CASE 2011-0048: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY VS. SPOUSES EDMUNDO MIRANDA AND JULIE MIRANDA (G.R. NO. 187917, 19 JANURY 2011, NACHURA, J.) SUBJECTS: WHEN FORECLOSURE IS DECLARED NULL FOR LACK OF PUBLICATION; EXORBITANT INTERESTS; WHEN COURT CAN INQUIRE INTO EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE. (BRIEF TITLE: METROBANK VS. SPOUSES MIRANDA).

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DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

          On appeal is the June 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87775, affirming the June 16, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Branch 35, as well as its subsequent Resolution dated May 7, 2009, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

          Respondents, spouses Edmundo Miranda and Julie Miranda, applied for and obtained a credit accommodation from petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank).   On August 27, 1996, respondents obtained a P4,000,000.00 loan from Metrobank and executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in Poblacion, Santiago, Isabela, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 202288. Upon respondents’ request, Metrobank increased the loan from P4,000,000.00 to P5,000,000.00.  The real estate mortgage executed on August 27, 1996 was thus amended to increase the principal amount of loan secured by the mortgage to P5,000,000.00.

Subsequently, respondents obtained additional loans from Metrobank – P1,000,000.00 on  December 3, 1996, and P1,000,000.00 on May 8, 1997. The additional loans were secured by mortgage over lands situated in Dubinan and Mabini, Santiago, Isabela, covered by TCT Nos. T-202288, T-180503, T-260279, and T-272664.

          Respondents encountered difficulties in paying their loans.  They requested for a longer period to settle their account and further requested for the restructuring of their loans, which requests Metrobank granted.  Respondents then signed Promissory Note (PN) No. 599773 for P6,400,000.00, and PN No. 599772 for P950,000.00, both payable on February 24, 2002, with interest at 17.250% per annum. They also amended the deeds of real estate mortgage they executed in favor of Metrobank to increase the amount of loans secured by mortgage to P6,350,000.00.  The amendment was inscribed on TCT Nos. T-202288, T-260279, and T-180503. 

          On August 25, 2000, Metrobank sent respondents a demand letter to settle their overdue account of P8,512,380.15, inclusive of interest and penalties; otherwise, the bank would initiate “the necessary legal proceedings x x x, without further notice.”  Respondents, however, failed to settle their account.   Consequently, Metrobank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of the mortgaged properties on November 16, 2000. The Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Santiago City sold the mortgaged properties at public auction for the sum of P9,284,452.00 to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.  A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of Metrobank on November 27, 2000, which was registered with the Registry of Deeds on November 29, 2000.

          Claiming that the extrajudicial foreclosure was void, respondents filed a complaint for Nullification of the Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction  with the RTC of Santiago City.  They alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1079 and Act No. 3135, particularly the publication requirement.  Respondents further asserted that Metrobank required them to sign blank promissory notes and real estate mortgage, and that they were not furnished with copies of these documents.  Later, they discovered that the terms and conditions of the promissory notes and of the mortgage were entirely different from what was represented to them  by  the  bank.   The  right  to  fix  the  interest  rates,  they  added,  was

exclusively given to the bank.  Respondents, thus, prayed for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.

          Metrobank answered the complaint, denying its material allegations and asserting the validity of the foreclosure proceedings.  Specifically, it averred compliance with the posting and publication requirements.  Thus, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

          Meanwhile, on December 20, 2001, Metrobank caused the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondents and the issuance of new ones in its name.  On December 21, 2001, the Ex-Officio Sheriff executed a Final Deed of Sale.

           On June 16, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.  The RTC reviewed the records of the foreclosure proceedings and found no proof of publication of the sheriff’s notice of sale; there was no affidavit of publication attached to the records.  This fatal defect, it held, invalidated the auction sale and the entire foreclosure proceedings.  The RTC further held that, when Metrobank foreclosed the mortgaged properties, respondents’ loan account was still outstanding for there was an overpayment of interests amounting to P1,529,922.00.  Thus, the foreclosure proceedings were without factual and legal basis.  The RTC further noted that Metrobank consolidated its title even before the issuance of the sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale.  The trial court considered it an irregularity sufficient to invalidate the consolidation.     

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondents] and against [petitioner] Metrobank as follows:

1)      DECLARING as null and void the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, dated November 27, 2000, Exhibit “11”;

2)      DECLARING as null and void the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale, dated December 21, 2000, Exhibit “12”;

3)      CANCELLING [Metrobank’s] TCT Nos. T-319236 (Exhibit      “13”); T-319235 over Lot 6-B-18 (Exhibit “14”); T-T-319235 over Lot 4-F (Exhibit “15”); and T-319237 (Exhibit “16”);

4)      RESTORING [respondents’] TCT Nos. T-260279 (Exhibit      “E”); T-202288 (Exhibit “F”); T-180503 (Exhibit “G”; and T- 272664 (Annex “E”); and

5)      ORDERING x x x Metrobank to pay PHP50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

          Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on July 31, 2006.

