J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0121: RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., (A.M. NO. 10-11-5-SC); RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF 57 PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO INTO A SPECIAL COURT HANDLING THIS CASE ALONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL and FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM AND MONITOR JUST OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR JOURNALISTS TO COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE “TRIAL OF THE DECADE” TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL AS COMMANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION (A.M. NO. 10-11-6-SC); RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR THE LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE TRIAL. (A.M. NO. 10-11-7-SC) (CARPIO-MORALES, J.) (14 JUNE 2011).

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SUBJECT: WIN-WIN SITUATION

In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings.  Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SUBJECT: RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A FAIR TRIAL IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE TO A FREE PRESS

Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the “totality of circumstances” test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.^[1][24] and Estrada v. Desierto,^[2][25] that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.  Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. 

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies.  He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right.  As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary.  The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.  

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EN BANC

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R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

          On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the “Maguindanao Massacre” spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.  Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofQuezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa inTaguigCity.

          Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims,^[3][1] individual journalists^[4][2] from various media entities, and members of the academe^[5][3] filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.^[6][4]   The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.

          In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines^[7][5] (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag^[8][6] (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao    Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court.^[9][7]   The Court docketed the petition as A.M.     No. 10-11-6-SC.

          President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010^[10][8]  addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out “in support of those who have petitioned [this Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial.”   The President expressed “earnest hope that [this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation,
attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits.”^[11][9]   The Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.  

          By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010,^[12][10] the Court  consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC  with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.  The Court shall treat in a separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.

          Meanwhile, various groups^[13][11] also sent to the Chief Justice their respective resolutions and statements bearing on these matters.

          The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a Consolidated Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.  The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and NUJP, et al. filed their respective Reply ofJanuary 18, 2011 andJanuary 20, 2011.  Ampatuan also filed a Rejoinder ofMarch 9, 2011. 

On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases

          Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings.  They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel Case^[14][12] and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada^[15][13] which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative. 

          Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed.  They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.

          The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter^[16][14] to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases.  Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that “matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Court’s attention through appropriate motion.”^[17][15]   Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.

          The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.

          Putt’s Law^[18][16] states that “technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage, and those who manage what they do not understand.”  Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the experts’ gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or risks from the use of technology inside the courtroom.

          A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced with the same task of striking that delicate balance between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights. 

          The indication of “serious risks” posed by live media coverage to the accused’s right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information.

          The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations. 

          In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings.  Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.

          The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ “[a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated.”  The observation that “[m]assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum” stands. 

The Court concluded in Aquino:

            Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant’s right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

            Accordingly, in order to protect the parties’ right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.^[19][17]

          The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case.   It held that “[t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.”  The Court disposed:

            The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

            WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

            SO ORDERED.^[20][18]

          In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following conditions:

          x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.^[21][19]

          Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas^[22][20] which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was borne out of the dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations for the possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members are not necessarily schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of evidence.  To petitioners,  Estes also does not represent the most contemporary position of the United States in the wake of latest jurisprudence^[23][21] and statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District of Columbia, allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness.

          Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage.  Almost all the proceedings of United Kingdom’s Supreme Court are filmed, and sometimes broadcast.^[24][22]  The International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the internet.^[25][23]

          On the media coverage’s influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out that Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion.  They point out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been mostly supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos.

          Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the “totality of circumstances” test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.^[26][24] and Estrada v. Desierto,^[27][25] that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.  Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. 

          Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies.  He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right.  As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary.  The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.  

          One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases – the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses – inside the courtroom.  On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:

            An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.  A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago.  A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.  In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.^[28][26] (underscoring supplied)

          Even before considering what is a “reasonable number of the public” who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families.  It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants.  It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.

          The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough.  What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom.  Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.

          In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:  

(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.

(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to  carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment. 

No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed.  No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court.      

(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court.  No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings.  The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court.  The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays.  Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should not be visible.  A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court. 

The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment. 

(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities. 

The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical glitches.  

If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities’ facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds. 

At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted.

(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court^[29][27] applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness). 

The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both.

(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the day’s proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.

