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CASE 2011-0202: ERNESTO Z. ORBE VS. JUDGE MANOLITO Y. GUMARANG, PAIRING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, IMUS, CAVITE (A.M. NO. MTJ-11-1792, 26 SEPTEMBER 2011) SUBJECTS: SMALL CLAIM CASES; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. (BRIEF TITLE: ORDE VS. JUDGE GUMARANG).

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October 12, 2011

CASE 2011-0202: ERNESTO Z. ORBE VS. JUDGE MANOLITO Y. GUMARANG, PAIRING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, IMUS, CAVITE (A.M. NO. MTJ-11-1792, 26 SEPTEMBER 2011) SUBJECTS: SMALL CLAIM CASES;  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. (BRIEF TITLE: ORDE VS. JUDGE GUMARANG).

 

===============================

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang, Municipal Trial Court, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision and Violation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST

 

 

SMALL CLAIM CASE FILED BY POBRE WAS ASSIGNED TO JUDGE GUMARANG ON FEB 9, 2010. IT WAS RESET TO MARCH 4 THEN RESET TO MARCH 11 THEN TO MARCH 25 AND THEN TO APRIL 15. DID JUDGE GUMARANG VIOLATE THE SMALL CLAIMS RULE?

 

 

YES. HE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE CASE WITHIN 5 DAYS FROM THE TIME IT WAS ASSIGNED TO HIM.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

JUDGE GUMARANG ARGUED THAT THE 5 DAYS REFER TO FIVE CALENDAR DATES WHEN THE CASE WAS SET FOR HEARING AND NOT FIVE CONSECUTIVE DAYS. IS HIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?

 

 

NO. THE RULE SAYS 5 DAYS. THERE IS NO ROOM FOR FURTHER INTERPRETATION; IT DOES NOT REQUIRE RESPONDENT’S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION.  HE IS DUTY-BOUND TO ADHERE TO THE RULES AND DECIDE SMALL CLAIMS CASES WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY.

 

 

Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, which is within five (5) days from the receipt of the order of assignment, is very clear.  The exigency of prompt rendition of judgment in small claims cases is a matter of public policy.  There is no room for further interpretation; it does not require respondent’s exercise of discretion.  He is duty-bound to adhere to the rules and decide small claims cases without undue delay.

………………………..

 

Time and again, we have ruled that when the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation, all that is needed to do is to simply apply it. 

 

XXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT IS HIS PENALTY?

 

 

UNDER THE RULES HIS ACT CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELAY IN RENDITION OF JUDGMENT. THE PENALTY IS, INTER ALIA, A FINE OF MORE THAN P10,000.00. BUT SINCE THE SMALL CLAIMS CASE RULE IS NEW, SC DEEMED IT PROPER TO IMPOSE FINE OF P5,000.00.

 

 

Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides that undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious charge, which is punishable by suspension from office, without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) or more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.  Considering that the Rule on small claims is a new rule, and that this is respondent judge’s first violation of the rule, we deem it proper to impose a fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT IS THE INTENT OF THE LAW IN PROVIDING A 5 DAY DEADLINE IN RESOLVING SMALL CLAIMS CASES?

 

 

THE EXIGENCY OF PROMPT RENDITION OF JUDGMENT IN SMALL CLAIMS CASES IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND ESSENCE OF THE RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES?

 

 

TO ENHANCE  ACCESS TO JUSTICE, ESPECIALLY BY THOSE WHO CANNOT AFFORD THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIGATION PARTICULARLY  IN CASES OF RELATIVELY SMALL VALUE AND TO IMPROVE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE.

 

 

Judge Gumarang must have missed the very purpose and essence of the creation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, as his interpretation of the Rule is rather misplaced.  It is, therefore, imperative to emphasize what the Court sought to accomplish in creating the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, to wit:

 

x x x Thus, pursuant to its rule-making power, the Court, under the present Constitution, can adopt a special rule of procedure to govern small claims cases and select pilot courts that would empower the people to bring suits before them pro se to resolve legal disputes involving simple issues of law and procedure without the need for legal representation and extensive judicial intervention. This system will enhance access to justice, especially by those who cannot afford the high costs of litigation even in cases of relatively small value.  It is envisioned that by facilitating the traffic of cases through simple and expeditious rules and means, our Court can improve the perception of justice in this country, thus, giving citizens a renewed “stake” in preserving peace in the land. x x x[1][6]

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE RULE?

 

 

THE TIME AND EXPENSE REQUIRED BY ORDINARY LEGISLATION IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE AMOUNT INVOLVED. THUS IT DISCOURAGE JUST RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE.

 

 

XXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT THE RULE?

 

 

THERE ARE NO LAWYERS, NO FORMAL PLEADINGS AND NO STRICT LEGAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.

 

 

        The theory behind the small claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the parties when the disputed claim is small, because the time and expense required by the ordinary litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages a just resolution of the dispute.  The small claims process is designed to function quickly and informally.  There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence.[2][7]

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

IS POSTPONEMENT ALLOWED?

 

 

ONLY ONE AND ONLY UPON PROOF OF PHYSICAL INABILITY OF THE PARTY TO APPEAR.

 

 

        The need for prompt resolution of small claims cases is further emphasized by Section 19 of the Rule, which provides that:

 

SEC. 19. Postponement When Allowed. — A request for postponement of a hearing may be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before the court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1) postponement.

 

 

          In the instant case, it is noteworthy to mention that the postponements were not attributed to any of the parties to the case.  The numerous postponements, which in some instances were upon respondent’s initiative, were uncalled for and unjustified, considering that it was already established that all efforts for amicable settlement were futile.  Thus, the postponements were clear violation of the Rule and defeat the very essence of the Rule.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

CAN JUDGE GUMARANG INVOKE AS DEFENSE GOOD FAITH OR LACK OF MALICE?

 

 

NO BECAUSE THE RULES VIOLATED WERE BASIC PROCEDURAL RULES.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

IF A JUDGE FAILS TO APPLY ELEMENTARY RULES OF PROCEDURE WHAT IS HIS LIABILITY?

 

 

HE IS LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW AND PROCEDURE.

 

 

         Time and again, we have ruled that when the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation, all that is needed to do is to simply apply it.  Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure.  In the instant case, neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent, as the rules violated were basic procedural rules.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT CASES BE DECIDED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

 

 

TO PREVENT DELAY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BECAUSE JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED.

