J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0044:  PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK VS. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ARMANDO SIMBILLO, CHRISTIAN MARCELO, ROLANDO DAVID, RICARDO BUCUD, PABLO SANTOS, AGRIFINA ENRIQUEZ, CONRADO ESPELETA, CATGERUBE CASTRO, CARLITO MERCADO   AND ALFREDO SUAREZ (G.R. NO. 173085, 19 JANUARY 2011, ABAD, J.)  SUBJECTS: EXPROPRIATION, INTERVENTION IN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS. (BRIEF TITLE: PVB VS. BCDA ET AL.)   

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DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the authority of the court in an expropriation case to adjudicate questions of ownership of the subject properties where such questions involve the determination of the validity of the issuance to the defendants of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs), questions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

The Facts and the Case

In late 2003 respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), a government corporation, filed several expropriation actions before the various branches of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway Project.  Ten of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court and it is these that are the concern of the present petition.

The defendants in Branch 58 cases were respondents Armando Simbillo, Christian Marcelo, Rolando David, Ricardo Bucud, Pablo Santos, Agrifina Enriquez, Conrado Espeleta, Catgerube Castro, Carlito Mercado, and Alfredo Suarez.  They were the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program.  Another defendant was Land Bank of the Philippines, the mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for their acquisition.  The lands in these cases were located in Porac and Floridablanca, Pampanga.

On learning of the expropriation cases before Branch 58, petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) filed motions to intervene in all the cases with attached complaints-in-intervention, a remedy that it adopted in similar cases with the other branches.  PVB alleged that the covered properties actually belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976.  PVB had since foreclosed on the mortgages and bought the same at public auction in 1982.  Unfortunately, the bank had been unable to consolidate ownership in its name. 

But, in its order of August 18, 2004, Branch 58 denied PVB’s motion for intervention on the ground that the intervention amounts to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and that the intervention would delay the proceedings in the cases before it.  Besides, said Branch 58, PVB had a pending action for annulment of the titles issued to the individual defendants and this was pending before Branch 62 of the court.

PVB filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch 58 denied the same, prompting the bank to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).  On January 26, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, dismissing the petition for lack of merit.   It also denied in a resolution dated June 2, 2006 PVB’s motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, on April 3, 2006 Branch 58 issued separate decisions in all 10 cases before it, granting the expropriation of the subject properties.  The court noted the uncertainty as to the ownership of such properties but took no action to grant BCDA’s prayer in its complaint that it determine the question of ownership of the same pursuant to Section 9, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Issue Presented

The issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC.

The Court’s Ruling

PVB maintains that in deciding the case, the RTC and the CA ignored Section 9, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the court adjudicating the expropriation case to hear and decide conflicting claims regarding the ownership of the properties involved while the compensation for the expropriated property is in the meantime deposited with the court.  Section 9 provides:

Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. – If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto.  But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.

PVB’s point regarding the authority of the court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the lands involved in such cases is valid.  But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the following reasons:

1.       At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court.  Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending before it. 

2.       Of course, subsequently, after the CA dismissed PVB’s petition on January 26, 2006, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that it had in the meantime already withdrawn the actions it filed with Branch 62 after learning from the decision of the Supreme Court in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, that jurisdiction over cases involving the annulment of CLOAs and EPs were vested by Republic Act 6657 in the DARAB. 

PVB now points out that, since there was no longer any impediment in RTC Branch 58 taking cognizance of its motion for intervention and adjudicating the parties’ conflicting claims over the expropriated properties, the CA was in error in not reconsidering its decision. 

But PVB’s withdrawal of its actions from Branch 62 cannot give Branch 58 comfort.  As PVB itself insists, jurisdiction over the annulment of the individual defendants’ CLOAs and EPs (which titles if annulled would leave PVB’s titles to the lands unchallenged) lies with the DARAB.  Branch 58 would still have no power to adjudicate the issues of ownership presented by the PVB’s intervention.

Actually, PVB’s remedy was to secure an order from Branch 58 to have the proceeds of the expropriation deposited with that branch in the meantime, pending adjudication of the issues of ownership of the expropriated lands by the DARAB.  Section 9 above empowers the court to order payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled.  There is no reason why this rule should not be applied even where the settlement of such questions is to be made by another tribunal. 

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 26, 2006 and its resolution dated June 2, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP 88144.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                              Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA     DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

                  Associate Justice                                  Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                   Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division                

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

SCA 11214 entitled “BCDA v. Alfredo Suarez, et al.”; SCA 11229 entitled “BCDA v. Heirs of Enriquez, et al.”; SCA 11230 entitled “BCDA v. Cristian Marcelo, et al.”; SCA 11232 entitled “BCDA v. Catherine Castro, et al.”; SCA 11237 entitled “BCDA v. Pablo Santos, et al.”; SCA 11260 entitled “BCDA v. Ricardo Bucud, et al.”; SCA 11262 entitled “BCDA v. Rolando David”; SCA 11263 entitled “BCDA v. Armando Simbillo, et al.”; SCA 11264 entitled “BCDA v. Conrado Espeleta”; and SCA 11291 entitled “BCDA v. Carlito Mercado, et al.”

