Category: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES


CASE 2011-0175: UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LAIN⃰ JUNIAT, WINWOOD APPAREL, INC., WINGYAN APPAREL, INC., NONWOVEN FABRIC PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 171569, 01 AUGUST 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: MORTGAGE; PLEDGE; DACION EN PAGO. (BRIEF TITLE: UNION BANK VS. JUNIAT).

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DIGEST/SUBJECT/DOCTRINE

 

 

JUNIAT EXECUTED A CHATTEL MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF UNION BANK COVERING SEWING MACHINES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT FOR AND ON BEHALF OF WINWOOD AND WINGYAN. JUNIAT ET AL DID NOT PAY SUBJECT LOAN. UNION BANK SUED THEM FOR SUM OF MONEY AND MOVED TO ATTACH THE SEWING MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT. THE MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT  WERE IN THE POSSESSION OF NONWOVEN. COURT ISSUED SUMMONS TO NONWOVEN. NONWOVEN ARGUED THAT IT HAS A BETTER RIGHT TO THE MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT BECAUSE  JUNIAT EXECUTED DACION EN PAGO IN THEIR FAVOR. THEY THEFORE HOLD THE MACHINES AS OWNER WHILE PETITIONER HOLDS THE MACHINES ONLY AS MORTGAGEE. NONWOVEN PRESENTED A DOCUMENT WHERE JUNIAT PLEGED THE MACHINES TO NONWOVEN TO SECURE AN OBLIGATION. WHO HAS A BETTER RIGHT TO THE MACHINES AND EQUPMENT?

 

 

UNION BANK HAS A BETTER RIGHT. NONWOVEN FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE WAS DACION EN PAGO. THE DOCUMENT EXECUTED BY JUNIAT APPEARS TO BE AN UNNOTARIZED  PLEDGE. IN CASE OF DOUBT WHETHER A DEED IS A SALE OR A PLEDGE, THE DEED IS DEEMED A PLEDGE. SINCE THE PLEDGE WAS NOT NOTARIZED IT CANNOT BIND THIRD PARTIES.

 

 

A perusal of the Agreement dated May 9, 1992 clearly shows that the sewing machines, snap machines and boilers were pledged to Nonwoven by Juniat to guarantee his obligation.  However, under Article 2096 of the Civil Code, “[a] pledge shall not take effect against third persons if a description of the thing pledged and the date of the pledge do not appear in a public instrument.”  Hence, just like the chattel mortgage executed in favor of petitioner, the pledge executed by Juniat in favor of Nonwoven cannot bind petitioner.

 

Neither can we sustain the finding of the CA that: “The machineries were ceded to THIRD PARTY NONWOVEN by way of dacion en pago, a contract later entered into by WINWOOD/WINGYAN and THIRD PARTY NONWOVEN.”[1][53] As aptly pointed out by petitioner, no evidence was presented by Nonwoven to show that the attached properties were subsequently sold to it by way of a dacion en pago.  Also, there is nothing in the Agreement dated May 9, 1992 to indicate that the motorized sewing machines, snap machines and boilers were ceded to Nonwoven as payment for the Wingyan’s and Winwood’s obligation.  It bears stressing that there can be no transfer of ownership if the delivery of the property to the creditor is by way of security.[2][54]  In fact, in case of doubt as to whether a transaction is one of pledge or dacion en pago, the presumption is that it is a pledge as this involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests.[3][55]

 

 

 

 

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FIRST DIVISION

 

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,   G.R. No.  171569
                    Petitioner,    
    Present:
     
                      – versus-   CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
    LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
    BERSAMIN,
ALAIN⃰ JUNIAT, WINWOOD APPAREL, INC., WINGYAN APPAREL, INC., NONWOVEN FABRIC PHILIPPINES,   DELCASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR. JJ.

 

Promulgated:

                   Respondents.   August 1, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

D E C I S I O N

 

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

 

To have a binding effect on third parties, a contract of pledge must appear in a public instrument.[4][1]

 

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[5][2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the June 23, 2005 Decision[6][3] and the February 9, 2006 Resolution[7][4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66392.

 

Factual Antecedents

 

Petitioner  Union  Bank  of  the  Philippines   (Union Bank)   is  a  universal banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws.[8][5] 

 

Respondents Winwood Apparel, Inc. (Winwood) and Wingyan Apparel, Inc. (Wingyan) are domestic corporations engaged in the business of apparel manufacturing.[9][6] Both respondent corporations are owned and operated by respondent Alain Juniat (Juniat), a French national based in Hongkong.[10][7] Respondent Nonwoven Fabric Philippines, Inc. (Nonwoven) is a Philippine corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of various types of nonwoven fabrics.[11][8]

 

On September 3, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 57, a Complaint[12][9] with prayer for the issuance of ex-parte writs of preliminary attachment and replevin against Juniat, Winwood, Wingyan, and the person in possession of the mortgaged motorized sewing machines and equipment.[13][10] Petitioner alleged that Juniat, acting for and in behalf of Winwood and Wingyan, executed a promissory note[14][11] dated April 11, 1992 and a Chattel Mortgage[15][12] dated March 27, 1992 over several motorized sewing machines and other allied equipment to secure their obligation arising from export bills transactions to petitioner in the amount of P1,131,134.35;[16][13] that as additional security for the obligation, Juniat executed a Continuing Surety Agreement[17][14] dated April 11, 1992 in favor of petitioner;[18][15] that the loan remains unpaid;[19][16] and that the mortgaged motorized sewing machines are  insufficient to answer for the obligation.[20][17]

 

On September 10, 1992, the RTC issued writs of preliminary attachment and replevin in favor of petitioner.[21][18]  The writs were served by the Sheriff upon Nonwoven as it was in possession of the motorized sewing machines and equipment.[22][19] Although Nonwoven was not impleaded in the complaint filed by petitioner, the RTC likewise served summons upon Nonwoven since it was in possession of the motorized sewing machines and equipment.[23][20]

 

On September 28, 1992, Nonwoven filed an Answer,[24][21]  contending that the unnotarized Chattel Mortgage executed in favor of petitioner has no binding effect on Nonwoven and that it has a better title over the motorized sewing machines and equipment because these were assigned to it by Juniat pursuant to their Agreement[25][22] dated May 9, 1992.[26][23]  Juniat, Winwood, and Wingyan, on the other hand, were declared in default for failure to file an answer within the reglementary period.[27][24]

 

On November 23, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Sell Chattels Seized by Replevin,[28][25] praying that the motorized sewing machines and equipment be sold to avoid depreciation and deterioration.[29][26]  However, on May 18, 1993, before the RTC could act on the motion, petitioner sold the attached properties for the amount of P1,350,000.00.[30][27]

 

Nonwowen moved to cite the officers of petitioner in contempt for selling the attached properties, but the RTC denied the same on the ground that Union Bank acted in good faith.[31][28]

 

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

 

On May 20, 1999, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145,[32][29] rendered a Decision[33][30] in favor of petitioner.  The RTC ruled that both the Chattel Mortgage dated March 27, 1992 in favor of petitioner and the Agreement dated May 9, 1992 in favor of Nonwoven have no obligatory effect on third persons because these documents were not notarized.[34][31]  However, since the Chattel Mortgage in favor of petitioner was executed earlier, petitioner has a better right over the motorized sewing machines and equipment under the doctrine of “first in time, stronger in right” (prius tempore, potior jure).[35][32]  Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:

 

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

 

1.]   Declaring the [petitioner] UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, as having the better right to the goods and/or machineries subject of the Writs of Preliminary Attachment and Replevin issued by this Court on September 10, 1992.

 

2.]   Declaring the [petitioner] as entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the subject machineries in the amount of P1,350,000.00;

 

3.]   Declaring [respondents] Allain Juniat, Winwood Apparel, Inc.  and Wingyan Apparel, Inc. to be jointly and severally liable to the [petitioner], for the deficiency between the proceeds of the sale of the machineries subject of this suit [P1,350,000.00] and original claim of the plaintiff [P1,919,907.03], in the amount of P569,907.03, with legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date of this judgment until fully paid; and

 

4.]   Declaring [respondents] Allain Juniat, Winwood Apparel, Inc. and Wingyan Apparel, Inc. to be jointly and severally liable to the [petitioner] for the amount of P50,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees;  and

 

5.]   Cost of this suit against the [respondents].

 

SO ORDERED.[36][33]

 

Nonwoven moved for reconsideration[37][34]  but the RTC denied the same in its Order[38][35] dated July 14, 1999.

 

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 

On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.  The CA ruled that the contract of pledge entered into between Juniat and Nonwoven is valid and binding, and that the motorized sewing machines and equipment were ceded to Nonwoven by Juniat by virtue of a dacion en pago.[39][36]  Thus, the CA declared Nonwoven entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the attached properties.[40][37]  The fallo reads:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  [Petitioner] Union Bank of the Philippines is hereby DIRECTED to pay Nonwoven Fabric Philippines, Inc. P1,350,000.00,  the amount it holds in escrow, realized from the May 18, 1993 sale of the machineries to avoid deterioration during pendency of suit.  No pronouncement as to costs.

 

SO ORDERED.[41][38]

 

 

Petitioner sought reconsideration[42][39] which was denied by the CA in a Resolution[43][40] dated February 9, 2006.

