J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

Latest Entries »

CASE 1012-0043: BLUE SKY TRADING COMPANY, INC. and/or JOSE TANTIANSU and LINDA TANTIANSU VS. ARLENE P. BLAS and JOSEPH D. SILVANO (G.R. No. 190559, March 7, 2012, REYES, J.) SUBJECT/S: DISMISSAL BASED ON LOSS OF TRUST; INSTANCE WHEN SC CAN RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES; SEPARATION PAY VIS A VIS REINSTATEMENT; WHEN MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES CAN BE AWARDED. (BRIEF TITLE: BLUE SKY TRADING VS. TANTIANSU)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment

April 11, 2012

CASE 1012-0043: BLUE SKY TRADING COMPANY, INC. and/or JOSE TANTIANSU and LINDA TANTIANSU VS. ARLENE P. BLAS and JOSEPH D. SILVANO (G.R. No. 190559, March 7, 2012, REYES, J.) SUBJECT/S: DISMISSAL BASED ON LOSS OF TRUST; INSTANCE WHEN SC CAN RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES; SEPARATION PAY VIS A VIS REINSTATEMENT; WHEN MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES CAN BE AWARDED. (BRIEF TITLE: BLUE SKY TRADING VS. TANTIANSU)

===================

DISPOSITIVE:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the October 26, 2009 Decision and December 14, 2009 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals, finding that the dismissal from service of respondents Arlene and Joseph was illegal and awarding in their favor full backwages, are AFFIRMED but with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) Blue Sky is directed to pay ECOLA and separation pay to the respondents;

(b) The award in favor of the respondents of ten percent attorney’s fees made by the National Labor Relations Commission in its November 29, 2007 Decision and which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the herein assailed decision and resolution is deleted; and

(c) Pursuant to our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA,^{^[1]}^[44] an
interest of 12% per annum is imposed on the total sum of the monetary award to be computed from the date of finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.

The case is remanded to the National Labor Relations Commission which is hereby ORDERED to COMPUTE the monetary benefits awarded in accordance with this Decision and to submit its compliance thereon within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.

===================

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST

CAN SC RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45?

AS A GENERAL RULE NO. BUT THERE IS AN EXCEPTION: WHEN THE CA’S FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT OR ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS FROM WHICH THE ACTION ORIGINATED.^{^[2]}^[30]

We deem it proper to first resolve the procedural challenge interposed by the respondents against the instant petition and we find it lacking in merit.

It bears stating that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision.^{^[3]}^[29] Further, the Court is generally bound by the CA’s factual findings. The foregoing rules, however, admit of exceptions, among which is when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.^{^[4]}^[30]The case before us now falls under the aforementioned exception as the LA, NLRC and the CA were at odds as to their findings.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SUPPOSE THE EMPLOYER WANTS TO JUSTIFY AN EMPLOYEE’S DISMISSAL ON THE BASIS OF BREACH OF TRUST. WHAT DEGREE OF EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED?

SUBSTANCIAL EVIDENCE.

We note that the petitioners essentially raise the sole question of whether they had proven by substantial evidence the charges of theft against Arlene and Joseph which led to the latter’s termination from service on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS UNDERSTOOD AS SUCH RELEVANT EVIDENCE AS A REASONABLE MIND MIGHT ACCEPT AS ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A CONCLUSION, EVEN IF OTHER EQUALLY REASONABLE MINDS MIGHT CONCEIVABLY OPINE OTHERWISE.

In Functional, Inc. v. Samuel Granfil,^{^[5]}^[31] we declared:

The rule is long and well settled that, in illegal dismissal cases like the one at bench, the burden of proof is upon the employer to show that the employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause. The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of that adduced by the employee, in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, the quantum of proof is substantial evidence which is understood as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Failure of the employer to discharge the foregoing onus would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TO EFFECT VALID DISMISSAL BASED ON LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHAT IS ESSENTIAL?

THAT BREACH OF TRUST MUST BE WILLFUL, MEANING IT MUST BE DONE INTENTIONALLY, KNOWINGLY, AND PURPOSELY, WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE EXCUSE.

Further, in Baron v. NLRC,^{^[6]}^[32] we held that for there to be a valid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence, the breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse.

In the case at bar, we agree with the petitioners that mere substantial evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to justify the dismissal from service of an employee charged with theft of company property. However, we find no error in the CA’s findings that the petitioners had not adequately proven by substantial evidence that Arlene and Joseph indeed participated or cooperated in the commission of theft relative to the six missing intensifying screens so as to justify the latter’s termination from employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

Blue Sky alleged that Arlene, who was a stock clerk, and Joseph, a warehouse helper, had free access to the missing items. Arlene, who kept the stock cards, was supposed to be monitoring on a daily basis the incoming and outgoing stocks stored in or taken out of the warehouse. Joseph took the stocks from the warehouse to the vehicles for transport or delivery purposes. Arlene and Joseph averred otherwise. They insisted that they were mere lowly employees who did not have actual custody of company property, specifically, of the missing items. Arlene claimed that she was not responsible for conducting inventories and that she released stocks only when urgently necessary and only in the absence of those authorized to do so. Joseph alleged that he only went to the mezzanine, where the missing items were stored, when ordered to do so by his superiors.

We note that the parties disagree as to what tasks were actually and regularly performed by Arlene and Joseph. They are at odds as to the issue of whether or not Arlene and Joseph had custody of the missing screens. We observe though that neither of the parties presented any documentary evidence, such as employment contracts, to establish their claims relative to the actual nature of Arlene and Joseph’s daily tasks. It bears emphasizing though that the photocopies of the identification cards issued by Blue Sky, which were annexed to the respondents’ position paper filed with the LA, indicated that Arlene was assigned at the customer service department while Joseph was part of the warehouse department.^{^[7]}^[33]

During the entrapment operation conducted by police operatives, Jayde and Helario were caught attempting to sell an ultrasound probe allegedly belonging to Blue Sky. Thereafter, Jayde, Helario and Wilfredo withdrew their complaints for illegal dismissal against the company. Arlene and Joseph, however, pursued their claims. Nonetheless, Blue Sky construed the result of the entrapment operation to mean that there was a conspiracy among the five employees to commit theft of company property. In the reply filed by the petitioners to the respondents’ position paper filed before the LA, the former alleged that in a letter, Jayde, Helario and Wilfredo implicated Arlene and Joseph as participants and conspirators in the commission of theft.^{^[8]}^[34] However, we note that the petitioners’ allegation was bare since the letter supposedly written by Jayde, Helario and Wilfredo was not offered as evidence. Further, Blue Sky alleged that the ultrasound probe was among the items found missing in the inventory conducted in December 2004. We observe though that the employees were dismissed for alleged theft of six intensifying screens. In the termination notices, no references were made at all to a missing ultrasound probe.

Further, we notice that both parties mentioned a certain “Boy” who conducted the inventory in October 2004. There is no dispute that at that time, the six intensifying screens were still completely accounted for. Further, Arlene and Joseph claimed that it was Lorna who had control and custody of the stocks as she was the warehouse supervisor. “Boy” and Lorna were not called upon by either of the parties to corroborate their claims. “Boy” and Lorna could have provided important information as to the time line and the manner the intensifying screens were lost. If “Boy” and Lorna remain under Blue Sky’s employ, it is the company which is in a better position to require the two to execute affidavits relative to what they know about the missing screens.

The petitioners also argue that if Arlene and Joseph had not been grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, Blue Sky would not have incurred the loss. We observe though that in the notices sent to Arlene and Joseph, first charging them with theft, and later, informing them of their dismissal from service, gross negligence was not stated therein as a ground. Hence, Arlene and Joseph could not have defended themselves against the charge of gross negligence. They cannot be dismissed on that ground lest due process be violated.

Only the following had been established without dispute: (a) the fact of loss of the six intensifying screens; (b) an entrapment operation was successfully conducted by the police operatives who caught Jayde and Helario in the act of attempting to sell an ultrasound probe which allegedly belonged to Blue Sky; and (c) Jayde, Helario and Wilfredo filed their affidavits of desistance to withdraw their complaints for illegal dismissal against Blue Sky while Arlene and Joseph pursued their complaints.

In its November 29, 2007 Decision, the NLRC found that Arlene and Joseph, a stock clerk and a warehouse helper, respectively, did not have unlimited access to or custody over Blue Sky’s property. The CA, in the decision and resolution assailed herein, while ordering the reinstatement of the November 29, 2007 NLRC Decision, found that Arlene and Joseph exercised custody over company property. Be that as it may, we observe that the nature of Arlene and Joseph’s regular duties while under Blue Sky’s employ and their specific participation in or knowledge of the theft of the intensifying screens remain uncertain. Thus, whether or not Arlene and Joseph had actual custody over company property, we agree with the CA that the petitioners had failed to establish by substantial evidence the charges which led to Arlene and Joseph’s dismissal from service.

While we empathize with Blue Sky’s loss and understand that its actions were merely motivated by its intent to protect the interests of the company, no blanket authority to terminate all employees whom it merely suspects as involved in the commission of theft resides in its favor. We thus reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Functional, Inc.^{^[9]}^[35] that the employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of that adduced by the employee, in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them.