  Rollo, pp. 43-46.

  Docketed as CA-G.R. SP 88144.

Rollo, pp. 35-40; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle.

 Id. at 42.

  Id. at 99, 104, 110, 116, 122, 127 and 132.

  482 Phil. 208, 216 (2004).

See also Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 24, 34 (2005); Dao-ayan v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, G.R. No. 172109, August 29, 2007, 531 SCRA 620, 628.

CASE 2011-0045: ALAIN M. DIÑO VS. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO (G.R. NO. 178044, 19 JANUARY 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECT: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE CAN BE DONE EVEN PRIOR TO DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES. (BRIEF SUBJECT: DINO VS. DINO).

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D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review¹ assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision² and the 12 March 2007 Order³ of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.

The Antecedent Facts

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.      Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2.      Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.⁴

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.⁵

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages⁶ (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.⁷ Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,⁸ such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1.      The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2.      They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3.      Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.⁹

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.¹⁰

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, “[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.¹¹

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.¹² In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property¹³ or conjugal partnership of gains¹⁴ unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36¹⁵ of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.¹⁶ The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2Rollo, pp. 28-34. Penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.

3Id. at 45-46.

4Id. at 34.

5Id. at 46.

6A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective 15 March 2003.

7328 Phil. 1289 (1996).

8Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr, 460 Phil. 445 (2003).

9Id.

10Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:

(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding;

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.

11Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).

12Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932 (1998).

13Article 88 of the Family Code.

14Article 105 of the Family Code.

15Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

16Supra note 7.

CASE NO. 2011-0043: SOLEDAD DALTON VS. FGR REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FELIX NG, NENITA NG, AND FLORA R. DAYRIT OR FLORA REGNER (G.R. NO. 172577, 19 JANUARY 2011, CARPIO, J) SUBJECTS: CONSIGNATION; FINDINGS OF COURT BINDING ON SC. (BRIEF TITLE: DALTON VS. FGR REALTY)

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R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition¹ for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 9 November 2005 Decision² and 10 April 2006 Resolution³ of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76536. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 26 February 2002 Decision⁴ of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 7, Branch 13, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB 4218.

The Facts

Flora R. Dayrit (Dayrit) owned a 1,811-square meter parcel of land located at the corner of Rama Avenue and Velez Street in Cebu City. Petitioner Soledad Dalton (Dalton), Clemente Sasam, Romulo Villalonga, Miguela Villarente, Aniceta Fuentes, Perla Pormento, Bonifacio Cabajar, Carmencita Yuson, Angel Ponce, Pedro Regudo, Pedro Quebedo, Mary Cabanlit, Marciana Encabo and Dolores Lim (Sasam, et al.) leased portions of the property.

In June 1985, Dayrit sold the property to respondent FGR Realty and Development Corporation (FGR). In August 1985, Dayrit and FGR stopped accepting rental payments because they wanted to terminate the lease agreements with Dalton and Sasam, et al.

In a complaint⁵ dated 11 September 1985, Dalton and Sasam, et al. consigned the rental payments with the RTC. They failed to notify Dayrit and FGR about the consignation. In motions dated 27 March 1987,⁶ 10 November 1987,⁷ 8 July 1988,⁸ and 28 November 1994,⁹ Dayrit and FGR withdrew the rental payments. In their motions, Dayrit and FGR reserved the right to question the validity of the consignation.

Dayrit, FGR and Sasam, et al. entered into compromise agreements dated 25 March 1997¹⁰ and 20 June 1997.¹¹ In the compromise agreements, they agreed to abandon all claims against each other. Dalton did not enter into a compromise agreement with Dayrit and FGR.

The RTC’s Ruling

In its 26 February 2002 Decision, the RTC dismissed the 11 September 1985 complaint and ordered Dalton to vacate the property. The RTC held that:

Soledad Dalton built a house which she initially used as a dwelling and store space. She vacated the premises when her children got married. She transferred her residence near F. Ramos Public Market, Cebu City.

She constructed the 20 feet by 20 feet floor area house sometime in 1973. The last monthly rental was P69.00. When defendants refused to accept rental and demanded vacation of the premises, she consignated [sic] her monthly rentals in court.

x x x x

It is very clear from the facts that there was no valid consignation made.