          Metrobank then appealed to the CA, faulting the RTC for annulling the foreclosure proceedings.  It insisted that the bank complied with the publication requirement.  Metrobank also disagreed with the trial court’s finding of overpayment of interests amounting to P1,529,922.00, claiming that the applicable interest rates on respondents’ loans were 17% and not 12% as computed by the trial court.  It further asserted that a final deed of sale is not necessary for purposes of consolidating its ownership over the subject properties.  Finally, Metrobank assailed the award of attorney’s fees for lack of basis.

          On June 30, 2008, the CA resolved Metrobank’s appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED.  The assailed decision dated June 16, 2006 of the RTC of Santiago City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 35-3022 is AFFIRMED.

            SO ORDERED.   

          Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration also suffered the same fate, as the CA denied it on May 7, 2009.

Before us, Metrobank insists on the validity of the foreclosure proceedings.  Essentially, it argues that foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the party alleging irregularity has the burden of proving his claim.  Metrobank asserts that, in this case, the presumption of regularity was not disputed because respondents failed to prove that the notice of sale was not published as required by law.

At the outset, it must be stated that only questions of law may be raised before this Court in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not the function of this Court to reexamine the evidence submitted by the parties.  

It has been our consistent ruling that the question of compliance or non-compliance with notice and publication requirements of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual issue, and the resolution thereof by the trial court is generally binding on this Court.  The matter of sufficiency of posting  and  publication of a notice of foreclosure sale need not be resolved by this Court, especially when the findings of the RTC were sustained by the CA. Well-established is the rule that factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.   

The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that there was non-compliance with the publication requirement bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting them with our own. Metrobank has not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. It has not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review.

Metrobank makes much ado of respondents’ failure to present proof of non-compliance with the publication requirement.  It insists that respondents failed to discharge the requisite burden of proof. 

Apparently, Metrobank lost sight of our ruling in Spouses Pulido v. CA, Sempio v. CA, and, recently, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo, viz.:

While it may be true that the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the burden of proof, still negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to one’s cause of action or defense if they constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the other party.

It would have been a simple matter for Metrobank to rebut the allegation of non-compliance by producing the required proof of publication.  Yet, Metrobank opted not to rebut the allegation; it simply relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

Unfortunately, Metrobank’s reliance on the presumption of regularity must fail because it did not present any proof of publication of the notice of sale.  As held by this Court in Spouses Pulido v. Court of Appeals:

[P]etitioners’ reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties falls in the face of a serious imputation on non-compliance. The presumption of compliance with official duty is rebutted by failure to present proof of posting.

Further, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo, this Court rejected a similar contention, viz.:

Petitioner’s invocation of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of Sheriff Castillo is misplaced. While posting the notice of sale is part of a sheriff’s official functions, the actual publication of the notice of sale cannot be considered as such, since this concerns the publisher’s business. Simply put, the sheriff is incompetent to prove that the notice of sale was actually published in a newspaper of general circulation.

As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the records of the foreclosure proceedings lacked any proof of publication. This explains why Metrobank could not present any proof of publication.

We take this occasion to reiterate that the object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of  securing  bidders  and preventing a sacrifice sale of the property.

The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a “reasonably wide publicity” of the auction sale.  This is why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the “far-reaching effects” of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation.  Thus, the publication of the notice of sale was held essential to the validity of foreclosure proceedings. In this case, Metrobank failed to establish compliance with the publication requirement.  The RTC and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for nullifying the foreclosure proceedings.

Metrobank next questions the authority of the RTC and the CA to take cognizance of the records of the foreclosure proceedings as basis for annulling the auction sale. It claims that the trial court may not take judicial notice of the records of proceedings in another case, unless the parties themselves agreed to it.  Metrobank asserts that it did not give its consent to the trial court’s examination of the records of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.  Further, the RTC did not even set a hearing for the purpose of declaring its intention to take judicial notice of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings, as required by Section 3 of Rule 129.  Metrobank, thus, contends that the RTC exceeded its authority in taking cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings.

          We disagree.

As a rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. This rule, however, is not absolute. 

In Juaban v. Espina and  “G” Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU), we held that, in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.

The RTC, therefore, acted well within its authority in taking cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and the CA cannot be faulted for sustaining the RTC.

Metrobank further questions the trial court’s finding of overpayment of interests.  But like the issue on compliance with the publication requirement, the issue on overpayment of interests involves the ascertainment of facts not subject of review by this Court. We reiterate that our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter’s findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.

Besides, we find nothing erroneous in this factual finding of the RTC.  As explained by the RTC in its decision:

[T]he Court notes that the original promissory notes evidencing the various loans of the plaintiffs were not presented in court by either party; they are needed to determine the stipulated interest rate.  The Court is thus left to determine the same based on the testimony of the plaintiffs that the agreed interest rate is 12% per annum; amazingly, this was not denied or refuted by the [petitioner] bank, in which case, 12% interest rate is applied at least for the period beginning 1997 until 1999, when the loan was renewed under the two (2) new promissory notes which indicated a higher rate of interest of 17.250% per annum.  As mentioned above, the interest payments made by the [respondents] were already admitted by [Metrobank] in its answer to the complaint as well as in its comment to [respondents’] formal offer of evidence, and such interest payments are duly reflected and contained in the passbook account of the [respondents], Exhibit “H,” “H-1” to “H-10.”  But, in order to determine whether [respondents’] account has become past due or not, as the [petitioner] bank represents, the Court deems it necessary to undertake some mathematical computation the result of which would decisively guide the Court to arrive at a rightful conclusion, thus:

