J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

MILAGROS SALTING VS. JOHN VELEZ AND CLARISSA R. VELEZ (G.R. NO. 181930, 10 JANUARY 2011, NACHURA, J.)

SUBJECTS: NOTICE TO COUNSEL WHO DIED; EJECTMENT) BRIEF TITLE: SALTING VS. VELEZ ET AL.

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DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

          This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision^[1][1] dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution^[2][2] dated February 27, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97618.

The factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant petition are as follows:

          On October 7, 2003, respondents John Velez and Clarissa Velez filed a complaint^[3][3] for ejectment against petitioner Milagros Salting involving a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 38079. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2524. On March 28, 2006, respondents obtained a favorable decision^[4][4] when the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch LXXIV, of Taguig City, Metro Manila, ordered petitioner to vacate the subject parcel of land and to pay attorney’s fees and costs of suit. The decision became final and executory, after which respondents filed a motion for execution which was opposed by petitioner.

 Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 153, for Annulment of Sale of the Property covered by  TCT No. 38079, with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondents, Hon. Ma. Paz Yson, Deputy Sheriff Ernesto G. Raymundo, Jr., Teresita Diokno-Villamena, and Heirs of Daniel B. Villamena (Heirs of Villamena).^[5][5] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70859-TG. Petitioner claimed that she purchased the subject parcel of land from Villamena as evidenced by a notarized document known as Sale of Real Estate. She further explained that respondents were able to obtain title to the subject property through the fraudulent acts of the heirs of Villamena. Finally, she averred that the decision in Civil Case No. 2524 had not attained finality as she was not properly informed of the MeTC decision. Petitioner thus prayed that a TRO be issued, restraining respondents and all persons acting for and in their behalf from executing the MeTC decision dated March 28, 2006. She further sought the declaration of nullity of the sale by the heirs of Villamena to respondents involving the subject parcel of land, and, consequently, the cancellation of the title to the property in the name of respondents.

          Finding that petitioner would suffer grave and irreparable damage if respondents would not be enjoined from executing the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision while respondents would not suffer any prejudice, the RTC, in an Order dated October 26, 2006, granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied for.^[6][6] Aggrieved, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, raising the sole issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the execution of a judgment for ejectment.

          In a Decision^[7][7] dated November 29, 2007, the CA resolved the issue in the affirmative. The CA noted that the principal action in Civil Case No. 70859-TG is the annulment of the deed of sale executed between respondents and the heirs of Villamena, while the subject of the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction is the execution of the final judgment in a separate proceeding for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2524. The appellate court concluded that petitioner had no clear and unmistakable right to possession over the subject parcel of land in view of the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision. Hence, contrary to the conclusion of the RTC, the CA opined that petitioner was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction. The CA thus set aside the October 26, 2006 Order of the RTC.

          Petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, claiming that:         

          In rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals has decided in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. (Section 6 (a), Rule 45, 1997 Rule[s] of Civil Procedure). The Court of Appeals disregarded the rule that service of decision to a deceased lawyer is invalid and that the party must be duly served by the final judgment in order that the final judgment will become final and executory. The Court of Appeals, likewise, disregarded the existence of a clear and existing right of the petitioner which should be protected by an injunctive relief and the rule that the pendency of an action assailing the right of a party to eject will justify the suspension of the proceedings of the ejectment case.^[8][8]  

Petitioner claims that she was denied her right to appeal when the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision was declared final and executory despite the fact that the copy of the decision was served on her deceased counsel. She further claims that the MeTC decision had not attained finality due to improper service of the decision. Moreover, petitioner avers that she has a clear and existing right and interest over the subject property which should be protected by injunction. Finally, petitioner argues that jurisprudence allows the suspension of proceedings in an ejectment case at whatever stage when warranted by the circumstances of the case.

In their Comment,^[9][9] respondents allege that the petition is already moot and academic in view of the execution of the MeTC decision. They claim that it is not proper to restrain the execution of the MeTC decision as the case instituted before the RTC was for the annulment of the sale executed between respondents and the heirs of Villamena, and not an action for annulment of judgment or mandamus to compel the MeTC to entertain her belated appeal. Respondents add that the finality of the ejectment case is not a bar to the case instituted for the annulment of the sale and the eventual recovery of ownership of the subject property. The actions for ejectment and for annulment of sale are two different cases that may proceed independently, especially when the judgment in the ejectment case had attained finality, as in the instant case. Finally, respondents fault the petitioner herself for not informing the MeTC of the death of her former counsel the moment she learned of such death.