The requisites of consignation are as follows:

1.      The existence of a valid debt.

2.      Valid prior tender, unless tender is excuse [sic];

3.      Prior notice of consignation (before deposit)

4.      Actual consignation (deposit);

5.      Subsequent notice of consignation;

Requisite Nos. 3 and 5 are absent or were not complied with. It is very clear that there were no prior notices of consignation (before deposit) and subsequent notices of consignation (after deposit)

Besides, the last deposit was made on December 21, 1988. At the time Dalton testified on December 22, 1999, she did not present evidence of payment in 1999. She had not, therefore, religiously paid her monthly obligation.

By clear preponderance of evidence, defendants have established that plaintiff was no longer residing at Eskina Banawa at the time she testified in court. She vacated her house and converted it into a store or business establishment. This is buttressed by the testimony of Rogelio Capacio, the court’s appointed commissioner, who submitted a report, the full text of which reads as follows:

REPORT AND/OR OBSERVATION

“The store and/or dwelling subject to ocular inspection is stuated [sic] on the left portion of the road which is about fifty-five (55) meters from the corner of Banawa-Guadalupe Streets, when turning right heading towards the direction of Guadalupe Church, if travelling from the Capitol Building.

I observed that when we arrived at the ocular inspection site, Mrs. Soledad Dalton with the use of a key opened the lock of a closed door. She claimed that it was a part of the dwelling which she occupies and was utilized as a store. There were few saleable items inside said space.”

Soledad Dalton did not take exception to the said report.

Two witnesses who were former sub-lessees testified and clearly established that Mrs. Dalton use the house for business purposes and not for dwelling.¹²

Dalton appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In its 9 November 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s 26 February 2002 Decision. The Court of Appeals held that:

After a careful review of the facts and evidence in this case, we find no basis for overturning the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint, as we find that no valid consignation was made by the plaintiff-appellant.

Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and generally requires a prior tender of payment. In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must show that: (1) there was a debt due; (2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or because the title to the obligation has been lost; (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof. Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective.

Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount to the judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. All interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. It had been consistently held that compliance with these requisites is mandatory.

No error, therefore, can be attributed to the lower court when it held that the consignation made by the plaintiff-appellant was invalid for failure to meet requisites 3 and 5 of a valid consignation (i.e., previous notice of the consignation given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation and, after the consignation had been made, the person interested was notified thereof).

Plaintiff-appellant failed to notify defendants-appellees of her intention to consign the amount due to them as rentals. She, however, justifies such failure by claiming that there had been substantial compliance with the said requirement of notice upon the service of the complaint on the defendants-appellees together with the summons.

We do not agree with such contention.

The prevailing rule is that substantial compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation is not enough. In Licuanan vs. Diaz, reiterating the ruling in Soco vs. Militante, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule thus:

“In addition, it must be stated that in the case of Soco v. Militante (123 SCRA 160, 166-167 [1983]), this Court ruled that the codal provisions of the Civil Code dealing with consignation (Articles 1252-1261) should be accorded mandatory construction —

We do not agree with the questioned decision. We hold that the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with fully and strictly in accordance with the law. Articles 1256-1261, New Civil Code. That these Articles must be accorded a mandatory construction is clearly evident and plain from the very language of the codal provisions themselves which require absolute compliance with the essential requisites therein provided. Substantial compliance is not enough for that would render only directory construction of the law. The use of the words “shall” and “must [sic] which are imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, positively indicated that all the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with. The Civil Code Articles expressly and explicitly direct what must be essentially done in order that consignation shall be valid and effectual…”

Clearly then, no valid consignation was made by the plaintiff-appellant for she did not give notice to the defendants-appellees of her intention to so consign her rental payments. Without any announcement of the intention to resort to consignation first having been made to persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation, the consignation as a means of payment is void.

As to the other issues raised by the plaintiff-appellant in her second and third assigned errors, we hold that the ruling of the lower court on such issues is supported by the evidence adduced in this case.

That plaintiff-appellant is not residing at the leased premises in Eskina Banawa and that she is using the same for business purposes, not as dwelling place, is amply supported by the testimony of two of plaintiff-appellant’s sub-lessees. The Commissioner’s Report submitted by Rogelio Capacio, who was commissioned by the lower court to conduct an ocular inspection of the leased premises, further lends support to the lower court’s findings. On the other hand, plaintiff-appellant only has her self-serving claims that she is residing at the leased premises in Eskina Banawa to prove her continued use of the leased premises as dwelling place.

There is thus no merit to plaintiff-appellant’s fourth assigned error. The lower court acted within its authority in ordering the plaintiff-appellant to vacate the leased premises. The evidence shows that plaintiff-appellant had failed to continuously pay the rentals due to the defendants-appellees. It was therefore within the powers of the lower court to grant such other relief and remedies equitable under the circumstances.