Notwithstanding our affirmation of the CA’s finding that the petitioners had failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed upon them to justify the dismissal of Arlene and Joseph, we deem it proper to modify the assailed decision and resolution in the manner to be discussed hereunder.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IS PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AGAINST AN EMPLOYEE LATER ADJUDGED AS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED PROPER?

YES, PROVIDED THAT IT DOES NOT EXCEED THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 30 DAYS AND THERE WAS A VALID PURPOSE FOR IT. THE PURPOSE IS TO PREVENT AN EMPLOYEE FROM CAUSING HARM OR INJURY TO HIS COLLEAGUES AND TO THE EMPLOYER.

We, however, find no merit in the challenge made by Arlene and Joseph against the legality of the preventive suspension imposed by Blue Sky upon them pending the investigation of the alleged theft.

In Mandapat v. Add Force Personnel Services, Inc.,^{^[10]}^[36] we explained that preventive suspension may be legally imposed on an employee whose alleged violation is the subject of an investigation. The purpose of the suspension is to prevent an employee from causing harm or injury to his colleagues and to the employer. The maximum period of suspension is 30 days, beyond which the employee should either be reinstated or be paid wages and benefits due to him.

In Arlene and Joseph’s case, Blue Sky issued to them notices to explain on February 3, 2005. They submitted their written explanation the day after and they were dismissed from service on February 5, 2005. While we do not agree with Blue Sky’s subsequent decision to terminate them from service, we find no impropriety in its act of imposing preventive suspension upon the respondents since the period did not exceed the maximum imposed by law and there was a valid purpose for the same.

=================

WHEN IS SEPARATION PAY PROPER IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT PROPER?

WHEN REINSTATEMENT PROVES IMPRACTICABLE, AND HARDLY IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PARTIES, PERHAPS DUE TO THE LAPSE OF TIME SINCE THE EMPLOYEE’S DISMISSAL, OR IF THE EMPLOYEE DECIDES NOT TO BE REINSTATED.

If reinstatement proves impracticable, and hardly in the best interest of the parties, perhaps due to the lapse of time since the employee’s dismissal, or if the employee decides not to be reinstated, the latter should be awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.^{^[11]}^[37]

In the case at bar, Arlene and Joseph were dismissed from service on February 5, 2005. We find that the lapse of more than seven years already renders their reinstatement impracticable. Further, from the stubborn stances of the parties, to wit, the petitioners’ insistence that dismissal was valid on one hand, and the respondents’ express prayer for the payment of separation pay on the other, we find that reinstatement would no longer be in the best interest of the contending parties.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE EMPLOYEES WERE ADJUDGED ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. ARE THEY ALSO ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES?

WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE DISMISSAL OF AN EMPLOYEE HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND MALICIOUSLY AND WITH PERSONAL ILL-WILL, MORAL DAMAGES CANNOT BE AWARDED.^{^[12]}^[40] IF MORAL DAMAGES CANNOT BE AWARDED, THE CONSEQUENCE IS THAT THERE CAN ALSO BE NO AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.^{^[13]}^[41]

If there is no evidence to show that the dismissal of an employee had been carried out arbitrarily, capriciously and maliciously and with personal ill-will, moral damages cannot be awarded.^{^[14]}^[40] If moral damages cannot be awarded, the consequence is that there can also be no award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.^{^[15]}^[41]

In the case at bar, albeit we find Arlene and Joseph’s dismissal from service as illegal, we cannot attribute bad faith on the part of Blue Sky which merely acted with an intent to protect its interest. Hence, we find as lacking in basis the NLRC’s award of ten percent attorney’s fees in the respondents’ favor.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

CAN A CORPORATE OFFICER BE HELD LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE CORPORATION?

NO IF HIS ACTS WERE DONE IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY BECAUSE A CORPORATION, BY LEGAL FICTION, HAS A PERSONALITY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ITS OFFICERS, STOCKHOLDERS, AND MEMBERS.^{^[16]}^[42

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHEN CAN CORPORATE OFFICERS BE HELD SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE CORPORATION?

IF THE TERMINATION WAS DONE WITH MALICE OR BAD FAITH.^{^[17]}^[43]

As a general rule, a corporate officer cannot be held liable for acts done in his official capacity because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and members.^{^[18]}^[42] In illegal dismissal cases, corporate officers may only be held solidarily liable with the corporation if the termination was done with malice or bad faith.^{^[19]}^[43] We find that the aforementioned circumstance did not obtain in the case of Jose and Linda relative to Arlene and Joseph’s dismissal from service.

===================

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

BLUE SKY TRADING COMPANY,

INC. and/or JOSE TANTIANSU and

LINDA TANTIANSU,

Petitioners,

– versus –

ARLENE P. BLAS and

JOSEPH D. SILVANO,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 190559

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 7, 2012

x—————————————————————————————-x

DECISION

REYES, J.:

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari^{^[20]}^[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the October 26, 2009 Decision^{^[21]}^[2] and the December 14, 2009 Resolution^{^[22]}^[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 108432. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the NLRC dated 30 January 2009 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the NLRC dated 29 November 2007 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.^{^[23]}^[4]

The assailed resolution denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration^{^[24]}^[5]to the foregoing.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner Blue Sky Trading Company, Inc. (Blue Sky) is a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in the importation and sale of medical supplies and equipment. Petitioner Jose G. Tantiansu, Jr. (Jose) is Blue Sky’s vice president for operations while petitioner Linda G. Tantiansu (Linda) is its assistant corporate secretary. The respondents Arlene P. Blas (Arlene) and Joseph D. Silvano (Joseph) were regular employees of Blue Sky and they respectively held the positions of stock clerk and warehouse helper before they were dismissed from service on February 5, 2005.

On January 29, 2005, Lorna N. Manalastas (Lorna), Blue Sky’s warehouse supervisor, wrote Jose a memorandum^{^[25]}^[6] informing the latter that six pairs of intensifying screens were missing. Lorna likewise stated that when a certain “Boy” conducted an inventory on October 2004, the screens were still completely accounted for.

On January 31, 2005, Helario Adonis, Jr. (Helario), warehouse personnel, was summoned by Linda, Jose’s wife Alice Tantiansu, and human resources department head Jean B. De La Paz (Jean). Helario was asked to admit his participation in the theft of the missing screens. While he was offered to be paid a separation pay if he would confess complicity with the alleged theft, he pleaded utter innocence.

On February 1, 2005, Jean notified Helario of his termination from service on the ground of his failure to properly account for and maintain a balance of the company’s stock inventories, hence, resulting in Blue Sky’s loss of trust and confidence in him.^{^[26]}^[7] The day after, Blue Sky promptly filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an establishment termination report^{^[27]}^[8] indicating therein Helario’s dismissal from service for cause.

On February 3, 2005, Jean issued notices to explain/preventive suspension^{^[28]}^[9] to Arlene, Joseph, delivery personnel Jayde Tano-an (Jayde) and maintenance personnel/driver Wilfredo Fasonilao (Wilfredo). The notices informed them that they were being accused of gross dishonesty in connection with their alleged participation in and conspiracy with other employees in committing theft against company property, specifically relative to the loss of the six intensifying screens. They were placed under preventive suspension pending investigation and were thus required to file their written explanations within 48 hours from receipt of the notices.

On February 4, 2005, Arlene submitted to Jean a handwritten memorandum denying knowledge or complicity with the theft of the intensifying screens. In part, the memorandum reads:

I’m not the supervisor of that dep’t. para tanungin sa lahat ng nangyayari. Second, hindi naman ako ang nag-inventory ng stocks na yan. Third, nag-oout lang ako ng stocks kapag wala sila at kailangan na ang stocks. And lastly, ano ba talaga ang trabaho ko dito, kc all I know is pag-re-record ng stocks but parang lumalabas guard ako na kailangan kong malaman ang lahat ng kilos at galaw ng lahat ng employee dito. Dahil ako lagi ang tinatanong tungkol sa nangyayari sa mezz. Bakit ako lang ba ang tao doon? So it means that, dapat lahat kami ay may memo para mag-explain regarding that matter. Maging fair naman kayo sa akin.

Anyway, regarding sa nawawalang IS, ang alam ko inim-ventory ni Kuya Boy yan last Oct. According to him, complete daw lahat yun. Nang bumaba si Sir Jun mga last week ng Dec. para magpalinis ng stocks, na-found out nya na kulang ang stocks. So we did, we compare the bincard to the stockcard. But tally silang pareho. Kaya, we did we trace it is sa mga possible records like shipment sa Cebuor sales. But wala doon. Ang naiisip naming dahilan ay baka nagpakabit si Ate Lorna ng cassette with IS sa technical and she forgot to report it. Yun lang ang possible reason na alam ko. At wala na akong alam pang iba. x x x^{^[29]}^[10]

On the other hand, Joseph proffered the following explanation:

Tungkol po sa nawawalang intensifying screen, wala po akong alam. Kasi po sa messanin[,] pumapasok lang po ako pag may inutos o may pagagawa, tsaka hindi po ako naghahanda ng lumang stocks. Nagbababa po kami ng stock at nag-aakyat sa 2^nd flor pag kami po ay inutusan ng nakakataas sa akin o may katungkulan. Yun lang po ang aking trabaho sa mesanin. Eto lang po ang aking masasabi.^{^[30]}^[11]

Jayde and Wilfredo also filed their written explanations denying any involvement in the theft which took place and professing their dedication and loyalty to Blue Sky.^{^[31]}^[12]

On February 5, 2005, Jean issued to Arlene, Joseph, Jayde and Wilfredo notices of dismissal for cause^{^[32]}^[13] stating therein that evidence that they had conspired with each other to commit theft against company property was too glaring to ignore. Blue Sky had lost its trust and confidence on them and as an act of self-preservation, their termination from service was in order.

