Category: Uncategorized


CASE 2011-0138: MAXIMINA A. BULAWAN VS. EMERSON B. AQUENDE (G.R. NO. 182819, 22 JUNE 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECT: ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT; ANNULMENT OF TITLE, RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: BULAWAN VS. AQUENDE)

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES, Uncategorized — 1 Comment
July 3, 2011

CASE 2011-0138: MAXIMINA A. BULAWAN VS. EMERSON B. AQUENDE (G.R. NO. 182819, 22 JUNE 2011, CARPIO,  J.) SUBJECT: ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT; ANNULMENT OF TITLE, RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: BULAWAN VS. AQUENDE)

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES:

 In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.26 Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.27 The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.28 On the other hand, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case the judgment or final order and resolution are void.29 Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void.30

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Moreover, annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.31 Consequently, an action for annulment of judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or implemented.32

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Moreover, a person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.42 In National Housing Authority v. Evangelista,43 we said:

 

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial court’s decision decreed that “(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs.” Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent’s title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Clearly, the trial court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned.44 (Emphasis supplied)

 

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SECOND DIVISION

 

MAXIMINA A. BULAWAN,Petitioner,- versus –

EMERSON B. AQUENDE,

Respondent.

 G.R. No. 182819Present:CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 22, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

 

This is a petition for review1 of the 26 November 2007 Decision2 and 7 May 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91763. In its 26 November 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondent Emerson B. Aquende’s (Aquende) petition for annulment of judgment and declared the 26 November 1996 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City, Branch 6 (trial court) void. In its 7 May 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner Maximina A. Bulawan’s5 (Bulawan) motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

 

On 1 March 1995, Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages against Lourdes Yap (Yap) and the Register of Deeds before the trial court docketed as Civil Case No. 9040.6 Bulawan claimed that she is the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13733 having bought the property from its owners, brothers Santos and Francisco Yaptengco (Yaptengco brothers), who claimed to have inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun.7 Bulawan alleged that Yap claimed ownership of the same property and caused the issuance of TCT No. 40292 inYap’s name.

In her Answer,8 Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of Lot No. 1634-A of Psd-187165, which she claimed is the controlling subdivision survey for Lot No. 1634. Yap also mentioned that, in Civil Case No. 5064, the trial court already declared that Psd-153847 was simulated by the Yaptengco brothers and that their claim on Lot No. 1634-B was void.9 The trial court likewise adjudged Yap Chin Cun as the rightful owner of Lot No. 1634-B.Yap also stated that Lot No. 1634-B was sold by Yap Chin Cun to the Aquende family.

On 26 November 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of Bulawan. The trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff (Bulawan) and against the defendant (Yap) declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner and possesor of the property in question, particularly designated as Lot 1634-B of Plan Psd-153847. The defendant Lourdes Yap is hereby ordered to respect the plaintiff’s ownership and possession of said lot and to desist from disturbing the plaintiff in her ownership and possession of said lot.

Subdivision Plan Psd-187165 for Lot 1634 Albay Cadastre as well as TCT No. 40292 in the name of plaintiff10 over Lot 1634-A of Plan Psd-187165 are hereby declared null and void and the Register of Deeds of Legazpi City is hereby ordered to cancel as well as any other certificate of title issued pursuant to said Plan Psd-187165.

Defendant Lourdes Yap is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees, P5,000.00 as litigation and incidental expenses and the costs.

SO ORDERED.11

Yapappealed. On 20 July 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissedYap’s appeal.

On 7 February 2002, the trial court’s 26 November 2006 Decision became final and executory per entry of judgment dated 20 July 2001. On 19 July 2002, the trial court issued a writ of execution.12

In a letter dated 24 July 2002,13 the Register of Deeds informed Aquende of the trial court’s writ of execution and required Aquende to produce TCT No. 40067 so that a memorandum of the lien may be annotated on the title. On 25 July 2002, Aquende wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds questioning the trial court’s writ of execution against his property.14 Aquende alleged that he was unaware of any litigation involving his property having received no summons or notice thereof, nor was he aware of any adverse claim as no notice of lis pendens was inscribed on the title.

On 2 August 2002, Aquende filed a Third Party Claim15 against the writ of execution because it affected his property and, not being a party in Civil Case No. 9040, he argued that he is not bound by the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision. In a letter dated 5 August 2002,16 the Clerk of Court said that a Third Party Claim was not the proper remedy because the sheriff did not levy upon or seize Aquende’s property. Moreover, the property was not in the sheriff’s possession and it was not about to be sold by virtue of the writ of execution.