We find no merit in the petition.

.

We first determine the validity of the service of the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision on petitioner’s counsel who, as of that date, was already deceased. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.^[10][10]  Thus, when the MeTC decision was sent to petitioner’s counsel, such service of judgment was valid and binding upon petitioner, notwithstanding the death of her counsel.  It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership continues to exist lawfully, the partners are still alive, or its associates are still connected with the firm.^[11][11] Litigants, represented by counsel, cannot simply sit back, relax, and await the outcome of their case.^[12][12] It is the duty of the party-litigant to be in contact with her counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of her case.^[13][13] It is likewise the duty of the party to inform the court of the fact of her counsel’s death. Her failure to do so means that she is negligent in the protection of her cause, and she cannot pass the blame to the court which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsels.

          It is noteworthy that when petitioner came to know of the death of her counsel and upon obtaining the services of a new counsel, petitioner instituted another action for the annulment of the deed of sale between her and the heirs of Villamena, instead of questioning the MeTC decision  through an action for annulment of judgment. Obviously, the annulment case instituted by petitioner is separate and distinct from the ejectment case filed by respondents. She cannot, therefore, obtain relief through the second case for alleged errors and injustices committed in the first case.

With the foregoing disquisition, we find that the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision had, indeed, become final and executory. A final and executory decision can only be annulled by a petition to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or by a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that effect was filed.^[14][14] Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. Nothing further can be done to a final judgment except to execute it.^[15][15]

          In the present case, the finality of the March 28, 2006 decision with respect to possession de facto cannot be affected by the pendency of the annulment case where the ownership of the property is being contested.^[16][16] We are inclined to adhere to settled jurisprudence that suits involving ownership may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of the enforcement of the final decision in an ejectment suit. The rationale of the rule has been explained in this wise:

This rule is not without good reason. If the rule were otherwise, ejectment cases could easily be frustrated through the simple expedient of filing an action contesting the ownership over the property subject of the controversy. This would render nugatory the underlying philosophy of the summary remedy of ejectment which is to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims.^[17][17]

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties’ opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.^[18][18] 

Finally, as aptly held by the CA, petitioner is not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the MeTC decision. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction, viz.:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

And as clearly explained in Ocampo v. Sison Vda. de Fernandez^[19][19] ¾

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The applicant’s right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the applicant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.

A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the applicant that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.^[20][20] 

In this case, the enforcement of the writ of execution which would evict petitioner from her residence is manifestly prejudicial to her interest. However, she possesses no legal right that merits the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction. Her right to possess the property in question has been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to respondents in the ejectment case in the MeTC decision which has become final and executory.^[21][21]

In any event, as manifested by respondents, the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision has already been executed. Hence, there is nothing more to restrain.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution dated February 27, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97618 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

                                      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                      Associate Justice

 WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                                      Associate Justice

                                                             Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice

PROSECUTOR HILARIO RONSON H. TILAN VS. JUDGE ESTER PISCOSO-FLOR, RTC, BRANCH 34, BANAUE, IFUGAO (A.M. NO. RTJ-09-2188, 10 JANUARY 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF DECISION BEYOND THE 90-DAY PERIOD, GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION. (BRIEF TITLE: TILAN VS. JUDGE FLOR).

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D E C I S I O N

We resolve in this Decision the Administrative Matter against Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Banaue, Ifugao.

The Antecedents

The case arose from the verified complaint, dated September 1, 2008,^[1][1] filed by Public Prosecutor Hilario Ronson H. Tilan, charging Judge Piscoso-Flor with gross inefficiency, gross negligence and dishonesty.

The records show that the prosecutor was then handling Criminal Case No. 127, People of the Philippines v. Juanito Baguilat, for Falsification of Public Document, and Criminal Case No. 140, People of the Philippines v. Wihlis Talanay, for Violation of RA 7610, pending promulgation before Judge Piscoso-Flor.  He was also handling Criminal Case No. 221, People of the Philippines v. Macario Tenefrancia, for Libel, pending arraignment in the same court.

