J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO LIM AND LELY KUNG LIM VS. SECURITY BANK CORP., TITOLAIDO E. PAYONGAYONG, EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY CORP. AND GIL SILOS (G.R. NO. 176339, 10 JANUARY 2011, ABAD, J) SUBJECTS: FILING FEES; EX-PARTE HEARING; TERMINATION OF LEASE. (BRIEF TITLE: DO-ALL METALS ET AL. VS. SECURITY BANK ET AL.)

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DOCTRINES

PETITIONERS FILED SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT BUT FAILED TO PAY THE FILING FEES. BANK SAID RTC DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FOR NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES. IS THIS CORRECT? NO BECAUSE WHEN THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS FILED FILING FEES WERE PAID AND THE COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.  SUCH JURISDICTION PERSISTS.

One.  On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action. 

But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint.  The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same.  The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.^[1][6] 

THE BANK FAILED TO APPEAR DURING TRIAL. EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED EX-PARTE. LATER THE BANK ARGUED THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF PETITIONERS’ WITNESSES SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN CREDENCE BECAUSE THEY WERE GIVEN EX-PARTE. SC RULED THAT AN EX PARTE HEARING CANNOT BE ASSAILED AS LESS CREDIBLE.

The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses for having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court.  But the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible.  It was the Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend the hearing.  It cannot profit from its lack of diligence. 

THE BANK CONTENDED THAT THE LEASE HAVE ALREADY EXPIRED. THEREFORE THEY CAN TAKE OVER THE BUILDING FROM THE PETITIONERS. SC RULED THAT THE BANK HAD NO BUSINESS HARASSING PETITIONERS.

While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees.  The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards. 

PETITIONERS EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAVE NOT PAID THE FILING FEES FOR THEIR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT BECAUSE ANYWAY THESE FEES CONSTITUTED A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT. SC RULED THAT AFTER-JUDGMENT LIEN APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE FEES WERE INCORRECTLY ASSESSED OR PAID OR WHERE THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO FIX THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD. NO SUCH CIRCUMSTANCE/S EXITS.

Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award.  But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award.^[2][8]  None of these circumstances obtain in this case. 

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank.  Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same.  And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same.  They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it.  But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing.^[3][9]  The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES PERTINENT TO A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT? SUCH SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT SHALL BE TREATED AS NOT HAVING BEEN FILED.

To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in.  Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court.  Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed. 

PETITIONERS ARGUED THAT THE BANK BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED ITS OBJECTION TO THE NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES BECAUSE THEY RAISED THE ISSUE ONLY AFTER THE RTC HAD RENDERED ITS DECISION ON THE CASE. SC RULED THAT A PARTY OR EVEN THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT WAIVE THE PAYMENT OF THE FILING FEES. ONLY THE SUPREME COURT CAN GRANT EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE RULES.

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case.  The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission.  But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint.  Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.

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DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims embodied in the plaintiff’s supplemental complaint filed without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.

The Facts and the Case

From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans from respondent Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled P92,454,776.45.  Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank to secure the same, including a building and the lot on which it stands (the property), located at M. de Leon St., Santolan, Pasig City.^[4][1] 

In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence.  DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the lease.  The contract also provided that, should the Bank decide to sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.

On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31, 1999.  Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the terms of its purchase.  DMI offered to pay the Bank P8 million for the property but the latter rejected the offer, suggesting P15 million instead.  DMI made a second offer of P10 million but the Bank declined the same. 

While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use the property in their business.  But the Bank posted at the place private security guards from Philippine Industrial Security Agency (PISA).  The Lims also claimed that on several occasions in 2000, the guards, on instructions of the Bank representatives Titolaido Payongayong and Evylene Sison, padlocked the entrances to the place and barred the Lims as well as DMI’s employees from entering the property.  One of the guards even pointed his gun at one employee and shots were fired.  Because of this, DMI was unable to close several projects and contracts with prospective clients.  Further, the Lims alleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and personal items left at the property. 

The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against the Bank and its co-defendants Payongayong, Sison, PISA, and Gil Silos.^[5][2]  Answering the complaint, the Bank pointed out that the lease contract allowed it to sell the property at any time provided only that it gave DMI the right of first refusal.  DMI had seven days from notice to exercise its option.  On September 10, 1999 the Bank gave notice to DMI that it intended to sell the property to a third party.  DMI asked for an extension of its option to buy and the Bank granted it.  But the parties could not agree on a purchase price.  The Bank required DMI to vacate and turnover the property but it failed to do so.  As a result, the Bank’s buyer backed-out of the sale.  Despite what happened, the Bank and DMI continued negotiations for the purchase of the leased premises but they came to no agreement. 