(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene.  Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;

(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;

(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in theNationalMuseumand the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

(j)  The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities. 

(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines.  The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein requirements.  It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication technology.

(l)  All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.

          Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable context.  Technology per se has always been neutral.  It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning.  Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.

          WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.

          SO ORDERED. 

                                                CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

 RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

CASE 2011-0120: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDREW ROBLE (G.R. NO. 192188, 11 APRIL 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.) SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE DANGERIOUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002; ACCUSED ACQUITTED. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. ROBLE).

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SUBJECT: INSTANCE WHEN TRIAL COURT OVERLOOKED, MISAPPREHENDED FACTS

It is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon appeal. However, such rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of weight or substance.^[33] In the instant case, circumstances are present that, when properly appreciated, would warrant the acquittal of accused-appellant.

SUBJECT: ELEMENTS THAT PROSECUTION MUST PROVE IN THE CRIME OF SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS.

In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able to successfully prove the following elements: “(1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.”^[34]  Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.^[35] Corpus delicti means the “actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.”^[36]

In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to prove all the elements of the crime with moral certainty.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Baguio City

FIRST DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the July 14, 2009 Decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00746, which affirmed the May 2, 2007 Decision^[2] in Criminal Case No. DNO-2989 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25 in DanaoCity. The RTC found accused-appellant Andrew Roble (Roble) guilty of violating Section 5,^[3] Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

The charge against Roble stemmed from the following Information:

That on or about March 12, 2003 at 6:30 o’clock in the evening more or less, in Looc, Danao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in a buy-bust operation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver two (2) plastic packets containing “shabu” powder/granule a regulated drug with a total weight of zero point zero six (0.06) gram to a poseur-buyer for a total consideration of Three Hundred (P300) pesos without any corresponding license or prescription from the proper authorities as provided by law; and the aforesaid packets of “shabu” was turned over by the poseur-buyer to the police as evidence.

Contrary to law.^[4]

On April 9, 2003, the City Prosecutor Dalmacio D. Suralta (City Prosecutor Suralta) issued a Resolution^[5] authorizing the filing of the foregoing information against Roble. Accordingly, a warrant of arrest was issued on April 21, 2003^[6] and Roble was arrested on June 17, 2003. On the same date, Roble, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation^[7] of the case. In the said motion, Roble intimated that when the case was filed against him, he was in the province of Leyte and, thus, was not able to refute the allegations against him. In an Order dated June 20, 2003, the RTC granted the motion.^[8]

After reinvestigation, City Prosecutor Suralta, however, did not find any reason to withdraw the said information^[9] and it was given due course by the RTC.^[10] As a result, Roble filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Reinvestigation Report before the Office of the City Prosecutor, which was subsequently denied on January 19, 2004.^[11]

On February 4, 2004, Roble was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to the offense charged.^[12]

During the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses Police Officer 2 Castor Laurel (PO2 Laurel) and Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza (Medical Technologist Mendoza). On the other hand, the defense presented accused Roble as its sole witness.

The Prosecution’s Version of Facts

On March 12, 2003, at around 5:30 p.m., PO3 Matias Casas (PO3 Casas) received information through a telephone call regarding the illegal drug activities of a certain “Jojo” Roble in Looc, Danao City.^[13] Coordination was then made with the Special Operations Group (SOG) and a buy-bust team was formed composed of PO3 Casas, PO2 Laurel, the SOG and the mayor of DanaoCity, Mayor Ramonito Durano (Mayor Durano).^[14] A briefing was conducted where several pieces of marked 100-peso bills were handed to the poseur-buyer, Abner Banzon Cuizon (Cuizon), by PO3 Casas.^[15]

At 6:30 p.m., the team proceeded to the reported area. PO3 Casas, PO2 Laurel and Cuizon were aboard a tricycle while the rest of the team were with Mayor Durano.^[16] The tricycle was parked on the side of a road where Cuizon alighted and walked to a nearby store, leaving PO3 Casas and PO2 Laurel inside the tricycle. At this time, the tricycle was parked seven (7) meters away from the said store while the group of Mayor Durano was about thirty (30) meters away.^[17]

PO2 Laurel saw Cuizon approach a person and hand him money in exchange for plastic sachets. Upon seeing Cuizon scratch his head, which was the pre-arranged signal, the policemen approached to arrest “Jojo” but he was able to flee from the scene.^[18]PO3 Casas and PO2 Laurel signaled the rest of the team for assistance but all of them could not locate “Jojo.”