 

Issues

 

Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the following issues:

 

1.     Whether x x x the Court of Appeals committed serious reversible error in setting aside the Decision of the trial court holding that Union Bank of the Philippines had a better right over the machineries seized/levied upon in the proceedings before the trial court and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof;

2.     Whether x x x the Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that [Nonwoven] has a valid claim over the subject sewing machines.[44][41]

 

 

Petitioner’s Arguments

 

Echoing the reasoning of the RTC, petitioner insists that it has a better title to the proceeds of the sale.[45][42]  Although the Chattel Mortgage executed in its favor was not notarized, petitioner insists that it is nevertheless valid, and thus, has preference over a subsequent unnotarized agreement.[46][43] Petitioner further claims that except for the said agreement, no other evidence was presented by Nonwoven to show that the motorized sewing machines and equipment were indeed transferred to them by Juniat/Winwood/Wingyan.[47][44]

 

Respondent Nonwoven’s Arguments

 

            Nonwoven, on the other hand, claims ownership over the proceeds of the sale under Article 1544[48][45] of the Civil Code on double sale, which it claims can be applied by analogy in the instant case.[49][46]  Nonwoven contends that since its prior possession over the motorized sewing machines and equipment was in good faith, it has a better title over the proceeds of the sale.[50][47]  Nonwoven likewise maintains that petitioner has no right over the proceeds of the sale because the Chattel Mortgage executed in its favor was unnotarized, unregistered, and without an affidavit of good faith.[51][48] 

 

Our Ruling

 

The petition has merit.

 

Nonwoven lays claim to the attached motorized sewing machines and equipment pursuant to the Agreement it entered into with Juniat, to wit: 

 

Hong Kong, 9th May, 1992

 

With reference to talks held this morning at the Holiday Inn Golden Mile Coffee Shop, among the following parties:

 

  1. Redflower Garments Inc. – Mrs. Maglipon
  2. Nonwoven Fabrics Phils. Inc. – Mr. J. Tan
  3. Winwood Apparel Inc./Wing Yan Apparel, Inc. – Mr. A. Juniat, Mrs. S. Juniat

 

IT WAS AGREED THAT:

 

a. Settlement of the accounts between Nonwoven Fabrics Phils. Inc. and Winwood Apparel Inc./Wing Yan Apparel, Inc. should be effected as agreed through partial payment by L/C with the balance to be settled at a later date for which Winwood Apparel, Inc. agrees to consign 94 sewing machines, 3 snap machines and 2 boilers,  presently in the care of Redflower Garments Inc., to the care of Nonwoven Fabrics Phils., Inc. as guarantee. Meanwhile, Nonwoven will resume delivery to Winwood/Win Yang as usual.

 

x x x x[52][49]  (Emphasis supplied.)

 

 

It insists that since the attached properties were assigned or ceded to it by Juniat, it has a better right over the proceeds of the sale of the attached properties than petitioner, whose claim is based on an unnotarized Chattel Mortgage.

 

We do not agree.

 

Indeed, the unnotarized Chattel Mortgage executed by Juniat, for and in behalf of Wingyan and Winwood, in favor of petitioner does not bind Nonwoven.[53][50]  However, it must be pointed out that petitioner’s primary cause of action is for a sum of money with prayer for the issuance of ex-parte writs of attachment and replevin against Juniat, Winwood, Wingyan, and the person in possession of the motorized sewing machines and equipment.[54][51]  Thus, the fact that the Chattel Mortgage executed in favor of petitioner was not notarized does not affect petitioner’s cause of action.  Petitioner only needed to show that the loan of Juniat, Wingyan and Winwood remains unpaid and that it is entitled to the issuance of the writs prayed for.  Considering that writs of attachment and replevin were issued by the RTC,[55][52] Nonwoven had to prove that it has a better right of possession or ownership over the attached properties. This it failed to do.

 

A perusal of the Agreement dated May 9, 1992 clearly shows that the sewing machines, snap machines and boilers were pledged to Nonwoven by Juniat to guarantee his obligation.  However, under Article 2096 of the Civil Code, “[a] pledge shall not take effect against third persons if a description of the thing pledged and the date of the pledge do not appear in a public instrument.”  Hence, just like the chattel mortgage executed in favor of petitioner, the pledge executed by Juniat in favor of Nonwoven cannot bind petitioner.

 

Neither can we sustain the finding of the CA that: “The machineries were ceded to THIRD PARTY NONWOVEN by way of dacion en pago, a contract later entered into by WINWOOD/WINGYAN and THIRD PARTY NONWOVEN.”[56][53] As aptly pointed out by petitioner, no evidence was presented by Nonwoven to show that the attached properties were subsequently sold to it by way of a dacion en pago.  Also, there is nothing in the Agreement dated May 9, 1992 to indicate that the motorized sewing machines, snap machines and boilers were ceded to Nonwoven as payment for the Wingyan’s and Winwood’s obligation.  It bears stressing that there can be no transfer of ownership if the delivery of the property to the creditor is by way of security.[57][54]  In fact, in case of doubt as to whether a transaction is one of pledge or dacion en pago, the presumption is that it is a pledge as this involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests.[58][55]

 

In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to reverse the ruling of the CA.  Nonwoven is not entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the attached properties because it failed to show that it has a better title over the same.   

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The assailed June 23, 2005 Decision and the February 9, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66392 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The May 20, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

 

            SO ORDERED.

 

                                               

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chairperson

Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

 


 


⃰      Also spelled as Allan and Allain in some parts of the records.

[1][53]Id. at 61.

[2][54] Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Yllas Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 454,  465.

[3][55] Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 150, 164 (1982).

⃰      Also spelled as Allan and Allain in some parts of the records.

[4][1]   Article 2096 of the Civil Code provides:

                A pledge shall not take effect against third persons if a description of the thing pledged and the date of the pledge do not appear in a public instrument.

[5][2]   Rollo, pp. 11-91 with Annexes “A” to “E inclusive. 

[6][3]      Id. at 52-62; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.

[7][4]  Id. at 63-64; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.

[8][5]  Id. at 15.

[9][6]  Id. 16.

[10][7]Id.

[11][8] CA rollo, p. 31.

[12][9] Records, pp. 1-9.

[13][10]         Rollo, pp. 54-55.

[14][11]         Records, pp. 749-750.

[15][12]        Id. at 751-754.

[16][13]         Rollo, pp. 65-66.

[17][14]         Records, pp. 755-758.

[18][15]         Rollo, p. 66.

[19][16]        Id. at 55.

[20][17]        Id.

[21][18]        Id.

[22][19]        Id. at 66.

[23][20]        Id.

[24][21]         Records, pp. 110-120.

[25][22]        Id. at 121.

[26][23]         Id. at 113.

[27][24]         Rollo, p. 67.

[28][25]         Records, pp. 357-359.

[29][26]         Rollo, p. 56

[30][27]        Id.

[31][28]        Id. at 57.

[32][29]         Id. at 70; The case was re-raffled to Branch 145 of the RTC of Makati as Presiding Judge Francisco X. Velez of Branch 57 inhibited himself from the case.

[33][30]        Id. at 65-76; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.

[34][31]        Id. at 74.

[35][32]        Id.

[36][33]        Id. at 75-76.

[37][34]         Records, pp. 1081-1094.

[38][35]         Rollo, p. 77.

[39][36]        Id. at 59-61.

[40][37]        Id. 61-62.

[41][38]        Id.

[42][39]        Id. at 78-87.

[43][40]        Id. at 63-64.

[44][41]        Id. at 283-284.

[45][42]        Id. at 290-291.

[46][43]        Id. at 287-293.

[47][44]        Id. at 286-287.

[48][45]         Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

[49][46]         Rollo, pp. 257.

[50][47]        Id. at 257-258.

[51][48]        Id. at 252.

[52][49]         Records, p. 121.

[53][50]         Civil Code, Art. 2125. In addition to the requisites stated in Article 2085, it is indispensable, in order that a mortgage may be validly constituted, that the document in which it appears be recorded in the Registry of Property. If the instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties.

The persons in whose favor the law establishes a mortgage have no other right than to demand the execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized.

[54][51]         Records, pp. 1-9.

[55][52]         Rollo, p. 66.

[56][53]        Id. at 61.

[57][54]         Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Yllas Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 454,  465.

[58][55]         Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 150, 164 (1982).

 

CASE 2011-0174: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. CIRIACO JUMAMOY AND HEIRS OF ANTONIO GO PACE REPRESENTED BY ROSALIA PACE (G.R. NO. 169901, 03 AUGUST 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECT: LAND TITLES. (BRIEF TITLE: PNB VS. JUMANOY)

 

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

FIRST DIVISION

 

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,   G.R. No. 169901

Petitioner,

   

 

   

 

  Present:

 

   

– versus –

  CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
    LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
    BERSAMIN,
    DELCASTILLO, and
CIRIACO JUMAMOY and   VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
HEIRS OF ANTONIO GO PACE,    
represented by ROSALIA PACE,   Promulgated:
                 Respondents.   August 3, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

D E C I S I O N

 

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

 

                A PARTY enters into an agreement or contract with an eye to reap benefits therefrom or be relieved of an oppressive economic condition. The other party likewise assumes that the agreement would be advantageous to him. But just like in any other human undertaking, the end-result may not be as sweet as expected.

 

                The problem could not be resolved by any other means but to litigate.

 

                Courts, however, are not defenders of bad bargains. At most, they only declare the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract in order to preserve sanctity of the same.

 

                We are confronted in this case with this legal predicament.[1][1]

 

 

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the February 28, 2005 Decision[2][2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73743 which dismissed petitioner Philippine National Bank’s (PNB’s) appeal from the July 30, 2001 Decision[3][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Digos City, Davao del Sur.  Said Decision of the RTC ordered PNB to reconvey to respondent Ciriaco Jumamoy (Ciriaco) a portion of the parcel of land subject of this case.

 

Likewise assailed in this petition is the September 28, 2005 Resolution[4][4] of the CA denying PNB’s Motion for Reconsideration.

