J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

LEGAL NOTE 0068: WHEN WILL AN EMPLOYER BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF ITS EMPLOYEE WHO DIED DUE TO AILMENT WHILE AT WORK?

SOURCE: OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP. AND/OR DENNIS HAO VS. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND ANICIA CUBACUB (G.R. NO. 150898, 13 APRIL 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) SUBJECTS: DAMAGE BASED ON TORT; WHETHER EMPLOYER IS LIABLE FOR DEATH OF EMPLOYEE. (BRIEF TITLE: OCEAN BUILDERS VS. SPOUSES CUBACUB).

DIGEST:

BLADIMIR BECAME SICK. HE REQUESTED THAT HE BE BROUGHT TO TARLAC. INSTEAD HIS EMPLOYER  BROUGHT HIM TO A COMMUNITY HOSPITAL. THERE HE DIED. HIS PARENTS FILED CASE FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE EMPLOYER OCEAN BUILDER.. RTC DISMISSED CASE. CA REVERSED ON THE GROUND THAT OCEAN BUILDERS HAS NO FULL TIME NURSE, VIOLATIVE OF THE LABOR CODE AND SHOULD HAVE BROUGHT HIM TO A BETTER HOSPITAL.

IS OCEAN BUILDERS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE?

NO. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HOW MANY EMPLOYEES IT HAS. IF PETITIONER’S MANAGER’S TESTIMONY IS TRUE,  IT HAD ONLY SEVEN REGULAR EMPLOYEES AND 20 CONTRACTUAL    EMPLOYEES ─ STILL SHORT OF THE MINIMUM 50 WORKERS THAT AN ESTABLISHMENT MUST HAVE FOR IT TO BE REQUIRED TO HAVE A FULL-TIME REGISTERED NURSE. 

ALSO,  THE EMPLOYER HAS  GIVEN ADEQUATE AND IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE WHEN ITS MANAGER ADVISED THE EMPLOYEE TO  TAKE A 3-DAY REST AND LATER BROUGHT HIM TO THE NEAREST HOSPITAL.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THIS CASE?

IT IS A CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON TORTS, THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BEING MERELY INCIDENTAL.

At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely incidental. 

SINCE THIS IS A CASE BASED ON TORTS WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS THAT MUST BE PRESENT.

THERE ARE THREE:  (1) DUTY; (2) BREACH; AND (3) INJURY AND PROXIMATE CAUSATION.

To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz:  (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation.  

IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY INVOLVING A SICK OR INJURED EMPLOYEE, WHAT IS THE DUTY OF EMPLOYER?

UNDER ART. 161 OF THE LABOR CODE, THE EMPLOYER MUST PROVIDE ALL THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE AND IMMEDIATE MEDICAL AND DENTAL ATTENDANCE  AND TREATMENT.

The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed.

        Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:

                  ART. 161.  Assistance of employer. – It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency.  (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHAT MEDICAL SERVICES MUST THE EMPLOYER PROVIDE?

ART. 157 OF THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES:

                  Article 157.  Emergency Medical and Dental Services. ─ It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of:

(a)          The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available.  The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;

(b)         The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300); and

(c)          The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300).  (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are hazardous.  Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees the company has.  If Hao’s testimony^[1][4] would be believed, the company had only seven regular employees and 20 contractual    employees ─ still short of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to have a full-time registered nurse. 

Chicken pox is self-limiting.  Hao does not appear to have a medical background.  He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the CaybigaHospital, contrary to appellate court’s ruling.

ONE OF THE ELEMENTS IN TORTS IS THAT NEGLIGENCE IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE. WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?

PROXIMATE CAUSE IS THAT WHICH, IN NATURAL AND CONTINUOUS SEQUENCE, UNBROKEN BY AN EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, PRODUCES INJURY, AND WITHOUT WHICH, THE RESULT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED.^[2][5]  AN INJURY OR DAMAGE IS PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR FAILURE TO ACT, WHENEVER IT APPEARS FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE THAT THE ACT OR OMISSION PLAYED A SUBSTANTIAL PART IN BRINGING ABOUT OR ACTUALLY CAUSING THE INJURY OR DAMAGE, AND THAT THE INJURY OR DAMAGE WAS EITHER A DIRECT RESULT OR A REASONABLY PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ACT OR OMISSION.^[3][6] 

AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir.  Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred.^[4][5]  An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.^[5][6] 

        Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature.  The dissent, apart from adopting the appellate court’s findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well.  This finding is not, however, borne by the records.  Nowhere in the appellate court’s or even the trial court’s decision is there any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker.  At best, the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it happened.^[6][7]

On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, the dissent, noting that Dr. Frias attended to Bladimir during his “last illness,” holds that the certificate which he issued ─ citing chicken pox as antecedent cause ─ deserves more credence. 