In People v. Baguilat, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an order dated October 20, 2007^[2][2] directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order. The complainant alleged that the judge failed to render a decision within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period; instead, she issued an order, dated April 8, 2008,^[3][3] reiterating her earlier directive for the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

 In People v. Talanay, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an order dated September 25, 2007^[4][4] giving the accused fifteen (15) days to file his formal offer of evidence, and five (5) days for the prosecution to file its comment/objections.  Allegedly, Judge Piscoso-Flor again failed to resolve the case within the 90-day reglementary period; instead, she issued another order dated May 21, 2008^[5][5] giving the parties fifteen (15) days within which to file their memoranda.

 Prosecutor Tilan claimed that in both cases, Judge Piscoso-Flor resorted to the issuance of an order requiring the submission of the parties’ memoranda to circumvent the statutory period for the resolution of cases.  Prosecutor Tilan pointed out that  the father of  the victim  (a minor)  in People v. Talanay sought the assistance of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) “regarding the slow process of resolving the case,”^[6][6] and the CHR even called his attention on the matter.^[7][7]

In People v. Tenefrancia, Prosecutor Tilan alleged that the accused filed a Petition for Suspension of Trial, prompting Judge Piscoso-Flor to call a hearing on the petition.  Despite the parties’ submission of the matter for resolution, Judge Piscoso-Flor failed to resolve the petition within the required period.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)^[8][8] required Judge Piscoso-Flor to submit her comment, and she complied on November 7, 2008.^[9][9]  She  offered   the following explanation: in the court’s monthly report  for  January 2008,^[10][10] Criminal Case No. 127, People v. Baguilat, was submitted for decision on January 31, 2008, and was due for decision on May 1, 2008;  the  reason  for this was the parties’ failure to submit their memoranda as required in her order dated October 20, 2007; on April 8, 2008, she issued another order reiterating her directive for the parties to file their memoranda because the case had been heard previously by her two predecessors.

Judge Piscoso-Flor further explained that on April 28, 2008, accused Baguilat moved for extension of time to submit his memorandum.^[11][11]  She herself requested for an extension of time to decide the case up to July 2, 2008.^[12][12] She promulgated the decision on September 29, 2008,^[13][13] after several postponements due to the absence of Prosecutor Tilan, the counsel for the accused, and of the accused himself.

In conclusion, she stated that Prosecutor Tilan filed the present complaint after she personally went to Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales to complain about the former’s actuations towards her,^[14][14]and after she cited him for direct contempt.^[15][15]

On November 19, 2008, Prosecutor Tilan filed a reply,^[16][16]reiterating the allegations in his complaint, and adding that he filed a Motion for Inhibition of Judge Piscoso-Flor in Criminal Case No. 228, People of the Philippines v. Eddie Immongor and Senando Bannog,” which was deemed submitted for resolution on July 18, 2008.

In a rejoinder dated November 25, 2008,^[17][17] Judge Piscoso-Flor explained  that in Criminal Case No. 142, People of the Philippines v. Myleen Dimpatan, for Estafa, which Prosecutor Tilan mentioned in his reply, she received the accused’s memorandum on April 20, 2007, and that of the prosecution on April 17, 2007.  She added that on July 24, 2007, the court   received  a joint manifestation by Prosecutor Tilan, Private Prosecutor Rufino  Lamase,  and  the accused’s counsel (Atty. Gerald Tabayan) asking that the promulgation of the decision be deferred pending a possible settlement of the case. It was only on October 8, 2008 that Prosecutor Lamase  moved  to  have  the case resolved for failure of the accused  to  settle  the civil  aspect  of the case. She immediately finalized the decision and  scheduled  its promulgation on November 14, 2008, but this was reset to November 24, 2008 upon motion of the counsel for the accused.

Judge Piscoso-Flor further explained that the motion for inhibition in Criminal Case No. 228 had been the subject of a contempt case which reached the Court of Appeals and gave rise to numerous complaints filed by Prosecutor Tilan against her. One of the cases had been considered closed and terminated by Deputy Court Administrator Reuben P. de la Cruz in a letter dated November 4, 2008.^[18][18] 

Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court issued a Resolution on July 6, 2009:^[19][19] (1) re-docketing the case as a regular administrative matter; (2) directing Judge Piscoso-Flor to conduct an inventory of cases pending in her court and find out whether there were cases submitted for decision that had not been decided within the required period, and to decide these cases within thirty (30) days; and (3) requiring the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the records.