 

Factual Antecedents

 

On December 27, 1989, the RTC, Branch 19, of Digos City, Davao del Sur, rendered a Decision[5][5] in Civil Case No. 2514 (a case for Reconveyance and Damages), ordering the exclusion of 2.5002 hectares from Lot 13521.  The trial court found that said 2.5002 hectares which is part of Lot 13521, a 13,752-square meter parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4952[6][6] registered in the name of Antonio Go Pace (Antonio) on July 19, 1971 actually pertains to Sesinando Jumamoy (Sesinando), Ciriaco’s predecessor-in-interest.  The RTC found that said 2.5002-hectare lot was erroneously included in Antonio’s free patent application which became the basis for the issuance of his OCT.  It then ordered the heirs of Antonio (the Paces [represented by Rosalia Pace (Rosalia)]) to reconvey said portion to Ciriaco.  In so ruling, the RTC acknowledged Ciriaco’s actual and exclusive possession, cultivation, and claim of ownership over the subject lot which he acquired from his father Sesinando, who occupied and improved the lot way back in the early 1950s.[7][7]

 

            The December 27, 1989 RTC Decision became final and executory but the Deed of Conveyance[8][8] issued in favor of Ciriaco could not be annotated on OCT No. P-4952 since said title was already cancelled.  Apparently, Antonio and his wife Rosalia mortgaged Lot 13521 to PNB as security for a series of loans dated February 25, 1971, April 26, 1972, and May 11, 1973.[9][9]  After Antonio and Rosalia failed to pay their obligation, PNB foreclosed the mortgage on July 14, 1986[10][10] and title toLot 13521 was transferred to PNB under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.T-23063.  Moreover, the Deed of Conveyance could not be annotated at the back of OCT No. P-4952 because PNB was not impleaded as a defendant in Civil Case No. 2514. 

 

Thus, in February 1996, Ciriaco filed the instant complaint against PNB and the Paces for Declaration of Nullity of Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale, Reconveyance and Damages,[11][11] docketed as Civil Case No. 3313 and raffled to Branch 18 of RTC,DigosCity, Davao del Sur. 

 

In his complaint, Ciriaco averred that Antonio could not validly mortgage the entire Lot13521 to PNB as a portion thereof consisting of 2.5002 hectares belongs to him (Ciriaco), as already held in Civil Case No. 2514.  He claimed that PNB is not an innocent mortgagee/purchaser for value because prior to the execution and registration of PNB’s deed of sale with the Register of Deeds, the bank had prior notice that the disputed lot is subject of a litigation.  It would appear that during the pendency of Civil Case No. 2514, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of OCT No. P-4952 as Entry No. 165547[12][12] on November 28, 1988.  

The Paces did not file any answer and were declared in default.[13][13] Meanwhile PNB filed its Amended Answer[14][14] denying for lack of knowledge and information Ciriaco’s claim of ownership and reliance on the judgment in Civil Case No. 2514.  It argued that it is a mortgagee and a buyer in good faith since at the time of the mortgage, Antonio’s certificate of title was “clean” and “devoid of any adverse annotations.”  PNB also filed a cross-claim against the Paces.    

Instead of having a full-blown trial, Ciriaco and PNB opted to submit the case for decision based on their respective memoranda.

 

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court     

 

In its July 30, 2001 Decision,[15][15] the RTC ordered the partial nullification of the mortgage and the reconveyance of the subject lot claimed by Ciriaco.  The RTC found that PNB was not a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith because it failed to take the necessary steps to protect its interest such as sending a field inspector to the area to determine the real owner, its occupants, its improvements and its boundaries.

 

            The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

 

            WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that defendant PNB shall reconvey, by the proper instrument of reconveyance, that portion of the land owned and claimed by plaintiff CIRIACO JUMAMOY.

 

                The claim for damages by all the parties are hereby DISMISSED for lack of proper basis.

 

                SO ORDERED.[16][16]

 

 

PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[17][17]  It argued that the trial court erred in finding that it is not an innocent mortgagee for value due to its alleged failure to send its field inspector to the area considering that such matter was never alleged in Ciriaco’s complaint.  PNB claimed that Ciriaco merely stated in his complaint that the bank is not an innocent mortgagee for value because it had already constructive notice that the subject land is under litigation by virtue of the notice of lis pendens already annotated on Antonio’s title when PNB consolidated in its name the title for Lot 13521.  PNB however argued that at the time of the constitution and registration of the mortgage in 1971, Antonio’s title was clean as the notice of lis pendens was annotated only in 1988.  And since there was no cause to arouse suspicion, it may rely on the face of theTorrens title.  As for its cross-claim against the heirs of Antonio, PNB prayed that a hearing be set.  

Ciriaco filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.[18][18]  He insisted that PNB cannot validly claim that it is an innocent mortgagee based on its reliance on Antonio’sTorrens title because when it first granted Antonio’s loan application, the subject property was still untitled and unregistered.

 

On January 7, 2002, the RTC denied PNB’s motion for reconsideration.[19][19]

 

PNB thus filed its appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 

            In its Decision of February 28, 2005,[20][20] the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling that PNB is not an innocent mortgagee/purchaser.  The CA reiterated that the business of a bank or a financial institution is imbued with public interest thus it is obliged to exercise extraordinary prudence and care by looking beyond what appears on the title.  The CA pointed out that in this case, PNB failed to prove that it conducted an investigation on the real condition of the mortgaged property.  Had the bank done so, it could have discovered that Ciriaco had possession of the disputed lot for quite some time.  Moreover, the CA held that PNB could not validly claim that it merely relied on the face of a “clean”Torrens title because when the disputed lot was first mortgaged in 1971, the same was still an untitled and unregistered land.  It likewise ruled that Ciriaco’s action for reconveyance is based on implied trust and is imprescriptible because the land has always been in his possession.

 

Anent PNB’s cross-claim against the Paces, the CA gave due course thereto and ordered the records remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

 

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

 

                WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, giving due course to the cross-claim of the defendant-appellant PNB against the Heirs of ANTONIO GO PACE as represented by ROSALIA PACE.  Accordingly, let the entire records of this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings of the said cross-claim.

 

                SO ORDERED.[21][21]

 

 

PNB moved for a reconsideration.[22][22]  However, the CA sustained its ruling in a Resolution[23][23] dated September 28, 2005.

 

Hence, this petition.

 

Issues

 

PNB ascribed upon the CA the following errors:

 

A.  THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION IN DECLARING THAT PNB FAILED TO QUALIFY AS AN INNOCENT MORTGAGEE FOR VALUE IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THIS FACT.

 

B.    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTIAL NULLIFICATION OF THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PNB IN DISREGARD OF THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.

 

C.    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTIAL NULLIFICATION OF PNB’S TITLE CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.

 

D.    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PNB’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND SUSTAINING RESPONDENT JUMAMOY’S INVOCATION OF THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN SPOUSES FLORENTINO AND FRANCISCA TOMAS VS. PNB (98 SCRA 280) INSTEAD OF THE LANDMARK CASE OF LILIA Y. GONZALES VS. IAC AND RURAL BANK OF PAVIA, INC. (157 SCRA 587) WHICH IS THE ONE APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE.

 

E.    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING PNB TO RECONVEY THE PORTION OF LAND CLAIMED BY RESPONDENT JUMAMOY NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT IS APPARENT FROM THE COMPLAINT THAT RESPONDENT JUMAMOY’S ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE IS ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.[24][24]

 

 

            In essence, PNB contends that the lower courts grievously erred in declaring that it is not an innocent mortgagee/purchaser for value.  PNB also argues that Ciriaco’s complaint is barred by prescription.  TCT No. T-23063 was issued on March 23, 1990, while Ciriaco filed his complaint only six years thereafter.  Thus, the one-year period to nullify PNB’s certificate of title had lapsed, making PNB’s title indefeasible.  Moreover, PNB claims that an action for reconveyance prescribes in four years if based on fraud, or, 10 years if based on an implied trust, both to be counted from the issuance of OCT No. P-4952 in July 1971 which constitutes as a constructive notice to the whole world.  Either way, Ciriaco’s action had already prescribed since it took him 17 years to file his first complaint for reconveyance in Civil Case No. 2514 and around 23 years to file his second complaint in Civil Case No. 3313. 

 

Our Ruling

 

            We deny the petition.

 

PNB is not an innocent purchaser/ mortgagee for value.

Undoubtedly, our land registration statute extends its protection to an innocent purchaser for value, defined as “one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.”[25][25] An “innocent purchaser for value” includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.[26][26] 

Here, we agree with the disposition of the RTC and the CA that PNB is not an innocent purchaser for value.  As we have already declared:

 

A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.[27][27]   (Emphasis ours.)   

 

 

PNB’s contention that Ciriaco failed to allege in his complaint that PNB failed to take the necessary precautions before accepting the mortgage is of no moment.  It is undisputed that the 2.5002-hectare portion of the mortgaged property has been adjudged in favor of Ciriaco’s predecessor-in-interest in Civil Case No. 2514.  Hence, PNB has the burden of evidence that it acted in good faith from the time the land was offered as collateral.  However, PNB miserably failed to overcome this burden.  There was no showing at all that it conducted an investigation; that it observed due diligence and prudence by checking for flaws in the title; that it verified the identity of the true owner and possessor of the land; and, that it visited subject premises to determine its actual condition before accepting the same as collateral. 

 

Both the CA and the trial court correctly observed that PNB could not validly raise the defense that it relied on Antonio’s clean title.  The land, when it was first mortgaged, was then unregistered under our Torrenssystem.  The first mortgage was on February 25, 1971[28][28] while OCT No. P-4952 was issued on July 19, 1971.  Since the Paces offered as collateral an unregistered land, with more reason PNB should have proven before the RTC that it had verified the status of the property by conducting an ocular inspection before granting Antonio his first loan.  Good faith which is a question of fact could have been proven in the proceedings before the RTC, but PNB dispensed with the trial proper and let its opportunity to dispute factual allegations pass.  Had PNB really taken the necessary precautions, it would have discovered that a large portion ofLot 13521 is occupied by Ciriaco. 

 

Ciriaco’s action for reconveyance is

inprescriptible.

 

 

Also, the incontrovertibility of a title does not preclude a rightful claimant to a property from seeking other remedies because it was never the intention of the Torrenssystem to perpetuate fraud.  As explained in Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong:[29][29]

 

The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrenssystem does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. It is evident from the records that the petitioner owns the portion in question and therefore the area should be conveyed to her. The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. (Emphasis supplied.)