In sum, there having been no valid consignation and with the plaintiff-appellant having failed to pay the rentals due to the defendants-appellees, no error can be attributed to the lower court in rendering its assailed decision.¹³

Hence, the present petition. Dalton raises as issues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that (1) the consignation was void, and (2) Dalton failed to pay rent.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Dalton claims that, “the issue as to whether the consignation made by the petitioner is valid or not for lack of notice has already been rendered moot and academic with the withdrawal by the private respondents of the amounts consigned and deposited by the petitioner as rental of the subject premises.”¹⁴

The Court is not impressed. First, in withdrawing the amounts consigned, Dayrit and FGR expressly reserved the right to question the validity of the consignation. In Riesenbeck v. Court of Appeals,¹⁵ the Court held that:

A sensu contrario, when the creditor’s acceptance of the money consigned is conditional and with reservations, he is not deemed to have waived the claims he reserved against his debtor. Thus, when the amount consigned does not cover the entire obligation, the creditor may accept it, reserving his right to the balance (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., Vol. IV, 1973 Ed., p. 317, citing 3 Llerena 263). The same factual milieu obtains here because the respondent creditor accepted with reservation the amount consigned in court by the petitioner-debtor. Therefore, the creditor is not barred from raising his other claims, as he did in his answer with special defenses and counterclaim against petitioner-debtor.

As respondent-creditor’s acceptance of the amount consigned was with reservations, it did not completely extinguish the entire indebtedness of the petitioner-debtor. It is apposite to note here that consignation is completed at the time the creditor accepts the same without objections, or, if he objects, at the time the court declares that it has been validly made in accordance with law.¹⁶ (Emphasis supplied)

Second, compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation is mandatory. Failure to comply strictly with any of the requisites will render the consignation void. Substantial compliance is not enough.

In Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Toyota Bel-Air, Inc.,¹⁷ the Court enumerated the requisites of a valid consignation: (1) a debt due; (2) the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused without just cause to accept the payment, or the creditor was absent, unknown or incapacitated, or several persons claimed the same right to collect, or the title of the obligation was lost; (3) the person interested in the performance of the obligation was given notice before consignation was made; (4) the amount was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) the person interested in the performance of the obligation was given notice after the consignation was made.

Articles 1257 and 1258 of the Civil Code state, respectively:

Art. 1257. In order that the consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation.

The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with the provisions which regulate payment.

Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.

The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The giving of notice to the persons interested in the performance of the obligation is mandatory. Failure to notify the persons interested in the performance of the obligation will render the consignation void. In Ramos v. Sarao,¹⁸ the Court held that, “All interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. Compliance with [this requisite] is mandatory.”¹⁹ In Valdellon v. Tengco,²⁰ the Court held that:

Under Art. 1257 of our Civil Code, in order that consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation. The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with the provisions which regulate payment. In said Article 1258, it is further stated that the consignation having been made, the interested party shall also be notified thereof.²¹ (Emphasis supplied)

In Soco v. Militante, et al.,²² the Court held that:

We hold that the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with fully and strictly in accordance with the law, Articles 1256 to 1261, New Civil Code. That these Articles must be accorded a mandatory construction is clearly evident and plain from the very language of the codal provisions themselves which require absolute compliance with the essential requisites therein provided. Substantial compliance is not enough for that would render only a directory construction to the law. The use of the words “shall” and “must” which are imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, positively indicate that all the essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied with. The Civil Code Articles expressly and explicitly direct what must be essentially done in order that consignation shall be valid and effectual.²³ (Emphasis supplied)

Dalton claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that she failed to pay rent. The Court is not impressed. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari “shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.” In Pagsibigan v. People,²⁴ the Court held that:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.²⁵

Whether Dalton failed to pay rent is a question of fact. It is not reviewable.

The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court. The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.²⁶ Dalton did not show that any of these circumstances is present.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 9 November 2005 Decision and 10 April 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76536.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1 Rollo, pp. 11-22.

2 Id. at 24-31. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. concurring.

3 Id. at 39-40.

4 CA rollo, pp. 23-30. Penned by Judge Meinrado P. Paredes.

5 Records, pp. 1-5.

6 Rollo, pp. 47-48.

7 Id. at 49-50.

8 Id. at 51-52.

9 Id. at 53-54.

10 Id. at 57-58.

11 Id. at 59-60.

12 CA rollo, pp. 28-30.

13 Rollo, pp. 27-30.

14 Id. at 18.

15 G.R. No. 90359, 9 June 1992, 209 SCRA 656.

16 Id. at 659.

17 G.R. No. 137884, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 70, 89.

18 491 Phil. 288 (2005).

19 Id. at 305.

20 225 Phil. 279 (1986).

21 Id. at 327.

22 208 Phil. 151 (1983).

23 Id. at 153-154.

24 G.R. No. 163868, 4 June 2009, 588 SCRA 249.

25 Id. at 256.

26 Id. at 257.