1)      Total interest payments by [respondents]                                    

      from May 7, 1997 to June 30, 1999          –                       P3,332,422.00   

2)      Interest due                                                                                  

from May 7, 1997 to June 30, 1999          –                       P1,802,500.00

computed as follows:

            a)  1^st year (P7 M x 12%), from May 7,                                                               1997 to May 28, 1998                      –                       P  840,000.00

            b)  2^nd year                                                                                            

i)  from June 3, 1998 to Feb. 24, 1999 (8 mos.)  – P  560,000.00       ii) from March, 1999 to June 30, 1999 (4 mos.) –     P  402,500.00

3)  Total Interest paid             –           P 3,332,422.00                          

      Less Interest due               –           P 1,802,500.00

      Overpaid interest              –           P 1,529,922.00

            From the foregoing, it is evident that [respondents] overpaid interests for the period of two (2) years, from May 1997 to June 1999, in the total amount of Php. 1,529,922.00.  Thus, the Court is convinced that it is just and equitable that such an overpayment be construed as advance interest payments which should be applied for the succeeding period or year of their contract.  Otherwise, [Metrobank] would unjustly enrich itself at the expense of [respondents].  In such a case, it was premature then for [Metrobank] to declare [respondents’] account as past due, because at that juncture[, respondents’] loan obligation was outstanding and in declaring otherwise, [Metrobank’s] action was without basis as there was no violation of their loan contract.  Consequently, it follows that the foreclosure proceedings subsequently held on November 26, 2000 was without factual and legal basis, too.  For, indeed, when the foreclosure proceedings in question was conducted, [respondents’] loan account with [Metrobank], as it is said, was still outstanding, because [respondents] were able to pay the interest due.  Therefore, the Court is again convinced that the nullification prayed for is in order.

We need not say more.

In fine, the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor’s failure to pay his obligation must be exercised according to its clear mandate, and every requirement of the law must be complied with, or the valid exercise of the right would end.  The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others. 

As further declared by this Court in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo:

While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor’s failure to pay his obligation, it is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear mandate. Each and every requirement of the law must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end. It must be remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others.

We, therefore, affirm the CA and sustain the RTC in nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage and sale, including Metrobank’s title.

With this disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the issue of the validity of the consolidation of title by Metrobank. 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87775 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

                                      ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

                                         ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                             ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                      Associate Justice

                                      Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                      Chief Justice

              Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, concurring, rollo, pp. 25-37.

              Id. at 166-176.

              Id. at 39-40.

              Exhibit “2”; records, p. 265.

              Exhibit “3”; id. at 266.

              See Exhibits “4” and “5”; id. at 267, 268.

              Exhibit “17”; id. at 285.

              Exhibit “18”; id. at 286.

              Id. at 353.

            Id. at 356-357.

            Id. at 359.

            Exhibit “10”; id. at 273.

            Exhibit “11”; id. at 274-276.

            Id. at 1-8.

         Revising and Consolidating All Laws and Decrees Regulating Publication of Judicial Notices, Advertisements for Public Biddings, Notices of Auction Sales and Other Similar Notices.

            An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages.

            Records, pp. 30-34.

            Id. at 348-350.

            Supra note 2.

            Id. at 416-417.

            Rollo, p. 36.

            CA rollo, pp. 117-118.

            Langkaan Realty & Devt., Inc. v. UCPB, 400 Phil. 1349, 1356-1357 (2000).

            Id. at 1357, citing Reyes v. Court of Appeals, No. L-52043, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 126, 129.

            321 Phil. 1064, 1069 (1995).

            331 Phil. 912, 925 (1996).

            G.R. No. 170241, April 19, 2010. 

            Supra note 25, at 1070.

            Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo, supra note 27. 

            Records, pp. 348-405.

            Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo, supra note 27, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Peñafiel, G.R. No. 173976, February 27, 2009, 580 SCRA 352, 357.

            Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. (Rule 129, Revised Rules on Evidence).

            G.R. No. 170049, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 588, 611.

            G.R. No. 160236, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 73, 91.

            Cuenca v. Atas, G.R. No. 146214, October 5, 2007, 535 SCRA 48, 84-85.

            Records, pp. 414-416.

            PNB v. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc.,  442 Phil. 655, 665 (2002).

            Supra note 27, citing Metropolitan Bank v. Wong, 412 Phil. 207, 220 (2001).

CASE  2011-0047:  BENJAMIN JESALVA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 187725,19 JANUARY 2011, NACHURA, J.) SUBJECTS: HOMICIDE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; CUSTODIAN INVESTIGATION. (BRIEF TITLE: JESALVA VS. PEOPLE)

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DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated October 17, 2008, which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated November 18, 1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Facts

On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a criminal complaint for Frustrated Murder against petitioner.  Four days thereafter, or on September 15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging petitioner with the crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo (Leticia) died on September 14, 1992. After conducting a hearing on the bail application of petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992, granted him bail. On January 11, 1993, the MTC recommended the filing of Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon.

Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information dated January 26, 1993, which reads:

That on or about the 9^th day of September, 1992 in the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with treachery and evident premeditation with the use of motor vehicle and during night time, did then and there [wilfully], unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, manhandle and use personal violence upon [Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:

In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner), Elog Ubaldo, Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were at Nena’s place playing mahjong.  A certain Mrs. Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also there.  At about 10 o’clock that night, Gloria’s group left Nena’s  place and boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner.  With the exception of Jo Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink.  While Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer and [F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.

After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded petitioner’s Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner who drove them home.  The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated at the front seat.  Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first, followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from Leticia’s house.  While at Gloria’s house, petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next day because the stores were already closed.  Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied her and petitioner at the gate.  After petitioner and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated his car and went to the direction of 6^th Street instead of towards 7^th Street where Leticia’s house was situated.

At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced upon petitioner’s Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our Lady’s Village] OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon.  The police patrol team approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check what was going on.  There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood seated in front of the wheel so he called out his name.  Instead of heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond, immediately started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters holding office at the Bishop’s Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang.  While he was walking from a certain Lea’s house, he saw a woman naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway.  Her jeans and [panty] were beside her.  Because it was raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her things to the shed some 10 meters away.  As he was doing so, a tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his direction.  De Vera called out, “What is that?”  Because he received no response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home first and just come back to check the site later.

Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was bleeding that he even got stained with her blood.  Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such that when De Vera came back, he no longer found Olbes.  De Vera then proceeded to the police station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.

De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area but to no avail.  On their way back at about 1:15 o’clock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes.  De Vera lost no time in identifying him to be the man he saw with the woman.  At this point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed innocence.  He admitted he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police found her.

Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the next day.  However, because the evidence pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a search for him was conducted.  He “surrendered” at one (1) o’clock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his first cousin.

The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia disclosed to her that petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner that they should just remain as friends because she was already married, and that she loved her handsome husband. Moreover, the prosecution asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, while conducting patrol in St. Rafael Subdivision, together with other police officers, Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner immediately started his vehicle and drove toward the town proper of Sorsogon, which was directly opposite his residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendoza’s calls. Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m. of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona),  went to the police station, wherein he voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder  (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle. At about 1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with other police officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner identified as the place where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains thereat.

After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence.  On February 21, 1994, the defense filed before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC, Branch 51, denied in its Order dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the defense filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further action in the case; hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52. Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, denied the same and set the reception of evidence of the defense.

Version of the Defense

In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied that he killed Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason to kill her, and that he had many reasons why he should not kill her. The prosecution manifested that it would not conduct a cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his testimony was tantamount to pure denial. To prove that there was a broken chain of circumstantial evidence, the defense presented, as witness, Eduardo de Vera. The CA narrated:

12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9, 1992 at about 12:30 a.m., he was driving his tricycle en route to OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon; upon reaching the junction of the national road or highway, he saw a man and a woman three meters from the edge of the road; he stopped his tricycle and focused the headlight of his tricycle towards the two; he saw the woman leaning on the left arm of the man while the man was on a squatting position; he asked them “what is that?” and did not get any response; that the man was hiding his face and saw little blood on the clothes of the woman; he saw the woman with clothes, a polo shirt and pants; he decided to bring home his passenger home (sic) first and then returned to the scene but found no one there; he reported the matter to [SPO1] Balaoro, who immediately accompanied him to the place; they searched for the man and woman but they could not find them; they checked the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital but nobody had been brought there; then they proceeded back to the junction and later to the Sorsogon town proper; upon reaching Barangay Tugos, they saw [Lt.] Caguia talking with a man, whom he (De Vera) recognized as the man with the woman; [Lt.] Caguia directed the man to go to Police Sub-Station 1; at the police Sub-Station 1, he came to know the name of the man – Noel Olbes; he saw bloodstains on Olbes’ arms, hands, face and nose; the police interrogated him about it and he replied that he just helped the woman.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he has known [petitioner] for a longtime; and he has good relationship with him; [petitioner] was his bondsman in Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession of firearms and because of this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants to repay his gratitude to [petitioner]; [petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the case.

Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro and Noel Olbes (Olbes), as follows:

6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around 1:00 a.m. of September 9, 1992, Eduardo De Vera reported to him at the Police Sub-Station 1 that he saw a man, who was in squatting position, and a woman, who had blood on the upper right breast of her clothes, lean[ing] against the man and that after De Vera brought his tricycle passenger home, he returned to the site but he could not find the two anymore; upon receiving the report, he (SPO1 Balaoro), together with SPO1 Sincua and De Vera, proceeded to the diversion road, at the junction going to the hospital and Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon to investigate; they searched the place and went to the hospital but found nothing; on their way back, at around 1:15 [a.m.] they saw Noel Olbes talking with Lt. Caguia at Barangay Tugos; De Vera pointed to Olbes as the man he saw with the woman at the crossing so they brought him to Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation; Olbes told them that he saw the woman lying on the side of the road so he tried to lift her up but when he saw the tricycle (De Vera’s) he became afraid as he might be implicated in the crime so he brought her to Hazelwood, which is five meters away from the highway; at 2:25 a.m. the patrol team found Leticia Aldemo, whom they found naked from the waist down; at the garage of Hazelwood; they found the long pants of  the victim lying beside her and noted that her panty was still on one of  her knees; the victim’s body appeared to have been laid down; they did not find any blood in the garage except where the victim’s body was found outside the garage, they saw the other pair of shoes of a woman and thick bloodstains; he (SPO1 Balaoro) brought Olbes to Balogo station and entrusted him to their investigator.