There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on the immediate cause of Bladimir’s death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to complications ─ from pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia and chicken pox per Dr. Frias’.  In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes of death in both certificates were the same.^[7][8] 

Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimir’s attending physician, he having merely ordered Bladimir’s transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the CaybigaHospital.  He thereafter left Bladimir to the care of doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 o’clock the following morning or eight hours after seeing Bladimir.  As he himself testified upon cross-examination, he did not personally attend to Bladimir anymore once the latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH.^[8][9] 

THERE ARE TWO DEATH CERTIFICATES. ONE IS DULY REGISTERED AND THE OTHER IS NOT. WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE?

THE REGISTERED ONE BECAUSE IT IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND THE ENTRIES THEREIN ARE PRESUMED CORRECT.

It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the entries therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing otherwise.^[9][10]  The QCGH death certificate was received by the City Civil Registrar on April 17, 1995.   Not only was the certificate shown by positive evidence to be inaccurate.  Its credibility, more than that issued by Dr. Frias, becomes more pronounced as note is taken of the fact that he was not around at the time of death.   

LEGAL NOTE 0070: CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI?

SOURCE: SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO AND MILAGROS MARCELO VS. LBC BANK (G.R. NO. 183575, 11 APRIL 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECT: WHETHER  C.A. CAN ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI. (BRIEF TITLE: SPOUSES MARCELO VS. LBC BANK).

CASE DIGEST:

SPOUSES MARCELO OBTAINED LOAN FROM LBC BANK AND MORTGAGED THEIR PROPERTY. THEY FAILED TO PAY THE LOAN. LBC BANK FILED EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS. LATER LBC BANK MANAGER MILAN EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION AND FILED IT WITH THE REGISTER OF DEEDS. MARCELO’S TITLE WAS CANCELLED AND A NEW TITLE WAS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF LBC BANK. THE LATTER FILED PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION. MARCELO SPOUSES OPPOSED ON GROUND THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT MILAN WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE AN AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION. RTC ISSUED WRIT OF POSSESSION. MARCELO SPOUSED FILED WITH C.A. A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIOARI.  C.A. REVERSED RTC DECISION. LBC MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION ATTACHING THERETO A SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE SHOWING THAT MILAN HAS AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE AN AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION. C.A. RECONSIDERED ITS DECISION AND AFFIRMED RTC DECISION.

ISSUE: CAN ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR CERIORARI?

YES.

PURSUANT TO SECTION 9 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, AS AMENDED, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE AND PERFORM ANY AND ALL ACTS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED IN CASES FALLING WITHIN ITS ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION.

In Maralit v. Philippine National Bank,¹⁴ where petitioner Maralit questioned the appellate court’s admission and appreciation of a belatedly submitted documentary evidence, the Court held that “[i]n a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new evidence and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues.” The Court explained further:

Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, states that, “The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.”¹⁵

Likewise, in VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,¹⁶ the Court held:

[I]t is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals — pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari — is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. As clearly stated in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7902:

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting the evidence showing LBC Bank’s express ratification ofMilan’s consolidation of the title over the subject property. Further, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting such evidence in resolving LBC Bank’s motion for reconsideration in a special civil action for certiorari. To rule otherwise will certainly defeat the ends of substantial justice.

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Rollo, pp. 32-42. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña, III and Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, concurring.

3 Id. at 44-46.

4 Docketed as P-525-2004.

5 Records, p. 55. Penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr.

6Id. at 56.

7 Id. at 154-164.

8 Id. at 163-164.

9Id. at 165-175.

10Id. at 195.

11Id. at 196. Executed by Jennifer D. Fajelagutan, Assistant Corporate Secretary of LBC Bank.

12Id. at 197-198. Executed by Jennifer D. Fajelagutan, Assistant Corporate Secretary of LBC Bank.

13 Id. at 41-42.

14 G.R. No. 163788, 24 August 2009, 596 SCRA 662.

15Id. at 682.

16 G.R. No. 153144, 12 October 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 348-350, cited in Maralit v. Philippine National Bank, supra.

LEGAL NOTE 0069: WHY DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS ALWAYS AFFIRMED?

 SOURCE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GONZALO BALDOGO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT (G.R. NO. 128106-07, 24 JANUARY 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J) SUBJECT: MURDER. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. BALOGO)

WHY IS THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT  ALWAYS AFFIRMED?

 BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE UNIQUE ADVANTAGE OF MONITORING AND OBSERVING AT CLOSE RANGE THE ATTITUDE, CONDUCT AND DEPORTMENT OF WITNESSES.

 In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close range the attitude, conduct and deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies before said court. 

IN PLEADINGS, LAWYERS USUALLY CITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF OBSERVING THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES IN CONVINCING THE APPELLATE COURT THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT MUST BE UPHELD. IS THERE A “SUAVE”, MORE CONVINCING,  AUTHORITATIVE,  AND POETIC WAY  OF STATING THE ABOVE?

YES. THE FOREIGN DECISION CITED IN SUPPORT OF THE ABOVE WHICH READS:

To him (THE JUDGE)  appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.  The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him.