Judge Piscoso-Flor and Prosecutor Tilan submitted the case for resolution on August 27, 2009 and October 8, 2009, respectively.

The Court’s Ruling

In his Memorandum dated March 19, 2009,^[20][20] Court Administrator Jose P. Perez (now a member of the Court) found Judge Piscoso-Flor to have been  remiss  in  her  duty  to  decide cases within the period required by law.  He recommended that the judge be merely admonished considering that  this  is her first infraction and that she inherited most of the cases that gave  rise  to  the  complaint.  At the same time, he recommended that a stern warning be given against the commission of a similar offense in the future.

The OCA evaluation tells us that Judge Piscoso-Flor is guilty of failing to decide cases within the required periods, citing Criminal Case No. 127  (People v. Juanito Baguilat)  as  the principal basis of its conclusion.  In  this case, the OCA faulted Judge Piscoso-Flor for using as justification for  her inaction the parties’ failure to submit their respective memoranda.  The  OCA  opined  that  this  is not a valid reason for not deciding the case; if  she  believed  she  would  not be able to decide the case on time, she could have asked the Court for an extension of the required period. The OCA acknowledged though that Judge Piscoso-Flor requested for an extension to decide the case in her monthly report of cases and certificate of service.^[21][21]

We find the OCA evaluation in order.  Although Judge Piscoso-Flor claimed that she had requested for an extension of time to decide Criminal Case No. 127, there was no showing that the request was ever granted. Over and above this consideration, she allowed the parties to control the period of disposition of the case through their lukewarm response to her call for the submission of memoranda, which she had to do twice.  She could have acted more firmly, considering, as she said, that she only inherited the case, which implies that it had been on the docket for quite some time.  In any event, Judge Piscoso-Flor should have known that “[t]he Court may grant extension of time to file memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall not be interrupted thereby.”^[22][22] 

The same is true with Criminal Case No. 140 (People v. Talanay).  As early as March 6, 2006,^[23][23] the CHR Office in the Cordillera Administrative Region relayed to Judge Piscoso-Flor the concern of the parent of the victim of the child abuse regarding the delay in the resolution of the case.  It was only on May 21, 2008 when Judge Piscoso-Flor called for the submission of memoranda.

 Judge Piscoso-Flor  had no comment on Criminal Case No. 221 (People v. Tenefrancia).  On the other hand, the Motion for Inhibition in Criminal Case No. 228, filed by Prosecutor Tilan, was deemed submitted for resolution on July 18, 2008,^[24][24] but Judge Piscoso-Flor herself admitted that she resolved the motion on November 10, 2008 or beyond the required 90-day period.

   Judge Piscoso-Flor, however, cannot be held liable for delay in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 142 (People v. Dimpatan), which Prosecutor Tilan cited in his reply.^[25][25] While he claimed that the case  was  deemed submitted for decision on March 12, 2007, it appears from the records  that he, Private Prosecutor Rufino Lamase, and the accused’s counsel  (Atty. Gerald Tabayan)  executed  a joint manifestation^[26][26] praying that the promulgation of the decision be deferred pending negotiations among  them  on  the  civil aspect of the case.  When the negotiations bogged down and upon motion of Prosecutor Lamase (dated October 8, 2008),^[27][27] Judge Piscoso-Flor promulgated the decision on November 24, 2008.

On the whole, we find Judge Piscoso-Flor guilty of undue delay in the disposition of cases. Except for People v. Dimpatan, Judge Piscoso-Flor failed to resolve the other cases within the required period, in violation of the law and the rules.  No less than the Constitution sets the limits on this all-important aspect in the administration of justice.  It mandates that lower courts have three (3) months or ninety (90) days within which to decide cases or matters submitted to them for resolution.^[28][28] Also, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the Court’s business promptly and decide cases within the prescribed period.^[29][29]

It cannot be over emphasized that judges need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously.  Delay in the disposition of cases, it must again be stated, is a major cause in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the justice system.^[30][30] For this fundamental and compelling reason, judges are required to decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch within the reglementary period.  Failure to comply constitutes gross inefficiency, a lapse that warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the erring magistrate.^[31][31]