On February 7, 2005, Blue Sky filed with the DOLE an establishment termination report stating therein the dismissal of Arlene, Joseph, Jayde and Wilfredo.^{^[33]}^[14]

On February 8, 2005, Arlene, Joseph, Helario, Jayde and Wilfredo filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal and suspension, underpayment of overtime pay, and non-payment of emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA), with prayers for reinstatement and payment of full backwages. The complaint was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01351-05.

Meanwhile, an entrapment operation was conducted by the police during which Jayde and Helario were caught allegedly attempting to sell to an operative an ultrasound probe worth around P400,000.00 belonging to Blue Sky. On April 22, 2005, Quezon City Inquest Prosecutor Arleen Tagaban issued a resolution^{^[34]}^[15] recommending the filing in court of criminal charges against Jayde and Helario.

On May 2005, before the complaint which was filed with the NLRC can be resolved, Helario, Jayde and Wilfredo executed affidavits of desistance^{^[35]}^[16] stating therein that their termination by Blue Sky was for cause and after observance of due process.

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On November 17, 2005, Labor Arbiter Gaudencio P. Demaisip, Jr. (LA Demaisip) dismissed the complaint relative to Helario, Jayde and Wilfredo as a consequence of their filing of the affidavits of desistance. As to Arlene and Joseph, LA Demaisip denied their claims of illegal suspension and dismissal and for payment of ECOLA and overtime pay based on the following grounds:

[T]he duties of Ms. Blas [Arlene] was to take out stocks. Also, Mr. Silvano’s [Joseph] work consisted of removing, storing, or furnishing of “stocks” or supplies.

Further, Ms. Blas [Arlene] was tasked to make written monitoring of “stocks” or supplies.

Complainants therefore, are charged with the care and custody of respondents’ property. They may not be given such functions or allowed entrance and exit from respondents’ bodega if they were untrustworthy.

Indeed, the functions consisting of removing, storing, furnishing, monitoring and gaining ingress to and egress from the “bodega”, where the “stocks” or supplies are kept, involved trust and confidence.

Article 282 of the Labor Code allows the employer to terminate the services of the employees, among others, for breach of trust and confidence.

Loss of confidence however, apply (sic) to the following: x x x (2) to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property such as auditors, cashier; property custodians, or those who regularly handle significant amount of money or property.

The dismissal must rest on actual breach of duty committed by the employee.

Further, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary. It is sufficient if there is some basis for such loss of confidence.

x x x

The basis, for the dismissal of the complainants, is the fact that six (6) pairs of assorted sizes of Intensifying Screen of the company at the bodega were lost x x x.

An entrapment was conducted against Tano-an [Jayde] and Adonis [Helario] x x x:

x x x

Simply put, the contention, about the missing items or supplies, is credible and reliable.

It is not necessary that proof of taking or conspiracy must exist.

The existence of the fact, that items or supplies were missing at the bodega of the company, would suffice to prove loss of confidence.

Complainants failed in their duties to exercise utmost protection, care, or custody of respondent’s property. Hence, their dismissal from the service is warranted.

x x x

Claims for ECOLA and overtime pay were not discussed by the complainants[,] hence, they should be denied.^{^[36]}^[17]

Arlene and Joseph assailed before the NLRC the decision rendered by LA Demaisip.^{^[37]}^[18]

The Rulings of the NLRC

On November 29, 2007, the NLRC ordered the reinstatement of Arlene and Joseph and the payment to them of full backwages and ten percent attorney’s fees. The decision, in part, reads:

[T]he respondents [Blue Sky, Jose and Linda] accused complainants [Arlene and Joseph] of theft of company property. It was, thus, incumbent upon the respondents to prove the alleged theft by the appellants [Arlene and Joseph] with clear and substantial evidence. A reading of the record will, however, show that respondents have not presented any evidence to show the involvement of the complaint [sic] Arlene Blas and Joseph Silvano x x x in the theft. To start with, appellants were not caught red handed. No specific acts or deeds were imputed upon appellants to prove the allegation that they committed theft against the respondents. While there may be articles which may have been lost, the respondents have not shown how these were lost and how appellants participated in the theft. The fact that appellants had access to the lost items is not sufficient to prove their guilt. As shown, there were several other persons who had unlimited access to the warehouse where the items stolen were stacked. No witnesses were also presented implicating appellants in the theft.

As it is, all respondents have are general allegations that appellants conspired with the other complainants in stealing the lost items. Allegations, no matter how convincing they may sound, while they remain to be so, cannot be considered as clear and substantial evidence sufficient to justify the dismissal of an employee. While proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, still respondents should have presented substantial evidence to support the grounds they have relied upon. x x x

x x x

Finally, [w]e do not see appellants as holding positions of trust and confidence. Before an employee may be dismissed due to willful breach of trust, he must hold a position of trust and confidence (Estiva [v]s. NLRC, G.R. No. 95145, August 5, 1993). A position of trust and confidence is one where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer’s property (Panday vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 67664, May 20, 1994) and/or funds (Gonzales vs. NLRC, 335 SCRA 197).

Appellant Arlene Blas is a Stock Clerk while Joseph Silvano is a warehouse helper. While they may have access to the lost items, they were not entrusted with confidence on delicate matters or custody of the employer’s property. They do not have the authority to withdraw, transfer or release items in the warehouse. They are mere low keyed employees who deal with the handling of stocks only when ordered to by their superiors.^{^[38]}^[19]

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration^{^[39]}^[20] to the foregoing.

Claiming that their relations with Blue Sky had been strained, Arlene and Joseph sought the payment of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement. Further, they lamented that the NLRC failed to specifically address the issue relative to their monetary claims. Hence, they reiterated the said claims, in addition to service incentive leave and 13^th month pay for the year 2005, arguing that the burden to prove payment of benefits pertained to Blue Sky which miserably failed in this regard.

On the other hand, Blue Sky averred that substantial evidence existed to support its claim that Arlene and Joseph participated in, or at the least knew about, the theft of the missing screens.

On January 30, 2009, the NLRC issued a resolution reversing its earlier decision and reinstating LA Demaisip’s dismissal of the complaint filed by Arlene and Joseph on the basis of the following:

In our Decision promulgated on November 29, 2007, we advanced the view that complainants Blas [Arlene] and Silvano [Joseph] were ordinary employees not occupying positions of trust, without however taking a profound appreciation of the fact that complainants’ duties as “stock clerk” and “warehouse helper” routinely involved having unlimited access to company’s properties and stocks. The fact that same properties which were subject of losses and thievery as established from the subsequent entrapment operations conducted by the respondents with the assistance of PNP operatives against the two (2) other complainants, namely Jayde [Tano-an] and Helario Adonis, who are presently facing charges for attempting to sell respondents’ property, convinced this Commission to reconsider its previous finding and be in agreement with the respondents’ position.

x x x

While we are not unmindful of the fact that complainants Blas and Silvano were not part of the group who were apprehended during the entrapment operations, however, had they not been remiss in their respective duties [as] “stock clerk” and “warehouse helper” or not aided their former co-workers Tano-an and Adonis, thievery or losses of company’s property could not have been committed.

x x x

The loss of company’s property having been substantially proven, complainants Blas [Arlene] and Silvano [Blas] cannot just make a general denial and wash their hands clean. Their termination not only due to loss of trust but also for gross neglect of duties is therefore found justified. x x x

x x x

Finally, as regards complainants’ claim for alleged unpaid 13^th month pay and service incentive leave pay for 2005, contrary evidence however showed that respondents [Blue Sky] had paid the said claims as shown by the payment of their final monetary benefits which the complainants had duly received.^{^[40]}^[21]

Aggrieved, Arlene and Joseph filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari^{^[41]}^[22] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to challenge the above quoted NLRC resolution.

The Ruling of the CA

In the decision rendered on October 26, 2009, which is now the subject of the instant petition, the CA found merit in the claims advanced by Arlene and Joseph. In reversing the January 30, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC, the CA ratiocinated that:

Prefatorily, the basic requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is that the employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and confidence. A position of trust and confidence is one where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling or care and protection of the employer’s property. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue to work for the employer.

In General Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence as a justification in the termination of erring employees, viz:

(a) loss of confidence which should not be simulated;

(b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified;

(d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.

x x x

To [o]urmind, the NLRC is correct insofar as it considered the nature of [p]etitioner BLAS and [p]etitioner SILVANO as stock clerk and warehouse helper, respectively, as positions of trust and confidence. On account of their positions in the company, the [p]etitioners were given access to the [r]espondents’ warehouse w[h]ere the company products and goods are kept. Likewise, by the nature of the work the [p]etitioners performed for the [r]espondents, it is logical to conclude that the former were charged with the custody of [r]espondents’ property, thus making their positions as one reposed with trust and confidence.

However, [w]e hold that the [r]espondents failed to sufficiently establish the charge against [p]etitioners which was the basis for its loss of trust and confidence that warranted their dismissal. Concededly, it is settled that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in dismissing an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. It is sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence or that there must be some reasonable grounds to believe, if not to entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position. However, loss of confidence as a valid cause to terminate an employee must nonetheless
rest on actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s imagined whim or caprice.

