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CASE 2017-0027– DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) VS. BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION & AD HOC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (G.R. NO. 225051, 19 JULY 2017, PERALTA, J.) (SUBJECT/S: APPLICATION OF CERTIORARI IN ARBITRATION) (BRIEF TITLE: DFA VS BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND AD HOC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the petition for failure to observe the rules on court intervention allowed by RA No. 9285 and the Special ADR Rules, specifically Rule 19.36 and Rule 19.37 of the latter, in the pending arbitration proceedings of the parties to this case.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

THE AD HOC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL ADMITTED RESPONDENT’S AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIMS. PETITIONER FILED THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI  ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. IS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI PROPER?

 

NO. THE ORDER BEING QUESTIONED IS NOT FROM A JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS BUT ONLY FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL.

 

“It is clear that an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court is from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals and only questions of law may be raised. There have been instances when we overlooked the rule on hierarchy of courts and took cognizance of a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by the Regional Trial Court when it granted interim relief to a party and issued an Order assailed by the petitioner, considering the transcendental importance of the issue involved therein35 or to better serve the ends of justice when the case is determined on the merits rather on technicality.36 However, in this case, the appeal by certiorari is not from a final Order of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, but from an interlocutory order of the Arbitral Tribunal; hence, the petition must be dismissed.”

 

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SCD-2017-0027-Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Vs. BCA International Corporation & Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal

 

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CASE 2017-0026– HON. MYLYN P. CAYABYAB, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF LUBAO, PAMPANGA AND ANGELITO L. DAVID, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE BARANGAY CHAIRMAN OF PRADO SIONGCO, LUBAO, PAMPANGA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EMMANUEL SANTOS VS. JAIME C. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT, CARMELA R. DIMSON AND IRENE R. DIMSON (G.R. NO. 223862, 1O JULY 2017,  PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (SUBJECT/S: CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT AS BASIS OF CERTIORARI; ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS PRESUMED REGULAR) (BRIEF TITLE: MAYOR CAYABYAB VS. JAIME C. DIMSON).

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 18, 2015 and the Resolution dated March 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138699 are hereby SET ASIDE.

 

SO ORDERED.’

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

CAN YOU OPERATE A BUSINESS MERELY BECAUSE THE BUSINESS IS LEGITIMATE IN NATURE?

 

NO. YOU MUST FIRST OBTAIN A BUSINESS PERMIT FROM THE MUNICIPALITY OR CITY.

 

“A business permit must be secured from the municipal business permits and licensing office in order for the business to legally operate in the locality.41 While poultry farming is admittedly a legitimate business, it cannot operate without a business permit, which expires on the 31st of December of every year and must be renewed before the end of January of the following year.”

 

IN THIS CASE COMPLAINTS FROM NEIGHBORING BARANGAYS WERE RECEIVED BY THE OFFICE OF MAYOR CAYABYAB BEWAILING THE FOUL ODOR COMING FROM THE SAID FARM, 42 WHICH WAS CONFIRMED UPON OCULAR INSPECTION CONDUCTED BY THE HEALTH AND SANITATION OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF LUBAO, PAMPANGA. IS THE OCULAR INSPECTION FINDING VALID?

 

YES. SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE PRESUMED TO BE REGULAR AND VALID, UNLESS SUFFICIENTLY SHOWN TO BE OTHERWISE.

  

“In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson filed any application for renewal of his business permit to operate the subject poultry farm in 2014, apparently due to his failure to secure the necessary barangay clearance which was not issued based on complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said farm. Records show that complaints from neighboring barangays were received by the office of Mayor Cayabyab bewailing the foul odor coming from the said farm, 42 which was confirmed upon ocular inspection conducted by the Health and Sanitation Office of the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga.43 Settled is the rule that acts of public officers are presumed to be regular and valid, unless sufficiently shown to be otherwise.44 In this case, Dimson was unable to refute the finding that foul odor is being emitted by his farm, having failed to present the inspection report of the sanitary officer who purportedly did not note any such foul smell in the fann.45 Not having passed the necessary sanitation standard, there was, therefore, a prima facie valid reason for the withholding of the required barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the renewal of Dimson’s business permit to operate.

 

Having failed to apply for and secure the necessary business pennit to operate in 2014 on account of his inability to obtain the required barangay clearance due to non-compliance with a requirement standard,46 Dimson may not legally operate in the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, thereby, warranting the issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the CDO and the Closure Order. Accordingly, no error, much less grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed on the RTC in denying Dimson’s application for the issuance of a TRO against the said orders. In the absence of a business permit, Dimson has no clear legal right to resume his operations pending final determination by the RTC of the merits of the main case for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law, which is not extant in the present case. It is settled that the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance of an injunctive.”

 

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SCD-2017-0026-Hon. Mylyn P. Cayabyab, in her capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga . . . . .

 

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CASE 2017-0025– REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ET AL./EUFEMIA C. CULLAMAT, ET AL. VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTER, ET AL./NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 231658/G.R. NO. 231771/G.R. NO. 231774. JULY 4, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (BRIEF TITLE: REP LAGMAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MEDIALDEA)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CRIME BEING COMMITTED IN MARAWI IS TERRORISM AND NOT REBELLION. THUS, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR MARTIAL LAW SINCE THERE IS NO REBELLION. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?

 

IT IS NOT CORRECT.

 

REBELLION MAY BE SUBSUMED UNDER THE CRIME OF TERRORISM WHICH HAS A BROADER SCOPE. REBELLION IS ONLY ONE OF THE VARIOUS MEANS BY WHICH TERRORISM CAN BE COMMITTED.

 

“It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has be’ n ongoing for decades. While some groups have sought legal and peace 1 means, others have resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope  covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed, However, while

the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a “‘terrorist” is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

 

In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.

 

In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that “[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government.” Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial  law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. . . .”

 

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SCD-2017-0025- Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, et al

 

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