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court defines undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, punishable under Section 11(b) of the same Rule and imposes a penalty of suspension from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.  In light, however, of the fact that this is Judge Piscoso-Flor’s first infraction and considering that most of the cases involved were inherited cases, we deem a fine in its minimum range an appropriate penalty for Judge Piscoso-Flor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor is declared liable for delay in the disposition of cases.  Accordingly, she is FINED P10,000.00, with a stern warning against the commission of a similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice 

PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. AND MR. RENATO CLAROS VS. DIOSDADO GARCIA, LUISITO GARCIA, RODANTE ROMERO, REX BARTOLOME, FELICIANO GASCO, JR., DANILO ROJO, EDGAR SANFUEGO, AMADO GALANTO, EUTIQUIO LUGTU, JOEL GRAMATICA, MIEL CERVANTES, TERESITA CABANES, ROE DELA CRUZ, RICHELO BALIDOY, VILMA PORRAS, MIGUELITO SALCEDO, CRISTINA GARCIA, MARIO NAZARENO, DINDO TORRES, ESMAEL RAMBOYONG, ROBETO^* MANO, ROGELIO BAGAWISAN, ARIEL SNACHEZ, ESTAQULO VILLAREAL, NELSON MONTERO, GLORIA ORANTE, HARRY TOCA, PABLITO MACASAET AND RONALD GARCITA (G.R. NO. 167291, 12 JANUARY 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECTS: POWER OF CA TO REVIEW NLRC DECISIONS; VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION; MAY NOT BE SIGNED BY ALL; ABSENCE OF VERIFICATION NOT JURISDICTIONAL, ONLY FORMAL DEFECT; GENERAL PRAYER IN PLEADING ENTITLES PETITIONER TO RELIEF OTHER THAN THOSE SPECIFICALLY SOUGHT; (BRIEF TITLE: PRINCE TRANSPORT ET AL. VS. GARCIA ET AL.)

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D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

          Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying for the annulment of the Decision^[1][1] and Resolution^[2][2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 20, 2004 and February 24, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 80953. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated May 30, 2003^[3][3] and September 26, 2003^[4][4] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in CA No. 029059-01, while the disputed Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

          The present petition arose from various complaints filed by herein respondents charging petitioners with illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and illegal deductions and praying for the award of premium pay for holiday and rest day, holiday pay, service leave pay, 13^th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

          Respondents alleged in their respective position papers and other related pleadings that they were employees of Prince Transport, Inc. (PTI), a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land; respondents were hired either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors, except for respondent Diosdado Garcia (Garcia), who was assigned as Operations Manager; in addition to their regular monthly income, respondents also received commissions equivalent to 8 to 10% of their wages; sometime in October 1997, the said commissions were reduced to 7 to 9%; this led respondents and other employees of PTI to hold a series of meetings to discuss the protection of their interests as employees; these meetings led petitioner Renato Claros, who is the president of PTI, to suspect that respondents are about to form a union; he made known to Garcia his objection to the formation of a union; in December 1997, PTI employees requested for a cash advance, but the same was denied by management which resulted in demoralization on the employees’ ranks; later, PTI acceded to the request of some, but not all, of the employees; the foregoing circumstances led respondents to form a union for their mutual aid and protection; in order to block the continued formation of the union, PTI caused the transfer of all union members and sympathizers to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas); despite such transfer, the schedule of drivers and conductors, as well as their company identification cards, were issued by PTI;  the daily time records, tickets and reports of the respondents were also filed at the PTI office; and, all claims for salaries were transacted at the same office; later, the business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents’ loss of employment.

          Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the complaints contending that herein respondents were no longer their employees, since they all transferred to Lubas at their own request;   petitioners have nothing to do with the management and operations of Lubas  as well as the control and supervision of the latter’s employees;  petitioners were not aware of the existence of any union in their company and came to know of the same only in June 1998 when they were served a copy of the summons in the petition for certification election filed by the union; that before the union was registered on April 15, 1998, the complaint subject of the present petition was already filed; that the real motive in the filing of the complaints was because PTI asked respondents to  vacate the bunkhouse where they (respondents) and their respective families were staying because PTI wanted to renovate the same.

          Subsequently, the complaints filed by respondents were consolidated.