Verily, [w]e are convinced that the [r]espondents failed to adduce any substantial proof showing that the [p]etitioners committed an actual breach of their duty which destroyed the trust and confidence reposed upon them by their employer. Clearly, there is no ample evidence to show that [p]etitioners conspired with the thieves in stealing six (6) pairs of intensifying screens from [r]espondents[‘] warehouse. Nor is there any shred of evidence that tends to prove that the [p]etitioners had a direct hand in the larceny committed against the [r]espondents. In fact, the verity of the [p]etitioners’ innocence on the thievery committed against the [r]espondents was recognized by the NLRC in the assailed Resolution, viz:

x x x

While we are not unmindful of the fact that complainants Blas [Arlene] and Silvano [Joseph] were not part of the group who were apprehended during the entrapment operations, however, had they not been remiss in their respective duties [as] “stock clerk” and “warehouse helper” or not aided their former co-workers Tano-an and Adonis, thievery or losses of company’s property could not have been committed. x x x

x x x

The ratiocination of the NLRC in reversing its initial pronouncement is that the [p]etitioners were “remiss” in their duty is flawed. It bears noting that the NLRC offered no explanation to justify this finding nor is there any scintilla of evidence in the records to support the conclusion that the [p]etitioners had aided, expressly or impliedly, their former co-workers in committing theft against the company.^{^[42]}^[23] (Citations omitted)

The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

The petitioners submit the following for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BEFORE THE NLRC BY PETITIONERS ARE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE CHARGES WHICH WAS (sic) BASIS FOR THE LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE AGAINST RESPONDENTS[-]EMPLOYEES.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY RESPONDENTS AND LATER, DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.^{^[43]}^[24]

The Petitioners’ Arguments

In Salvador v. Philippine Mining Service Corporation,^{^[44]}^[25] it was ruled that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee’s misconduct or dishonesty is not required to justify loss of confidence, it being sufficient that there is substantial basis for loss of trust. Thus, an employer should not be held liable for dismissing the services of an employee sincerely believed to have at least known or participated in the commission of theft against company property. The employer is not required to present proofs of the employee’s actual taking or unlawful possession of company property. In fact, in Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al.,^{^[45]}^[26] the court held that where the dismissal for loss of confidence is based on suspected theft of company property on the part of the employee, it remains a valid cause for dismissal even if the employee is subsequently acquitted.

It is immaterial that Arlene and Joseph were not among those who were entrapped attempting to sell an ultrasound probe to a police operative. The nature of their tasks at Blue Sky and the fact of loss of the intensifying screens dictated Arlene and Joseph’s liabilities. Arlene’s daily work routine involved (a) receiving and releasing of stocks; and (b) preparing stock cards
for purposes of checking and monitoring the items in the warehouse. On the other hand, Joseph carried and moved stocks in and out of the warehouse. The six intensifying screens were discovered missing while Arlene, Joseph, Helario, Jayde and Wilfredo were supposedly performing their tasks, hence, the logical inference that they conspired to commit the theft or at least, knowingly allowed it to happen. Had the employees exercised due or even ordinary diligence to protect company property, no loss would have been incurred. Further, the defense interposed by Arlene in her written explanation that she was not employed by Blue Sky as a security guard, showed her utter lack of concern for the company’s welfare, which rendered her undeserving of an employer’s trust and confidence.

Findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not only respect but even finality when they are supported by substantial evidence.^{^[46]}^[27] Thus, the CA erred when it ruled that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of the respondents’ complaint.

The Respondents’ Contentions

In their Comment,^{^[47]}^[28] the respondents cited Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to argue that only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. In the case at bar, the petitioners raise a factual question, to wit, the alleged sufficiency of the evidence they presented to justify the dismissal of Arlene and Joseph on the basis of loss of trust and confidence. The petitioners thus call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence offered by the parties, which is beyond the province of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This Court’s Ruling

While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court generally precludes us from resolving factual issues, the instant case falls among the exceptions as the LA, the NLRC and the CA were at odds as to their findings.

We deem it proper to first resolve the procedural challenge interposed by the respondents against the instant petition and we find it lacking in merit.

It bears stating that Rule 45 limits us merely to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision.^{^[48]}^[29] Further, the Court is generally bound by the CA’s factual findings. The foregoing rules, however, admit of exceptions, among which is when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.^{^[49]}^[30]The case before us now falls under the aforementioned exception as the LA, NLRC and the CA were at odds as to their findings.

Substantial evidence of actual breach by an employee is required from an employer to be able to justify the former’s dismissal from service on the basis of an alleged participation in theft of company property. However, in the case at bar, Blue Sky had failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed upon it.

We rule in the negative.

In Functional, Inc. v. Samuel Granfil,^{^[50]}^[31] we declared:

Further, in Baron v. NLRC,^{^[51]}^[32] we held that for there to be a valid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence, the breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse.

During the entrapment operation conducted by police operatives, Jayde and Helario were caught attempting to sell an ultrasound probe allegedly belonging to Blue Sky. Thereafter, Jayde, Helario and Wilfredo withdrew their complaints for illegal dismissal against the company. Arlene and Joseph, however, pursued their claims. Nonetheless, Blue Sky construed the result of the entrapment operation to mean that there was a conspiracy among the five employees to commit theft of company property. In the reply filed by the petitioners to the respondents’ position paper filed before the LA, the former alleged that in a letter, Jayde, Helario and Wilfredo implicated Arlene and Joseph as participants and conspirators in the commission of theft.^{^[53]}^[34] However, we note that the petitioners’ allegation was bare since the letter supposedly written by Jayde, Helario and Wilfredo was not offered as evidence. Further, Blue Sky alleged that the ultrasound probe was among the items found missing in the inventory conducted in December 2004. We observe though that the employees were dismissed for alleged theft of six intensifying screens. In the termination notices, no references were made at all to a missing ultrasound probe.

While we empathize with Blue Sky’s loss and understand that its actions were merely motivated by its intent to protect the interests of the company, no blanket authority to terminate all employees whom it merely suspects as involved in the commission of theft resides in its favor. We thus reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Functional, Inc.^{^[54]}^[35] that the employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of that adduced by the employee, in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the evidence presented by them.

Blue Sky committed no impropriety in imposing preventive suspension against Arlene and Joseph pending investigation of the theft allegedly committed against the company.

We, however, find no merit in the challenge made by Arlene and Joseph against the legality of the preventive suspension imposed by Blue Sky upon them pending the investigation of the alleged theft.

In Mandapat v. Add Force Personnel Services, Inc.,^{^[55]}^[36] we explained that preventive suspension may be legally imposed on an employee whose alleged violation is the subject of an investigation. The purpose of the suspension is to prevent an employee from causing harm or injury to his colleagues and to the employer. The maximum period of suspension is 30 days, beyond which the employee should either be reinstated or be paid wages and benefits due to him.

In lieu of reinstatement, Arlene and Joseph are entitled to an award of separation pay.

Arlene and Joseph are entitled to the payment of ECOLA, but not to 13^th month, service incentive leave and overtime pay.

It is well-settled that in labor cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer.^{^[57]}^[38]

We find nothing in the records to indicate that the petitioners had indeed paid ECOLA to Arlene and Joseph.

In the resolution issued on January 30, 2009, the NLRC found proof by way of the petitioners’ annex to their position paper that Arlene and Joseph already received their 13^th month and service incentive leave pay for the year 2005.^{^[58]}^[39] The respondents had not specifically refuted the NLRC’s findings, hence, we sustain the same.

Anent the respondents’ claim for overtime pay, we find no ample basis to grant it as they had not offered any proof to show that they in fact rendered such service.

The decision rendered by the NLRC on November 29, 2007, which the CA affirmed, did not award in favor of Arlene and Joseph moral and exemplary damages. Consequently, we delete the award in the respondents’ favor of ten percent attorney’s fees.

If there is no evidence to show that the dismissal of an employee had been carried out arbitrarily, capriciously and maliciously and with personal ill-will, moral damages cannot be awarded.^{^[59]}^[40] If moral damages cannot be awarded, the consequence is that there can also be no award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.^{^[60]}^[41]

Jose and Linda cannot be held solidarily liable for the dismissal of Arlene and Joseph in the absence of proof that they acted with malice and bad faith.

As a general rule, a corporate officer cannot be held liable for acts done in his official capacity because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and members.^{^[61]}^[42] In illegal dismissal cases, corporate officers may only be held solidarily liable with the corporation if the termination was done with malice or bad faith.^{^[62]}^[43] We find that the aforementioned circumstance did not obtain in the case of Jose and Linda relative to Arlene and Joseph’s dismissal from service.

(a) Blue Sky is directed to pay ECOLA and separation pay to the respondents;

(c) Pursuant to our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA,^{^[63]}^[44] an
interest of 12% per annum is imposed on the total sum of the monetary award to be computed from the date of finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][44] G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.

[2][30] AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 633, 651.

[3][29] Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., G.R. No. 183572, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 218, 233.

[4][30] AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 633, 651.

[5][31] G.R. No. 176377, November 16, 2011. (Citations omitted)

[6][32] G.R. No. 182299, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 351.

[7][33] Rollo, pp. 118 and 120.

[8][34] Id. at 135.