7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the MCST Sisters who are holding office at the Bishop’s Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that on September 8, 1997, he went out with his friends Danny, Oca and Ely in Almendras to drink a bottle of gin; at around 6:30 p.m. he went to downtown Sorsogon and roamed around until 10:30 p.m.; then he went to Bahay Kainan and at about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., he went to Pena Fast Food and took a bottle of beer; upon the invitation of Lea, he went inside Pena and drank another bottle of beer; he brought Lea to her home at OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Lea’s house, he walked and upon reaching the junction of OLV, he saw a woman lying on her belly naked from the waist down; the woman was just uttering guttural sound; her jeans and panty were just lying beside her; taking pity on the woman and since it was raining that night, he carried the woman to a nearby shed in order that she would not be run over by motor vehicles; he also took the panty and the jeans to the shed; he noticed that a tricycle stopped for a while and focused its headlight on them and proceeded on its way; when he laid down the woman in the shed, he noticed that she was bleeding and he was stained with her blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and left; he walked towards the Sorsogon town proper and after about forty-five minutes, two policem[e]n apprehended him and brought him to the police station for investigation; while being investigated, he was not apprised of his constitutional rights and made to sign the police blotter; he was detained as he was a suspect for the injuries of the victim; after 7 or 8 hours, he was released; and he executed a Sworn Statement and affirmed its contents.

Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr. and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes) testified on the injuries suffered by Leticia, which eventually caused her death:

9.         Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on September 9, 1992 a patient by the name of Leticia Aldemo, who was in comatose state; she sustained the following injuries (1) severe cerebral contusion; (2) 2.5 cm punctured wound, occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured wound, parietal left area[;] (4) multiple contusion hematoma antero lateral aspect deltoid left area[;] (5) contusion hematoma 3^rd upper left arm; (6)  contusion hematoma left elbow[;] (7) abrasion left elbow[;] (8) hematoma, 3^rd left thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10) multiple confluent abrasion right foot[;] (11) contusion hematoma right hand[;] (12) abrasion right elbow[;] (13) contusion hematoma right elbow[;] and (14) skull-segmented fracture parietal bone with separation.

He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area (lower back of the skull) was caused by a pebble which they recovered from said area; the punctured wound on the parietal left area was caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface; the first three findings could also have been caused by the punch made by the perpetrator; the fourth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the fifth and the sixth findings could have been caused also by some of the above-mentioned means; the eighth finding could have been caused by a fall or rubbing on a hard object; the ninth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow while the tenth finding could have been caused by a fall on a rough object and the knee rubbing on a rough object; the eleventh finding could have been due to a fall or by being dragged; the twelfth finding could be caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by fist blow and the thirteenth finding could also be caused by a fall or fist blow.

He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation he performed on her.

x x x x

14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes – He explained the different kinds of injuries sustained by the victim. In addition, he stated that since there were wounds sustained by the victim in the dorsum part of the foot and sustained injuries on both knees, upper portion of the back of the hand, the victim could have been thrown off while unconscious.

The RTC’s Ruling

On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence, not of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was not established, and that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly proven. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code and considering that there was no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant thereto and taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of the sum of P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim, plus P42,755.45 for compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees (People  v.  Aguiluz, March 11, 1992).

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.

The CA’s Ruling

On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others, that petitioner could not point to Olbes as the culprit because, when Eduardo de Vera saw the former holding on to Leticia in a squatting position, Olbes was in the act of lifting her in order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any misdeed or omission could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring Leticia to a nearby hospital, because his fear of being implicated in the crime clouded his better judgment. Thus:

All told, We find that the prosecution’s evidence suffice to sustain the accused-appellant’s conviction for homicide.

As to the award of attorney’s fees, We find the award of P10,000.00 by the trial court meritorious, the records reveal that services of private prosecutor was engaged.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. With the attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of accused-appellant, the penalty reclusion temporal is imposed in its minimum period.  Accordingly, accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated November 18, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 3243 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty.

Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

A)          THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE BASED ON PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE BOTH NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING THAT SUCH BE ACTED WITH CAUTION AND THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL FACTS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE HYPOTHESIS OF GUILT; AND

B)          THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY.

Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecution’s contention that, even if he took the 6^th Street, the same could still lead to the 7^th Street, where Leticia’s house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been considered as a suspect in this case, considering that he was the last person seen with Leticia when she was still alive. He avers that the statements he made at the police station are not admissible in evidence, considering that he was, technically, under custodial investigation, and that there was no waiver of his right to remain silent. Moreover, petitioner alleges that the fatal injuries sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes, are consistent with a fall, thereby suggesting petitioner’s innocence. Petitioner claims that the evidence shows that there was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place where Olbes spotted Leticia, thereby suggesting that something worse than her jumping out of the vehicle might have happened.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG, argues that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, and that we accord great respect to factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTC’s ruling, did not err in convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial evidence, because the particular circumstances enumerated by both the RTC and the CA satisfactorily meet the requirements of the rules and of jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover, the OSG claims that the statements made by petitioner before SPO4 Desder, in the presence of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given and were not elicited on custodial investigation. Lastly, the OSG counters that petitioner was not deprived of his rights since he was never held for questioning by any police officer upon arriving at the police station and, besides, he was accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona.