          On October 25, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,^[5][5] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

            WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.      Dismissing the complaints for Unfair Labor Practice, non-payment of holiday pay and holiday premium, service incentive leave pay and 13^th month pay;

                                                                                                                                                       Dismissing the complaint of Edgardo Belda for refund of boundary-hulog;

2.      Dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondents Prince Transport, Inc. and/or Prince Transport Phils. Corporation, Roberto Buenaventura, Rory Bayona, Ailee Avenue, Nerissa Uy, Mario Feranil and Peter Buentiempo;

3.      Declaring that the complainants named below are illegally dismissed by Lubas Transport; ordering said Lubas Transport to pay backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the following amount:

            Complainants                            Backwages               Separation Pay

            (1) Diosdado Garcia                 P222,348.70                P79,456.00

(2) Feliciano Gasco, Jr.    203,350.00                 54,600.00

            (3) Pablito Macasaet                   145,250.00                 13,000.00

            (4) Esmael Ramboyong    221,500.00                 30,000.00

            (5) Joel Gramatica                       221,500.00                 60,000.00

            (6) Amado Galanto                      130,725.00                 29,250.00

            (7) Miel Cervantes                       265,800.00                 60,000.00

            (8) Roberto Mano                       221,500.00                 50,000.00

            (9) Roe dela Cruz                        265,800.00                 60,000.00

            (10) Richelo Balidoy                    130,725.00                 29,250.00

            (11) Vilma Porras                        221,500.00                 70,000.00

            (12) Miguelito Salcedo    265,800.00                 60,000.00

            (13) Cristina Garcia                     130,725.00                 35,100.00

            (14) Luisito Garcia                       145,250.00                 19,500.00

            (15) Rogelio Bagawisan               265,800.00                60,000.00

(16) Rodante H. Romero             221,500.00                 60,000.00

            (17) Dindo Torres                       265,800.00                 50,000.00

            (18) Edgar Sanfuego                    221,500.00                 40,000.00

            (19) Ronald Gacita                      221,500.00                 40,000.00

            (20) Harry Toca                          174,300.00                 23,400.00

            (21) Amado Galanto                    130,725.00                 17,550.00

            (22) Teresita Cabañes                 130,725.00                 17,550.00

            (23) Rex Bartolome                     301,500.00                 30,000.00

            (24) Mario Nazareno                   221,500.00                 30,000.00

            (25) Eustaquio Villareal    145,250.00                 19,500.00 

            (26) Ariel Sanchez                       265,800.00                 60,000.00

            (27) Gloria Orante                       263,100.00                 60,000.00

            (28) Nelson Montero                   264,600.00                 60,000.00

            (29) Rizal Beato                          295,000.00                 40,000.00

            (30) Eutiquio Lugtu                      354,000.00                 48,000.00

            (31) Warlito Dickensomn            295,000.00                  40,000.00

            (32) Edgardo Belda                     354,000.00                 84,000.00

            (33) Tita Go                                295,000.00                 70,000.00

            (34) Alex Lodor                          295,000.00                 50,000.00

            (35) Glenda Arguilles                   295,000.00                 40,000.00

            (36) Erwin Luces                         354,000.00                 48,000.00

            (37) Jesse Celle                           354,000.00                 48,000.00

            (38) Roy Adorable                      295,000.00                 40,000.00

            (39) Marlon Bangcoro                 295,000.00                 40,000.00

            (40)Edgardo Bangcoro    354,000.00                 36,000.00

4.      Ordering Lubas Transport to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) of the total monetary award; and

6.  Ordering the dismissal of the claim for moral and exemplary damages for lack merit.

            SO ORDERED.^[6][6]

          The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners are not guilty of unfair labor practice in the absence of evidence to show that they violated respondents’ right to self-organization. The Labor Arbiter also held that Lubas is the respondents’ employer and that it (Lubas) is an entity which is separate, distinct and independent from PTI. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter found that Lubas is guilty of illegally dismissing respondents from their employment.

          Respondents filed a Partial Appeal with the NLRC praying, among others, that PTI should also be held equally liable as Lubas.

          In a Resolution dated May 30, 2003, the NLRC modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and disposed as follows:

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is SUSTAINED subject to the modification that Complainant-Appellant Edgardo Belda deserves refund of his boundary-hulog in the amount of P446,862.00; and that Complainants-Appellants Danilo Rojo and Danilo Laurel should be included in the computation of Complainants-Appellants claim as follows:

            Complainants                Backwages                   Separation Pay

            41. Danilo Rojo            P355,560.00                P48,000.00

42. Danilo Laurel          P357,960.00                P72,000.00

            As regards all other aspects, the Decision appealed from is SUSTAINED.