Aquende then filed a Notice of Appearance with Third Party Motion17 and prayed for the partial annulment of the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision, specifically the portion which ordered the cancellation of Psd-187165 as well as any other certificate of title issued pursuant to Psd-187165. Aquende also filed a Supplemental Motion18 where he reiterated that he was not a party in Civil Case No. 9040 and that since the action was in personam or quasi in rem, only the parties in the case are bound by the decision.

In its 19 February 2003 Order,19 the trial court denied Aquende’s motions. According to the trial court, it had lost jurisdiction to modify its 26 November 1996 Decision when the Court of Appeals affirmed said decision.

Thereafter, Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.20 Aquende alleged that he was deprived of his property without due process of law. Aquende argued that there was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan conveniently failed to implead him despite her knowledge of the existing title in his name and, thus, prevented him from participating in the proceedings and protecting his title. Aquende also alleged that Bulawan was in collusion with Judge Vladimir B. Brusola who, despite knowledge of the earlier decision in Civil Case No. 5064 on the ownership of Lot No. 1634-B and Aquende’s interest over the property, ruled in favor of Bulawan. Aquende added that he is an indispensable party and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not impleaded as a party in the case. Aquende also pointed out that the trial court went beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the allegations on the complaint because Bulawan did not pray for the cancellation of Psd-187165 and TCT No. 40067. Aquende likewise argued that a certificate of title should not be subject to collateral attack and it cannot be altered, modified or canceled except in direct proceedings in accordance with law.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Aquende. The 26 November 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 26, 1996 in Civil Case No. 9040 is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 40067 registered in the name of petitioner Emerson B. Aquende and (LRC) Psd-187165 are hereby ordered REINSTATED. Entry Nos. 3823 – A, B and C annotated by the Register of Deeds of Legazpi City on TCT No. 40067 are hereby ordered DELETED.

The parties are hereby DIRECTED to respect and abide by the Decision dated October 31, 1990 in Civil Case No. 5064 quieting title over Lot No. 1634-B (LRC) Psd-187165, now registered in the name of Emerson Aquende under TCT No. 40067.

SO ORDERED.21

 

On 8 January 2008, Bulawan filed a motion for reconsideration.22 In its 7 May 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Bulawan’s motion.

Hence, this petition.

 

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 

The Court of Appeals ruled that it may still entertain the petition despite the fact that another division of the Court of Appeals already affirmed the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision. The other division of the Court of Appeals was not given the opportunity to rule on the issue of Aquende being an indispensable party because that issue was not raised during the proceedings before the trial court and on appeal.

The Court of Appeals declared that Aquende was an indispensable party who was adversely affected by the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision. The Court of Appeals said that the trial court should have impleaded Aquende under Section 11, Rule 323 of the Rules of Court. Since jurisdiction was not properly acquired over Aquende, the Court of Appeals declared the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision void. According to the Court of Appeals, Aquende had no other recourse but to seek the nullification of the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision that unduly deprived him of his property.

The Court of Appeals added that the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision was void because the trial court failed to note that the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Partition, from where the Yaptengco brothers derived their ownership over Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 allegedly as heirs of Yap Chin Cun and now being claimed by Bulawan, had already been declared void in Civil Case No. 5064.24 The Court of Appeals also said that a reading of Bulawan’s complaint showed that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order the nullification of Psd-187165 and TCT No. 40067 because this was not one of the reliefs that Bulawan prayed for.

The Issues

 

Bulawan raises the following issues:

I.

The Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals decided contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence when it declared the Decision, dated 26 November 1996, in Civil Case No. 9040 null and void considering that a petition for annulment [of judgment] under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is an equitable remedy which is available only under extraordinary circumstances.

II.

The Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals decided contrary to law when it considered Respondent Emerson B. Aquende as an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 9040.

III.

The Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals sanctioned a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it overturned a final and executory decision of another Division thereof.25

 

 

 

The Ruling of the Court

 

The petition has no merit.

Petition for Annulment of Judgment

is the Proper Remedy

 

Bulawan argues that the Court of Appeals erred in granting Aquende’s petition for annulment of judgment in the absence of extrinsic fraud and the existence of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Bulawan adds that the Court of Appeals erred because it annulled a decision which had already been considered and affirmed by another division of the Court of Appeals. According to Bulawan, the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision is already final and had been fully executed.