[9][35] Supra note 31.

[10][36] G.R. No. 180285, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 155.

[11][37] St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. and Robert Kuan v. Notario, G.R. No. 152166, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 67, 80-81. (Citation omitted)

[12][40] Chaves v. NLRC, G.R. No. 166382, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 434.

[13][41] Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 157966, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 344, 363. (Citation omitted)

[14][40] Chaves v. NLRC, G.R. No. 166382, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 434.

[15][41] Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 157966, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 344, 363. (Citation omitted)

[16][42] Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 338, 365.

[17][43] Id.

[18][42] Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 338, 365.

[19][43] Id.

[20][1] Rollo, pp. 28-48.

[21][2] Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, with Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this court) and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring; id. at 10-23.

[22][3] Id. at 25.

[23][4] Id. at 23.

[24][5] Id. at 220-229.

[25][6] Id. at 86.

[26][7] Id. at 88.

[27][8] Id. at 89.

[28][9] Id. at 91-95.

[29][10] Id. at 96.

[30][11] Id. at 98.

[31][12] Id. at 97, 99.

[32][13] Id. at 100-103.

[33][14] Id. at 104-105.

[34][15] Id. at 141.

[35][16] Id. at 139-140, 142-145.

[36][17] Id. at 154-156.

[37][18] Id. at 157-162.

[38][19] Id. at 171-173.

[39][20] Id. at 175-182, 183-186.

[40][21] Id. at 192-193. (Citations omitted)

[41][22] Id. at 195-210.

[42][23] Supra note 2, at 18-22.

[43][24] Supra note 1, at 35.

[44][25] 443 Phil. 878 (2003).

[45][26] 208 Phil. 591 (1983).

[46][27] Duldulao v. CA, G.R. No. 164893, March 1, 2007, 517 SCRA 191, 198. (Citations omitted)

[47][28] Rollo, pp. 236-246.

[48][29] Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., G.R. No. 183572, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 218, 233.

[49][30] AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 633, 651.

[50][31] G.R. No. 176377, November 16, 2011. (Citations omitted)

[51][32] G.R. No. 182299, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 351.

[52][33] Rollo, pp. 118 and 120.

[53][34] Id. at 135.

[54][35] Supra note 31.

[55][36] G.R. No. 180285, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 155.

[56][37] St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. and Robert Kuan v. Notario, G.R. No. 152166, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 67, 80-81. (Citation omitted)

[57][38] Smart Communications, Inc. v. Astorga, G.R. No. 148132, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 434, 453. (Citation omitted)

[58][39] Supra note 21, at 193.

[59][40] Chaves v. NLRC, G.R. No. 166382, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 434.

[60][41] Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 157966, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 344, 363. (Citation omitted)

[61][42] Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 338, 365.

[62][43] Id.

[63][44] G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.

Comment

CASE 2012-0042: PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC. (G.R. NO. 176628, MARCH 19, 2012, BRION, J.) SUBJECT/S: JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT; ACTS OF COUNSEL BINDS CLIENT/ EXCEPTION; APPEAL VIS A VIS CERTIORARI; EXTRINSIC FRAUD (BRIEF TITLE: PTA VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment

April 10, 2012

CASE 2012-0042: PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC. (G.R. NO. 176628, MARCH 19, 2012, BRION, J.) SUBJECT/S: JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT; ACTS OF COUNSEL BINDS CLIENT/ EXCEPTION; APPEAL VIS A VIS CERTIORARI; EXTRINSIC FRAUD (BRIEF TITLE: PTA VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF)

====================

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for certiorari. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

====================

WHY DOES THE COURT PROVIDES FOR DEADLINES IN ACTIONS?

TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY DISPOSITION OF CASES.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

CAN A PARTY INVOKE THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS COUNSEL IF COUNSEL FAILED TO MEET A DEADLINE IN AN ACTION?

NO. OTHERWISE, SUCH PRACTICE IF ALLOWED WOULD DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF THE RULES ON PERIODS SINCE EVERY PARTY WOULD MERELY LAY THE BLAME ON ITS COUNSEL TO AVOID ANY LIABILITY.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE RULE ON THIS MATTER?

A CLIENT IS BOUND BY THE ACTS, EVEN MISTAKES, OF HIS COUNSEL IN THE REALM OF PROCEDURAL TECHNIQUE[,]AND UNLESS SUCH ACTS INVOLVE GROSS NEGLIGENCE THAT THE CLAIMING PARTY CAN PROVE, THE ACTS OF A COUNSEL BIND THE CLIENT AS IF IT HAD BEEN THE LATTER’S ACTS.”[1][6]

NOTE THE EXCEPTION: UNLESS SUCH ACT INVOLVES GROSS NEGLIGENCE.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in actions before the court to ensure an orderly disposition of cases. PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by simply invoking the negligence of its counsel. This practice, if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods since every party would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any liability. The rule is that “a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique[,]and unless such acts involve gross negligence that the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had been the latter’s acts.”[2][6]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

DEFINE GROSS NEGLIGENCE APPLICABLE TO THIS RULE?

THAT “[G]ROSS NEGLIGENCE IS CHARACTERIZED BY WANT OF EVEN SLIGHT CARE, ACTING OR OMITTING TO ACT IN A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS A DUTY TO ACT, NOT INADVERTENTLY BUT WILLFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY WITH A CONSCIOUS INDIFFERENCE TO CONSEQUENCES INSOFAR AS OTHER PERSONS MAY BE AFFECTED.”

In LBC Express – Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo,[3][7] the Court held that “[g]ross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.” This cannot be invoked in cases where the counsel is merely negligent in submitting his required pleadings within the period that the rules mandate.

It is not disputed that the summons together with a copy of the complaint was personally served upon, and received by PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department, on October 10, 2003.[4][8] Thus, in failing to submit a responsive pleading within the required time despite sufficient notice, the RTC was correct in declaring PTA in default.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PTA FAILED TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADING. IT WAS DECLARED IN DEFAULT BY RTC. WAS RTC CORRECT?

YES. THE RECORDS REVEAL THAT THE JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT[5][10] WAS SENT VIA REGISTERED MAIL TO PTA’S COUNSEL. HOWEVER, PTA NEVER AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF A MOTION TO LIFT THE ORDER OF DEFAULT.[6][11] SINCE THE FAILURE OF PTA TO PRESENT ITS EVIDENCE WAS NOT A PRODUCT OF ANY FRAUDULENT ACTS (REFERRED TO AS EXTRINSIC FRAUD) COMMITTED OUTSIDE TRIAL, THE RTC DID NOT ERR IN DECLARING PTA IN DEFAULT.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS EXTRINSIC FRAUD?

IT REFERS TO ANY FRAUDULENT ACT OF THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THE LITIGATION WHICH IS COMMITTED OUTSIDE OF THE TRIAL OF THE CASE, WHEREBY THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY HAS BEEN PREVENTED FROM EXHIBITING FULLY HIS CASE, BY FRAUD OR DECEPTION PRACTICED ON HIM BY HIS OPPONENT.”[7][9]

“Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.”[8][9] Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the acts of PTA’s counsel to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.

The records reveal that the judgment of default[9][10] was sent via registered mail to PTA’s counsel. However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default.[10][11] Since the failure of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in declaring PTA in default.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PTA FILED A PETITION TO ANNUL JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT? IS THIS THE PROPER REMEDY?

NO. THE PROPER REMEDY IS APPEAL. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS A RECOURSE EQUITABLE IN CHARACTER AND ALLOWED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF NEW TRIAL, APPEAL, PETITION FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REMEDIES ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE THROUGH NO FAULT OF PETITIONER.”[11][12]

PTA’s appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC decision. “Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.”[12][12]

In this case, appeal was an available remedy. There was also no extraordinary reason for a petition for annulment of judgment, nor was there any adequate explanation on why the remedy for new trial or petition for relief could not be used. The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had withdrawn a properly filed appeal and substituted it with another petition, when PTA could have merely raised the same issues through an ordinary appeal.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PTA RAISED THE DEFENSE OF STATE IMMUNITY. IS PTA CORRECT?

NO. THE APPLICATION OF STATE IMMUNITY IS PROPER ONLY WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISE OUT OF SOVEREIGN TRANSACTIONS AND NOT IN CASES OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. THE STATE, IN ENTERING INTO A BUSINESS CONTRACT, DESCENDS TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND IS DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED.[13][13]

PTA also erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.[14][13]

Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PTA FILED PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 AT SC. IS THIS A PROPER REMEDY?

NO. CERTIORARI IS NOT A MODE OF APPEAL AND CANNOT BE MADE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR APPEAL.

Lastly, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only available in cases when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a substitute for appeal. It will not lie in cases where other remedies are available under the law.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[15][14] the Court had the occasion to state:

The general rule is that a [certiorari] will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. xxx

x x x x

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. [emphases supplied; citations omitted]

In sum, PTA had the remedy of appealing the RTC decision to the CA and, thereafter, to us. Under the circumstances, we find no adequate reason to justify the elevation of this case to the CA and then to us, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

====================

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PHILIPPINE TOURISM G.R. No. 176628

AUTHORITY,

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

– versus – PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT

& EQUIPMENT, INC., March 19, 2012

Respondent.

x————————————————————————————x

R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to annul the decision[16][1] dated December 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 90402. This CA decision dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment which sought to set aside the decision[17][2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in Civil Case No. 03-212. The RTC held the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) liable for its unpaid obligation to Philippine Golf Development & Equipment, Inc. (PHILGOLF).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects (PAR 60-66) for a contract price of Fifty-Seven Million Nine Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94).