Meanwhile, Cuizon gave the sachets to PO3 Casas when they approached to arrest “Jojo.” PO3 Casas, in turn, gave them to the investigator, Senior Police Officer 3 Edgar Awe (SPO3 Awe). Thereafter, a request for laboratory examination was made and submitted to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City.^[19] After examination, Medical Technologist Mendoza issued Chemistry Report No. D-459-2003, which stated that the two (2) plastic sachets contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.^[20]

Version of the Defense

In contrast, Roble interposes the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that from March 11, 2003 to June 14, 2003, he was in Babatngon, Leyte working, to avoid a frame-up by his enemy.^[21]

Specifically, on March 12, 2003 at around 2:00 p.m., he went to his cousin, Danilo Roble, to ask him to accompany him to Wantai Piggery, owned by Nicomedes Alde (Alde), where he would apply as a worker on the recommendation of his uncle, Atty. Santiago Maravilles (Atty. Maravilles).^[22] Alde told him to come back and bring his bio-data with picture and that he would start working on March 17, 2003.^[23] He worked there until May 31, 2003 and was not able to return home until June 14, 2003. ^[24] In support of his claim, he presented a Barangay Certification issued by the Barangay Captain, affidavits of Alde and Danilo Roble, vouchers sighed by Alde, and the endorsement letter of Atty. Maravilles.

Roble further testified that the poseur-buyer, Cuizon, is his enemy in Danao City. Roble’s girlfriend, Leny Tiango (Tiango), informed him that Cuizon would frame him in a buy-bust operation because Tiango is also the girlfriend of Cuizon.^[25]

Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the RTC found Roble guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the prosecution to have sufficiently established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 5, Art. 11, of R.A. 9165 and, therefore, sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and pay the fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00). The two (2) packets of “shabu” which are the evidence in this case shall be forfeited in favor of the government, and turn over to PDEA for disposition and destruction.

 SO ORDERED.^[26]

On appeal to the CA, Roble argued that the testimony of PO2 Laurel was replete with inconsistencies.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On July 14, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court based on the time-honored doctrine that the assessment by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies deserves great respect. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated May 2, 2007 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, inDanao City is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.^[27]

Roble timely filed a notice of appeal of the decision of the CA. On October 13, 2010, he filed his supplemental brief with this Court.

The Issues

Accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

I.

The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.^[28]

II.

Both the [RTC] and the [CA] erred in relying upon the weakness of the defense of the accused, instead of the strength of the evidence of the prosecution against him, to come up with Decisions finding him guilty as charged.^[29]

III.

Corollarily, the [CA] erred in finding that the basic elements for the sale of illegal drugs are present in this case.^[30]

IV.

The [CA] erred in finding that the inconsistency in the markings appearing in the letter request and chemistry report are not material enough to cast doubt that the substance subjected for examination was indeed shabu.^[31]

V.

The [CA] erred in finding that the assessment by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies deserves great respect and remaining unconvinced that the lower court overlooked any important fact or misapprehended any relevant information, which if properly weighed and considered, would negate or erode its assessment.^[32]

Our Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Accused-appellant argues that the trial and appellate courts erred in relying on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. He points out several inconsistencies in the testimony of PO2 Laurel raising doubts as to its credibility. Further, he argues that the buy-bust operation was irregularly conducted resulting in a broken chain in the custody of the drugs.

We agree with accused-appellant.

It is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon appeal. However, such rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of weight or substance.^[33] In the instant case, circumstances are present that, when properly appreciated, would warrant the acquittal of accused-appellant.

In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able to successfully prove the following elements: “(1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.”^[34]  Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.^[35] Corpus delicti means the “actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.”^[36]

In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to prove all the elements of the crime with moral certainty.

A careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Laurel readily reveals that there is serious doubt as to the identity of the seller. In his testimony, PO2 Laurel stated that when the transaction took place at 6:30 p.m., he was inside a parked tricycle located seven (7) meters away from where the transaction took place. Significantly the transaction occurred behind a store and not along the road. Add to this the fact that it happened at dusk, making it harder to see. Considering all these, it is, therefore, highly improbable that PO2 Laurel actually saw accused-appellant. In fact, he testified that the poseur-buyer approached a “certain person” and that he onlyassumed it was accused-appellant to whom the poseur-buyer was talking, viz:

Q         It is therefore safe to say that there is a distance of ten (10) to 15 meters between you and the person approached by the poseur buyer?

A         Around seven (7) meters, mam.

Q         At the time of the approach of your poseur buyer, he was just standing there outside of the road?

A         Not at the side of the road, but behind the store.

Q         This store was beside at the National Highway?

A         Yes, mam.

Q         At that time, there was still some day light?

A         Yes, mam.

Q         Nevertheless, the day light that was available at that time was not so bright anymore?

A         No mam, but there was an electrical light in that area.

Q         You were inside the cab of the tricycle, is that correct?

A         Yes, mam.

Q         PO3 Casas was also inside the cab together with you?

A         Yes, mam.

Q         Who was on the side that was nearest the road?

A         PO3 Casas.

Q         When you saw that poseur buyer approached the subject and it was not so bright anymore, you could only see that your poseur buyer approached a man?

A         Yes, mam, the poseur buyer approached a certain person.

Q         You assumed this man that the poseur buyer approached to be the subject Jojo Roble also known as Andrew Roble?

A         Yes, mam, he was the one.

Q         You stated that you had arranged with the poseur buyer to execute a pre-arranged signal by scratching of his head upon the completion of the transaction, is that right?

A         Yes, mam.

Q         And, it was the execution by this poseur buyer of that pre-arranged signal that prompted you and Police Officer Casas to rush towards the place where the poseur buyer and the subject were standing?

A         Yes, mam.^[37] (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, PO2 Laurel’s testimony cannot establish with moral certainty the identity of the seller. It baffles this Court why the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer as he would be the best person to identify the identity of the seller. No justifiable reason was submitted as to why Cuizon’s testimony could not be presented.

Even more doubtful is the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug itself.  In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, “[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction x x x.”^[38] Thus, it must be established that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.^[39]

In Malillin v. People,^[40] the Court explained the importance of the chain of custody, to wit:

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt.  More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.  These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs. State positively acknowledged this danger.  In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession—was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder.  It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.

After a thorough review of the records of the instant case, this Court has serious doubts as to the identity of the drug in question. While a buy-bust operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards must be undertaken. It is the duty of the Courts to ascertain if the operation was subject to any police abuse.^[41]

In his Supplemental Brief, accused-appellant aptly points out certain points in the evidence of the prosecution that cast uncertainty on the identity of the drug in question.

At the outset, it must be pointed out that there is confusion as to when the plastic sachet in question was turned over by the poseur-buyer to PO3 Casas. During PO2 Laurel’s direct examination, he testified that the plastic sachet was handed over by the poseur-buyer to PO3 Casas when they arrived at the police station.^[42] But, on cross-examination, his story changed. He testified that the poseur-buyer handed the plastic sachet when his team tried to approach him after he gave the pre-arranged signal, viz:

Q         It was already there at the Police Station that your poseur buyer handed the packet of shabu which he allegedly bought from the subject to your investigator?

A         There at the buy bust area, the poseur buyer delivered to Casas the plastic packet of shabu he bought from the subject.

Q         He gave that plastic sachet of shabu to Casas after you chased the accused, correct?

A         No, mam, upon approaching the poseur buyer, he handed to Casas the plastic packet of shabu, then we ran after the subject and, likewise, PO3 Casas followed us.^[43]

After receiving the plastic sachet, PO3 Casas then gave it to the investigator, SPO3 Awe. From here, the trail becomes vague once again. The testimony of PO2 Laurel up to this point talks about a single plastic sachet, but the Request for Laboratory Examination^[44] (Request) identifies not one (1) but two (2) plastic sachets. This contradictory fact was not explained in his testimony. Further, one Police Superintendent Agustin G. Lloveras, Jr. (P/Supt. Lloveras) signed the Request. P/Supt. Lloveras was never mentioned in PO2 Laurel’s testimony. It is unclear as to who he is and as to how he was able to obtain the plastic sachets. Similarly, it is uncertain as to how the plastic sachets were transferred to P/Supt. Lloveras from SPO3 Awe. Again, PO2 Laurel’s testimony is bereft of any details as to the chain of custody of the drugs at these critical points.