 

 

        We cannot countenance undue delay in the disposition of cases or motions, especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize  if not totally eradicate  the problem of congestion long plaguing our courts.  The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice.  For obviously, justice delayed is justice denied.  Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute.[3][8]

 

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

 

                                                        THIRD DIVISION

                         

ERNESTO Z. ORBE,                                                                                               

                          Complainant,

 

 

 

– versus –

 

 

 

JUDGE MANOLITO Y. GUMARANG, Pairing Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Imus, Cavite,

                           Respondent.                                   

A.M. No.  MTJ-11-1792

[Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 10-2294-MTJ]

      

      Present:

 

PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,

ABAD,

PEREZ,*

MENDOZA, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

 

Promulgated:

 

        September 26, 2011

x—————————————————————————————x

 

 

DECISION

 

 

PERALTA, J.:

 

 

          Before us is an administrative complaint[4][1] filed by complainant Ernesto Z. Orbe (Orbe) against Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang (respondent), Pairing Judge, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Imus,Cavite for Violation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

 

          The antecedent facts are as follows:

 

 

          Orbe is the plaintiff of a small claims case docketed as Civil Case No. ICSCC 09-65 entitled E.Z. Orbe Tax Accounting Services, thru, Ernesto Z. Orbe v. L.G.M. Silver Star Credit Corporation, represented by Librado Montano, filed before the MTC of Imus,Cavite, presided by Judge Emily A. Geluz.

 

          During the hearing of the case onFebruary 9, 2010, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.  On the same day, the case was assigned to respondent Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang, Assisting Judge of the MTC of Imus,Cavite, for the continuation of the trial.

 

          Complainant alleged that the case was scheduled for hearing onMarch 4, 2010, but was postponed by respondent toMarch 11, 2010because of power interruption.  OnMarch 11, 2010, again the hearing was reset by respondent Judge Gumarang toMarch 25, 2010as he was due for medical check-up.  OnMarch 25, 2010, respondent conducted another Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR), and again reset the hearing toApril 15, 2010when the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement.

 

          Complainant argued that Judge Gumarang violated the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases for failure to decide the civil case within five (5) days from receipt of the order of reassignment.

 

          On August 2, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Gumarang to submit his comment on the complaint against him.[5][2]

 

          In his Comment[6][3] datedSeptember 13, 2010, Judge Gumarang explained that as Assisting Judge in the MTC of Bacoor,Cavite, he tried small claims cases only on Thursdays.  He admitted that he failed to decide the case within five (5) working days from receipt of the order, as mandated by the Rule.  However, he pointed out that the Rule needed clarification since, as in his case, the five (5) working days should be construed to refer to five (5) calendared trial dates falling on Thursdays only, considering that he allotted only one day, that is Thursday, to hear and try small claims cases.

 

          On May 10, 2011, the OCA, in its Memorandum,[7][4] recommended that the instant matter be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint. It likewise found Judge Gumarang guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, but recommended that he be fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) only for  violating the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases.

 

          We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

 

          Indeed, Section 22 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases clearly provided for the period within which judgment should be rendered, to wit:

Section 22. Failure of Settlement – If efforts at settlement fail, the hearing shall proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and be terminated within one (1) day. Either party may move in writing to have another judge hear and decide the case. The reassignment of the case shall be done in accordance with existing issuances.

 

            The referral by the original judge to the Executive Judge shall be made within the same day the motion is filed and granted, and by the Executive Judge to the designated judge within the same day of the referral. The new judge shall hear and decide the case within five (5) days from the receipt of the order of reassignment.[8][5]

 

 

          In this case, it is undisputed that it took more than two (2) months for respondent to render a decision on the subject case as he himself admitted the series of postponements which occurred during the pendency of the case. His lone argument was that he hears small claims cases on Thursdays only, hence, he claimed that, in his case, the period of five (5) working days being referred to by Section 22 of the Rule should pertain only to Thursdays.

 

          We are unconvinced.

 

          Judge Gumarang must have missed the very purpose and essence of the creation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, as his interpretation of the Rule is rather misplaced.  It is, therefore, imperative to emphasize what the Court sought to accomplish in creating the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, to wit:

 

x x x Thus, pursuant to its rule-making power, the Court, under the present Constitution, can adopt a special rule of procedure to govern small claims cases and select pilot courts that would empower the people to bring suits before them pro se to resolve legal disputes involving simple issues of law and procedure without the need for legal representation and extensive judicial intervention. This system will enhance access to justice, especially by those who cannot afford the high costs of litigation even in cases of relatively small value.  It is envisioned that by facilitating the traffic of cases through simple and expeditious rules and means, our Court can improve the perception of justice in this country, thus, giving citizens a renewed “stake” in preserving peace in the land. x x x[9][6]

 

 

          The theory behind the small claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the parties when the disputed claim is small, because the time and expense required by the ordinary litigation process is so disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages a just resolution of the dispute.  The small claims process is designed to function quickly and informally.  There are no lawyers, no formal pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence.[10][7]

 

          Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, which is within five (5) days from the receipt of the order of assignment, is very clear.  The exigency of prompt rendition of judgment in small claims cases is a matter of public policy.  There is no room for further interpretation; it does not require respondent’s exercise of discretion.  He is duty-bound to adhere to the rules and decide small claims cases without undue delay.

 

          The need for prompt resolution of small claims cases is further emphasized by Section 19 of the Rule, which provides that:

 

SEC. 19. Postponement When Allowed. — A request for postponement of a hearing may be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before the court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1) postponement.

 

 

            In the instant case, it is noteworthy to mention that the postponements were not attributed to any of the parties to the case.  The numerous postponements, which in some instances were upon respondent’s initiative, were uncalled for and unjustified, considering that it was already established that all efforts for amicable settlement were futile.  Thus, the postponements were clear violation of the Rule and defeat the very essence of the Rule.

 

           Time and again, we have ruled that when the rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation, all that is needed to do is to simply apply it.  Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure.  In the instant case, neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent, as the rules violated were basic procedural rules.

 

          We cannot countenance undue delay in the disposition of cases or motions, especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize  if not totally eradicate  the problem of congestion long plaguing our courts.  The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice.  For obviously, justice delayed is justice denied.  Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute.[11][8]

 

          Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides that undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious charge, which is punishable by suspension from office, without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) or more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.  Considering that the Rule on small claims is a new rule, and that this is respondent judge’s first violation of the rule, we deem it proper to impose a fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

 

          WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang, Municipal Trial Court, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision and Violation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

                                             ROBERTO A. ABAD  

                                                Associate Justice

 

 

 

   JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                          JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA 

             Associate Justice                                        Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

[1][6]           A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES, EFFECTIVEOCTOBER 1, 2008, p. 34.  (Emphasis supplied.)