In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.26 Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.27 The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.28 On the other hand, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case the judgment or final order and resolution are void.29 Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void.30

In his petition for annulment of judgment, Aquende alleged that there was extrinsic fraud because he was prevented from protecting his title when Bulawan and the trial court failed to implead him as a party. Bulawan also maintained that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and, therefore, its 26 November 1996 Decision is not binding on him. In its 26 November 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals found merit in Aquende’s petition and declared that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Aquende, who was adversely affected by its 26 November 1996 Decision. We find no error in the findings of the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.31 Consequently, an action for annulment of judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or implemented.32

Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it took cognizance of Aquende’s petition for annulment of judgment and overturned the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision even if another division of the Court of Appeals had already affirmed it and it had already been executed.

The Court also notes that when the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision, it had not been given the occasion to rule on the issue of Aquende being an indispensable party and, if in the affirmative, whether the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over his person. This question had not been raised before the trial court and earlier proceedings before the Court of Appeals.

Aquende is a Proper Party to Sue

for the Annulment of the Judgment

Bulawan argues that Aquende was not an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 9040 because the lot Aquende claims ownership of is different from the subject matter of the case. Bulawan clarifies that she claims ownership of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847, while Aquende claims ownership of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-187165. Bulawan argues that even if Aquende will be affected by the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision, this will not make him an indispensable party.

Contrary to Bulawan’s argument, it appears that Aquende’s Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-187165 and Bulawan’s Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 actually refer to the same Lot No. 1634-B originally owned by Yap Chin Cun. Both Aquende and Bulawan trace their ownership of the property to Yap Chin Cun. Aquende maintains that he purchased the property from Yap Chin Cun, while Bulawan claims to have purchased the property from the Yaptengco brothers, who alleged that they inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. However, as the Court of Appeals declared, the title of the Yaptengco brothers over Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 had already been cancelled and they were forever enjoined not to disturb the right of ownership and possession of Yap Chin Cun.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation.33 As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,34 we said:

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely “when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed.” The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.35

During the proceedings before the trial court, the answers of Yap36 and the Register of Deeds37 should have prompted the trial court to inquire further whether there were other indispensable parties who were not impleaded. The trial court should have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as defendant or to order Bulawan to do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.38 The burden to implead or to order the impleading of indispensable parties is placed on Bulawan and on the trial court, respectively.39

However, even if Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file a petition for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled.40 What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby.41

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Bulawan obtained a favorable judgment from the trial court by the use of fraud. Bulawan prevented Aquende from presenting his case before the trial court and from protecting his title over his property. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the 26 November 1996 Decision adversely affected Aquende as he was deprived of his property without due process.

Moreover, a person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.42 In National Housing Authority v. Evangelista,43 we said:

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial court’s decision decreed that “(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs.” Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent’s title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Clearly, the trial court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned.44 (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, Aquende was never made a party in Civil Case No. 9040. Yet, the trial court ordered the cancellation of Psd-187165 and any other certificate of title issued pursuant to Psd-187165, including Aquende’s TCT No. 40067. Aquende was adversely affected by such judgment as his title was cancelled without giving him the opportunity to present his evidence to prove his ownership of the property.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 November 2007 Decision and 7 May 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91763.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

 

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1006 dated 10 June 2011.

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Rollo, pp. 57-81. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. DeLeon, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) concurring.

3Id. at 83-85.

4 CA rollo, pp. 65-76. Penned by Judge Vladimir B. Brusola.

5 Substituted by her legal heirs, namely: Helena A. Bulawan, Araceli B. Vargas, Henry A. Bulawan, Mario A. Bulawan and Cesar A. Bulawan. Bulawan died on 23 April 2009.

6 CA rollo, pp. 165-168.

7 Alias Antonio Luna.

8 CA rollo, pp. 184-185.

9Id. at 158-160. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s 31 October 1990 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the plaintiff (Yap Chin Cun) is hereby declared the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of the cadastral survey of Legazpi described in the technical description marked as Exhibit N and his title thereto is quieted and the defendants (Yaptengco brothers) are hereby forever enjoined not to disturb the right of ownership and possession of the plaintiff. That the document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Partition executed by and among the Yaptengcos is hereby declared null and void, as Yap Chin Cun is presently much alive, hence, there is no reason for its execution. That TCT No. 13733 issued to Santos Yaptengco and Francisco Yaptengco for Lot No. 1634-B is ordered cancelled. That all the defendants be ordered to pay to plaintiff P5,000 for attorney’s fees and P1,000 for miscellaneous expenses. The Register of Deeds is hereby directed to register and implement this decision. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds of Legazpi.