 

 

“If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.”[30][30]  An action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years as it is an obligation created by law,[31][31] to be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property.[32][32]  This rule, however, applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. 

 

In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals,[33][33] we said that there is no prescription when in an action for reconveyance, the claimant is in actual possession of the property because this in effect is an action for quieting of title: 

 

[S]ince if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.[34][34]

 

 

In Ciriaco’s case, as it has been judicially established that he is in actual possession of the property he claims as his and that he has a better right to the disputed portion, his suit for reconveyance is in effect an action for quieting of title.  Hence, petitioner’s defense of prescription against Ciriaco does not lie.

 

            WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The February 28, 2005 Decision and September 28, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73743 are hereby AFFIRMED.

 

 

            SO ORDERED.

 

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

 

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 


 


[1][1]   July 30, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,DigosCity, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 3313, records, p. 122.

[2][2]   CA rollo, pp. 59-75; penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Edgardo A. Camello.

[3][3]   Records, pp. 122-126; penned by Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray.

[4][4]   CA rollo, p. 133.

[5][5]   Records, pp. 9-19.

[6][6]  Id. at 88-91, 141-142.

[7][7]   Sesinando’s possession has been upheld in the case of CA-G.R. No. 29215-R entitled De Salvilla vs. Jumamoy.

[8][8]   Records, pp. 20-21.

[9][9]   Entry Nos. 5575, 11332, 17171, id. at 89-90 and 142-143.

[10][10]         See Entry No. 178169 in OCT No. P-4952, id. at 91 and dorsal side of p. 142.

[11][11]        Id. at 1-8.

[12][12]        Id. at 91 and dorsal side of p. 142.

[13][13]        Id. at 42.

[14][14]        Id. at 46-50.

[15][15]        Id. at 122-126.

[16][16]        Id. at 126.

[17][17]        Id. at 127-140.

[18][18]        Id. at 144-154.

[19][19]        Id. at 158-161.

[20][20]         Supra note 2.

[21][21]         CA rollo, p. 75.

[22][22]        Id. at 81-98.

[23][23]         Supra note 4.

[24][24]         Rollo, pp. 43-44

[25][25]         Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, 464 Phil. 812, 823 (2004), citing Spouses Chu, Sr. v. Benelda Estate Development Corporation, 405 Phil. 936 (2001).

[26][26]         Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 32.

[27][27]         Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429 Phil 225, 239 (2002). 

[28][28]         Records, p. 89.

[29][29]         167 Phil. 555, 559 (1977).

[30][30]         Civil Code, Article 1456.

[31][31]         Civil Code, Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

x x x x

(2)  Upon an obligation created by law;

x x x x

[32][32]         Crisostomo v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 164787, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 402, 413.

[33][33]         335 Phil. 19 (1997).

[34][34]         Id. at 32. Reiterated in Ney v. Sps. Quijano, G.R. No. 178609,  August 4, 2010, 626 SCRA 800, 808 citing Mendizabel v. Apao, G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 609 and Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc., G.R. No. 175375, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 616, 631.

CASE 2011-0173: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (G.R. NO. 163653) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (G.R. NO. 167689) (19 JULY 2011, PEREZ, J) SUBJECTS: TAXATION, THEORETICAL INTERESTS, CONTROLLED TAXPAYERS. (BRIEF TITLE: CIR VS. FILINVEST)

 

 

EN BANC

 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

                                      Petitioner,

 

 

 

 

–versus–

 

 

 

 

FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,   

                                   Respondent.

 

 

x————————————-x

 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

                                      Petitioner,

 

 

 

 

                     –versus–

 

 

 

FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

                                   Respondent.

     G. R. No. 163653

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

     G. R. No. 167689

 

Present:

 

     CORONA, C.J.,

     CARPIO,

     VELASCO, JR.,

     LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

     BRION,

     PERALTA,

     BERSAMIN,

     DEL CASTILLO,

     ABAD,

     VILLARAMA, JR.,

     PEREZ,

    MENDOZA, and

     SERENO,* JJ.

 

 

 

 

 

      Promulgated:

 

      July 19, 2011

x———————————————————————————————– x

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

PEREZ, J.:

 

Assailed in these twin petitions for review on certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in the following cases: (a) Decision dated 16 December 2003 of the then Special Fifth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72992;[1][1] and, (b) Decision dated 26 January 2005 of the then Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 74510.[2][2]

 

The Facts

 

          The owner of 80% of the outstanding shares of respondent Filinvest Alabang, Inc. (FAI), respondent Filinvest Development Corporation (FDC) is a holding company which also owned 67.42% of the outstanding shares of Filinvest Land, Inc. (FLI).  On 29 November 1996, FDC and FAI entered into a Deed of Exchange with FLI whereby the former both transferred in favor of the latter parcels of land appraised at P4,306,777,000.00.  In exchange for said parcels which were intended to facilitate development of medium-rise residential and commercial buildings, 463,094,301 shares of stock of FLI were issued to FDC and FAI.[3][3]  As a result of the exchange, FLI’s ownership structure was changed to the extent reflected in the following tabular précis, viz.:

 

Stockholder Number and Percentage of Shares Held Prior to the Exchange Number of Additional Shares Issued Number and Percentage of Shares Held After the Exchange

 

FDC 2,537,358,000    67.42%       42,217,000 2,579,575,000    61.03%

 

FAI                      0      0       420,877,000 420,877,000         9.96%

 

OTHERS 1,226,177,000    32.58%                   0              1,226,177,000    29.01%

 

  —————–    ———–

 

————– —————
  3,763,535,000    100% 463,094,301 4,226,629,000     (100%)

 

 

          On 13 January 1997, FLI requested a ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to the effect that no gain or loss should be recognized in the aforesaid transfer of real properties.  Acting on the request, the BIR issued Ruling No. S-34-046-97 dated 3 February 1997, finding that the exchange is among those contemplated under Section 34 (c) (2) of the old National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)[4][4] which provides that “(n)o gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by a person in exchange for a stock in such corporation of which as a result of such exchange said person, alone or together with others, not exceeding four (4) persons, gains control of said corporation.”[5][5]  With the BIR’s reiteration of the foregoing ruling upon the 10 February 1997 request for clarification filed by FLI,[6][6] the latter, together with FDC and FAI, complied with all the requirements imposed in the ruling.[7][7]  

 

          On various dates during the years 1996 and 1997, in the meantime, FDC also extended advances in favor of its affiliates, namely, FAI, FLI, Davao Sugar Central Corporation (DSCC) and Filinvest Capital, Inc. (FCI).[8][8] Duly evidenced by instructional letters as well as cash and journal vouchers, said cash advances amounted to P2,557,213,942.60 in 1996[9][9] and P3,360,889,677.48 in 1997.[10][10]   On 15 November 1996, FDC also entered into a Shareholders’ Agreement with Reco Herrera PTE Ltd. (RHPL) for the formation of a Singapore-based joint venture company called Filinvest Asia Corporation (FAC), tasked to develop and manage FDC’s 50% ownership of its PBCom Office Tower Project (the Project).  With their equity participation in FAC respectively pegged at 60% and 40% in the Shareholders’ Agreement, FDC subscribed to P500.7 million worth of shares in said joint venture company to RHPL’s subscription worth P433.8 million.  Having paid its subscription by executing a Deed of Assignment transferring to FAC a portion of its rights and interest in the Project worth P500.7 million, FDC eventually reported a net loss of P190,695,061.00 in its Annual Income Tax Return for the taxable year 1996.[11][11]

 

          On 3 January 2000, FDC received from the BIR a Formal Notice of Demand to pay deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes, plus interests and compromise penalties,[12][12] covered by the following Assessment Notices, viz.: (a) Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-96-00018-2000 for deficiency income taxes in the sum of P150,074,066.27 for 1996; (b) Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-96-00020-2000 for deficiency documentary stamp taxes in the sum of P10,425,487.06 for 1996; (c) Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-97-00019-2000 for deficiency income taxes in the sum of P5,716,927.03 for 1997; and (d) Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-97-00021-2000 for deficiency documentary stamp taxes in the sum of P5,796,699.40 for 1997.[13][13]   The foregoing deficiency taxes were assessed on the taxable gain supposedly realized by FDC from the Deed of Exchange it executed with FAI and FLI, on the dilution resulting from the Shareholders’ Agreement FDC executed with RHPL as well as the “arm’s-length” interest rate and documentary stamp taxes imposable on the advances FDC extended to its affiliates.[14][14]

 

          On 3 January 2000, FAI similarly received from the BIR a Formal Letter of Demand for deficiency income taxes in the sum of P1,477,494,638.23 for the year 1997.[15][15]  Covered by Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-97-0027-2000,[16][16] said deficiency tax was also assessed on the taxable gain purportedly realized by FAI from the Deed of Exchange it executed with FDC and FLI.[17][17]  On 26 January 2000 or within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days from notice of the assessment, both FDC and FAI filed their respective requests for reconsideration/protest, on the ground that the deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes assessed by the BIR were bereft of factual and legal basis.[18][18]  Having submitted the relevant supporting documents pursuant to the 31 January 2000 directive from the BIR Appellate Division, FDC and FAI filed on 11 September 2000 a letter requesting an early resolution of their request for reconsideration/protest on the ground that the 180 days prescribed for the resolution thereof under Section 228 of the NIRC was going to expire on 20 September 2000.[19][19]  

 

          In view of the failure of petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to resolve their request for reconsideration/protest within the aforesaid period, FDC and FAI filed on 17 October 2000 a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) pursuant to Section 228 of the 1997 NIRC.  Docketed before said court as CTA Case No. 6182, the petition alleged, among other matters, that as previously opined in BIR Ruling No. S-34-046-97, no taxable gain should have been assessed from the subject Deed of Exchange since FDC and FAI collectively gained further control of FLI as a consequence of the exchange; that correlative to the CIR’s lack of authority to impute theoretical interests on the cash advances FDC extended in favor of its affiliates, the rule is settled that interests cannot be demanded in the absence of a stipulation to the effect; that not being promissory notes or certificates of obligations, the instructional letters as well as the cash and journal vouchers evidencing said cash advances were not subject to documentary stamp taxes; and, that no income tax may be imposed on the prospective gain from the supposed appreciation of FDC’s shareholdings in FAC.  As a consequence, FDC and FAC both prayed that the subject assessments for deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes for the years 1996 and 1997 be cancelled and annulled.[20][20]