Furthermore, the Request also mentions that the plastic sachets were marked “ARJ 1-2.” Yet again, PO2 Laurel’s testimony is lacking as to who marked the plastic sachets and when it was done.

Moreover, the testimony of Medical Technologist Mendoza reveals certain anomalies in the handling of the plastic sachets as well. In his testimony, a certain PO3 Enriquez delivered the plastic sachets. The trail from P/Supt. Lloveras to PO3 Enriquez was also not explained by the prosecution. Further, the sachets were delivered to Medical Technologist Mendoza in an unsealed packet, viz:

Q         Mr. Witness, when you received the specimens for examination, you received them attached to accompanying letter-request and already in bigger plastic packet. Is that correct?

A         Yes, Ma’am.

Q         Now, this bigger plastic packet was not sealed.

A         No, Ma’am.

Q         Only the two (2) smaller plastic packets inside them. Is that correct?

A         No, Ma’am.^[45]

Obviously, the way the packets were delivered could make them easily susceptible to replacement or substitution. Medical Technologist Mendoza even attested that he had no knowledge as to who marked the plastic sachets since they arrived in his office already marked.

          Clearly, the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove that the plastic sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant are the very same objects tested by the crime laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody of the drugs is patently broken.

Similarly, the prosecution failed to follow the requisites found in Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which outlines the post-procedure in taking custody of seized drugs, viz:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a)                The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items x x x.

Even though non-compliance with Sec. 21 of the IRR is excusable, such cannot be relied upon when there is lack of any acceptable justification for failure to do so. In People v. Lorenzo,^[46] citing People v. Sanchez,^[47] the Court explained that “this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.”

          In the instant case, no justifiable grounds were put forth by the prosecution for the procedural lapses. In his testimony, PO2 Laurel clearly stated that no inventory was made after he and his team obtained custody of the drugs. This is a patent violation of the aforementioned section. Citing Zarraga v. People,^[48] the Court, in People v. Lorenzo, held that “the lack of inventory on the seized drugs create[s] reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti.”^[49]

Parenthetically, no coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency was made, in violation of Sec. 86(a) of the IRR of RA 9165.^[50]

Summing up all these circumstances, it behooves this Court not to blindingly accept the flagrantly wanting evidence of the prosecution. Undoubtedly, the prosecution failed to meet the required quantum of evidence sufficient to support a conviction, in which case, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails. As we have held, “When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.”^[51]

WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 14, 2009 in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00746 affirming the RTC’s judgment of conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Andrew Roble is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

                                                          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                                                     Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO     MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

                  Associate Justice                                   Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                          RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                                                      Chief Justice

^[1] Rollo, pp. 3-11. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Rodil V. Zalameda.

^[2] CA rollo, pp. 29-33.  Penned by Judge Edito Y. Enemecio.

^[3] Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemical trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a “financier” of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a “protector/coddler” of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

^[4] Records, p. 1.

^[5] Id. at 7.

^[6] Id. at 9.

^[7] Id. at 12-13.

^[8] Id. at 15.

^[9] Id. at 17.

^[10] Id. at 19.

^[11] Id. at 128-129.

^[12] Id. at 135.

^[13] TSN, February 21, 2005, p. 4.

^[14] TSN, August 24, 2004, p. 5.

^[15] Records, p. 2.

^[16] TSN, March 7, 2005, pp. 5-7.

^[17] Id. at 5-6.

^[18] TSN, August 24, 2004, p. 6.

^[19] Records, p. 6.

^[20] Id. at 195.

^[21] TSN, March 29, 2005, p. 5.

^[22] Id. at 5-6.

^[23] TSN, July 20, 2005, p. 3.

^[24] Id. at 4.

^[25] Id. at 13.

^[26] Records, pp. 231-232.

^[27] Rollo, pp. 10-11.