10 Rollo, p. 247. In its 13 December 1996 Order, the trial court corrected the typographical error. It should have been “defendantLourdesYap” instead of plaintiff.

11Id. at 57-58.

12Id. at 262-263.

13 CA rollo, p. 78.

14Id. at 188-189.

15Id. at 190-191.

16Id. at 192-193.

17Id. at 194-222.

18Id. at 249-259.

19Id. at 260.

20Id. at 2-64.

21 Rollo, pp. 80-81.

22 CA rollo, pp. 427-438.

23 Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded separately.

24 The Yaptengco brothers appealed the trial court’s 31 October 1990 Decision to the Court of Appeals. However, in its 6 December 1991 Resolution, the Court of Appeals considered the appeal abandoned and dismissed the same. There was entry of judgment on 1 January 1992. The trial court issued a writ of execution on 6 July 1992.

25 Rollo, p. 16.

26 Rules of Court, Rule 47, Sec. 2.

27 Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 507 Phil. 682 (2005).

28 Carillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121165, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 66; Alaban v. Court of Appeals, supra.

29 National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, 497 Phil. 762 (2005); Capacete v. Baroro, 453 Phil. 392 (2003).

30 Rules of Court, Rule 47, Sec. 7.

31 Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 258 Phil. 802 (1989), Alaban v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27; Carillo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28.

32 Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, supra.

33 Servicewide Specialists, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103301, 8 December 1995, 251 SCRA 70.

34 345 Phil. 250 (1997).

35Id. at 267-268.

36 Rollo, pp. 198-199.

37Id. at 201-202.

38 Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded separately.

39 Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, supra.

40 Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, supra note 31; Alaban v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27.

41Id.

42 National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, supra note 29; Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 222 (2000); Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34.

43 Supra note 29.

44Id. at 770-771.

Comment

CASE 2011-0101: MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DANTE O. TINGA (G.R. NO. 193846, 12 APRIL 2011, NACHURA, J.) SUBJECT: POWER OF SC TO REVIEW ORDER OF DIVISION OF COMELEC. (BRIEF TITLE: CAYETANO VS. COMELEC).

Filed under: Uncategorized — 3 Comments
April 28, 2011

 

CASE 2011-0101: MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DANTE O. TINGA (G.R. NO. 193846, 12 APRIL 2011, NACHURA, J.) SUBJECT: POWER OF SC TO REVIEW ORDER OF DIVISION OF COMELEC. (BRIEF TITLE: CAYETANO VS. COMELEC).

Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Baguio City

 

EN BANC

 

MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO,

Petitioner,   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                 – versus –

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DANTE O. TINGA,

Respondents.

  

 

 

 G.R. No. 193846

Present:

 

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DELCASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 12, 2011

x—————————————————————————————–x

 

 

RESOLUTION

 

NACHURA, J.:

 

 

          Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders issued by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), through its Second Division, dated August 23, 2010[1][1] and September 7, 2010,[2][2] respectively. The two Orders were issued in relation to the election protest, docketed as EPC No. 2010-44, filed by private respondent Dante O. Tinga against petitioner Maria Laarni Cayetano.

          In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner thereof on May 12, 2010, receiving a total of Ninety-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Five (95,865) votes as against the Ninety-Three Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Five (93,445) votes received by private respondent.

On May 24, 2010, private respondent filed an Election Protest against petitioner before the COMELEC. Private respondent’s protest listed election frauds and irregularities allegedly committed by petitioner, which translated to the latter’s ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City. On the whole, private respondent claims that he is the actual winner of the mayoralty elections inTaguigCity.

         Posthaste, petitioner filed her Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim on June 7, 2010. Petitioner raised, among others, the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of the Election Protest and prayed for the immediate dismissal thereof.

          On July 1, 2010, the COMELEC held a preliminary conference and issued an Order granting private respondent a period within which to file the appropriate responsive pleading to the Answer of petitioner. The COMELEC likewise stated that it will rule on the affirmative defenses raised by petitioner.