            SO ORDERED.^[7][7]

          Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in its Resolution^[8][8] dated September 26, 2003.

          Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC.

          On December 20, 2004, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision which granted respondents’ petition. The CA ruled that petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice; that Lubas is a mere instrumentality, agent conduit or adjunct of PTI; and that petitioners’ act of transferring respondents’ employment to Lubas is indicative of their intent to frustrate the efforts of respondents to organize themselves into a union. Accordingly, the CA disposed of the case as follows:

            WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the subject decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one ENTERED finding the respondents guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages.

            With respect to the portion ordering the inclusion of Danilo Rojo and Danilo Laurel in the computation of petitioner’s claim for backwages and with respect to the portion ordering the refund of Edgardo Belda’s boundary-hulog in the amount of P446,862.00, the NLRC decision is affirmed and maintained.

            SO ORDERED.^[9][9]

          Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it via its Resolution^[10][10] dated February 24, 2005.

          Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:

A

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RESPECTED THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND AFFIRMED BY THE NLRC

2.   ONLY ONE PETITIONER EXECUTED AND VERIFIED THE PETITION

3.   THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION WITH RESPECT TO RESPONDENTS REX BARTOLOME, FELICIANO GASCO, DANILO ROJO, EUTIQUIO LUGTU, AND NELSON MONTERO AS THEY FAILED TO FILE AN APPEAL TO THE NLRC

B

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. AND MR. RENATO CLAROS AND LUBAS TRANSPORT ARE ONE AND THE SAME CORPORATION AND THUS, LIABLE IN SOLIDUM TO RESPONDENTS.

C

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF RESPONDENTS TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION WHEN IT IS NOT ONE OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.^[11][11]

          Petitioners assert that factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions like the NLRC are accorded not only respect but even finality; that the CA should have outrightly dismissed the petition filed before it because in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court it is not within the province of the CA to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the NLRC based its determination, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not said tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners assert that the CA can only pass upon the factual findings of the NLRC if they are not supported by evidence on record, or if the impugned judgment is based on misapprehension of facts — which circumstances are not present in this case. Petitioners also emphasize that the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter concurred in their factual findings which were based on substantial evidence and, therefore, should have been accorded great weight and respect by the CA.

          Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the CA neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor committed error in re-evaluating the NLRC’s factual findings since such findings are not in accord with the evidence on record and the applicable law or jurisprudence.

          The Court agrees with respondents.

          The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has been settled as early as this Court’s decision in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.^[12][12] In said case, the Court held that the proper vehicle for such review is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules, and that the case should be filed with the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA — pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari — is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.^[13][13] Section 9 clearly states:

             x x x x

                        The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x

          However, equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.^[14][14] But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.^[15][15]  The CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence.^[16][16] It is within the jurisdiction of the CA, whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the findings of the NLRC.^[17][17]

          In this case, the NLRC sustained the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, these findings are generally binding on the appellate court, unless there was a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. In respondents’ petition for certiorari with the CA, these factual findings were reexamined and reversed by the appellate court on the ground that they were not in accord with credible evidence presented in this case. To determine if the CA’s reexamination of factual findings and reversal of the NLRC decision are proper and with sufficient basis, it is incumbent upon this Court to make its own evaluation of the evidence on record.^[18][18]

          After a thorough review of the records at hand, the Court finds that the CA did not commit error in arriving at its own findings and conclusions for reasons to be discussed hereunder.

          Firstly, petitioners posit that the petition filed with the CA is fatally defective, because the attached verification and certificate against forum shopping was signed only by respondent Garcia.

          The Court does not agree.

          While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient, the Court has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.^[19][19] Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.^[20][20] It does not, however, prohibit substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances, considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.^[21][21]

          In a number of cases, the Court has consistently held that when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules.^{[22][22]  In the present case, there is no question that respondents share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action. Hence, the signature of respondent Garcia is a sufficient compliance with the rule governing certificates of non-forum shopping. In the first place, some of the respondents actually executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Garcia as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.[23][23]}

          The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioners’ argument that the CA should not have given due course to the petition filed before it with respect to some of the respondents, considering that these respondents did not sign the verification attached to the Memorandum of Partial Appeal earlier filed with the NLRC. Petitioners assert that the decision of the Labor Arbiter has become final and executory with respect to these respondents and, as a consequence, they are barred from filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.