Our Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

Custodial investigation refers to “any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case.

Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.

Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime.  However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that the circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution, when viewed in its entirety, points unerringly to [petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva as the person responsible for the death of the victim Leticia Aldemo.  Truly, the following combination of the circumstances which comprised such evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to [petitioner] and no other, as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:

1.      [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously courting the victim Leticia Aldemo, and whom the latter advised to stop as she was already married) together with Gloria Haboc, and six other individuals left Nena Ables’ house at 10 p.m. of September 8, 1992 after playing mahjong thereat.  They rode in [petitioner’s] red panel.

2.      Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc and two others proceeded to Bistro Christina. [Petitioner], together with other two male companions, consumed one bottle of Fundador, in addition to the three bottles of beer. At 11:30 p.m., the group left the place.

3.      After dropping one male companion at his house, Benjamin Jesalva, together with Leticia Aldemo, proceeded to bring Gloria Haboc to her home, which was only twenty meters away from Leticia’s residence.

4.      After staying at Gloria Haboc’s house for five minutes, and denied another drink, Benjamin Jesalva immediately accelerated his vehicle en route to 6^th Street instead of the  shorter and direct route, the 7^th street, where Leticia Aldemo’s house is located;

5.      Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her husband Efren Aldemo;

6.      At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the police patrolling the St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision saw the red panel thereat and when they approached and beamed a flashlight, they saw Benjamin Jesalva behind the wheel, who suddenly drove away in the direction of Sorsogon town proper, opposite to where he lives.  SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told Benjamin Jesalva (whom he had known since his teen-age years) to stop but the latter did not respond or heed his call;

7.      At 12:30 o’clock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body of Leticia Aldemo sprawled on her belly at the crossing/junction of OLV, Pangpang Sorsogon, Sorsogon, naked from the waist down.  He lifted her up and brought the body at Hazelwood, which is about 10 meters away from the highway.

8.      The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at around 2:15 a.m. of the same day, and brought her to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital in comatose condition.

9.      The police proceeded to inform the victim’s sister, who in turn informed the victim’s husband of the incident.

10.    In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for Benjamin Jesalva to invite him at the police station but was not able to find him.

11.        At around 1:00 o’clock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin Jesalva, together with his first cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose Jayona, presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon headquarters, where he voluntarily stated that the victim Leticia Aldemo was his passenger in his vehicle at about 12:30 in the early morning of September 9, 1992 at St. Rafael Subdivision but upon reaching the crossing of OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital, she jumped out of his vehicle.  These declarations were recorded in the police blotter by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon the instruction of SPO4 William Desder, the PNP Sorsogon Chief Investigator.

12.    At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together with [petitioner] and Asst. Prosecutor Jayona, went to St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision to conduct an ocular inspection.  [Petitioner] pointed to the police the place where he and the victim spent their time.  The police photographed what appear[ed] to be bloodstains just two meters away from the place pointed by [petitioner].

13.    Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured wound in the occipital area was caused by a pebble which he recovered from said area; the punctured wound in the parietal left area was caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface, the cerebral contusion, the punctured wound in the occipital and in the parietal area could also be caused by a punch by the perpetrator.  As to the multiple contusion hematoma anterior lateral aspect of the deltoid left area was caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the contusion hematoma on the upper left arm and left elbow could as well be similarly caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip.  As to the abrasion on the right knee, the same could have been caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow.  The multiple confluent abrasion[s] on the right foot could have been caused by a fall on a rough object.  The abrasions on the right elbow could have been caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by a fist blow.  The same is true with the contusion hematoma found on the victim’s right elbow.

Petitioner’s mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioner’s defense of denial was weak, self-serving, speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioner’s silence as to the matters that occurred during the time he was alone with Leticia is deafening. An accused can only be exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We find that the prosecution has met this quantum of proof in this case.

All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision which would warrant the modification much less the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Rollo, pp. 9-26.

Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong, with Associate Justices Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; id. at 29-64.

CA rollo, pp. 104-119.

Also referred to as Ben Jesalva in some pleadings and documents.

Records, p. 1.

Also referred to as Letecia Aldemo and Letty Aldemo in some pleadings and documents.

Records, p. 12.

Id. at 101-109.

Id. at 122-123.

Id. at 125.

Id. at 141.

Also referred to as Ilog Ubaldo in some pleadings and documents.

Rollo, pp. 77-80.

TSN, March 20, 1996, pp. 27-28.

Also referred to as St. Raphael Subdivision in some pleadings and documents.

TSN, January 24, 1996, pp. 12-29.

TSN, May 22, 1996, pp. 18-20 and TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 38.

TSN, August 8, 1996, pp. 25-29.

Records, pp. 188-218.

Id. at 229-231.

Id. at 232-234.

Id. at 244.

Id. at 262-263.