 

          On 4 December 2000, the CIR filed its answer, claiming that the transfer of property in question should not be considered tax free since, with the resultant diminution of its shares in FLI, FDC did not gain further control of said corporation.  Likewise calling attention to the fact that the cash advances FDC extended to its affiliates were interest free despite the interest bearing loans it obtained from banking institutions, the CIR invoked Section 43 of the old NIRC which, as implemented by Revenue Regulations No. 2, Section 179 (b) and (c), gave him “the power to allocate, distribute or apportion income or deductions between or among such organizations, trades or business in order to prevent evasion of taxes.”  The CIR justified the imposition of documentary stamp taxes on the instructional letters as well as cash and journal vouchers for said cash advances on the strength of Section 180 of the NIRC and Revenue Regulations No. 9-94 which provide that loan transactions are subject to said tax irrespective of whether or not they are evidenced by a formal agreement or by mere office memo.  The CIR also argued that FDC realized taxable gain arising from the dilution of its shares in FAC as a result of its Shareholders’ Agreement with RHPL.[21][21]

 

          At the pre-trial conference, the parties filed a Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues[22][22] which was admitted in the 16 February 2001 resolution issued by the CTA. With the further admission of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence subsequently filed by FDC and FAI[23][23] and the conclusion of the testimony of Susana Macabelda anent the cash advances FDC extended in favor of its affiliates,[24][24] the CTA went on to render the Decision dated 10 September 2002 which, with the exception of the deficiency income tax on the interest income FDC supposedly realized from the advances it extended in favor of its affiliates, cancelled the rest of deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes assessed against FDC and FAI for the years 1996 and 1997,[25][25] thus: 

 

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the instant petition partly meritorious.  Accordingly, Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-96-00018-2000 imposing deficiency income tax on FDC for taxable year 1996, Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-96-00020-2000 and SP-DST-97-00021-2000 imposing deficiency documentary stamp tax on FDC for taxable years 1996 and 1997, respectively and Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-97-0027-2000 imposing deficiency income tax on FAI for the taxable year 1997 are hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE.  However, [FDC] is hereby ORDERED to PAY the amount of P5,691,972.03 as deficiency income tax for taxable year 1997.  In addition, petitioner is also ORDERED to PAY 20% delinquency interest computed from February 16, 2000 until full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249 (c) (3) of the Tax Code.[26][26]

 

 

Finding that the collective increase of the equity participation of FDC and FAI in FLI rendered the gain derived from the exchange tax-free, the CTA also ruled that the increase in the value of FDC’s shares in FAC did not result in economic advantage in the absence of actual sale or conversion thereof.  While likewise finding that the documents evidencing the cash advances FDC extended to its affiliates cannot be considered as loan agreements that are subject to documentary stamp tax, the CTA enunciated, however, that the CIR was justified in assessing undeclared interests on the same cash advances pursuant to his authority under Section 43 of the NIRC in order to forestall tax evasion.  For persuasive effect, the CTA referred to the equivalent provision in the Internal Revenue Code of the United States(IRC-US), i.e., Sec.  482, as implemented by Section 1.482-2 of 1965-1969 Regulations of the Law of Federal Income Taxation.[27][27]

 

          Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, FDC filed on 5 November 2002 the petition for review docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. No. 72992, pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.  Calling attention to the fact that the cash advances it extended to its affiliates were interest-free in the absence of the express stipulation on interest required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, FDC questioned the imposition of an arm’s-length interest rate thereon on the ground, among others, that the CIR’s authority under Section 43 of the NIRC: (a) does not include the power to impute imaginary interest on said transactions; (b) is directed only against controlled taxpayers and not against mother or holding corporations; and, (c) can only be invoked in cases of understatement of taxable net income or evident tax evasion.[28][28]  Upholding FDC’s position, the CA’s then Special Fifth Division rendered the herein assailed decision dated 16 December 2003,[29][29] the decretal portion of which states:  

 

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.  The assailed Decision dated September 10, 2002 rendered by the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 6182 directing petitioner Filinvest Development Corporation to pay the amount of P5,691,972.03 representing deficiency income tax on allegedly undeclared interest income for the taxable year 1997, plus 20% delinquency interest computed from February 16, 2000 until full payment thereof is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, a new one entered annulling Assessment Notice No. SP-INC-97-00019-2000 imposing deficiency income tax on petitioner for taxable year 1997.  No pronouncement as to costs.[30][30]

 

With the denial of its partial motion for reconsideration of the same 11 December 2002 resolution issued by the CTA,[31][31] the CIR also filed the petition for review docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. No. 74510.  In essence, the CIR argued that the CTA reversibly erred in cancelling the assessment notices: (a) for deficiency income taxes on the exchange of property between FDC, FAI and FLI; (b) for deficiency documentary stamp taxes on the documents evidencing FDC’s cash advances to its affiliates; and (c) for deficiency income tax on the gain FDC purportedly realized from the increase of the value of its shareholdings in FAC.[32][32] The foregoing petition was, however, denied due course and dismissed for lack of merit in the herein assailed decision dated 26 January 2005[33][33] rendered by the CA’s then Fourteenth Division, upon the following findings and conclusions, to wit:

 

1.         As affirmed in the 3 February 1997 BIR Ruling No. S-34-046-97, the 29 November 1996 Deed of Exchange resulted in the combined control by FDC and FAI of more than 51% of the outstanding shares of FLI, hence, no taxable gain can be recognized from the transaction under Section 34 (c) (2) of the old NIRC;

2.         The instructional letters as well as the cash and journal vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates are not subject to documentary stamp taxes pursuant to BIR Ruling No. 116-98, dated 30 July 1998, since they do not partake the nature of loan agreements;

 

3.         Although BIR Ruling No. 116-98 had been subsequently modified by BIR Ruling No. 108-99, dated 15 July 1999, to the effect that documentary stamp taxes are imposable on inter-office memos evidencing cash advances similar to those extended by FDC, said latter ruling cannot be given retroactive application if to do so would be prejudicial to the taxpayer;

 

4.         FDC’s alleged gain from the increase of its shareholdings in FAC as a consequence of the Shareholders’ Agreement it executed with RHPL cannot be considered taxable income since, until actually converted thru sale or disposition of said shares, they merely represent unrealized increase in capital.[34][34]

 

 

Respectively docketed before this Court as G.R. Nos. 163653 and 167689, the CIR’s petitions for review on certiorari assailing the 16 December 2003 decision in CA-G.R. No. 72992 and the 26 January 2005 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 74510 were consolidated pursuant to the 1 March 2006 resolution issued by this Court’s Third Division.

 

The Issues

 

 

          In G.R. No. 163653, the CIR urges the grant of its petition on the following ground:

 

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND IN HOLDING THAT THE ADVANCES EXTENDED BY RESPONDENT TO ITS AFFILIATES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO INCOME TAX.[35][35]

 

          In G.R. No. 167689, on the other hand, petitioner proffers the following issues for resolution:

 

I

 

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE EXCHANGE OF SHARES OF STOCK FOR PROPERTY AMONG FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (FDC), FILINVEST ALABANG, INCORPORATED (FAI) AND FILINVEST LAND INCORPORATED (FLI) MET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NON-RECOGNITION OF TAXABLE GAIN UNDER SECTION 34 (c) (2) OF THE OLD NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (NIRC) (NOW SECTION 40 (C) (2) (c) OF THE NIRC.

 

II

 

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION OR CASH VOUCHERS EXTENDED BY FDC TO ITS AFFILIATES ARE NOT DEEMED LOAN AGREEMENTS SUBJECT TO DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES UNDER SECTION 180 OF THE NIRC.

 

III

 

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT GAIN ON DILUTION AS A RESULT OF THE INCREASE IN THE VALUE OF FDC’S SHAREHOLDINGS IN FAC IS NOT TAXABLE.[36][36]

 

The Court’s Ruling

 

          While the petition in G.R. No. 163653 is bereft of merit, we find the CIR’s petition in G.R. No. 167689 impressed with partial merit.

 

          In G.R. No. 163653, the CIR argues that the CA erred in reversing the CTA’s finding that theoretical interests can be imputed on the advances FDC extended to its affiliates in 1996 and 1997 considering that, for said purpose, FDC resorted to interest-bearing fund borrowings from commercial banks. Since considerable interest expenses were deducted by FDC when said funds were borrowed, the CIR theorizes that interest income should likewise be declared when the same funds were sourced for the advances FDC extended to its affiliates.  Invoking Section 43 of the 1993 NIRC in relation to Section 179(b) of Revenue Regulation No. 2, the CIR maintains that it is vested with the power to allocate, distribute or apportion income or deductions between or among controlled organizations, trades or businesses even in the absence of fraud, since said power is intended “to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations, trades or businesses.”  In addition, the CIR asseverates that the CA should have accorded weight and respect to the findings of the CTA which, as the specialized court dedicated to the study and consideration of tax matters, can take judicial notice of US income tax laws and regulations.[37][37]

 

Admittedly, Section 43 of the 1993 NIRC[38][38] provides that, “(i)n any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated and whether or not organized in the Philippines) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or deductions between or among such organization, trade or business, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organization, trade or business.” In amplification of the equivalent provision[39][39] under Commonwealth Act No. 466,[40][40] Sec. 179(b) of Revenue Regulation No. 2 states as follows:

 

Determination of the taxable net income of controlled taxpayer. – (A) DEFINITIONS. –  When used in this section –

(1)               The term “organization” includes any kind, whether it be a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a trust, an estate, or a corporation or association, irrespective of the place where organized, where operated, or where its trade or business is conducted, and regardless of whether domestic or foreign, whether exempt or taxable, or whether affiliated or not.