The Bank denied, on the other hand, that its guards harassed DMI and the Lims.  To protect its property, the Bank began posting guards at the building even before it leased the same to DMI.  Indeed, this arrangement benefited both parties.  The Bank alleged that in October of 2000, when the parties could not come to an agreement regarding the purchase of the property, DMI vacated the same and peacefully turned over possession to the Bank.

The Bank offered no objection to the issuance of a TRO since it claimed that it never prevented DMI or its employees from entering or leaving the building.  For this reason, the RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI and the Lims to enter the building and get the things they left there.  The latter claimed, however, that on entering the building, they were unable to find the movable properties they left there.  In a supplemental complaint, DMI and the Lims alleged that the Bank surreptitiously took such properties, resulting in additional actual damages to them of over P27 million.

The RTC set the pre-trial in the case for December 4, 2001.  On that date, however, counsel for the Bank moved to reset the proceeding.  The court denied the motion and allowed DMI and the Lims to present their evidence ex parte.  The court eventually reconsidered its order but only after the plaintiffs had already presented their evidence and were about to rest their case.  The RTC declined to recall the plaintiffs’ witnesses for cross- examination but allowed the Bank to present its evidence.^[6][3]  This prompted the Bank to seek relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually from this Court but to no avail.^[7][4]

During its turn at the trial, the Bank got to present only defendant Payongayong, a bank officer.  For repeatedly canceling the hearings and incurring delays, the RTC declared the Bank to have forfeited its right to present additional evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a decision in favor of DMI and the Lims.  It ordered the Bank to pay the plaintiffs P27,974,564.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees.  But the court absolved defendants Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.

The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things the RTC’s authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint.  The RTC denied the motion.  On appeal to the CA, the latter found for the Bank, reversed the RTC decision, and dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaims.^[8][5]  DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same, hence this petition.

The Issues Presented

          The issues presented in this case are:

          1.       Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiff’s supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it;

2.       Whether or not the Bank is liable for the intimidation and harassment committed against DMI and its representatives; and

3.       Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the machineries, equipment, and other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from the property.

The Court’s Rulings

One.  On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their action. 

But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint.  The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same.  The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.^[9][6] 

Two.  As to the claim that Bank’s representatives and retained guards harassed and intimidated DMI’s employees and the Lims, the RTC found ample proof of such wrongdoings and accordingly awarded damages to the plaintiffs.  But the CA disagreed, discounting the testimony of the police officers regarding their investigations of the incidents since such officers were not present when they happened.  The CA may be correct in a way but the plaintiffs presented eyewitnesses who testified out of personal knowledge.  The police officers testified merely to point out that there had been trouble at the place and their investigations yielded their findings.

The Bank belittles the testimonies of the petitioners’ witnesses for having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court.  But the ex parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible.  It was the Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend the hearing.  It cannot profit from its lack of diligence. 

Domingo Lim and some employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank guards’ unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower.  Their testimonies were never refuted.  Police Inspector Priscillo dela Paz testified that he responded to several complaints regarding shooting incidents at the leased premises and on one occasion, he found Domingo Lim was locked in the building.  When he asked why Lim had been locked in, a Bank representative told him that they had instructions to prevent anyone from taking any property out of the premises.  It was only after Dela Paz talked to the Bank representative that they let Lim out.^[10][7]

Payongayong, the Bank’s sole witness, denied charges of harassment against the Bank’s representatives and the guards.  But his denial came merely from reports relayed to him.  They were not based on personal knowledge. 

While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees.  The RTC was therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards. 

Three. As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award.  But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award.^[11][8]  None of these circumstances obtain in this case. 

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank.  Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same.  And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same.  They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it.  But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing.^[12][9]  The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment before the case could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had not then set it in.  Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the court.  Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed. 

Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case.  The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such omission.  But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint.  Only the Supreme Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are embodied in its rules.

Besides, as correctly pointed out by the CA, plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the movable properties in question had remained in the premises and that the bank was responsible for their loss.  The only evidence offered to prove the loss was Domingo Lim’s testimony and some undated and unsigned inventories.  These were self-serving and uncorroborated. 