The civil works of the project commenced. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course amounting to Twenty-Seven Million Pesos (P27,000,000.00). The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.[18][3]

On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting to Eleven Million Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 53/100 Pesos (P11,820,550.53), plus interest, for the construction of the golf course. Within the period to file a responsive pleading, PTA filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer.

On October 30, 2003, the RTC granted the motion for extension of time. PTA filed another motion for extension of time to file an answer. The RTC again granted the motion.

Despite the RTC’s liberality of granting two successive motions for extension of time, PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, on April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a judgment of default, ruling as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff:

The amount of Eleven Million, Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand, Five Hundred Fifty Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P11,820,550.53), representing defendant’s outstanding obligation, plus interest thereon of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time the unpaid billings of plaintiff were due for payment by the defendant, until they are fully paid.

The amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as attorney’s fees.

The amount of One Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand, Five Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (P128,529.14), as filing fees and other costs of litigation.

The amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), as moral damages.

The amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (Pesos (P150,000.00), as nominal damages, and

The amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[19][4]

On July 11, 2005, PTA seasonably appealed the case to the CA. But before the appeal of PTA could be perfected, PHILGOLF already filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC. The RTC, in an Order dated June 2, 2004, granted the motion and a writ of execution pending appeal was issued against PTA. On June 3, 2004, a notice of garnishment was issued against PTA’s bank account at the Land Bank of thePhilippines, NAIA-BOC Branch to fully satisfy the judgment.

PTA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for granting the motion for execution pending appeal. The CA ruled in favor of PTA and set aside the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.

On July 11, 2005, PTA withdrew its appeal of the RTC decision and, instead, filed a petition[20][5] for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The petition for annulment of judgment was premised on the argument that the gross negligence of PTA’s counsel prevented the presentation of evidence before the RTC.

On December 13, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of merit. PTA questions this CA action in the present petition for certiorari.

THE PETITION

The petition cites three arguments: first, that the negligence of PTA’s counsel amounted to an extrinsic fraud warranting an annulment of judgment; second, that since PTA is a government entity, it should not be bound by the inactions or negligence of its counsel; and third, that there were no other available remedies left for PTA but a petition for annulment of judgment.

OUR RULING

We find the petition unmeritorious.

In LBC Express – Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo,[22][7] the Court held that “[g]ross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.” This cannot be invoked in cases where the counsel is merely negligent in submitting his required pleadings within the period that the rules mandate.

It is not disputed that the summons together with a copy of the complaint was personally served upon, and received by PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department, on October 10, 2003.[23][8] Thus, in failing to submit a responsive pleading within the required time despite sufficient notice, the RTC was correct in declaring PTA in default.

There was no extrinsic fraud

“Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.”[24][9] Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the acts of PTA’s counsel to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.

The records reveal that the judgment of default[25][10] was sent via registered mail to PTA’s counsel. However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default.[26][11] Since the failure of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in declaring PTA in default.

Annulment of judgment is not

the proper remedy

PTA was acting in a proprietary

character

A special civil action for certiorari

under Rule 65 is proper only when

there is no other plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[29][14] the Court had the occasion to state:

x x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for certiorari. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][6] Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984,November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723, 733.

[2][6] Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984,November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723, 733.

[3][7] G.R. No. 168215,June 9, 2009, 589 SCRA 33, 37.

[4][8] Rollo, p. 28.

[5][10] DatedFebruary 17, 2004.

[6][11] Rollo, p. 46.

[7][9] City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, G.R. Nos. 140743, 140745 and 141451-52,September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 33, 61.

[8][9] City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, G.R. Nos. 140743, 140745 and 141451-52,September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 33, 61.

[9][10] DatedFebruary 17, 2004.

[10][11] Rollo, p. 46.

[11][12] City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, supra note 8, at 51.

[12][12] City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, supra note 8, at 51.

[13][13] United States of America v. Ruiz, No. L-35645, May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 487.

[14][13] United States of America v. Ruiz, No. L-35645, May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 487.

[15][14] 456 Phil. 755, 785-787 (2003).

[16][1] Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa; rollo, pp. 86-95.

[17][2] Dated April 6, 2004; id. at 26-33.

[18][3] Id. at 88.

[19][4] Id. at 33.

[20][5] DatedJuly 5, 2005.

[21][6] Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984,November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723, 733.

[22][7] G.R. No. 168215,June 9, 2009, 589 SCRA 33, 37.

[23][8] Rollo, p. 28.

[24][9] City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, G.R. Nos. 140743, 140745 and 141451-52,September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 33, 61.

[25][10] DatedFebruary 17, 2004.

[26][11] Rollo, p. 46.

[27][12] City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, supra note 8, at 51.

[28][13] United States of America v. Ruiz, No. L-35645, May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 487.

[29][14] 456 Phil. 755, 785-787 (2003).

Comment

CASE 2012-0041: STRADCOM CORPORATION VS. HONORABLE HILARIO L. LAQUI AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 97 AND DTECH MANAGEMENT, INC., (G.R. NO. 172712, MARCH 21, 2012, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECT/S: MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES; EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES (BRIEF TITLE: STRADCOM VS. JUDGE LAQUI)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES — Leave a comment

April 6, 2012

CASE 2012-0041: STRADCOM CORPORATION VS. HONORABLE HILARIO L. LAQUI AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 97 AND DTECH MANAGEMENT, INC., (G.R. NO. 172712, MARCH 21, 2012, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECT/S: MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES; EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES (BRIEF TITLE: STRADCOM VS. JUDGE LAQUI)

===============

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

===============

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHEN DOES A CASE BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC?

WHEN WHEN, BY VIRTUE OF SUPERVENING EVENTS,^{^[1]}^[23] THERE IS NO MORE ACTUAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND NO USEFUL PURPOSE CAN BE SERVED IN PASSING UPON THE MERITS.^{^[2]}^[24]

^{XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX}

WHEN A MOOT CASE IS FILED WITH THE COURT WHAT WILL THE COURT DO?

AS A GENERAL RULE, THE COURT WILL DECLINE JURISDICTION ON GROUND OF MOOTNESS.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHY WILL THE COURT DECLINE JURISDICTION ON GROUND OF MOOTNESS?

BECAUSE COURTS ARE CONSTITUTED TO PASS UPON SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AND THUS COURTS WILL NOT CONSIDER QUESTIONS WHERE NO ACTUAL INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED.

Where a case has become moot and academic, there is no more justiceable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value.^{^[3]}^[22] A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events,^{^[4]}^[23] there is no more actual controversy between the parties and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.^{^[5]}^[24] Since they are constituted to pass upon substantial rights, courts of justice will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved.^{^[6]}^[25] As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness.^{^[7]}^[26]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

RTC ISSUED A TRO RESTRAINING LTO TO TERMINATE DETECH’S SERVICES. LATER DETECH’S CONTRACT WITH LTO EXPIRED. DESPITE SUCH EXPIRATION, STADCOM STILL PURSUED ITS CASE AGAINST RTC ALLEDGING GRAVE ABUSE OF DECISION WHEN RTC ISSUED THE TRO. CA DENIED THE PETITION OF STADCOM ON GROUND OF MOOTNESS. WAS CA’S DECISION CORRECT?

YES. THE MAIN CASE OF DTECH HAS BEEN MOOTED BY EXPIRATION OF ITS CONTRACT WITH LTO. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS A PROVISIONAL REMEDY, AN ADJUNCT TO THE MAIN CASE SUBJECT TO THE LATTER’S OUTCOME.^{^[8]}^[31] IT IS RESORTED TO BY A LITIGANT FOR THE PRESERVATION OR PROTECTION OF HIS RIGHTS OR INTEREST AND FOR NO OTHER PURPOSE DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTION.^{^[9]}^[32]

Our perusal of the record shows that STRADCOM’s petition assailing the CA’s decision which upheld the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC had been rendered moot and academic. It is beyond dispute, after all, that DTECH commenced its main action for injunction for no other purpose than to restrain the LTO from putting into effect its termination of the 1 July 2002 MOA and, with it, DTECH’s services as sole IT provider of the verification aspect of the COCAS. In its 6 June 2003 complaint, DTECH specifically sought the following reliefs:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that:

(a) immediately upon receipt of this complaint, a temporary restraining order be issued restraining [LTO] and all other agencies, parties or persons acting for and in his behalf and under its authority from – terminating and/or otherwise giving effect and implementing the termination of the [MOA] dated July 01, 2002 and the COCAS and/or the services of [DTECH] as IT service provider of the verification aspect of the COC Authentication System; allowing any other IT service provider or party to perform the function of [DTECH] as the sole IT service provider for the verification of Certificates of Cover of motor vehicles for registration and in any way disrupting the function of [DTECH] as such, either directly or indirectly, by terminating the MOA and/or rendering the rights of the parties emanating therefrom to become ineffective, moot and academic;

(b) after due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued in the same tenor as that of the temporary restraining order herein prayed for; and

(c) thereafter, making the injunction permanent within the period of effectivity of the [MOA] by and among the LTO, IC, ISAP and [DTECH] dated July 01, 2002.^{^[10]}^[27] (underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned from the MOA, however, the engagement of DTECH as exclusive IT service provider for the verification aspect of the COCAS was only for a limited period of five years. In specifying the term of the agreement, Section 2 of the MOA provides that, “(t)he engagement of [DTECH] by ISAP as the sole IT service provider for the verification of COCs shall be five (5) years commencing on July 24, 2002 until July 24, 2007, renewable for the same period of time under such terms and conditions mutually acceptable, subject to the provisions of sections 7^{^[11]}^[28] and 8^{^[12]}^[29] hereof.”^{^[13]}^[30] Having been prompted by LTO’s supposed wrongful pre-termination of the MOA on 26 May 2003, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that DTECH’s cause of action for injunction had been mooted by the supervening expiration of the term agreed upon by the parties.