(2)               The terms “trade” or “business” include any trade or business activity of any kind, regardless of whether or where organized, whether owned individually or otherwise, and regardless of the place where carried on.

(3)               The term “controlled” includes any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised.  It is the reality of the control which is decisive, not its form or mode of exercise.  A presumption of control arises if income or deductions have been arbitrarily shifted.

(4)               The term “controlled taxpayer” means any one of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests.

(5)               The term “group” and “group of controlled taxpayers” means the organizations, trades or businesses owned or controlled by the same interests.

(6)               The term “true net income” means, in the case of a controlled taxpayer, the net income (or as the case may be, any item or element affecting net income) which would have resulted to the controlled taxpayer, had it in the conduct of its affairs (or, as the case may be, any item or element affecting net income) which would have resulted to the controlled taxpayer, had it in the conduct of its affairs (or, as the case may be, in the particular contract, transaction, arrangement or other act) dealt with the other members or members of the group at arm’s length.  It does not mean the income, the deductions, or the item or element of either, resulting to the controlled taxpayer by reason of the particular contract, transaction, or arrangement, the controlled taxpayer, or the interest controlling it, chose to make (even though such contract, transaction, or arrangement be legally binding upon the parties thereto).

 

(B) SCOPE AND PURPOSE.  – The purpose of Section 44 of the Tax Code is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true net income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer.  The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayer are assumed to have complete power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and accounting records truly reflect the net income from the property and business of each of the controlled taxpayers.  If, however, this has not been done and the taxable net income are thereby understated, the statute contemplates that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall intervene, and, by making such distributions, apportionments, or allocations as he may deem necessary of gross income or deductions, or of any item or element affecting net income, between or among the controlled taxpayers constituting the group, shall determine the true net income of each controlled taxpayer.  The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer.  Section 44 grants no right to a controlled taxpayer to apply its provisions at will, nor does it grant any right to compel the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to apply its provisions.

 

(C) APPLICATION – Transactions between controlled taxpayer and another will be subjected to special scrutiny to ascertain whether the common control is being used to reduce, avoid or escape taxes.  In determining the true net income of a controlled taxpayer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not restricted to the case of improper accounting, to the case of a fraudulent, colorable, or sham transaction, or to the case of a device designed to reduce or avoid tax by shifting or distorting income or deductions.  The authority to determine true net income extends to any case in which either by inadvertence or design the taxable net income in whole or in part, of a controlled taxpayer, is other than it would have been had the taxpayer in the conduct of his affairs been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.[41][41]

 

As may be gleaned from the definitions of the terms “controlled” and “controlled taxpayer” under paragraphs (a) (3) and (4) of the foregoing provision, it would appear that FDC and its affiliates come within the purview of Section 43 of the 1993 NIRC.  Aside from owning significant portions of the shares of stock of FLI, FAI, DSCC and FCI, the fact that FDC extended substantial sums of money as cash advances to its said affiliates for the purpose of providing them financial assistance for their operational and capital expenditures seemingly indicate that the situation sought to be addressed by the subject provision exists.  From the tenor of paragraph (c) of Section 179 of Revenue Regulation No. 2, it may also be seen that the CIR’s power to distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or deductions between or among controlled taxpayers may be likewise exercised whether or not fraud inheres in the transaction/s under scrutiny.  For as long as the controlled taxpayer’s taxable income is not reflective of that which it would have realized had it been dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer, the CIR can make the necessary rectifications in order to prevent evasion of taxes.

 

Despite the broad parameters provided, however, we find that the CIR’s powers of distribution, apportionment or allocation of gross income and deductions under Section 43 of the 1993 NIRC and Section 179 of Revenue Regulation No. 2 does not include the power to impute “theoretical interests” to the controlled taxpayer’s transactions.   Pursuant to Section 28 of the 1993 NIRC,[42][42] after all, the term “gross income” is understood to mean all income from whatever source derived, including, but not limited to the following items: compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items; gross income derived from business; gains derived from dealings in property;” interest; rents; royalties;  dividends; annuities; prizes and winnings; pensions; and partner’s distributive share of the gross income of general professional partnership.[43][43]  While it has been held that the phrase “from whatever source derived” indicates a legislative policy to include all income not expressly exempted within the class of taxable income under our laws, the term “income” has been variously interpreted to mean “cash received or its equivalent”, “the amount of money coming to a person within a specific time” or “something distinct from principal or capital.”[44][44] Otherwise stated, there must be proof of the actual or, at the very least, probable receipt or realization by the controlled taxpayer of the item of gross income sought to be distributed, apportioned or allocated by the CIR. 

 

Our circumspect perusal of the record yielded no evidence of actual or possible showing that the advances FDC extended to its affiliates had resulted to the interests subsequently assessed by the CIR.  For all its harping upon the supposed fact that FDC had resorted to borrowings from commercial banks, the CIR had adduced no concrete proof that said funds were, indeed, the source of the advances the former provided its affiliates.  While admitting that FDC obtained interest-bearing loans from commercial banks,[45][45] Susan Macabelda – FDC’s Funds Management Department Manager who was the sole witness presented before the CTA – clarified that the subject advances were sourced from the corporation’s rights offering in 1995 as well as the sale of its investment in Bonifacio Land in 1997.[46][46]  More significantly, said witness testified that said advances: (a) were extended to give FLI, FAI, DSCC and FCI financial assistance for their operational and capital expenditures; and, (b) were all temporarily in nature since they were repaid within the duration of one week to three months and were evidenced by mere journal entries, cash vouchers and instructional letters.”[47][47] 

 

Even if we were, therefore, to accord precipitate credulity to the CIR’s bare assertion that FDC had deducted substantial interest expense from its gross income, there would still be no factual basis for the imputation of theoretical interests on the subject advances and assess deficiency income taxes thereon.  More so, when it is borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 1956 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.  Considering that taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly declares,[48][48] the rule is likewise settled that tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.[49][49]  Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.[50][50]  While it is true that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, it has been held that their assessment and collection should be in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself.[51][51]

 

In G.R. No. 167689, we also find a dearth of merit in the CIR’s insistence on the imposition of deficiency income taxes on the transfer FDC and FAI effected in exchange for the shares of stock of FLI.  With respect to the Deed of Exchange executed between FDC, FAI and FLI, Section 34 (c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC pertinently provides as follows:

 

Sec. 34. Determination of amount of and recognition of gain or loss.-

 

            x x x x

 

            (c) Exception – x x x x

 

            No gain or loss shall also be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by a person in exchange for shares of stock in such corporation of which as a result of such exchange said person, alone or together with others, not exceeding four persons, gains control of said corporation; Provided, That stocks issued for services shall not be considered as issued in return of property.

 

 

          As even admitted in the 14 February 2001 Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties,[52][52] the requisites for the non-recognition of gain or loss under the foregoing provision are as follows: (a) the transferee is a corporation; (b) the transferee exchanges its shares of stock for property/ies of the transferor; (c) the transfer is made by a person, acting alone or together with others, not exceeding four persons; and, (d) as a result of the exchange the transferor, alone or together with others, not exceeding four, gains control of the transferee.[53][53]  Acting on the 13 January 1997 request filed by FLI, the BIR had, in fact, acknowledged the concurrence of the foregoing requisites in the Deed of Exchange the former executed with FDC and FAI by issuing BIR Ruling No. S-34-046-97.[54][54]  With the BIR’s reiteration of said ruling upon the request for clarification filed by FLI,[55][55] there is also no dispute that said transferee and transferors subsequently complied with the requirements provided for the non-recognition of gain or loss from the exchange of property for tax, as provided under Section 34 (c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC.[56][56]

 

          Then as now, the CIR argues that taxable gain should be recognized for the exchange considering that FDC’s controlling interest in FLI was actually decreased as a result thereof.  For said purpose, the CIR calls attention to the fact that, prior to the exchange, FDC owned 2,537,358,000 or 67.42% of FLI’s 3,763,535,000 outstanding capital stock.  Upon the issuance of 443,094,000 additional FLI shares as a consequence of the exchange and with only 42,217,000 thereof accruing in favor of FDC for a total of 2,579,575,000 shares, said corporation’s controlling interest was supposedly reduced to 61%.03 when reckoned from the transferee’s aggregate 4,226,629,000 outstanding shares.  Without owning a share from FLI’s initial 3,763,535,000 outstanding shares, on the other hand, FAI’s acquisition of 420,877,000 FLI shares as a result of the exchange purportedly resulted in its control of only 9.96% of said transferee corporation’s 4,226,629,000 outstanding shares.  On the principle that the transaction did not qualify as a tax-free exchange under Section 34 (c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC, the CIR asseverates that taxable gain in the sum of P263,386,921.00 should be recognized on the part of FDC and in the sum of P3,088,711,367.00 on the part of FAI.[57][57]

 

          The paucity of merit in the CIR’s position is, however, evident from the categorical language of Section 34 (c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC which provides that gain or loss will not be recognized in case the exchange of property for stocks results in the control of the transferee by the transferor, alone or with other transferors not exceeding four persons.  Rather than isolating the same as proposed by the CIR, FDC’s 2,579,575,000 shares or 61.03% control of FLI’s 4,226,629,000 outstanding shares should, therefore, be appreciated in combination with the 420,877,000 new shares issued to FAI which represents 9.96% control of said transferee corporation.  Together FDC’s 2,579,575,000 shares (61.03%) and FAI’s 420,877,000 shares (9.96%) clearly add up to 3,000,452,000 shares or 70.99% of FLI’s 4,226,629,000 shares.  Since the term “control” is clearly defined as “ownership of stocks in a corporation possessing at least fifty-one percent of the total voting power of classes of stocks entitled to one vote” under Section 34 (c) (6) [c] of the 1993 NIRC, the exchange of property for stocks between FDC FAI and FLI clearly qualify as a tax-free transaction under paragraph 34 (c) (2) of the same provision.