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and REINSTATES with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case 68184.  The Court DIRECTS respondent Security Bank Corporation to pay petitioners DMI and spouses Domingo and Lely Kung Lim damages in the following amounts: P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees.  The Court DELETES the award of actual damages of P27,974,564.00.

          SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD 

                                                              Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA       DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                  Associate Justice                                    Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                  

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

  SPOUSES GEORGE R. TAN AND SUSAN L. TAN VS. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.,(G.R. NOS. 190677-78); GEORGE R. TAN AND SUSAN L. TAN, VS. BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK (G.R. NOS. 190699-700); BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., VS. GEORGE R. TAN AND SUSAN L. TAN (G.R. NO. 188792,  10 JANUARY 2011, NACHURA, J.: )

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RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

These consolidated petitions assail the Court of Appeals (CA) September 18, 2009 Decision^[1][1] and December 16, 2009 Resolution^[2][2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 98307 and CA-G.R. SP No. 101421; and its March 12, 2009 Decision^[3][3] and July 15, 2009 Resolution^[4][4] in CA-G.R. SP No. 102799.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 98307 and CA-G.R. SP No. 101421, the appellate court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, in Civil Case No. Q-07-59545, restraining the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted by Spouses George R. Tan and Susan L. Tan (hereafter referred to as Spouses Tan) in favor of Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO). The CA concluded that the issuance of the writ was unfounded and unsubstantiated.  In CA-G.R. SP No. 102799, the CA found that the bond set by the RTC was grossly insufficient to cover all the damages which BDO might sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide that Spouses Tan were not entitled to the writ. It thus remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the proper injunction bond which should not be less than P32 Million.

After the filing of the Reply to BDO’s Comment in G.R. No. 188792 and while awaiting BDO’s Comment on the petition in G.R. Nos. 190677-78 and Spouses Tan’s Comment on the petition in G.R. Nos. 190699-700, BDO moved for extension of time to file the appropriate pleading in view of the settlement of the consolidated cases.^[5][5] 

On December 16, 2010, Spouses Tan and BDO filed a Joint Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss,^[6][6] alleging that they have come to an agreement for the amicable resolution of their respective claims to avoid the inconvenience of litigation. Attached to the motion are the Compromise Agreement executed by the parties and a copy of the RTC decision approving the agreement. The Compromise Agreement reads:

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

This Agreement, which shall supplement Memorandum of Agreement dated 27 May 2010, is made and executed this _____ day of _______ 2010, by and between:

SPOUSES GEORGE R. TAN AND SUSAN L. TAN, Filipinos, of legal age, residing at 42 Ifugao St., La Vista Subd., Brgy. Pansol, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as “Spouses Tan”;

– and –

BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., a banking corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with office address at 10/F BDO Corporate  Center South Tower, Makati Avenue corner H.V. Dela Costa St., Makati City, represented herein by its Senior Vice President, Melanie S. Belen, and Vice President, Emily D. Samoy, as evidenced by the Special Power of Attorney indicating their authority, a copy of which is attached hereto as Annex “A,” hereinafter referred to as the “Bank”;

(herein after referred to singly as a “Party,” and collectively as “Parties”).

WITNESSETH: That

Spouses Tan obtained various loans and other credit accommodations from the Bank in the total principal amount of Fifty Nine Million Nine Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Four and 19/100 Pesos (P59,984,624.19). As security for the loans and other credit accommodations, Spouses Tan executed a Real Estate Mortgage and Amended Real Estate Mortgage on 15 January 2004 and 02 February 2004, respectively, covering a parcel of land located at 42 Ifugao Street, La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (“TCT”) No. 13600, registered in the name of George Sin Gee Tan married to Susan  Lim Tan (the “Property”).

Sometime in 2006, Spouses Tan defaulted in the payment of their loan obligations. Hence, the Bank initiated  foreclosure proceedings on the foregoing Real Estate Mortgage. At the auction sale on 03 December 2009, the Bank emerged as highest bidder and was issued Certificate of Sale dated 04 December 2009.

Spouses Tan filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-07-59545 (the “Case”), pending before Branch 81 (the “Court”).

In order to put an end to the protracted litigation, the Bank has accepted the proposal of Spouses Tan and entered into and executed Memorandum of Agreement dated 27 May 2010 (the “MOA”).