          As previously adverted to, the COMELEC issued the assailed Preliminary Conference Order dated August 23, 2010, finding the protest filed by private respondent and counter-protest filed by petitioner to be sufficient in form and substance. Effectively, the COMELEC denied petitioner’s affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and substance of the protest filed by private respondent. The Order reads:

            WHEREFORE, finding the instant protest and the counter-protest to be sufficient in form and substance, the Commission (Second Division) hereby:

            1.         DIRECTS [private respondent] to make a cash deposit [of] ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,609,500.00) to defray the expenses for the recount of the ballots as well as for other incidental expenses relative thereto pertaining to the 217 clustered protested precincts composed of 1,073 established precinct[s] at the rate of P1,500.00 for each precinct as required in Section 2 Rule II of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 payable in three (3) equal installments every twenty (20) days starting within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

 

            2.         DIRECTS [petitioner] to make a cash deposit of TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P2,811,000.00) to defray the expenses for the recount of the ballots as well as for other incidental expenses relative thereto pertaining to the 380 protested clustered precinct[s] composed of 1,874 established precincts at the rate of P1,500.00 for each precinct as required in Section 2[,] Rule II of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 payable in three (3) equal installments every twenty (20) days starting within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

 

            3.         DIRECTS the City Election Officer (EO) of Taguig City, to gather and collect the subject contested ballot boxes containing the ballots, and their keys from the City Treasurer of Taguig City and to deliver the same to ECAD, COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the ballot boxes from said Treasurer with prior notice to herein parties who may wish to send their respective duly authorized representatives to accompany the same, observing strict measures to protect the safety and integrity of the ballot boxes;

 

            4.         DIRECTS [private respondent] and [petitioner] to provide for the needed vehicle/s to the EO for the gathering and transportation of the subject contested ballot boxes. All expenses for the retrieval and transportation of the said ballot boxes shall be borne by both [private respondent] and [petitioner];

 

            5.         AUTHORIZES the City Election Officer to secure a sufficient number of security personnel either from the PNP or the AFP in connection with the afore-directed gathering and transportation of the subject ballot boxes;

 

            6.         DIRECTS [private respondent] to shoulder the travel expenses, per diems and necessary allowance of the COMELEC personnel, which include the PES and at most two (2) support staff, and the PNP/AFP personnel acting as security; and

 

            7.         DIRECTS the herein parties to shoulder the travelling expenses of their respective counsels and watchers.

            8.         DIRECTS [private respondent] in the protest proper and [petitioner] in the counter protest to bear the expenses for the rental of the Precinct Count Optical System (PCOS) machine that will be used for the authentication of the ballots as well as the payment for the information Technology Expert (IT Expert) who will assist in the authentication of the ballots, unless they are both willing to stipulate on the authenticity of the said ballots cast in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. DIRECTS further that in case [private respondent] agree[s] to stipulate on the authenticity of the ballots and [petitioner] raises the issue of authenticity, [petitioner] shall be the one to bear the fee for the rent of the PCOS machine as well as the service of the IT Expert.

            9.         DIRECTS the parties to file a manifestation whether they intend to secure photocopies of the contested ballots within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of this Order. No belated request for the photocopying of ballots shall be entertained by this Commission (Second Division). The photocopying shall be done simultaneous with the recount of the ballots considering that the ballot box storage area is no longer near the recount room.

 

            The pertinent Order for the constitution of Recount Committees and the schedule of recount shall be issued after the arrival of the subject ballot boxes and after the required cash deposits shall have been paid by [private respondent].

            The Preliminary Conference is hereby ordered terminated. The parties are given three (3) days from receipt hereof to file their comment, suggestions or corrections, if any, to this Preliminary Conference Order. After the lapse of said period, no more comment, suggestion or correction shall be entertained, and this Preliminary Conference Order shall thereafter be valid and binding upon the parties.[3][3]

          Thereafter, on August 31, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Preliminary Conference Order relative to the denial of her affirmative defenses. Private respondent filed a Comment and Opposition thereto. Consequently, the COMELEC issued the second assailed Order dated September 7, 2010, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

          Hence, this petition for certiorari positing the singular issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and content.

          Not unexpectedly, private respondent refutes the allegations of petitioner and raises the procedural infirmity in the instant petition, i.e., the power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC under Section 3,[4][4] Article IX-C of the Constitution, pursuant to the leading case of Repol v. COMELEC.[5][5] Private respondent likewise counters that the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion.