^[28] CA rollo, p. 20.

^[29] Rollo, p. 57.

^[30] Id.

^[31] Id. at 68.

^[32] Id. at 69.

^[33] People v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 146277, June 20, 2002, 383 SCRA 390, 398; citations omitted.

^[34] People v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 184760, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 389, 400; People v. Ong, G.R. No. 175940, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 123, 132.

^[35] Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 164580, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 147, 152-153.

^[36] People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 185166, January 26, 2011; People v. Baga, G.R. No. 189844, November 15, 2010.

^[37] TSN, March 7, 2005, pp. 6-7.

^[38] People v. Robles, G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647, 654.

^[39] Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632.

^[40] Id. at 631-634.

^[41] People v. Baga, supra note 35; citing People v. Herrera, G.R. No. 93728, August 21, 1995, 247 SCRA 433, 439; People v. Tadepa, G.R. No. 100354, May 26, 1995, 244 SCRA 339, 341.

^[42] TSN, August 24, 2004, p. 7:

                Q             After observing that the accused had ran away, what did you and your group do?

A             We chased him, but unfortunately, we did not catch him. We even looked for him, but we were not able to find him, we then went back to the station and our poseur buyer handed the shabu to PO3 Casas.

^[43] TSN, March 7, 2005, pp. 6-7.

^[44] Records, p. 6.

^[45] TSN, February 7, 2005, pp. 14-15.

^[46] Supra note 33, at 402.

^[47] G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194.

^[48] G.R. No. 162064, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 639, 647-650.

^[49] Supra note 33, at 404.

^[50] IRR of RA 9165, Sec. 86(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies.––The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of PDEA: Provided, that the said agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA prior to anti-drug operations; Provided, further, that, in any case, said agencies shall inform the PDEA of their anti-drug operations within twenty-four (24) hours from the time of actual custody of the suspects or seizure of said drugs and substances, and shall regularly update the PDEA on the status of the cases involving the said anti-drug operations.

^[51] Malillin v. People, supra note 38, at 639.

CASE 2011-0119: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ELIZABETH DIAZ, REPRESENTED BY FRANCISCA P. DE GUZMAN AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT (G.R. NO.    190660, 11 APRIL 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) SUBJECT: APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT (SAC) MUST BE BY PETITION FOR REVIEW. (BRIEF TITLE: LAND BANK VS. C.A.)

X =================== X

DOCTRINE: APPEAL FROM DECISION OF SAC MUST BE BY PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42 NOT BY ORDINARY APPEAL UNDER RULE 41.

Indeed, following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon,^[11] the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.  The Court, in the immediately cited case of Land Bank, observing that “before the instant case reached us, Land Bank of the Philippines had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of SACs considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657,” held that “Sec. 60 of RA 6657^[12] clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal (petition for review) should be adopted.”

X =================== X

THIRD DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – — – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

          Private respondent Elizabeth P. Diaz (Elizabeth) was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land measuring approximately 15 hectares, situated in San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 197132.  Ten hectares of the land were expropriated by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228. 

The DAR valued the expropriated land (the land) at P54,880.59 plus increment of P143,041.59 or a total of P197,922.18.  Not satisfied with the valuation, Elizabeth, through her attorney-in-fact Francisca P. De Guzman (Francisca), filed a complaint^[1] on November 28, 2001 against the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the DAR before the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).  The complaint, docketed as Special Agrarian Case No. 1194-G, prayed that just compensation be fixed at P350,000 per hectare or a total of P5,250.000. 

Upon Elizabeth’s motion, three Commissioners were appointed to determine the just compensation for the land.

          By Decision of June 21, 2006,^[2] the SAC, adopted the DAR’s valuation on the basis of average gross production and fixed the just compensation plus increment at P19,107.235 per hectare or a total of P197,922.29.  It held that given  the formula used inGabatin v. LBP,^[3] the Commissioner’s Report and the fair market or assessed value of the land can not be considered in the valuation. 