 

          Against the clear tenor of Section 34(c) (2) of the 1993 NIRC, the CIR cites then Supreme Court Justice Jose Vitug and CTA  Justice Ernesto D. Acosta who, in their book Tax Law and Jurisprudence, opined that said provision could be inapplicable if control is already vested in the exchangor prior to exchange.[58][58]  Aside from the fact that that the 10 September 2002 Decision in CTA Case No. 6182 upholding the tax-exempt status of the exchange between FDC, FAI and FLI was penned by no less than Justice Acosta himself,[59][59] FDC and FAI significantly point out that said authors have acknowledged that the position taken by the BIR is to the effect that “the law would apply even when the exchangor already has control of the corporation at the time of the exchange.”[60][60] This was confirmed when, apprised in FLI’s request for clarification about the change of percentage of ownership of its outstanding capital stock, the BIR opined as follows:

 

Please be informed that regardless of the foregoing, the transferors, Filinvest Development Corp. and Filinvest Alabang, Inc. still gained control of Filinvest Land, Inc.  The term ‘control’ shall mean ownership of stocks in a corporation by possessing at least 51% of the total voting power of all classes of stocks entitled to vote.  Control is determined by the amount of stocks received, i.e., total subscribed, whether for property or for services by the transferor or transferors.  In determining the 51% stock ownership, only those persons who transferred property for stocks in the same transaction may be counted up to the maximum of five (BIR Ruling No. 547-93 dated December 29, 1993.[61][61]

 

          At any rate, it also appears that the supposed reduction of FDC’s shares in FLI posited by the CIR is more apparent than real.  As the uncontested owner of 80% of the outstanding shares of FAI, it cannot be gainsaid that FDC ideally controls the same percentage of the 420,877,000 shares issued to its said co-transferor which, by itself, represents 7.968% of the outstanding shares of FLI.  Considered alongside FDC’s 61.03% control of FLI as a consequence of the 29 November 1996 Deed of Transfer, said 7.968% add up to an aggregate of 68.998% of said transferee corporation’s outstanding shares of stock which is evidently still greater than the 67.42% FDC initially held prior to the exchange.  This much was admitted by the parties in the 14 February 2001 Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues they submitted to the CTA.[62][62] Inasmuch as the combined ownership of FDC and FAI of FLI’s outstanding capital stock adds up to a total of 70.99%, it stands to reason that neither of said transferors can be held liable for deficiency income taxes the CIR assessed on the supposed gain which resulted from the subject transfer. 

 

          On the other hand, insofar as documentary stamp taxes on loan agreements and promissory notes are concerned, Section 180 of the NIRC provides follows:

 

            Sec. 180. Stamp tax on all loan agreements, promissory notes, bills of exchange, drafts, instruments and securities issued by the government or any of its instrumentalities, certificates of deposit bearing interest and others not payable on sight or demand. – On all loan agreements signed abroad wherein the object of the contract is located or used in the Philippines; bill of exchange (between points within the Philippines), drafts, instruments and securities issued by the Government or any of its instrumentalities or certificates of deposits drawing interest, or orders for the payment of any sum of money otherwise than at sight or on demand, or on all promissory notes, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, except bank notes issued for circulation, and on each renewal of any such note, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of Thirty centavos (P0.30) on each two hundred pesos, or fractional part thereof, of the face value of any such agreement, bill of exchange, draft, certificate of deposit or note: Provided, That only one documentary stamp tax shall be imposed on either loan agreement, or promissory notes issued to secure such loan, whichever will yield a higher tax: Provided however, That loan agreements or promissory notes the aggregate of which does not exceed Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) executed by an individual for his purchase on installment for his personal use or that of his family and not for business, resale, barter or hire of a house, lot, motor vehicle, appliance or furniture shall be exempt from the payment of documentary stamp tax provided under this Section.

 

          When read in conjunction with Section 173 of the 1993 NIRC,[63][63] the foregoing provision concededly applies to “(a)ll loan agreements, whether made or signed in the Philippines, or abroad when the obligation or right arises from Philippine sources or the property or object of the contract is located or used in the Philippines.”  Correlatively, Section 3 (b) and Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 9-94 provide as follows:

 

            Section 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of these Regulations, the following term shall mean:

 

            (b) ‘Loan agreement’ – refers to a contract in writing where one of the parties delivers to another money or other consumable thing, upon the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid.  The term shall include credit facilities, which may be evidenced by credit memo, advice or drawings.

 

            The terms ‘Loan Agreement” under Section 180 and “Mortgage’ under Section 195, both of the Tax Code, as amended, generally refer to distinct and separate instruments.  A loan agreement shall be taxed under Section 180, while a deed of mortgage shall be taxed under Section 195.”

 

            “Section 6. Stamp on all Loan Agreements. – All loan agreements whether made or signed in the Philippines, or abroad when the obligation or right arises from Philippine sources or the property or object of the contract is located in the Philippines shall be subject to the documentary stamp tax of thirty centavos (P0.30) on each two hundred pesos, or fractional part thereof, of the face value of any such agreements, pursuant to Section 180 in relation to Section 173 of the Tax Code.

 

In cases where no formal agreements or promissory notes have been executed to cover credit facilities, the documentary stamp tax shall be based on the amount of drawings or availment of the facilities, which may be evidenced by credit/debit memo, advice or drawings by any form of check or withdrawal slip, under Section 180 of the Tax Code.   

 

Applying the aforesaid provisions to the case at bench, we find that the instructional letters as well as the journal and cash vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates in 1996 and 1997 qualified as loan agreements upon which documentary stamp taxes may be imposed.   In keeping with the caveat attendant to every BIR Ruling to the effect that it is valid only if the facts claimed by the taxpayer are correct, we find that the CA reversibly erred in utilizing BIR Ruling No. 116-98, dated 30 July 1998 which, strictly speaking, could be invoked only by ASB Development Corporation, the taxpayer who sought the same.  In said ruling, the CIR opined that documents like those evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates are not subject to documentary stamp tax, to wit:  

 

            On the matter of whether or not the inter-office memo covering the advances granted by an affiliate company is subject to documentary stamp tax, it is informed that nothing in Regulations No. 26 (Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations) and Revenue Regulations No. 9-94 states that the same is subject to documentary stamp tax. Such being the case, said inter-office memo evidencing the lendings or borrowings which is neither a form of promissory note nor a certificate of indebtedness issued by the corporation-affiliate or a certificate of obligation, which are, more or less, categorized as ‘securities’, is not subject to documentary stamp tax imposed under Section 180, 174 and 175 of the Tax Code of 1997, respectively.  Rather, the inter-office memo is being prepared for accounting purposes only in order to avoid the co-mingling of funds of the corporate affiliates.

 

 

          In its appeal before the CA, the CIR argued that the foregoing ruling was later modified in BIR Ruling No. 108-99 dated 15 July 1999, which opined that inter-office memos evidencing lendings or borrowings extended by a corporation to its affiliates are akin to promissory notes, hence, subject to documentary stamp taxes.[64][64]   In brushing aside the foregoing argument, however, the CA applied Section 246 of the 1993 NIRC[65][65] from which proceeds the settled principle that rulings, circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the BIR have no retroactive application if to so apply them would be prejudicial to the taxpayers.[66][66]  Admittedly, this rule does not apply: (a) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (b) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.[67][67] Not being the taxpayer who, in the first instance, sought a ruling from the CIR, however, FDC cannot invoke the foregoing principle on non-retroactivity of BIR rulings.

 

          Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, we find that both the CTA and the CA erred in invalidating the assessments issued by the CIR for the deficiency documentary stamp taxes due on the instructional letters as well as the journal and cash vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates in 1996 and 1997.   In Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-96-00020-2000, the CIR correctly assessed the sum of P6,400,693.62 for documentary stamp tax, P3,999,793.44 in interests and P25,000.00 as compromise penalty, for a total of P10,425,487.06.  Alongside the sum of P4,050,599.62 for documentary stamp tax, the CIR similarly assessed P1,721,099.78 in interests and P25,000.00 as compromise penalty  in Assessment Notice No. SP-DST-97-00021-2000 or a total of P5,796,699.40.  The imposition of deficiency interest is justified under Sec. 249 (a) and (b) of the NIRC which authorizes the assessment of the same “at the rate of twenty percent (20%), or such higher rate as may be prescribed by regulations”, from the date prescribed for the payment of the unpaid amount of tax until full payment.[68][68]  The imposition of the compromise penalty is, in turn, warranted under Sec. 250[69][69] of the NIRC which prescribes the imposition thereof “in case of each failure to file an information or return, statement or list, or keep any record or supply any information required” on the date prescribed therefor.

 

          To our mind, no reversible error can, finally, be imputed against both the CTA and the CA for invalidating the Assessment Notice issued by the CIR for the deficiency income taxes FDC is supposed to have incurred as a consequence of the dilution of its shares in FAC.  Anent FDC’s Shareholders’ Agreement with RHPL, the record shows that the parties were in agreement about the following factual antecedents narrated in the 14 February 2001 Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues they submitted before the CTA,[70][70] viz.:

 

            “1.11. On November 15, 1996, FDC entered into a Shareholders’ Agreement (‘SA’) with Reco Herrera Pte. Ltd. (‘RHPL’) for the formation of a joint venture company named Filinvest Asia Corporation (‘FAC’) which is based inSingapore(pars. 1.01 and 6.11, Petition, pars. 1 and 7, Answer).

 

            1.12. FAC, the joint venture company formed by FDC and RHPL, is tasked to develop and manage the 50% ownership interest of FDC in its PBCom Office Tower Project (‘Project’) with the Philippine Bank of Communications (par. 6.12, Petition; par. 7, Answer).

 

            1.13. Pursuant to the SA between FDC and RHPL, the equity participation of FDC and RHPL in FAC was 60% and 40% respectively.