[2][7]           Rollo, p. 36.

[3][8]           Visbal v. Sescon, 456 Phil. 552, 558-559 (2003).

*               Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1102 datedSeptember 21, 2011.

[4][1]           Rollo, pp. 1-4.

[5][2]           Id. at 43.

[6][3]           Id. at 41-42.

[7][4]           Id. at 45-47.

[8][5]           Emphasis supplied.

[9][6]           A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES, EFFECTIVEOCTOBER 1, 2008, p. 34.  (Emphasis supplied.)

[10][7]          Rollo, p. 36.

[11][8]          Visbal v. Sescon, 456 Phil. 552, 558-559 (2003).

Comment

CASE 2011-0201: PEDRO ANGELES , REPRESENTED BY ADELINA T. ANGELES, ATTORNEY-IN FACT VS. ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL AND EDWIN PASCUAL (G.R. NO. 157150, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011, BERSAMIN J.) SUBJECTS: SC NOT TRIER OF FACTS; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH. (BRIEF TITLE: ANGELES VS. PASCUAL)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — 3 Comments
October 9, 2011

CASE 2011-0201: PEDRO ANGELES , REPRESENTED BY ADELINA T. ANGELES, ATTORNEY-IN FACT VS. ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL AND EDWIN PASCUAL (G.R. NO. 157150, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011, BERSAMIN J.) SUBJECTS: SC NOT TRIER OF FACTS; BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH. (BRIEF TITLE: ANGELES VS. PASCUAL)

 

===========================

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 31, 2002 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61600. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

 

          SO ORDERED.

 

===========================

 

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:

 

I

The Court, not being a trier of facts,

cannot review factual issues

 

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.” In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.[1][11] A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.  There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.[2][12]

 

          Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;  whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side;  whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.  Questions like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.[3][13]

 

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[4][14] The circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is attendant herein.

          The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive upon this Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by the CA of the RTC.  Resultantly, the fact of Angeles’ encroachment on Pascual’sLot4 was proved by preponderant evidence.

 

          It is noteworthy to point out, too, that the argument of Angeles based on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of Torrens titles pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) is inapplicable considering that the ownership of Lot 4 andLot 5 was not the issue. Nor were the metes and bounds of the lots as indicated in the respective TCTs being assailed, for the only issue concerned the exact and actual location of Lot 4 andLot 5.

 

II

Angeles was a builder in good faith

 

          To be next determined is whether the CA’s application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.

 

           Article 448 of the Civil Code provides thusly:

 

         Article 448.  The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.  However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.  In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.  The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. 

          The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned by another.  The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith.  We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.[5][15]

 

          With the unassailable finding that Angeles’ house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.  Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder  to pay the value of the land.  Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.

 

================================

 

 

 

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

FIRST DIVISION                                                            

    

PEDRO ANGELES , Represented by ADELINA T. ANGELES, Attorney-in Fact,      

                         Petitioner,

 

 

                  – versus –

 

 

ESTELITA B. PASCUAL, MARIA THERESA PASCUAL, NERISSA PASCUAL, IMELDA PASCUAL, MA. LAARNI PASCUAL and EDWIN PASCUAL,

                         Respondents.

          G.R. No. 157150

 

         Present:

 

         CORONA, C.J.,  Chairperson,

         LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

         BERSAMIN,

        DELCASTILLO, and

        *PEREZ, JJ.

 

         Promulgated:

 

 

          September 21, 2011

x—————————————————————————————–x

 

R E S O L U T I O N

 

BERSAMIN, J.:

 

 

          Under appeal is the decision promulgated on January 31, 2002 in CA- G.R. CV No. 61600,[6][1] which involved a dispute about the true location of the respective lots of the parties, with the respondents claiming that the petitioner had encroached on their lot but the latter denying the encroachment.

 

Antecedents

 

          Neighbors Regidor Pascual (Pascual) and Pedro Angeles (Angeles) were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land located in CabanatuanCity.  Pascual owned Lot 4, Block 2 (Lot4) of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-951, a portion of the consolidation of Lots 1419-B-2B-3, 1419-B-2-B-4 and 1419-B-2-B-5, Psd- 9016, LGC (GLRO) Cadastral Record No. 94 covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-43707 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija;[7][2] Angeles owned Lot 5, Block 2 (Lot 5) of the same consolidation-subdivision plan covered by TCT No. T-9459 of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.[8][3] Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, Block 2 (Lot 3), caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascual’s house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.

 

          In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his ownLot4 and discovered that Angeles’ house also encroached on his lot.  Of the 318 square meters comprisingLot4, Angeles occupied 252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area ofLot4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles’ house. Angeles refused the demand.  Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inCabanatuanCity.

 

          In the course of the trial, Pascual presented Clarito Fajardo, the geodetic engineer who had conducted the relocation survey and had made the relocation plan of Lot4.[9][4]  Fajardo testified that Angeles’ house was erected on Lot 4. On the other hand, Angeles presented Juan Fernandez, the geodetic engineer who had prepared the sketch plan relied upon by Angeles to support his claim that there had been no encroachment.[10][5] However, Fernandez explained that he had performed only a “table work,” that is, he did not actually go to the site but based the sketch plan on the descriptions and bearings appearing on the TCTs of Lot 4, Lot 5 and Lot 6; and recommended the conduct of a relocation survey.[11][6]

 

          In its decision of November 3, 1998,[12][7] the RTC held that there was no dispute that Pascual and Angeles were the respective registered owners of Lot 4 and Lot 5; that what was disputed between them was the location of their respective lots; that Pascual proved Angeles’ encroachment on Lot 4 by preponderant evidence; and that Pascual was entitled to relief.  The RTC thus disposed:

 

         WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

 

1)      ordering the defendant or persons claiming right through him to cause the removal of his house insofar as the same occupies the portion ofLot4, Block 2 (TCT No. T-43707), of an area of 252 square meters, as particularly indicated in the Sketch Plan (Exhibit C-1);  and

 

2)      and without pronouncement to damages in both the complainant and counterclaim.

 

With Costs.

 

SO ORDERED.[13][8]

 

 

          Angeles appealed to the CA.