Considering that DTECH’s main case has been already mooted, it stands to reason that the issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC had likewise been mooted. Indeed, a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome.^{^[14]}^[31] It is resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interest and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.^{^[15]}^[32] Under the above-discussed factual milieu, we find no more reason to determine whether or not the RTC’s grant of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by DTECH amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOT AND ACADEMIC PRINCIPLE?

YES. A COURT WILL DECIDE A CASE, OTHERWISE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, IF IT FINDS THAT: (A) THERE IS A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION; (B) THE SITUATION IS OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER AND PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED; (C) THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE RAISED REQUIRES FORMULATION OF CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE BENCH, THE BAR, AND THE PUBLIC; AND (D) THE CASE IS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET EVADING REVIEW.^{^[16]}^[34]

While courts should abstain from expressing its opinion where no legal relief is needed or called for,^{^[17]}^[33] we are well aware of the fact that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that should automatically dissuade courts from resolving a case. Accordingly, it has been held that a court will decide a case, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.^{^[18]}^[34] None of these exceptions is, however, present in this case.

===============

SECOND DIVISION

STRADCOM CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

– versus –

HONORABLE HILARIO L. LAQUI as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97 and DTECH MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 172712

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 21, 2012

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the Decision dated 8 May 2006^{^[19]}^[1] rendered by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87233, dismissing for lack of merit the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM) which sought the nullification of the Resolutions dated 3 March 2004 and 16 August 2004 in turn issued in Civil Case No. Q03-49859 by public respondent, the Hon. Hilario Laqui, as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City.^{^[20]}^[2]

On 19 June 2003, respondent DTech Management Incorporated (DTECH), filed a complaint for injunction, with prayer for Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the Land Transportation Office (LTO), represented by Assistant Secretary Robert T. Lastimoso. Docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-49859 before the RTC,^{^[21]}^[3] the complaint alleged that, in May 2001, DTECH submitted to the LTO a proposal to remedy problems relating to Compulsory Third Party Liability (CTPL) insurance of motor vehicles, specifically the proliferation of fake or duplicate CTPL insurance policies or Certificates of Cover (COC) which resulted in non-payment of claims thereon and loss of government revenues. To determine the viability of the proposal which entailed the computerization of all CTPL insurance transactions, the LTO conducted consultations with the Insurance Commission (IC), the Insurance and Surety Association of the Philippines, Inc. (ISAP) and DTECH. An acceptable information technology (IT) solution denominated as the COC Authentication System (COCAS) was eventually approved whereby COCs issued by insurance companies would undergo authentication and verification by IT service providers chosen by ISAP. Through its own selection and bidding process, ISAP hired DTECH to undertake the COC verification process while SQL Wizard, Inc. (SQL) likewise engaged to handle the COC authentication process.^{^[22]}^[4]

DTECH further averred that, on 1 July 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed by the LTO, IC and ISAP which affirmed, among other matters, DTECH’s accreditation and qualification “as an entity that could effectively and efficiently provide the required IT services in the verification end of the COCAS.” Consistent with the MOU, the LTO, IC, ISAP and DTECH also executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on the same date, specifying the terms and conditions of DTECH’s engagement as “the sole IT service provider for the verification of COC for a term of five (5) years commencing on July 24, 2002 until July 24, 2007.” Under the MOA, verification was defined as “the act of having an authenticated COC validated through the process of the on-line verification via the internet, SMS and other present day information technology and telecommunications applications.” For each and every verification, DTECH was allowed to charge a fee of P20.00, exclusive of VAT, payable by the insurance company concerned within thirty (30) days from receipt of the billing therefor. After purportedly investing millions of pesos and exerting diligent effort to comply with its obligations under the MOA, DTECH maintained that, without any burden on public coffers, its initial operations yielded dramatic improvements and huge benefits to the government and the public.^{^[23]}^[5]

Despite the foregoing factual antecedents, however, DTECH claimed that, on 17 January 2003, LTO wrote ISAP, suggesting the termination of DTECH’s services in view of its supposed failure to interconnect with the LTO IT Motor Vehicle Registration System (LTO IT MVRS) owned and operated by STRADCOM under a Build Operate and Own (BOO) contract with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)/LTO. LTO further issued a Memorandum Circular directing that all COCs must be registered and verified under the LTO IT MVRS and that only COCs thus authenticated and verified would be thereafter accepted. The strict implementation of the foregoing directive was required in the 10 March 2003 Memorandum Circular issued by LTO, in blatant disregard of the meetings conducted by the parties to discuss the recall and/or postponement of the implementation thereof. Although the implementation of the directive was briefly suspended, the LTO went on to issue yet another Memorandum Circular on 28 April 2003, instructing all its officials and employees to accept COCs “that have been verified and authenticated on-line, real time either by [STRADCOM’s] CTPL COC Authentication Facility or ISAP-[SQL]-[DTECH].” On 26 May 2003, the LTO notified the IC, ISAP and DTECH of its termination of the 1 July 2002 MOA, in view of the latter’s failure to integrate the COCAS with the existing workflow of the LTO and its offices nationwide.^{^[24]}^[6]

DTECH maintained that LTO’s termination of its services and cancellation of the COCAS is violative of its contractual rights, the law as well as principles of fairness and due process. Since it was never a part of the parties’ agreement, DTECH’s alleged failure to interconnect with LTO MVRS is neither a valid ground for the termination of its services nor a reason to give undue advantage to STRADCOM. Emphasizing its considerable investments in the setting up the IT infrastructure required nationwide for the COCAS as well as its hiring of hundreds of personnel, installation of facilities and entry into service contracts required by the endeavor, DTECH argued that the pre-termination of the five-year term for which it was designated the sole IT provider for the verification of COCs and/or the performance of its functions by another private IT service would not only cause injustice and irreparable damage but would also engender confusion in the insurance industry and to the general public.^{^[25]}^[7]

Over the opposition interposed by the LTO, the RTC issued the 25 June 2003 order granting DTECH’s application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the termination of the implementation of the parties’ 1 July 2002 MOA.^{^[26]}^[8] Contending that the complaint was fatally defective and failed to state a cause of action, LTO filed an urgent motion to dismiss dated 8 July 2003, with opposition to DTECH’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction for lack of showing of a right in esse and the resultant irreparable injury from the act complained against.^{^[27]}^[9] On 1 August 2003, the RTC issued two (2) resolutions, denying LTO’s motion to dismiss^{^[28]}^[10] and granting DTECH’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction which was deemed necessary pending the determination of the validity of the MOA’s termination at the trial of the case on the merits.^{^[29]}^[11] Upon DTECH’s posting of the bond which was fixed at P1,500,000.00, the RTC went on to issue the corresponding writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction dated 4 August 2003, restraining LTO from implementing the termination of the MOA.^{^[30]}^[12]

On 6 August 2003, STRADCOM filed a motion for leave to admit its answer-in-intervention, manifesting its legal interest in the matter in litigation and its intent to unite with LTO in resisting the complaint. In its attached answer-in-intervention, STRADCOM averred that, on 26 March 1998, it executed with the DOTC a BOO Agreement for the implementation of infrastructure facilities in accordance with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6957, as amended by R.A. 7718. Having been authorized to design, construct and operate the IT system for the DOTC/ LTO, STRADCOM argued that the 1 July 2002 MOU and MOA breached the BOO Agreement which included the verification of COCs granted to DTECH without the requisite public bidding. With the latter’s failure to comply with its contractual undertakings despite repeated warnings, STRADCOM claimed that LTO validly terminated the MOA on 26 May 2003 and effectively mooted DTECH’s cause of action for injunction. STRADCOM likewise called attention to the prohibition against the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction against national infrastructure^{^[31]}^[13] projects like those Covered by R.A. Nos. 6957^{^[32]}^[14] and 7718.^{^[33]}^[15]

On 21 August 2003, LTO moved for the reconsideration of the RTC’s 1 August 2003 Resolution.^{^[34]}^[16] With the admission of its answer-in-intervention, STRADCOM, in turn, filed its 15 October 2003 motion for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued in the case.^{^[35]}^[17] On 3 March 2004, the RTC issued a resolution, denying the motions filed by LTO and STRADCOM upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) the pleadings so far filed required factual issues which can only be determined after trial of the case on the merits; (b) as LTO’s agents insofar as the COCAS is concerned, the IC and ISAP are not indispensable parties to the case; (c) in the absence of government capital investment thereon, the COCAS do not come within the purview of the prohibition against injunctive orders and writs under R.A. 8975; (d) there is no adequate showing that the verification of the COCs is included in the BOO Agreement between DOTC/LTO and STRADCOM which even participated in the bidding ISAP conducted for the COCAS; and, (e) DTECH was able to demonstrate that the damage it would suffer as a consequence of the pre-termination of the MOA went beyond monetary injury.^{^[36]}^[18] STRADCOM’s motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was denied for lack of merit in the RTC’s Resolution dated 16 August 2004.^{^[37]}^[19]