TSN, August 23, 1997, p. 7.

Id. at 8-9.

Supra note 2, at 46-48.

Id. at 40-43.

Also referred to as Dr. Antonio Dioneda and Dr. Antonio Dionedas in other pleadings and documents.

Supra note 2, at 44-48.

Supra note 3, at 119.

Records, p. 410.

Supra note 2, at 62-63.

CA rollo, pp. 179-186.

Id. at 221-222.

Supra note 1, at 15.

Supra note 1.

Rollo, pp. 100-102.

Id.  at 74-98.

People v. Canton, 442 Phil. 743, 761 (2002).

People v. De la Cruz, 344 Phil. 653, 660-661 (1997).

Supra note 17.

People v. Manalo, G.R. No. 173054, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 664, 670.

People v. Matignas, 428 Phil. 834, 869-870 (2002).

Supra note 2, at 53-58.

People  v. Macabare, G.R. No. 179941, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 119, 132.

CASE  2011-0046: ROBINSONS GALLERIA/ ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET CORPORATION AND/OR JESS MANUEL VS. IRENE R. RANCHEZ (G.R. NO. 177937, 19 JANUARY 2011, NACHURA, J.) SUBJECTS: PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT; CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL; BACKWAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: ROBINSONS GALLERIA VS. RACHEZ)

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

 x————————————————————————————x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

          Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated August 29, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91631.

The Facts

          The facts of the case are as follows.

          Respondent was a probationary employee of petitioner Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation (petitioner Supermarket) for a period of five (5) months, or from October 15, 1997 until March 14, 1998. She underwent six (6) weeks of training as a cashier before she was hired as such on October 15, 1997.

          Two weeks after she was hired, or on October 30, 1997, respondent reported to her supervisor the loss of cash amounting to Twenty Thousand Two Hundred Ninety-Nine Pesos (P20,299.00) which she had placed inside the company locker. Petitioner Jess Manuel (petitioner Manuel), the Operations Manager of petitioner Supermarket, ordered that respondent be strip-searched by the company guards. However, the search on her and her personal belongings yielded nothing.

          Respondent acknowledged her responsibility and requested that she be allowed to settle and pay the lost amount. However, petitioner Manuel did not heed her request and instead reported the matter to the police. Petitioner Manuel likewise requested the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office for an inquest.

          On November 5, 1997, an information for Qualified Theft was filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. Respondent was constrained to spend two weeks in jail for failure to immediately post bail in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).

          On November 25, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages.

          On March 12, 1998, petitioners sent to respondent by mail a notice of termination and/or notice of expiration of probationary employment dated March 9, 1998.

          On August 10, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the fallo of which reads:

            CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the claim of illegal dismissal for lack of merit.

            Respondents are ordered to accept complainant to her former or equivalent work without prejudice to any action they may take in the premises in connection with the missing money of P20,299.00.

            SO ORDERED.

          In dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal, the Labor Arbiter ratiocinated that at the time respondent filed the complaint for illegal dismissal, she was not yet dismissed by petitioners. When she was strip- searched by the security personnel of petitioner Supermarket, the guards were merely conducting an investigation. The subsequent referral of the loss to the police authorities might be considered routine. Respondent’s non-reporting for work after her release from detention could be taken against her in the investigation that petitioner supermarket would conduct.

          On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated October 20, 2003. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

            WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE.  The respondents are hereby ordered to immediately reinstate complainant to her former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and privileges and to pay her full backwages computed from the time she was constructively dismissed on October 30, 1997 up to the time she is actually reinstated.

            SO ORDERED.

          In reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC ruled that respondent was denied due process by petitioners. Strip-searching respondent and sending her to jail for two weeks certainly amounted to constructive dismissal because continued employment had been rendered impossible, unreasonable, and unlikely. The wedge that had been driven between the parties was impossible to ignore. Although respondent was only a probationary employee, the subsequent lapse of her probationary contract of employment did not have the effect of validly terminating her employment because constructive dismissal had already been effected earlier by petitioners.

          Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated July 21, 2005.

          Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. On August 29, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that should reinstatement be no longer possible in view of the strained relation between the parties, Petitioners are ordered to pay Respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay in addition to backwages from the date of dismissal until the finality of the assailed decision.

            SO ORDERED.

          Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA denied the same in a Resolution dated May 16, 2007.

          Hence, this petition.

          Petitioners assail the reinstatement of respondent, highlighting the fact that she was a probationary employee and that her probationary contract of employment lapsed on March 14, 1998. Thus, her reinstatement was rendered moot and academic. Furthermore, even if her probationary contract had not yet expired, the offense that she committed would nonetheless militate against her regularization.

On the other hand, respondent insists that she was constructively dismissed by petitioner Supermarket when she was strip-searched, divested of her dignity, and summarily thrown in jail. She could not have been expected to go back to work after being allowed to post bail because her continued employment had been rendered impossible, unreasonable, and unlikely. She stresses that, at the time the money was discovered missing, it was not with her but locked in the company locker. The company failed to provide its cashiers with strong locks and proper security in the work place. Respondent argues that she was not caught in the act and even reported that the money was missing. She claims that she was denied due process.

The Issue

          The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent was illegally terminated from employment by petitioners.