 

          On January 31, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC,[14][9] and held that as between the findings of the geodetic engineer (Fajardo) who had actually gone to the site and those of the other (Fernandez) who had based his findings on the TCTs of the owners of the three lots, those of the former should prevail.  However, the CA, modifying the RTC’s ruling, applied Article 448 of the Civil Code (which defined the rights of a builder, sower and planter in good faith).  The decision decreed thus:[15][10]

 

         WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED.  Plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision their option to either buy the portion of defendant-appellant’s house on theirLot. No. 4, or to sell to defendant-appellant the portion of their land on which his house stands. If plaintiffs-appellees elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must be at the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will render the defendant-appellant’s house useless, then plaintiffs-appellees should sell the encroached portion of their land to defendant-appellant. If plaintiffs-appellees choose to sell the land but defendant-appellant is unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from the time plaintiffs-appellees made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises.  But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the improvement, then defendant-appellant may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease.  Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease. From the moment plaintiffs-appellees shall have exercised their option, defendant-appellant shall pay reasonable monthly rent up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the court fixes such terms. This is without prejudice to any future compromise which may be agreed upon by the parties.

 

         SO ORDERED.

 

          Angeles expectedly sought reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on February 13, 2003. 

 

Issues

 

          Hence, Angeles appeals, assailing: (a) the credence the CA accorded to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo as opposed to the survey plan prepared by Fernandez; and (b) the options laid down by the CA, i.e., for Pascual either to buy the portion of Angeles’ house or to sell to Angeles the portion of his land occupied by Angeles were contrary to its finding of good faith.

 

Ruling

 

          The petition lacks merit.

 

I

The Court, not being a trier of facts,

cannot review factual issues

 

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.” In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.[16][11] A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.  There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.[17][12]

 

          Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;  whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side;  whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.  Questions like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.[18][13]

 

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[19][14] The circumstances of this case indicate that none of such exceptions is attendant herein.

          The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive upon this Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by the CA of the RTC.  Resultantly, the fact of Angeles’ encroachment on Pascual’sLot4 was proved by preponderant evidence.

 

          It is noteworthy to point out, too, that the argument of Angeles based on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of Torrens titles pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree) is inapplicable considering that the ownership of Lot 4 andLot 5 was not the issue. Nor were the metes and bounds of the lots as indicated in the respective TCTs being assailed, for the only issue concerned the exact and actual location of Lot 4 andLot 5.

 

II

Angeles was a builder in good faith

 

          To be next determined is whether the CA’s application of Article 448 of the Civil Code was correct and proper.

 

           Article 448 of the Civil Code provides thusly:

 

         Article 448.  The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.  However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.  In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.  The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. 

          The provision contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned by another.  The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith.  We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.[20][15]

 

          With the unassailable finding that Angeles’ house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.  Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder  to pay the value of the land.  Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.

 

          WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 31, 2002 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61600. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

 

          SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

                                                          LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

                                                               Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

 Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO       MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

     Associate Justice                                            Associate Justice

 

 

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

[1][11]    FNCB Finance v. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 514, 517.

[2][12]       II Herrera, Remedial Law, 2000 Edition, p. 648; citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Edition.

[3][13]    Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630.

[4][14]       Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79; Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 140043, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 97, 110; Sps. Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).

[5][15]    Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA 10, 18; Floreza v. Evangelista, No. L-25462, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 130.

*     Vice Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.

[6][1]    Rollo, pp. 46-74; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (later a Member of the Court, but now retired) and Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria- Tirona (retired) concurring.

[7][2]    Records, p. 69.

[8][3]    Id., p. 171.

[9][4]    Id., p. 69.

[10][5]        Id., p. 161.

[11][6]        TSN dated March 12, 1996, pp. 10-12.

[12][7]        Rollo, pp. 96-104.

[13][8]       Id., p. 104.

[14][9]       Id., pp. 46-74.

[15][10]       Id., pp. 73-74.

[16][11]    FNCB Finance v. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 514, 517.

[17][12]       II Herrera, Remedial Law, 2000 Edition, p. 648; citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Edition.

[18][13]    Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630.

[19][14]       Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79; Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 542, 549; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 140043, July 18, 2000, 336 SCRA 97, 110; Sps. Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).

[20][15]    Pleasantville Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA 10, 18; Floreza v. Evangelista, No. L-25462, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 130.

Comment

TIP 0013: THE CASE OF JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR.

Filed under: TIPS FOR JUDGES — Leave a comment
October 8, 2011

TIP 0013: THE CASE OF JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR.

 

SOURCE: ATTY. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO VS. JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR., CLERK OF COURT STANLEE D. CALMA AND LEGAL RESEARCHER DIANA G. RUIZ, ALL OF  REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 18 TAGAYTAY CITY (G.R. NO. RTJ-11-2265, 21 SEPTEMBER 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECTS: FILING FRIVOLOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST COURT PERSONNEL; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION AS MINISTERIAL DUTY. (BRIEF TITLE: ATTY. ANDAMO VS. JUDGE LARIDA).

========================

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, as recommended by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the complaint against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr., Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, for gross ignorance of the law is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

 

Complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo is hereby ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint against the respondent judiciary personnel, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

 

SO ORDERED. 

========================

 

SUBJECTS/ DOCTRINES/ DIGESTS:

 

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE MINISTERIAL CHARACTER OF THE JUDICIAL DUTY TO ISSUE WRITS OF POSSESSION?

 

 

AFTER ALL THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION, WHICH ARE: (1) CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MORTGAGOR’S NAME; AND (2) ISSUANCE TO MORTGAGOR OF A NEW TCT, SHALL HAVE BEEN DULY ESTABLISHED, THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO ISSUE THE WRIT PRAYED FOR. IT CANNOT WITHHOLD, SUSPEND, OR OTHERWISE DENY THIS RELIEF FROM PETITIONER.

 

 

The ministerial character of judicial duty to issue writs of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is explained in the case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications. [1][32] Thus:

 

A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a person’s recovery of possession of real or personal property.  An instance when a writ of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, as amended by act No. 4118, on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.  Sections 6 and 7 provide, to wit:

 

            Section 6.  Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

 

            Section 7.  Possession during redemption period.—In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the same was made without  violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act.  Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of the ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall , upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

 

From the foregoing provisions, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.

 

Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by aTorrenstitle.  Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the order for a writ of possession.

 

On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed property.  Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed.  The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT.  After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.  At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function.  Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.