Further to the MOA, and as a supplement thereto, and pursuant to the Court’s Order given in open court on 07 July 2010, the parties have agreed to execute this Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereby agree to the following terms and conditions:

1.         The Bank shall allow Spouses Tan to redeem the Property for a total redemption price of SIXTY MILLION PESOS (P60,000,000.00), subject to the following terms:

a.                           THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P30,000,000.00), payable in five (5) years beginning June 2010, or until June 2015 (the “Term”). Spouses Tan shall pay Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) a month, for sixty (60) months, with a balloon payment in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) at the end of the Term.

b.                           For and in consideration of the amount of THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P30,000,000.00), Spouses Tan shall cede, transfer and convey to and in favor of the Bank, all its rights, possession, title and interests in a parcel of land in Roxas City covered by TCT No. T-16024, registered in the name of Spouses Tan (the “Roxas Property”).

2.         On December 2010, or upon expiration of the redemption period, Spouses Tan shall allow the Bank to consolidate title over the Property.

3.         Upon consolidation of title in the Bank’s name, the Bank and Spouses Tan shall execute a Contract to Sell covering the Property in accordance with the terms under Section 1.

4.         Upon full payment of the amount under Section 1 (a), and the cession, transfer and conveyance to the Bank of the Roxas Property pursuant to Section 1 (b), the parties agree that Spouses Tan’s personal loan obligations with the Bank, including Spouses Tan’s personal loan obligations with then Equitable PCI Bank, shall be deemed fully settled.

5.         After execution and signing, the parties shall file this Agreement with the Court for approval.

The parties hereby agree to move for the approval of this Agreement before the Court. However, the obligations under this Agreement shall be immediately enforceable even prior to the approval of this Agreement.

6.         Parties agree to move for the dismissal of the Case, within fifteen (15) days from execution of all documents necessary to implement this Agreement.

7.         All expenses, fees, and taxes in connection with: (a) the cession, transfer and conveyance to the Bank of the Roxas Property; and (b) the consolidation of title of the Property in the Bank’s name, shall be for the account of the Bank.

8.         Upon failure of Spouses Tan to comply with any of the terms and conditions under this Agreement, the Bank shall be entitled, without necessity of any demand or notice:

a.       To take immediate possession of the Property. Spouses Tan agree to peacefully surrender and immediately vacate the Property.

b.      To file the necessary motion or pleading with the Court to implement this Agreement, and/or enforce its rights under law and equity.

9.         Parties hereby mutually and irrevocably waive all claims, counterclaims, demands, and causes of action, which they raised, or could have raised, against each other, including future claims of whatever kind, in connection with the Case and the Property.

10.       The parties confirm that the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement have been mutually agreed upon, without any act of force, fraud or undue intimidation. The parties further confirm that they have consulted their respective legal counsel, and that they understand the legal consequences of this Agreement. Accordingly, the parties hereby agree to abide by the terms and conditions hereof, which have the force and effect of a lawful right and a demandable obligation.

11.       In the event that any one or more of the provisions of this Agreement be later declared invalid, illegal or unenforceable by any court of competent jurisdiction, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions shall in no way be impaired or affected thereby.

12.       The parties hereto intend for this Agreement to supplement the MOA. All terms and conditions of the MOA shall remain in full force and effect and remain unmodified except as specifically set forth in this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first above-written.

BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.

By:

            Sgd.                                                                         Sgd.

MELANIE S. BELEN                                          GEORGE R. TAN

            Sgd.                                                                         Sgd.

EMILY D. SAMOY                                              SUSAN L. TAN^[7][7]

In a decision^[8][8] dated September 15, 2010, the RTC approved the compromise agreement. Having been sealed with court approval, the compromise agreement shall govern the respective rights and obligations of the parties. In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of the consolidated petitions is in order.

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The cases are considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

                                      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                      Associate Justice

                                         Acting Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                       ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                                                      Associate Justice

                                                        Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                                              Chief Justice

^*               In lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Raffle dated October 13, 2010.

^**             In lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Raffle dated October 13, 2010.

^***            In lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per Raffle dated March 8, 2010.

^[9][1]           Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring; rollo (G.R. Nos. 190699-700), pp. 56-87. 

^[10][2]          Id. at 89-94.

^[11][3]          Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 188792), pp. 29-45.

^[12][4]          Id. at 83-85.

^[13][5]          Rollo (G.R. Nos. 190699-700), pp. 757-759.

^[14][6]          Id. at 771-773.

^[15][7]          Id. at 760-762.

^[16][8]          Rollo (G.R. Nos. 190677-78), pp. 150-153.