          Adamantly, petitioner insists that the case at bar differs from Repol since the herein assailed Orders constituted a final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) on that particular issue. Moreover, petitioner maintains that the COMELEC patently committed grave abuse of discretion.

          We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s proposition. The landmark case of Repol, as affirmed in the subsequent cases of Soriano, Jr.  v. COMELEC[6][6] and Blanco v. COMELEC,[7][7] leaves no room for equivocation.

          Reviewing well-settled jurisprudence on the power of this Court to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, or final resolution of a division of the COMELEC, Soriano definitively ruled, thus:

In the 2004 case of Repol v. Commission on Elections, the Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In Repol, what was assailed was a status quo ante Order without any time limit, and more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the COMELEC First Division issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court held that the status quo ante Order of the COMELEC First Division was actually a temporary restraining order because it ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime. Since the status quo ante Order, which was qualified by the phrase “until further orders from this Commission,” had a lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order clearly violates the rule that a temporary restraining order has an effective period of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the COMELEC’s denial of preliminary injunction. The Court held:

“Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus:
            SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in Division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied.)
            Under this constitutional provision, the COMELEC en banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Clearly, the assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory, should first be resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a motion for reconsideration.
            Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the instances over which the COMELEC en banc can take cognizance of the case. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

            SEC. 2. The Commission En Banc. — The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the Members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc.

The present case is not one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the COMELEC may sit en banc. Neither is this case one where a division is not authorized to act nor a case where the members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the issue to the COMELEC en banc. Thus, the COMELEC en banc is not even the proper forum where Repol may bring the assailed interlocutory Order for resolution.
We held in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that —

Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in division [cannot] dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed x x x.
            Repol went directly to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, as follows:
            Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
            We have interpreted this constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)

            However, this rule is not ironclad. In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, we stated —

            This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

            The Court further pointed out in ABS-CBN that an exception was warranted under the peculiar circumstances of the case since there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the 11 May 1998 elections. The same can be said in Repol’s case. We rule that direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is justified under the circumstances obtaining in the present case. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

            The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.

            Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining order without a time limit, which is the Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period, which is the Kho case.

            This Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro,that “it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.” The exception provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case because unlike in Kho and Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC First Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The assailed orders in this case involve the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the Rosal case apply because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case were already consolidated.[8][8]

Plainly, from the foregoing, the Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A  of the Constitution.

          Petitioner’s assertion that circumstances prevailing herein are different from the factual milieu attendant in Repol has no merit. As stated in Soriano, “the general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari.” In short, the final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before this Court even via a petition for certiorari.

          True, the aforestated rule admits of exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same.[9][9] Unfortunately for petitioner, none of the circumstances permitting an exception to the rule occurs in this instance.

          Finally, certiorari will not lie in this case.

          The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two prerequisites: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10][10]


          Although it is not the duty of the Court to point petitioner, or all litigants for that matter, to the appropriate remedy which she should have taken, we refer her to the cue found in Soriano, i.e., “[t]he aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc.” In addition, the protest filed by private respondent and the counter-protest filed by petitioner remain pending before the COMELEC, which should afford petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances.  Thereafter, the COMELEC should decide these cases with dispatch.

          WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

            SO ORDERED.

 

                                                ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                                Associate Justice

         

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

     PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.  

Associate Justice

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

 

 

 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

 

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

 

                                                RENATO C. CORONA

                                                Chief Justice

 

 

 

[1][1]           Rollo, pp. 32-43.

[2][2]          Id. at 44.

[3][3]           Supra note 1, at 41-43.

[4][4]           Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

[5][5]           G.R. No. 161418, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 321.

[6][6]           G.R. Nos. 164496-505, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 88.

[7][7]           G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 755.

[8][8]           Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 6, at 102-107. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

[9][9]           Kho v. COMELEC, 344 Phil. 878, 886 (1997).

[10][10]         See RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1.

Comment

CASE 2011-0095: PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK VS. RAMON VALENZUELA (G.R. NO. 163530, 9 MARCH 2011, PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. (BRIEF TITLE: PHILIPPINE VETERAN’S BANK VS. VALENZUELA).

Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES, Uncategorized — 2 Comments
April 10, 2011

CASE NO. 2011-0095: PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK VS. RAMON VALENZUELA (G.R. NO. 163530, 9 MARCH 2011,  PERALTA, J.) SUBJECT: CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. (BRIEF TITLE: PHILIPPINE VETERAN’S BANK VS. VALENZUELA).