 

Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper.  We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment.  The propriety of the issuance of the writ was heightened in this case where the respondent’s right to possession of the properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and became absolute upon the petitioners’ failure to redeem the mortgaged properties. [Underscoring supplied]

 

Simply put, after all the requisite elements for issuance of a writ of possession, which are: (1) consolidation of ownership in the mortgagor’s name; and (2) issuance to mortgagor of a new TCT, shall have been duly established, the trial court has no choice but to issue the writ prayed for. It cannot withhold, suspend, or otherwise deny this relief from petitioner.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

JUDGE LARIDA JR. DID NOT GRANT IMMEDIATELY COMPLAINANT’S URGENT MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION. HE RULED THAT COMPLAINANT HAD YET TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS ENTITLEMENT TO THE WRIT. CAN HE BE HELD LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

 

 

NO. JUDGE LARIDA JR.’S FAITHFULLY ADHERED TO HIS JUDICIAL DUTY TO REVIEW THE CASES, SERVE DUE PROCESS TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, AND TO EVENTUALLY DECIDE THE PETITIONS BASED SOLELY ON LAW AND EVIDENCE.

 

 

In this case, Judge Larida Jr. denied complainant’s “Urgent Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petition for the Issuance of Writs of Possession” in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 precisely because CRBC had yet to present evidence to establish its entitlement to the writs prayed for.[2][33] As it was, complainant negatively reacted to Judge Larida Jr.’s directive and accused him of gross ignorance of the law for not instantly resolving the petitions, for ruling that his client had yet to present evidence and for recognizing Atty. Anarna’s appearance as oppositor’s counsel.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHEN CAN A JUDGE BE HELD LIABLE FOR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

IF IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT HE COMMITTED AN ERROR SO GROSS AND PATENT AS TO PRODUCE AN INFERENCE OF BAD FAITH. IN ADDITION TO THIS, THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF MUST NOT ONLY BE CONTRARY TO EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, BUT SHOULD ALSO BE MOTIVATED BY BAD FAITH, FRAUD, DISHONESTY, AND CORRUPTION.[3][34]

 

 

It is settled that a judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[4][34]

 

The reasons cited by complainant, far from constituting gross ignorance of the law, actually reflect respondent Judge Larida Jr.’s faithful adherence to his judicial duty to review the cases, serve due process to all parties concerned, and to eventually decide the petitions based solely on law and evidence. Be that as it may, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. has nothing more to do with these cases since his detail to RTC, Branch 74,MalabonCity.

 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

 

 

WHAT MUST BE DONE TO A LAWYER WHO FILES AN UNFOUNDED COMPLAINT?

 

 

HE MUST BE SANCTIONED. FILING OF BASELESS COMPLAINT IS CONTEMPTUOUS.

 

 

 

 “A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because, as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts.”[5][41]

 

========================

 

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

THIRD DIVISION

 

ATTY. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO,

                                   Complainant,

 

 

 

– versus –

 

 

 

 

JUDGE EDWIN G. LARIDA, JR., CLERK OF COURT STANLEE D. CALMA and

LEGAL RESEARCHER

DIANA G. RUIZ,

all of  Regional Trial Court,

Branch 18 Tagaytay City,

                                    Respondents.

 

 A.M. No. RTJ-11-2265

[Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2986-RTJ]

 

Present:

 

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,

ABAD,

MENDOZA, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Promulgated:

 

       September 21, 2011

 

x ————————————————————————————— x

 

D E C I S I O N

 

MENDOZA, J.:

 

Doubtless, the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary. However, it will not hesitate to protect innocent court employees against any baseless accusation or administrative charge that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[6][1]

           

 

At bench is an administrative case against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. (Judge Larida, Jr.), Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma (Atty. Calma) and Legal Researcher Diana G. Cruz (LR Ruiz), all of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18,TagaytayCity.

 

 

The Facts:

 

 

            In a Letter-Complaint dated August 26, 2008,[7][2] complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo (complainant), counsel for Cavite Rural Banking Corporation (CRBC), charged Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz with ignorance of the law.

 

          The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the letter-complaint and its attachments as follows:

 

I.         Four (4) Petitions for issuance by the Clerk of Court of Certificates of Sale under Act 3135, as amended:

 

  1. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Freddie P. Magno, mortgagor, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re:  application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

 

2.  Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Sixto & Norma Tolentino, mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re:  application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

 

  1. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Jonathan & Yolanda Peñaranda, mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re:  application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 01 October 2001);

 

4.   Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Celia Bay, mortgagor, filed on 28 December 2005 – (Re:  application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);

 

 

 

II.        Four (4) Ex-parte Joint Petitions for the issuance by the Honorable Trial Court of Writs of Possession under Act 3135, as amended:

 

 

  1. TG-05-1103, 08 August 2005, Sps. Babestil & Sancha Pendatum, mortgagors;

 

2.   TG-05-1104, 24 November 2005, Josefina Villanueva, mortgagor;

 

3.   TG-05-1105, 08 August 2005, Sps. Josefa Desipeda & Roqueno Calderon, mortgagors;

 

  1. TG-05-1141, 28 December 2005, Norma Malabanan, mortgagor;

 

Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo avers that the aforementioned Petitions have long been pending before the above-mentioned court saying that the ongoing hearings of said cases may be further extended by the respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.

 

Anent TG-05-1103 and TG-05-1105, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo argues that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed an error when he recognized the appearance and participation of Atty. Ireneo Anarna as lawyer for the oppositors to the said petitions in the hearings thereof, and thereafter gave due course to the two oppositions filed, both dated 15 November 2005.  Respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed another error when he failed to require the oppositors and Atty. Anarna the required guaranty bonds as mandated by Section 47 of Republic Act 8791.

 

Likewise, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo bewails the issuance by respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. of the Order dated 10 July 2008 in TG-05-1141 which denied complainant’s Ex Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petitions for the Issuance of Writs of Possession (in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141) by ruling that the petitioner has yet to present evidence besides marking of exhibits.  Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo considers the said Order as contrary to Sections 7 and 8 of Act 3135 which mandates, among others, that the trial court shall issue the Writ of Possession regardless of opposition thereto.

 

In addition, complainant Emmanuel B. Andamo accuses respondent Diana Ruiz, as then Officer-in-Charge and Acting Clerk of Court, and Atty. Stanlee Calma, as the incumbent Clerk of Court, for not having “lifted a finger, say, by placing the docket of those eight (8) long pending cases beside the other dockets already placed on the Hon. Court’s working table by way of requesting his Honor for instruction or reminding his Honor of the urgency of action thereon, and notwithstanding Mrs. Ruiz[’s] acknowledged receipt of the written instruction of the Hon. Supreme Court Administrator, dated November 17, 2005 as to how to act thereon….”