………..Echoing a foreign court’s observation, this Court declared:

“Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a court of last resort.  She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind’s eye of the judge who tries the case.  To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.  The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him.”[15] (PEOPLE V. DELOVINO, 247 SCRA 637, 647 (1995).

ARE  THERE  EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE JUDGE IS ABLE TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES?

YES. THE EXCEPTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WHEN PATENT INCONSISTENCIES IN THE STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES ARE IGNORED BY THE TRIAL COURT; 

(B) WHEN THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT ARE CLEARLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE;  AND

(C) WHEN THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED, MISUNDERSTOOD, MISINTERPRETED AND/OR MISCONSTRUED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBSTANCE WHICH, IF CONSIDERED, WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE

The rule, however, is not iron clad.  This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto, namely:  (a) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court;  (b) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence;  (c) when the trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[16]  In this case, the trial court found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled to full probative weight.  Accused-appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the aforestated exceptions.

[1]  Original records, p. 1.

[2] Id.at 15.

[3] Id.at 21.

[4] Id.at 65.

[5]  Exhibit “E.”

[6]  Exhibit “A.”

[7]  Ibid.

[8]   Exhibit “B.”

[9]  TSN, Joaquin, August 20, 1996, pp. 13-14.

[10]  Exhibit “A.”

[11]  Exhibit “D.”

[12]  Records, pp. 74-76.

[13]  Rollo, pp. 44-45.

[14]  People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637, 647 (1995).

[15]  Ibid.

[16]  People v. Garcia, et al., 361 SCRA 598 (2001); People v. De losSantos, 314 SCRA 303 (1999).

[17]  People v. Dramayo, et al., 42 SCRA 59 (1971).

[18]  25 L.Ed. 368.

[19]  People v. Landicho, et al., 258 SCRA 1 (1996).

[20]  People v. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79 (1996).

[21]  People v. Lopez, et al., 249 SCRA 610 (1995).

[22]  People v. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693 (1996).

[23]  People v. Abendan, 360 SCRA 106 (2001).

[24]  TSN, Camacho, pp. 8-13, July 25, 1996.

[25] Id.at 13-14.

[26] Id.at 15-17.

[27] Id.at 45-46.

[28] Id.at 20-21.

[29] Id.at 25-26.

[30]  TSN, Baldogo, September 17, 1996, pp. 19-20.

[31]  TSN, Baldogo, September 19, 1996, pp. 17-19.

[32]  People v. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397 (2001).

[33]  People v. Salvatierra, 257 SCRA 489 (1996).

[34]  People v. Garcia, 361 SCRA 598 (2001).

[35]  Wharton, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, pp. 514-515.

[36]  State v. Nargashian, 106AmericanStateReports, 715, 58 Atl. 953.

[37]  8 Car. & P. (Eng) 616 (1838).

[38]  TSN, Baldogo, September 19, 1996, p. 15.

[39]  Marco v. Court of Appeals, et al., 273 SCRA 276 (1997).

[40]  People v. Sulplito, 314 SCRA 493 (2001).

[41]  The crimes were committed after the effectivity of Republic Act 7659:

            Article 267.  Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

            1.   If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

            2.   If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

            3.   If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

            4.  If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

            The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

            When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

[42]  Rollo, pp. 70-71.

[43] Id.at 71-72.

[44]  People v. Sison, 312 SCRA 792, 804 (1999).

[45]  People v. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577 (1999); People v. Deopante, 263 SCRA 691 (1996).

[46]  People v. Patrolla, Jr., 254 SCRA 467 (1996).

[47]  People v. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655 (1999).

[48]  People v. Lumacang, et al., 324 SCRA 254 (2000).

[49]  People v. Abuyen, 213 SCRA 569 (1992).

[50]  People v. Cabarrubias, 223 SCRA 363 (1993).

[51]  Article 63, Revised Penal Code.

[52]  Velasquez, Revised Spanish-English Dictionary (Revised, 1959).

[53]  Third New International Dictionary, p. 2071.

[54]  People v.Santos, 283 SCRA 443 (1997).

[55] Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo V, pp. 639-640, cited in People vs. Marasigan, et al., 55 O.G. 8297 (1959).

[56]  Derecho Penal, Novena Edicion, Tomo II, pp. 700-701.

[57]  People v. Caber, Sr., 346 SCRA 166 (2000); People v. Berzuela, 341 SCRA 46 (2000).

[58]  People v. Gallego, 338 SCRA 21 (2000).

[59]  ART. 160.  Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous offense.—Penalty.—Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

      Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.

[60]  Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance. (People v. Pereto, 111 Phil. 943).

[61]  People v. Gaorana, 289 SCRA 665 (1998).

[62]  People v. Compendio, Jr., 258 SCRA 254, 268 (1996).

[63]  Exhibit “D.”

[64]  Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

     (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

     (b)  When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

     (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;

     (d)  When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

[65]  People v. Gaorana, supra.

[66]  Vide note 70 infra.

[67]  Article 2219, paragraph 5, New Civil Code; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 133489 and 143970, January 15, 2002.

[68]  People v. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2000).

[i]  Penned by Judge Felomino A. Vergara.