 

  

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

 

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK,Petitioner,

– versus –

RAMON VALENZUELA,

Respondent.

 G.R. No. 163530Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,*

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 9, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

 

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the November 4, 2003 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,Bulacan, Branch 8 in Case No. P-261-97, which dismissed herein petitioner’s Petition for Correction of Entry in a Transfer Certificate of Title covering a property which it bought in a foreclosure sale.

The petition, which was filed with the trial court on June 27, 1997, alleged as follows:

1. [Philippine Veterans Bank] PVB is a private commercial bank duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines x x x.

2. PVB, as a banking institution, grants loan, among others, to its clients.

3. On various dates, Cafe Valenzuela, Inc. obtained a loan from PVB in the total amount of PESOS: SIX MILLION (P 6,000,000.00). As a security for said loan, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM), which was amended on March 8, 1979 and on June 22, 1979 (AREMs), was executed byEnrico Valenzuela as representative of Cafe Valenzuela, Inc. and as Attorney-in-Fact of Spouses Maximo and Honorata Valenzuela, covering several parcels of land, including TCT No. T-105375 which was subsequently reconstituted as TCT No. RT-35677, registered in the name of SpousesMaximo and Honorata Valenzuela.

x x x x

4. Cafe Valenzuela, Inc. failed to fully pay its loan obligation. It has failed and continues to fail and/or refuse to pay its outstanding principal obligation. As a result, PVB, executed an application for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the REM, particularly TCT No. T-105375. The same property was subsequently sold by public auction and was awarded to PVB for being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale in the amount of P1,923,878.40dated 31 July 1985 was issued to this effect, x x x.

5. PVB proceeded to register the said certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds (ROD) of Malolos, Bulacan on 23 July 1986. It was entered as Entry No. 9242 as shown in the stamp of the ROD at the back of the certificate of sale which is on file with the PVB. x x x

6. Entry No. 9242 was thereby annotated on TCT No. T-105375. However, the contents of the certificate of sale in the amount of P1,923,878.40 dated 31 July 1985 issued to PVB was not reflected in the Entry No. 9242. Instead, the contents of another certificate of sale in the amount ofP31,496.00 dated 15 April 1986, which was simultaneously registered, was erroneously copied. The latter certificate of sale was entered as Entry No. 9244 on TCT No. T-249213 which is now reconstituted as TCT No. RT-35700.

x x x x

7. The fees paid for by the PVB with the ROD relative to the registration of the certificate of sale also shows payment of fees corresponding to the amount of P1,923,878.40.

x x x x

8. Entry No. 9242 must therefore be corrected to reflect the true contents of certificate of sale dated 31 July 1985 in the amount of P1,923,878.40to avoid confusion and to put in proper order Entry No. 9242.

x x x x2

Herein respondent then filed an Opposition with Motion to Dismiss claiming that: (1) he is one of the legitimate children of the spousesMaximo and Honorata Valenzuela, who are the registered owners of the subject property covered by TCT No. T-105375; (2) EnricoValenzuela’s authority as the attorney-in-fact of Maximo and Honorata is limited and that he is not authorized to mortgage the subject property; (3) the alleged certificate of sale involving the subject parcel of land was never duly registered or annotated as a memorandum on TCT No. T-105375 or the reconstituted TCT No. RT-35677; (4) what was really annotated as Entry No. 9242 on TCT No. T-105375 is an entirely different certificate of sale involving a different parcel of land owned by a certain Laida Mercado; (5) a civil case was filed by respondent against petitioner (Civil Case No. 414-M-97) for annulment of title wherein one of the issues involved is the non-registration of the abovementioned certificate of sale; and (6) petitioner does not seek a mere correction of Entry No. 9242, but the registration of a new, distinct and different certificate of sale. Respondent argues that where controversial issues, such as ownership of a disputed property, are raised in proceedings brought under Section 108 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, such as the instant case, it is the duty of the court sitting as a cadastral court or land registration court to dismiss the petition and the proper recourse for the parties would be to bring up said issues in an ordinary civil action or in the proceedings where the incident properly belongs.3

On April 30, 2002, the RTC issued an Order with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to correct Entry No. 9242 on TCT No. T-105375 which was reconstituted as TCT No. RT-35677 to reflect the contents of Certificate of Sale dated July 31, 1985 in the amount of P1,923,878.40 issued to Philippine Veterans Bank.