 

Furthermore, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo implicated Atty. Ireneo Anarna, charging the latter of ignorance on the provisions of Act 3135 and for obstruction of justice for filing misplaced oppositions to non-litigious ex-parte petitions for issuance of Writ of Possession and for not submitting the required oppositor’s bond.[8][3]

 

 

          The Joint Comment of respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz dated October 3, 2007was also summarized by the OCA, viz:

Respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo mainly charges them for the non-issuance of certificates of sale in the abovementioned extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings which were filed by Pepito Abueg as Acting Manager of petitioner Cavite Rural Banking Corporation.  Respondents Calma and Ruiz declare that in all the aforesaid applications for foreclosure, were undated certificates of sale signed by then Deputy Sheriff Victor Hernandez, and Clerk of Court Analiza Luna. However, these certificates do not bear the signature of approval of then Assisting Judge (and eventually Deputy Court Administrator) Reuben P. Dela Cruz.

 

Likewise, respondents Calma and Ruiz stress that there is an Order in an undocketed case, entitled Cavite Rural Banking Corporation (then Cavite Development Bank), mortgagee v. Sps. Jonathan Peñaranda, Sps. Simon and Petronila Peji, Celia M. Bay, Sixto and Norma Tolentino and Freddie Magno, mortgagors.  This Order was issued by then Judge Reuben Dela Cruz on17 March 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

 

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda; Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji; Celia M. Bay; Spouses Sixto and Norma Tolentino; and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to comply with the requirements thereto.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue that the aforesaid applications for foreclosure, including the petition for issuance of certificates of sale, were properly brought before and deliberated by the court.  Hence, taking into consideration the issuance of the17 March 2004Order which they cannot alter or modify, respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that any issuance of certificates of sale on the subject applications for foreclosure cannot be done.

 

Respondents Calma and Ruiz further explicate that in a copy of the 17 March 2004Order, there appears a signature over a handwritten name “Sibano J. Sibero” dated “3-17-04.” Thus suggesting that he received a copy of said Order in behalf of Cavite Rural Banking Corporation. Hence, respondents Calma and Ruiz chide complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo for not mentioning in his complaint the 17 March 2004 Order.  Furthermore, assuming ex gratia argumenti that complainant Emmanuel  R. Andamo is not aware of said Order, respondents Calma and Ruiz still blame complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo that it took him almost seven (7) years before he made a follow up on the petitions for issuance of certificates of sale. If only their attention were called, respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that they would have searched for the records and inform complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo about the Order.

 

In addition, respondents Calma and Ruiz call as an unfair accusation complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo’s imputation that they were the reason for the issuance of the10 July 2008Order.  Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue that said Order is a judicial action and an exercise of discretion by the court to which they, being merely the Clerk of Court and the Legal Researcher, respectively, do not have any control.  Moreover, they point out that the said Order was also given in the other petitions of complainant where there is no oppositor, thus, rendering complainants’ perception as unfounded.

 

Lastly, while complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo charges respondents Calma and Ruiz with gross ignorance of Act No. 3135, respondents Calma and Ruiz find it ironic that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo misses the entire point of the issuance of the 17 March 2004 Order which states complainant’s failure to show compliance with the same Act No. 3135.[9][4]

 

 

          After perusing the records, the OCA found that the allegations in the complaint and the defenses raised by respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented conflicting factual issues that could not be categorically resolved merely on the basis of the records submitted. Judge Larida, Jr. even failed to submit his Comment on the matter. The OCA then pointed out the necessity for a formal investigation where the complainant and the respondents would be given the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence. Thus, it recommended that the administrative complaint against respondents be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case, and the same be REFERRED to a Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.

 

In the Resolution dated January 19, 2011,[10][5] the Court resolved to: (1) note the letter-complaint of Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo against respondents Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz, for gross ignorance of the law relative to LRC Case Nos. 05-1105, 05-1104, 05-1103, and 05-1141 for the issuance of writs of possession under Act 3135, as amended, and the joint comment dated October 3, 2007 of respondents Clerk of Court and Legal Researcher; (2)  re-docket the instant administrative complaint; (3) refer this case to a Justice of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records, and direct the Presiding Justice of the CA to raffle the case among the incumbent Justices of the CA who shall conduct the investigation and submit the required report and recommendation; and (4) note the Report dated June 18, 2010 of the OCA.

 

          The case was eventually assigned to CA Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice Lazaro-Javier) who, as directed by the Court, conducted the corresponding investigation on the complaint.

 

          Notably, during the initial stage of the proceedings, Judge Larida, Jr. filed his Motion with Leave of Court to Admit Comment[11][6] dated April 14, 2011.[12][7] The same was granted in the interest of substantial justice.[13][8] In         his Comment, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. denied that he delayed               the resolution of complainant’s petitions for issuance of writs of     possession in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. He claimed that he was unaware of unacted foreclosure proceedings pending before the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC-Br. 18, Tagaytay City; that he never talked to complainant about the cases in his chambers; that it was only out of prudence and propriety that he acknowledged the oppositions to complainant’s four (4) petitions as the said oppositions were necessarily part of the proceedings; and that he eventually set the petitions for hearing since there was a need for complainant to present evidence to support his entitlement to the four (4) writs prayed for.

 

          Judge Larida, Jr. also informed the Court that per Supreme Court Resolution dated November 18, 2008,[14][9] he was detailed as Assisting Judge of RTC, Branch 74,MalabonCity.

 

          During the hearing on April 14, 2011, the parties agreed to submit their affidavits with attachments to constitute their testimony subject to cross-examination.[15][10]

 

          Complainant did not submit an affidavit and opted to adopt his Letter-Complaint as his direct testimony. He further submitted several documentary evidence.[16][11]

          For his part, Judge Larida, Jr. submitted his Judicial Affidavit dated April 18, 2011. He essentially iterated therein his allegations in his Comment. He also offered various documentary evidence[17][12] to refute the charges against him.

 

Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz likewise submitted their undated Joint Affidavit.

 

Atty. Calma emphasized that then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz had long denied complainant’s undocketed petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure in CRBC v. Magno, in his Order of March 17, 2004. The grounds for the said denial were: (1) non-payment of entry fees; (2) non-assignment of docket numbers; (3) absence of proofs of service to the sheriff and the parties; (4) non-attachment of photocopies of the official receipts to the cases; and (5) non-payment of sufficient amount of docket fees. Atty. Calma also disclosed that he was no longer connected with the judiciary as he had opted to engage in the private practice of law.