Elizabeth’s motion for reconsideration was denied by Order dated August 31, 2006,^[4] hence, she elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.^[5] 

Land Bank and the DAR failed to file their appellees’ brief.  During the pendency of the appeal, Land Bank filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Defendant-Appellee[’s] Motion to Dismiss Appeal,^[6] maintaining that the appeal should be dismissed because an ordinary appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode being by way of a petition for review, citing Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.   Hence, Land Bank concluded that the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the case, the SAC decision having attained finality following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon^[7] which held that failure of a party to file the proper remedy within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the assailed decision renders it final. 

By Resolution^[8] of June 2, 2009, the appellate court denied Land Bank’s motion to dismiss.  It faulted Land Bank for not filing an appellee’s brief as directed, and for filing the motion to dismiss the appeal after the lapse of 157 days from the last day for filing the brief. 

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari,^[9] Land Bank maintaining that the SAC Decision had become final and executory and, therefore, the appellate court never acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed by Elizabeth, a wrong mode of appeal. 

Additionally, Land Bank ascribes bad faith on the part of Elizabeth for, instead of sending a copy of her motion for reconsideration before the SAC and her subsequent Notice of Appeal to Land Bank’s counsel of record Atty. Graciela L. Gutierrez at her address at the Land Bank Field Office in Cabanatuan City, Elizabeth sent them to the Land Bank’s main office in Malate, Manila where, it points out, the lawyers neither have control nor possession of the records of the case.

          In view of the filing of the present petition, action on Elizabeth’s appeal was held in abeyance by the appellate court per Resolution dated June 7, 2010.^[10]

The petition is meritorious.

Indeed, following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon,^[11] the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.  The Court, in the immediately cited case of Land Bank, observing that “before the instant case reached us, Land Bank of the Philippines had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of SACs considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657,” held that “Sec. 60 of RA 6657^[12] clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal (petition for review) should be adopted.”

First, there is no conflict between Section[s] 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.  Section 61 in fact makes no more than a general reference to the Rules of Court and does not even mention the procedure for ordinary appeals in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special method of elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases.

Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not permissible for decisions of the said special courts.  In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, why they act as Special Agrarian Courts.  Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.  Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong.  Although Supreme Court of Circular No. 1-91 (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a quasi-judicial agencies.

What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the proper way of appealing decisions of agrarian courts.  So far, there is no rule prescribed by this Court expressly disallowing the said procedure.

Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with Section 60.  The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of Appeals shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.  Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for review shall be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary.  In fact, Section 61 uses the word “review” to designate the mode by which the appeal is to be effected.  The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases.^[13]   (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The adoption of a petition for review as the mode of appeal is justified in order to “hasten” the resolution of cases involving issues on just compensation of expropriated lands under RA 6657.  Thus the Court, still in the immediately cited Land Bank case, pronounced:

The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain case is the need for absolute dispatch in the determination of just compensation.  Just compensation means not only paying the correct amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition.  Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.  Such objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for review.

Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted.  A petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. . . .^[14]  (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following then the same Land Bank case, resort by Elizabeth to a wrong mode of appeal was fatal to her cause as it resulted in rendering the decision appealed from final and executory.  Her notice of appeal did not, it bears emphasis, stop the running of the reglementary period to file a petition for review.

Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege.  Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory.  Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court – not even the Supreme Court – has the power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.^[15] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 2, 2009 is SET ASIDE. 

The Decision dated June 21, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 sitting as a Special Agrarian Court in Agr. Case No. 1194-G is deemed  final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                             Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                  CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                      Associate Justice

                                   Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                     RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                Chief Justice

^[1]       Records, pp. 1-11.

^[2]       Id. at 240-244.  Penned by Judge Ismael P. Casabar.

^[3]       G.R. No. 148223, November 25, 2004.

^[4]       Records, pp. 257-258.

^[5]      Id. at 260-262.

^[6]      Rollo, pp. 131-135

^[7]       G.R. No. 143275, September 10, 2002, 388 SCRA 537.

^[8]       CA rollo, pp.  178-181.

^[9]      Id. at 3-46.

^[10]     Id. at  363.

^[11]     Supra note 7.

^[12]    “AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”

^[13]     388 SCRA 537, 544-545.

^[14]     Id. at 546.

^[15]     Zamboanga Forest Managers Corp. v. New Pacific Timber and Supply Co., et al., G.R. No. 143275, 399 SCRA 376, 385.