00. In light of these considerations, we thus deduct the P10,000.00 fine, imposed in this case, from the P80,000.00 which this Court withheld, pursuant to our  January 15, 2008 Resolution.

Other Charges

The Court agrees with the OCA that the complainant’s charges of misconduct and rendering an erroneous decision have no leg to stand on. The respondent judge’s dismissal of the civil case for Support and her denial of the notice of appeal were done in the discharge of her judicial functions. Time and again, we have ruled that the acts of a judge, pertaining to his judicial functions, are not subject to disciplinary action, unless they are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.[12][10] As we explained in Jabon v. Usman:[13][11]

It must be stressed that an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty.  The remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction.  Thus, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against magistrates do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their civil, criminal and/or administrative liability may be made only after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with finality. In fine, only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.  To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Fatima G. Asdala is hereby found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision. Accordingly, she is FINED  Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), to be deducted from the Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) which the Court withheld pursuant to its January 15, 2008 Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

                                                                       Associate Justice  

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
 

 

  
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice 

 

 

 

 

 

[1][10] Mariano v. Garfin, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2024, [formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 06-2410-RTJ], October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 605, 614.

[2][11] A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1257-RTJ], October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 36, 61.

[3][1]  Rollo, pp. 2-9.

[4][2]  Id. at 34-37.

[5][3]  Id. at 41-42.

[6][4]  Id. at 46-50.

[7][5]  A.M. No. RTJ-05-1941 [formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-6-373-RTC], April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 109, 120.

[8][6]  A.M. No. RTJ-05-1892 [formerly A.M. No. 04-9-494-RTC], January 24, 2008, 542 SCRA 330, 338, citing Petallar v. Pullos, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 434.

[9][7]  SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less Serious Charges include:

1.       Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case[.]

[10][8]  Re: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

[11][9]  A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974 [formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2226-RTJ], July 26, 2007, 528 SCRA 212.

[12][10] Mariano v. Garfin, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2024, [formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 06-2410-RTJ], October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 605, 614.

[13][11] A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1257-RTJ], October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 36, 61.

Comment