 

Aside from those previously submitted exhibits, Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented the following: (1) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Magno;[18][13] (2) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Spouses Tolentino;[19][14] (3) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda;[20][15]              (4) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in Celia M. Bay;[21][16]       (5) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Freddie P. Magno;[22][17]     (6) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[23][18]            (7) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Sps. Tolentino;[24][19]           (8) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[25][20]             (9) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda;[26][21] (10) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[27][22] (11) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Celia Bay;[28][23] (12) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[29][24] (13) Order of Judge Reuben Dela Cruz dated March 17, 2004;[30][25] (14) Certification dated June 7, 2004 by Judge Reuben dela Cruz;[31][26] (15) Comment dated October 3, 2007 filed before the OCA;[32][27] and (16) Joint Affidavit of respondent Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz.[33][28]

The Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 18, TagaytayCity, submitted a status report and certified copies of the pertinent documents in LRC Case Nos. TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141.[34][29]

 

 After the formal offer of evidence and the admission of the exhibits, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda. Only respondent Judge Larida, Jr. complied.

 

Accordingly, in her Report and Recommendation dated July 25, 2011, Justice Lazaro-Javier recommended that Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz be EXONERATED of the charges against them for ignorance of the law.  In sum, Justice Lazaro-Javier found that:

 

Complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it was he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the court, as well. The evidence likewise showed that contrary to complainant’s accusation, respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure.  Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this unnecessary battle.  Precious time, energy and expense were wasted when the same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphasis supplied]

 

          Now, the Court resolves.

 

After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and recommendation of Justice Lazaro-Javier.

 

          Notably, respondents are all charged with gross ignorance of the law for their alleged acts or omissions, as follows:

 

 

Name

 

Cases

 

Acts or Omission Charged

 
Judge Edwin Larida,  Jr. LRC No. TG-05-1103 Issuing Order datedAugust 9, 2005which set the petition for hearingOctober 21, 2005

 
  LRC No. TG-05-1105 Issuing Order datedAugust 11, 2005which set the petition for hearing onOctober 21, 2005

 
  LRC Nos. TG-05-1103 and TG-05-1105 a) Recognizing the appearance of Atty. Ireneo Anarna as oppositors’ counsel;

 

b)       Not requiring the oppositors therein to file guaranty bonds pursuant to Section 47 of RA 8791.

 
  LRC No. TG-05-1141 For issuing Order dated10 July 2008denying the Ex Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petitions for the Issuance of Writs of Possession in LRC Nos. TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 on the ground that CRBC had yet to present

evidence besides marking of exhibits.

 

 

 

 

 
Atty. Stanlee  Calma             

and

Legal Researcher Diana Ruiz

   For not having “lifted a finger, say, by placing the docket of those eight (8) long pending cases beside the other dockets already placed on the Hon. Court’s working table by way of requesting his Honor for instruction or reminding his Honor of the urgency of action thereon, and notwithstanding Mrs. Ruiz[‘s] acknowledged receipt of the written instruction of the Hon. Supreme Court Administrator, dated November 17, 2005 as to how to act thereon.”

 

 

 

As to respondent

Judge Edwin Larida, Jr.

 

 

According to complainant, it was Judge Larida Jr.’s ministerial duty under Act 3135, specifically Sections 7[35][30] and 8[36][31] thereof, to issue the writs of possession in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. This being so, there was no need for him to still require applicant to present evidence as condition for granting them.  The fact that he did, nonetheless, was a clear defiance of his ministerial duty and rendered him guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

 

Complainant is mistaken.

 

The ministerial character of judicial duty to issue writs of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is explained in the case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications. [37][32] Thus:

 

A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a person’s recovery of possession of real or personal property.  An instance when a writ of possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, as amended by act No. 4118, on extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.  Sections 6 and 7 provide, to wit:

 

            Section 6.  Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

 

            Section 7.  Possession during redemption period.—In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the same was made without  violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act.  Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of the ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall , upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

 

From the foregoing provisions, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.

 

Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by aTorrenstitle.  Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the order for a writ of possession.

 

On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed property.  Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed.  The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT.  After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.  At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function.  Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion.

 

Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper.  We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment.  The propriety of the issuance of the writ was heightened in this case where the respondent’s right to possession of the properties extended after the expiration of the redemption period, and became absolute upon the petitioners’ failure to redeem the mortgaged properties. [Underscoring supplied]

 

Simply put, after all the requisite elements for issuance of a writ of possession, which are: (1) consolidation of ownership in the mortgagor’s name; and (2) issuance to mortgagor of a new TCT, shall have been duly established, the trial court has no choice but to issue the writ prayed for. It cannot withhold, suspend, or otherwise deny this relief from petitioner.

 

In this case, Judge Larida Jr. denied complainant’s “Urgent Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petition for the Issuance of Writs of Possession” in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 precisely because CRBC had yet to present evidence to establish its entitlement to the writs prayed for.[38][33] As it was, complainant negatively reacted to Judge Larida Jr.’s directive and accused him of gross ignorance of the law for not instantly resolving the petitions, for ruling that his client had yet to present evidence and for recognizing Atty. Anarna’s appearance as oppositor’s counsel.

 

It is settled that a judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[39][34]

 

The reasons cited by complainant, far from constituting gross ignorance of the law, actually reflect respondent Judge Larida Jr.’s faithful adherence to his judicial duty to review the cases, serve due process to all parties concerned, and to eventually decide the petitions based solely on law and evidence. Be that as it may, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. has nothing more to do with these cases since his detail to RTC, Branch 74,MalabonCity.

 

At any rate, the filing of this administrative complainant is not the proper remedy for complainant.  Complainant should have sought relief from higher courts.  The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies provided by law; neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions. As regards this matter, the case of Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis[40][35] is enlightening:

 

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

 

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.

 

Complainant also held against Judge Larida, Jr. his alleged failure to require oppositors to post guaranty bonds in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. Complainant invokes Section 47 of Republic Act (R.A) No. 8791.[41][36]

 

Clearly, the provision cited by complainant refers to restraint of foreclosure proceedings which requires posting of bond by one who seeks it.  It does not apply to the present case wherein the subject properties had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction.  Thus, petitioner’s insistence for imposition of guaranty bonds on the oppositors in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 is misplaced.  On this score too, Judge Larida, Jr. cannot be accused of gross ignorance of the law for not imposing these bonds in the cases mentioned.