 

            1.14. In accordance with the terms of the SA, FDC subscribed to P500.7 million worth of shares of stock representing a 60% equity participation in FAC.  In turn, RHPL subscribed to P433.8 million worth of shares of stock of FAC representing a 40% equity participation in FAC.

 

1.15.  In payment of its subscription in FAC, FDC executed a Deed of Assignment transferring to FAC a portion of FDC’s right and interests in the Project to the extent of P500.7 million.

 

1.16. FDC reported a net loss of P190,695,061.00 in its Annual Income Tax Return for the taxable year 1996.”[71][71]

 

 

Alongside the principle that tax revenues are not intended to be liberally construed,[72][72] the rule is settled that the findings and conclusions of the CTA are accorded great respect and are generally upheld by this Court, unless there is a clear showing of a reversible error or an improvident exercise of authority.[73][73]  Absent showing of such error here, we find no strong and cogent reasons to depart from said rule with respect to the CTA’s finding that no deficiency income tax can be assessed on the gain on the supposed dilution and/or increase in the value of FDC’s shareholdings in FAC which the CIR, at any rate, failed to establish. Bearing in mind the meaning of “gross income” as above discussed, it cannot be gainsaid, even then, that a mere increase or appreciation in the value of said shares cannot be considered income for taxation purposes.  Since “a mere advance in the value of the property of a person or corporation in no sense constitute the ‘income’ specified in the revenue law,” it has been held in the early case of Fisher vs. Trinidad,[74][74] that it “constitutes and can be treated merely as an increase of capital.”  Hence, the CIR has no factual and legal basis in assessing income tax on the increase in the value of FDC’s shareholdings in FAC until the same is actually sold at a profit.

 

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CIR’s petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 163653 is DENIED for lack of merit and the CA’s 16 December 2003 Decision in G.R. No. 72992 is AFFIRMED in toto. The CIR’s petition in G.R. No. 167689 is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the CA’s 26 January 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 74510 is MODIFIED. 

 

Accordingly, Assessment Notices Nos. SP-DST-96-00020-2000 and SP-DST-97-00021-2000 issued for deficiency documentary stamp taxes due on the instructional letters as well as journal and cash vouchers evidencing the advances FDC extended to its affiliates are declared valid. 

 

The cancellation of Assessment Notices Nos. SP-INC-96-00018-2000, SP-INC-97-00019-2000 and SP-INC-97-0027-2000 issued for deficiency income assessed on (a) the “arms-length” interest from said advances; (b) the gain from FDC’s Deed of Exchange with FAI and FLI; and (c) income from the dilution resulting from FDC’s Shareholders’ Agreement with RHPL is, however, upheld.  

         

          SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

 Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO                    PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

      Associate Justice                                   Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO      ARTURO D. BRION

       Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

 

 

 

                  DIOSDADO M. PERALTA                            LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

       Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

    MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO                    ROBERTO A. ABAD

        Associate Justice                                      Associate Justice       

 

 

 

 

               

      

 

 

  MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.                  JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

 Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

                                        (On Leave)                       

                        MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

                                      Associate Justice                                         

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

 

 

 

       RENATO C. CORONA

                                                             Chief Justice

 


 


*              Associate Justice MariaLourdesP. A. Sereno is on Special Leave from 16-30 July 2011 under the Court’s Wellness Program.

[1][1]           Rollo (G.R. No. 163653), pp. 40-57.

[2][2]           Rollo (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 68-88.

[3][3]          Id. at 219-222; 241-245.

[4][4]           Now Section 40 of the NIRC.

[5][5]           Rollo (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 246-251.

[6][6]          Id. at 252-253.

[7][7]          Id. at 222.

[8][8]           Rollo, (G.R. No. 163653), pp. 211-309.

[9][9]           FLI (P863,619,234.42), FAI (P1,216,477,700.00); and DSCC (P477,117,008.18).

[10][10]         FLI (P1,717,096,764.22); FAI (P1,258,792,913.26); and, FCI (P385,000,000.00).

[11][11]         Rollo, (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 223-224.

[12][12]        Id. at 284-285.

[13][13]        Id. at 291-294.

[14][14]        Id. at 286-290.

[15][15]        Id. at 295-296.

[16][16]        Id. at 299.

[17][17]        Id. at 297-298.

[18][18]        Id. at 300-315; 316-326.

[19][19]        Id. at 327.

[20][20]        Id. at 179-211.

[21][21]        Id. at 212-217.

[22][22]        Id. at 218-240.

[23][23]         Rollo (G.R. No. 163653), p. 45.

[24][24]         Rollo (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 412-454.

[25][25]        Id. at 455-477.

[26][26]        Id. at 477.

[27][27]        Id. at 463-476.

[28][28]         Rollo (G.R. No. 163653), pp. 81-121.

[29][29]        Id. at 40-57.

[30][30]        Id. at 56.

[31][31]         Rollo (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 479-480.

[32][32]        Id. at 30 and 76.

[33][33]        Id. at 68-88.

[34][34]        Id. at 76-88.

[35][35]         Rollo (G.R. No. 163653), p. 19.

[36][36]      Rollo, (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 31-32.

[37][37]         Rollo (G.R. No. 163653), pp. 20-32.

[38][38]         Now Section 50 of the 1997 NIRC.

[39][39]         Section 44.

[40][40]         An Act to Revise, Amend and Codify the Internal Revenue Laws of the Philippines.

[41][41]         As quoted in Montejo, National Internal Revenue Code Annotated, 1963 ed., pp. 164-165.

[42][42]         Now Section 32 of the 1997 NIRC.

[43][43]         CIR v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160528, 9 October 2006, 504 SCRA 90, 99.

[44][44]         CIR v. AIR India, 241 Phil. 689, 694-695 (1988) citing CIR v. British Overseas Airways Corporation, G.R. No. L-65773-74, 30 April 1987, 149 SCRA 395.

[45][45]         Rollo (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 446-447.  TSN, 25 July 2001, pp. 9-10.

[46][46]        Id. at 15-16.

[47][47]        Id. at 426.  TSN, 26 June 2001, p. 15.

[48][48]         Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69344, 26 April 1991, 196 SCRA 335, 340.

[49][49]         Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos, 330 Phil. 392, 405 (1996).

[50][50]         CIR v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 322, 330 (1997).

[51][51]         Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, G.R. No. 159694, 27 January 2006; Azucena T. Reyes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 163581, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 382, 397.

[52][52]         Rollo (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 218-240.

[53][53]        Id. at 229.

[54][54]        Id. at 246-251.

[55][55]        Id. at 252-253.

[56][56]        Id. at 222.

[57][57]        Id. at 33-40.

[58][58]         Tax Law and Jurisprudence, 2000 Edition, p. 161.

[59][59]         Rollo (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 455-477.

[60][60]         Tax Law and Jurisprudence, 2000 Edition, pp. 161-162.

[61][61]         Rollo (G.R. No. 167689), p. 253.

[62][62]        Id. at 221.

[63][63]                   Sec. 173. Stamp taxes upon documents, instruments, loan agreements and papers. – Upon documents, instruments, loan agreements, and papers, and upon acceptances, assignments, sales, and transfers of the obligation, right or property incident thereto, there shall be levied, collected and paid for, and in respect of the transaction so had or accomplished, the corresponding documentary stamp taxes prescribed in the following Sections of this Title, by the person making, signing, issuing, accepting , or transferring the same wherever the document is made, signed, issued, accepted or transferred when the obligation or right arises from Philippine sources or the property is situated in the Philippines, and at the same time such act is done or transaction had: Provided, That whenever one party to the taxable document enjoys exemption from the tax herein imposed, the other party thereto who is not exempt shall be the one directly liable for the tax.

[64][64]                         After a careful restudy of the aforementioned ruling, this office is of the opinion as it hereby hold that inter-office memo covering the advances granted by a corporation affiliate company, i.e., or inter-office memo evidencing lendings/borrowings is in the nature of a promissory note subject to the documentary stamp tax imposed under Section 180 of the Tax Code of 1997.

                                This modifies BIR Ruling No. 116-98 dated 30 July 1998 insofar as inter-office memo covering the advances granted by a corporation affiliate company, i.e., inter-office memo evidencing lendings/borrowings, is concerned which shall be subject to documentary stamp tax imposed under Section 180 of the Tax Code of 1997.

[65][65]                         Section 246.  Non-retroactivity of Rulings. – Any revocation, modification, or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding section or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers except in the following cases: (a) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (b) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

[66][66]         CIR v. Benguet Corporation, G.R. No. 145559, 14 July 2006, 495 SCRA 59, 65-66.

[67][67]         Section 246, 1993 NIRC.

[68][68]                         Sec. 248. Interest. (a) In general. – There shall be assessed and collected on any unpaid tax, interest at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum, or such higher rate as may be prescribed by rules and regulations, from the date prescribed for payment until the amount is fully paid.

                (b) Deficiency Interest. – Any deficiency in the tax due as the term is defined in this Code, shall be subject to the interest prescribed in Subsection (A) hereof, which interest shall be assessed and collected from the date prescribed for its payment until the full payment thereof.

[69][69]                         Sec. 250. Failure to File Certain Information Returns. – In the case of each failure to file an information return, statement or list, or keep any record, or supply any information required by this Code or by the Commissioner on the date prescribed therefor, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, there shall, upon notice and demand by the Commissioner, be paid by the person failing to file, keep or supply the same, One thousand pesos (P1,000) for each such failure: Provided, however, That the aggregate amount to be imposed for all such failures during a calendar year shall not exceed Twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000).

[70][70]         Rollo, (G.R. No. 167689), pp. 218-240.

[71][71]        Id. at 223-224.

[72][72]         Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.  Acosta, G.R. No. 154068, 3 August 2007, 529 SCRA 177, 186.

[73][73]         Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 178759, 11 August 2008, 561 SCRA 710, 742.

[74][74]         43 Phil. 973, 981 (1922).