SO ORDERED.4

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.5

On November 4, 2003, the RTC issued its presently assailed Order6 granting herein respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC set aside its Order dated April 30, 2002 and dismissed the petition of herein petitioner for lack of merit.

The RTC based its Order in a Resolution7 issued by the CA, dated November 14, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703 wherein the appellate court made a finding that the Certificate of Sale involving TCT No. T-105375 was never registered with the Register of Deeds ofBulacan. The RTC held that since the subject certificate of sale was not registered, there is nothing to correct, alter or amend under Section 108 of PD No. 1529.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration8 of the November 4, 2003 Order of the RTC, but the trial court denied it via its Order9 dated April 27, 2004.

Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the RTC erred in relying on the November 14, 2002 Resolution of the CA in dismissing petitioner’s petition for correction of entry.

Petitioner claims that the CA in its subject resolution erroneously ruled that a previous order of the RTC of Bulacan, Branch 22 in a related case between the same parties, wherein the trial court passed upon the issue of non-registration of the certificate of sale in question and made a finding that the same was indeed not registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, constitutes res judicata that would preclude the parties from litigating the factual issue of non-registration of the subject certificate of sale.

The petition lacks merits.

Settled is the rule that a judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable; the judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.10 While there are recognized exceptions – e.g., the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable – none of these exceptions apply to the present case.11

There is no dispute that the November 14, 2002 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703, which is being questioned by petitioner, had already become final and executory. The petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner assailing the said CA Resolution had been denied with finality as this Court found no compelling reason to grant the said petition. Consequently, an entry of judgment was already issued by this Court on September 1, 2003.

It has been established in the assailed CA Resolution that the Certificate of Sale involving TCT No. T-105375 was not registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Owing to the finality of the said Resolution, the Court as well as the parties therein, which includes herein petitioner, are now bound by the said factual finding.

The determination of the questions of fact and of law by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703 already attained finality, and may not now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent litigation between the same parties and their privies over the same subject matter.12 On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC did not err in relying on the November 14, 2002 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703.

In any case, petitioner is seeking relief under the provisions of Section 108 of PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (formerly Section 112 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act) which provides as follows:

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner’s duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.

While the abovequoted section, among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title or of any memorandum appearing therein, the prevailing rule is that proceedings thereunder are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.13Relief under the said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.14

In the present case, there is no question that there is a serious objection and an adverse claim on the part of an interested party as shown by respondent’s opposition and motion to dismiss the petition for correction of entry filed by petitioner. The absence of unanimity among the parties is also evidenced by respondent’s action for damages and annulment of petitioner’s title over the subject parcel of land docketed as Civil Case No. 414-M-97. In fact, the RTC, in its decision in Civil Case No. 414-M-97, found partial merit in respondent’s action so much so that it ordered the cancellation of the TCT covering the subject property in the name of petitioner. The RTC made a categorical finding that the subject Certificate of Sale was not registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan leading to the conclusion that the one-year period within which respondent may exercise his right of redemption shall begin to run only after the said Certificate of Sale has been registered. Thus, petitioner may not avail of the remedy provided for under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.

Lastly, in view of the established fact that the Certificate of Sale covering the subject property was not registered, and considering that there is nothing which prohibits petitioner from registering the said Certificate of Sale, its most logical and expedient recourse then is to register the same with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The November 4, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 8, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 933 dated January 24, 2011.1 Penned by Judge Manuel R. Ortiguerra; rollo, pp. 76-78.2 Rollo, pp. 21-23.3 Id. at 34-37.4 Id. at 43.5 Id. at 44-66.6 Id. at 76-78.7 Id. at 167-170.8Id. at 79-81.9Id. at 82.10National Tobacco Administration v. Castillo, G.R. No. 154124, August 13, 2010; Spouses William Genato and Rebecca Genato v. Viola, G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010, 611 SCRA 677, 690; Spouses Heber & Charlita Edillo v. Spouses Norberto & Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010, 610 SCRA 590, 601-602.11Id.12City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, G.R. Nos. 140734 & 140745 and G.R. Nos. 141451-52, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 33, 59; Lee Bun Ting v. Judge Aligaen, 167 Phil. 164, 176 (1977).

13Heirs of Miguel Franco v. CA, 463 Phil. 417, 431-432 (2003).

14City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, supra note 12; Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation v. CA, 339 Phil. 377, 389 (1997).

Comment