 

As to respondents

Atty. Calma and

LR Ruiz

 

 

Records bear out that as early as March 17, 2004, then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz of RTC Branch 18, TagaytayCity, under Order[42][37] of even date, had already denied CRBC’s petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Peñaranda, thus:

 

Hence, it is very evident, therefore, that there is no payment of the entry fees; there are no docket numbers assigned and stamped on the cases; there are no proofs of service of the notices of the Sheriff to the parties, particularly the mortgagors; there are no xerox copies of the official receipts attached to the cases, except Spouses Peñaranda; and that official receipts issued do not cover the correct amounts and entries for each pertinent book of accounts, in violation of RA 3135, as amended and the issuances of the Supreme Court.

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda, Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji;CeliaM.Bay; Spouses Sixto and Norma Tolentino and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to comply with the requirements thereto.

 

SO ORDERED. [Italics supplied]

 

 

It is worth noting, too, that there were no pending motions for reconsideration filed or other incidents initiated by complainant in the subject cases to warrant their entry in the court calendar.  As a matter of fact, complainant does not deny that the assailed Order dated March 17, 2004had long attained finality.  For Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz to put them back in the court calendar, for no cogent reason at all, is obviously improper.

 

Finally, the trial court, through then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz, had already spoken when it denied the petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Peñaranda. As stated, it was beyond Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz to order the trial court what to do next with these cases. At that time, complainant had plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available to him under the rules.  He could have filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari from the Order of denial datedMarch 17, 2004 but he did not. What complainant failed to do as a judicial remedy, he cannot revive through an administrative complaint against these court employees. It bears pointing out that it was only onAugust 26, 2008 or more than four years since the Order ofMarch 17, 2004 was issued when the complainant unfairly turned his ire on these innocent and helpless respondents by wrongly accusing them in this administrative case.

 

          Clearly, this is a frivolous and baseless complaint. The respondents cannot be held liable for judiciously performing their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings as provided by the Rules. Complainant apparently filed this complaint primarily to divert the attention of his client from his shortcomings as its counsel, if not to simply harass the respondents. At this juncture, the Court finds it worth quoting again the conclusion of the Investigating Justice Lazaro-Javier, to wit:

 

Complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondents remains unfounded and unsubstantiated.  The evidence which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it was he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the court, as well. The evidence likewise showed that contrary to complainant’s accusation, respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession or allowance of extrajudicial foreclosure.  Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly inconvenienced and mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this unnecessary battle.  Precious time, energy and expense were wasted when the same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphases supplied]

 

 

A repeat of this cannot be tolerated.

 

This administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judge, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. “As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the administration of justice.”[43][38] “Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.”[44][39] 

 

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.” Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.”[45][40]

 

 

 “A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because, as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts.”[46][41]

 

WHEREFORE, as recommended by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, the complaint against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr., Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, for gross ignorance of the law is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

 

Complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo is hereby ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint against the respondent judiciary personnel, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

 

SO ORDERED. 

 

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                      ROBERTO A. ABAD

               Associate Justice                                  Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice     

 

 

[1][32] G.R. No. 159882,November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 390, 394-397.

[2][33] Rollo, p. 17

[3][34] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, supra note 1.  

[4][34] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, supra note 1.  

[5][41] Dela  Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-On, A.M. No. P-07-2343,August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 1, 11.

[6][1] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197,April 13, 2011.  

[7][2] Rollo, pp. 1-8.

[8][3]Id. at 114-116.

[9][4]Id. at 116-117.

[10][5]Id. at 124-125.

[11][6]Id. at 128-129

[12][7]Id. at 130-132.

[13][8]Id. at 142.

[14][9]  Id. at 119-120.

[15][10]Id. at 140.

[16][11] Exhs. “A” to “A-6,” “B,” “B-1,” and “B-1-a,” “C” to “C-3,” “D” to “D-4,” “E,” “F” to “F-6-a,” “G” to “G-3-a,” “H” to “H-4-a,” “I” to “I-7-a,” “J” to “J-2,” “K” to “K-2,” “L,” “M,” “N,” “O,” “P,” “Q,” to “X.” 

[17][12] Exhs. “1” (with submarkings), “2” (with submarkings), “3” (with submarkings), “4,” “4-a,” “5” (with submarkings), “6” (with submarkings), “7” (with submarkings), unmarked status report.

[18][13] Exh. “8.”

[19][14] Exh. “9.”

[20][15] Exh. “10.”

[21][16] Exh. “11.”

[22][17] Exh. “12.”

[23][18] Exh. “12-a.”

[24][19] Exh. “13.”

[25][20] Exh. “13-a.”

[26][21] Exh. “14.”

[27][22] Exh. “14-a.”

[28][23] Exh. “15.”

[29][24] Exh. “15-a.”

[30][25] Exh. “16.”

[31][26] Exh. “17.”

[32][27] Exh. “18.”

[33][28] Exh. “19.”

[34][29] Rollo, pp. 154-202.

[35][30] Section 7. Possession during redemption period.—In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property  or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act.  Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in [the] form of an ex-parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

[36][31] Section 8.  The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession.  Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.

[37][32] G.R. No. 159882,November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 390, 394-397.

[38][33] Rollo, p. 17

[39][34] Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, supra note 1.  

[40][35] 341 Phil. 299, 312-313 (1997).

[41][36] Section 47.  Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage.—In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extra-judicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan or other credit accommodation granted, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold for the full or partial payment of his obligation shall have the right within one year after the sale of the real estate, to redeem the property by paying the amount due under the mortgage deed, with interest thereon at rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank of institution from the sale and custody of said property less the income derived therefrom. However, the purchaser of the auction sale concerned whether in a judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure shall have the right to enter upon and take possession of such property immediately after the date of the confirmation of the auction sale and administer the same in accordance with law.  Any petition in court to enjoin or restrain the conduct of foreclosure proceedings instituted pursuant to this provision shall be given due course only upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all the damages which the bank may suffer by the enjoining or the restraint of the foreclosure proceeding.  Notwithstanding act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier.  Owners of property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act shall retain their redemption rights until their expiration.

[42][37] Rollo, pp. 105-108.

[43][38] Cordova v. Hon. Labayen, 319 Phil. 273, 287 (1995).

[44][39] Cruz v. Aliño-Hormachuelos,  A.M. No. CA-04-38,March 31, 2004, 426 SCRA 573, 581.

[45][40]Id. at 580.

[46][41] Dela  Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-On, A.M. No. P-07-2343,August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 1, 11.

Comment