Aggrieved, STRADCOM filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition which, docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 87233, was dismissed for lack of merit in the herein assailed Decision dated 8 May 2006. In affirming the RTC’s Resolutions dated 3 March 2004 and 16 August 2004, the CA’s then Fourteenth Division ruled that the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued a quo was directed against the pre-termination of the 1 July 2002 MOA and not STRADCOM’s BOO Agreement with the LTO. Finding that the scope of the BOO Agreement had yet to be threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits, the CA discounted the grave abuse of discretion STRADCOM imputed against the RTC which, in issuing the injunctive writ, was found to be exercising a discretionary act outside the ambit of a writ of prohibition. Absent showing of manifest abuse, the CA desisted from interfering with the RTC’s exercise of its discretion in issuing the injunctive writ as it involved determination of factual issues which is not the function of appellate courts.^{^[38]}^[20]

Unfazed, STRADCOM filed the petition at bench, urging the reversal of the CA’s 8 May 2006 Decision on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI’S PATENT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE “COCAS” SUBJECT OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT IS NOT A “GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT” WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW PARTICULARLY COVERED BY THE BAN ON COURTS FROM ISSUING TRO/PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CONTEMPLATED BY P.D. 1818 AS AMENDED BY R.A. 8975 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 DATED JUNE 25, 1999, BY NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE BUILD-OWN-AND-OPERATE AGREEMENT EXECUTED BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION (DOTC/LTO) AND PETITIONER STRADCOM CORPORATION COVERED BY R.A. 6957, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 7718.

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI’S OBVIOUS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER STRADCOM IS IN ESTOPPEL FOR HAVING PARTICIPATED IN THE BIDDING CONDUCTED BY ISAP FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHOOSING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) SERVICE PROVIDER FOR THE COCAS WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF THE BOO AGREEMENT.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI’S PATENT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST AN ACCOMPLISHED ACT, AN ACT IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON FAIT ACOMPLI.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI’S GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED WRIT OF INJUNCTION DESPITE CLEAR AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF RESPONDENT DTECH WHO COME TO COURT OF EQUITY WITH UNCLEAN HANDS.^{^[39]}^[21]

We find the denial of STRADCOM’s petition in order.

Where a case has become moot and academic, there is no more justiceable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value.^{^[40]}^[22] A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events,^{^[41]}^[23] there is no more actual controversy between the parties and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.^{^[42]}^[24] Since they are constituted to pass upon substantial rights, courts of justice will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved.^{^[43]}^[25] As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness.^{^[44]}^[26]

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that:

(d) immediately upon receipt of this complaint, a temporary restraining order be issued restraining [LTO] and all other agencies, parties or persons acting for and in his behalf and under its authority from – terminating and/or otherwise giving effect and implementing the termination of the [MOA] dated July 01, 2002 and the COCAS and/or the services of [DTECH] as IT service provider of the verification aspect of the COC Authentication System; allowing any other IT service provider or party to perform the function of [DTECH] as the sole IT service provider for the verification of Certificates of Cover of motor vehicles for registration and in any way disrupting the function of [DTECH] as such, either directly or indirectly, by terminating the MOA and/or rendering the rights of the parties emanating therefrom to become ineffective, moot and academic;

(e) after due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued in the same tenor as that of the temporary restraining order herein prayed for; and

(f) thereafter, making the injunction permanent within the period of effectivity of the [MOA] by and among the LTO, IC, ISAP and [DTECH] dated July 01, 2002.^{^[45]}^[27] (underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned from the MOA, however, the engagement of DTECH as exclusive IT service provider for the verification aspect of the COCAS was only for a limited period of five years. In specifying the term of the agreement, Section 2 of the MOA provides that, “(t)he engagement of [DTECH] by ISAP as the sole IT service provider for the verification of COCs shall be five (5) years commencing on July 24, 2002 until July 24, 2007, renewable for the same period of time under such terms and conditions mutually acceptable, subject to the provisions of sections 7^{^[46]}^[28] and 8^{^[47]}^[29] hereof.”^{^[48]}^[30] Having been prompted by LTO’s supposed wrongful pre-termination of the MOA on 26 May 2003, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that DTECH’s cause of action for injunction had been mooted by the supervening expiration of the term agreed upon by the parties.

Considering that DTECH’s main case has been already mooted, it stands to reason that the issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC had likewise been mooted. Indeed, a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome.^{^[49]}^[31] It is resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interest and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.^{^[50]}^[32] Under the above-discussed factual milieu, we find no more reason to determine whether or not the RTC’s grant of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by DTECH amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

While courts should abstain from expressing its opinion where no legal relief is needed or called for,^{^[51]}^[33] we are well aware of the fact that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that should automatically dissuade courts from resolving a case. Accordingly, it has been held that a court will decide a case, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.^{^[52]}^[34] None of these exceptions is, however, present in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1][23] Vilando v. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, 23 August 2011.

[2][24] Samson v. Caterpillar, Inc., G.R. No. 169882, 12 September 2007, 533 SCRA 88, 96.

[3][22] Paloma v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 269, 276 (2003).

[4][23] Vilando v. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, 23 August 2011.

[5][24] Samson v. Caterpillar, Inc., G.R. No. 169882, 12 September 2007, 533 SCRA 88, 96.

[6][25] Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 153785, 3 August 2006, 497 SCRA 562, 572.

[7][26] Mendoza v. Villas, G.R. Nos. 187256, 23 February 2011, 644 SCRA 347, 357.

[8][31] Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 797, 808 (2002).

[9][32] Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation Workers’ Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 661, 682 (2003).

[10][27] Records, Vol. I, Civil Case No. Q03-49859, pp. 29-30

[11][28] On the “Responsibilities of [the] IC”

[12][29] On the “Pre-Termination of [the] Agreement”

[13][30] Records, Vol. I, Civil Case No. Q03-49859, p. 49

[14][31] Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 797, 808 (2002).

[15][32] Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation Workers’ Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 661, 682 (2003).

[16][34] Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 460.

[17][33] Korea Exchange Bank v. Hon. Rogelio C. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139460, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 166, 176.

[18][34] Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 460.

[19][1] Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Sesinando E. Villon.

[20][2] CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 87233, 8 May 2006 Decision, pp 486-502.

[21][3] Records, Vol. I, Civil Case No. Q03-49859, DTECH’s 6 June 2003 Complaint, pp. 1-32.

[22][4] Id. at 1-5.

[23][5] Id. at 6-10.

[24][6] Id. at 11-21.

[25][7] Id. at 22-29.

[26][8] RTC’s 25 June 2003 Order, id. at 84.

[27][9] LTO’s 8 July 2003 Urgent Motion to Dismiss, id. at 87-100.

[28][10] RTC’s 1 August 2003 Resolution, id. at 121-123.

[29][11] RTC’s 1 August 2003 Resolution, id. at 124-125.

[30][12] RTC’s 4 August 2003 Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, id. at 150-151.

[31][13] STRADCOM’s 6 August 2003 Answer-In-Intervention, id. at 154-162.

[32][14] An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for Other Purposes.

[33][15] An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for Other Purposes.

[34][16] Records, Vol. I, Civil Case No. Q03-49859, LTO’s 19 August 2003 Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 200-214.

[35][17] STRADCOM’s 15 October 2003 Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction, id. at 255-261.

[36][18] RTC’s 3 March 2004 Resolution, id. at 308-315.

[37][19] RTC’s 16 August 2004 Resolution, id. at 367-369.

[38][20] CA rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 87233, 8 May 2006 Decision, pp. 486-502.

[39][21] Rollo, p. 11.

[40][22] Paloma v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 269, 276 (2003).

[41][23] Vilando v. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, 23 August 2011.

[42][24] Samson v. Caterpillar, Inc., G.R. No. 169882, 12 September 2007, 533 SCRA 88, 96.

[43][25] Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 153785, 3 August 2006, 497 SCRA 562, 572.

[44][26] Mendoza v. Villas, G.R. Nos. 187256, 23 February 2011, 644 SCRA 347, 357.

[45][27] Records, Vol. I, Civil Case No. Q03-49859, pp. 29-30

[46][28] On the “Responsibilities of [the] IC”

[47][29] On the “Pre-Termination of [the] Agreement”

[48][30] Records, Vol. I, Civil Case No. Q03-49859, p. 49

[49][31] Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 797, 808 (2002).

[50][32] Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation Workers’ Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 661, 682 (2003).

[51][33] Korea Exchange Bank v. Hon. Rogelio C. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139460, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 166, 176.

[52][34] Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 460.

Comment

J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

Latest Entries »

CASE 2012-0042: PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC. (G.R. NO. 176628, MARCH 19, 2012, BRION, J.) SUBJECT/S: JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT; ACTS OF COUNSEL BINDS CLIENT/ EXCEPTION; APPEAL VIS A VIS CERTIORARI; EXTRINSIC FRAUD (BRIEF TITLE: PTA VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF)

Archives

Categories

Email Subscription

Friends & links

Pages

Monthly archives