The Ruling of the Court

          We rule in the affirmative.

          There is probationary employment when the employee upon his engagement is made to undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment based on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of engagement.

          A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure.  However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement.  Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following:  (1) a just or (2) an authorized cause; and  (3) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer. 

          Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal, except for just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of the same Code, the employer shall furnish the worker, whose employment is sought to be terminated, a written notice containing a statement  of the causes of termination, and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and regulations pursuant to the guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.

          In the instant case, based on the facts on record, petitioners failed to accord respondent substantive and procedural due process. The haphazard manner in the investigation of the missing cash, which was left to the determination of the police authorities and the Prosecutor’s Office, left respondent with no choice but to cry foul.  Administrative investigation was not conducted by petitioner Supermarket.  On the same day that the missing money was reported by respondent to her immediate superior, the company already pre-judged her guilt without proper investigation, and instantly reported her to the police as the suspected thief, which resulted in her languishing in jail for two weeks.  

          As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the due process requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory and may not be supplanted by police investigation or court proceedings. The criminal aspect of the case is considered independent of the administrative aspect. Thus, employers should not rely solely on the findings of the Prosecutor’s Office. They are mandated to conduct their own separate investigation, and to accord the employee every opportunity to defend himself.  Furthermore, respondent was not represented by counsel when she was strip-searched inside the company premises or during the police investigation, and in the preliminary investigation before the Prosecutor’s Office.

          Respondent was constructively dismissed by petitioner Supermarket effective October 30, 1997. It was unreasonable for petitioners to charge her with abandonment for not reporting for work upon her release in jail. It would be the height of callousness to expect her to return to work after suffering in jail for two weeks. Work had been rendered unreasonable, unlikely, and definitely impossible, considering the treatment that was accorded respondent by petitioners.

          As to respondent’s monetary claims, Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. However, due to the strained relations of the parties, the payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement, when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable.  On the one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work environment.  On the other, the payment releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.

           Thus, as an illegally or constructively dismissed employee, respondent is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages. These two reliefs are separate and distinct from each other and are awarded conjunctively.

 In this case, since respondent was a probationary employee at the time she was constructively dismissed by petitioners, she is entitled to separation pay and backwages. Reinstatement of respondent is no longer viable considering the circumstances.

          However, the backwages that should be awarded to respondent shall be reckoned from the time of her constructive dismissal until the date of the termination of her employment, i.e., from October 30, 1997 to March 14, 1998.  The computation should not cover the entire period from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement. This is because respondent was a probationary employee, and the lapse of her probationary employment without her appointment as a regular employee of petitioner Supermarket effectively severed the employer-employee relationship between the parties. 

          In all cases involving employees engaged on probationary basis, the employer shall make known to its employees the standards under which they will qualify as regular employees at the time of their engagement. Where no standards are made known to an employee at the time, he shall be deemed a regular employee, unless the job is self-descriptive, like maid, cook, driver, or messenger.  However, the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy management. Naturally, petitioner Supermarket cannot be expected to retain respondent as a regular employee considering that she lost P20,299.00  while acting as a cashier during the probationary period. The rules on probationary employment should not be used to exculpate a probationary employee who acts in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense, in regard to which, there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91631 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioners are hereby ordered to pay respondent Irene R. Ranchez separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay and backwages from October 30, 1997 to March 14, 1998.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

                                       ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                      Associate Justice

                                      Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                      RENATO C. CORONA

                                      Chief Justice

*               In lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per Raffle dated July 6, 2009.

              Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, with Associate Justices Bienvenido Reyes and Fernanda Lampas Peralta, concurring; rollo, pp. 67-75.

              Id. at  77-78.

              Labor Arbiter’s decision; CA rollo, p. 50.

              Id. at 47.

              Id. at 48.

              Labor Arbiter’s decision, id.; NLRC decision, id. at 67; CA Decision, rollo, p. 68.

              Labor Arbiter’s decision, CA rollo, p. 48; NLRC decision, CA rollo, p. 70; CA Decision, rollo, p. 68.

              CA Decision; rollo, p. 69.

              CA Decision, id. at 68; NLRC decision, CA rollo, p. 67.

            Penned by Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D. del Rosario; CA rollo, pp. 47-53.

            Id. at 52-53.

            Labor Arbiter’s decision; id. at 51-52.

            Penned by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Presiding Commissioner Roy V. Señeres and Commissioner Romeo L. Go, concurring; id. at 65-72.

            Id. at 71.

            Id. at 69.

            Id. at 70.

            Penned by Commissioner Proculo T. Sarmen, with the concurrence of OIC, Office of the Chairman Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Romeo L. Go; id. at 86-88.

            Rollo, p. 74.

            CA Decision, id. at 68-69; NLRC decision, CA rollo, p. 67.

            CA Decision, rollo, p. 68; NLRC decision, CA rollo, p. 67.

            Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 6.

            Id.

            Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 6(c).

            Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. v. Daniel, 499 Phil. 491, 511 (2005).   

            Siemens v. Domingo, G.R. No. 150488, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 86, 100.

            Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 6(d).

            Capili v. National Labor Relations Commission, 337 Phil. 210, 216 (1997).

            Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr., 495 Phil. 706, 716-717 (2005).