          With respect to the absence of some of the workers’ signatures in the verification, the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when some of the parties who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition had signed the same. Such verification is deemed a sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Moreover, respondents’ Partial Appeal shows that the appeal stipulated as complainants-appellants “Rizal Beato, et al.”, meaning that there were more than one appellant who were all workers of petitioners.

          In any case, the settled rule is that a pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified, may be given due course even without a verification if the circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice.^[24][24]  Indeed, the absence of a verification is not jurisdictional, but only a formal defect, which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act on a case.^[25][25] Hence, the failure of some of the respondents to sign the verification attached to their Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC is not fatal to their cause of action.

          Petitioners also contend that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil with respect to Lubas, because the said doctrine is applicable only to corporations and Lubas is not a corporation but a single proprietorship; that Lubas had been found by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to have a personality which is separate and distinct from that of PTI; that PTI had no hand in the management and operation as well as control and supervision of the employees of Lubas.

          The Court is not persuaded.

          On the contrary, the Court agrees with the CA that Lubas is a mere agent, conduit or adjunct of PTI. A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same.^[26][26]  In the present case, it may be true that Lubas is a single proprietorship and not a corporation. However, petitioners’ attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed separate and distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy.

          Thus, the Court agrees with the observations of the CA, to wit:

            As correctly pointed out by petitioners, if Lubas were truly a separate entity, how come that it was Prince Transport who made the decision to transfer its employees to the former? Besides, Prince Transport never regarded Lubas Transport as a separate entity. In the aforesaid letter, it referred to said entity as “Lubas operations.” Moreover, in said letter, it did not transfer the employees; it “assigned” them. Lastly, the existing funds and 201 file of the employees were turned over not to a new company but a “new management.”^[27][27]

          The Court also agrees with respondents that if Lubas is indeed an entity separate and independent from PTI why is it that the latter decides which employees shall work in the former?

          What is telling is the fact that in a memorandum issued by PTI, dated January 22, 1998, petitioner company admitted that Lubas is one of its sub-companies.^{[28][28] In addition, PTI, in its letters to its employees who were transferred to Lubas, referred to the latter as its “New City Operations Bus.”[29][29]}

          Moreover, petitioners failed to refute the contention of respondents that despite the latter’s transfer to Lubas of their daily time records, reports, daily income remittances of conductors, schedule of drivers and conductors were all made, performed, filed and kept at the office of PTI. In fact, respondents’ identification cards bear the name of PTI.

          It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that in two separate illegal dismissal cases involving different groups of employees transferred by PTI to other companies, the Labor Arbiter handling the cases found that these companies and PTI are one and the same entity; thus, making them solidarily liable for the payment of backwages and other money claims awarded to the complainants therein.^[30][30]

          Petitioners likewise aver that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioners to reinstate respondents to their former positions, considering that the issue of reinstatement was never brought up before it and respondents never questioned the award of separation pay to them.

            The Court is not persuaded.

          It is clear from the complaints filed by respondents that they are seeking reinstatement.^[31][31]

          In any case, Section 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading shall specify the relief sought, but may add a general prayer for such further or other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under this rule, a court can grant the relief warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.^[32][32]

          Moreover, in BPI Family Bank v. Buenaventura,^[33][33] this Court ruled that the general prayer is broad enough “to justify extension of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought.” Even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for.^{[34][34] In the instant case, aside from their specific prayer for reinstatement, respondents, in their separate complaints, prayed for such reliefs which are deemed just and equitable.}

          As to whether petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA that respondents’ transfer of work assignments to Lubas was designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the former’s right to organize themselves into a union. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

          Indeed, evidence of petitioners’ unfair labor practice is shown by the established fact that,  after respondents’ transfer to Lubas, petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned. The Court finds no error in the findings and conclusion of the CA that petitioners “withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts, and repair and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition.” This left respondents virtually jobless.

          WHEREFORE, the instant petition is denied. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated December 20, 2004 and February 24, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 80953, are AFFIRMED.

          SO ORDERED.

                                                     DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA              ROBERTO A. ABAD

                   Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice

________________________

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

    Associate Justice

    Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                             Chief Justice