J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2011-0235: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA (G.R. No. 183563, 14 DECEMBER 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECT/S: RAPE; PENALTIES AND INDEMNITIES  MODIFIED. (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. ARPON)

 

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DISPOSITIVE:

 

          WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED.  The Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

 

(1)                     For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.

 

(2)                     For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. 

 

(3)                     As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3) counts of rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision. 

 

(4)                     The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

 

No costs.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

 

FIRST DIVISION

 

 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,                    Plaintiff-Appellee,         –  versus  –         HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA,                    Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 183563   Present:   CORONA, C.J.,        Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DELCASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.   Promulgated:   December 14, 2011

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 

 

Assailed before Us is the Decision^[1][1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed with modification the Decision^[2][2] dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of rape against the private complainant AAA.^[3][3]

 

On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged^[4][4] with eight (8) counts of rape in separate informations, the accusatory portions of which state:

 

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

 

That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without her consent and against her will.

 

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.^[5][5] 

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

 

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

 

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.^[6][6]

 

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48

 

That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

 

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.^[7][7]

 

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49

 

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

 

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.^[8][8]

 

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50

 

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

 

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.^[9][9]

 

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51

 

That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

 

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.^[10][10]

 

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52

 

That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

 

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.^[11][11]

 

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

 

That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.

 

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.^[12][12] (Emphases ours.)

 

 

During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he entered a plea of not guilty.^[13][13]  On March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated on the identity of the accused-appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused appellant is the uncle of the victim.^[14][14]

 

The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the accused and his counsel.  The cases were then heard on consolidated trial. 

 

The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against the accused-appellant.  AAA testified that she was born on November 1, 1987.^[15][15]  In one afternoon when she was only eight years old, she stated that the accused-appellant raped her inside their house.  She could not remember, though, the exact month and date of the incident.  The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of her.  He had his clothes on and only pulled down his zipper.  He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina and did the pumping motion.  AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her vagina.  When he pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood.  She did so only when she urinated.^[16][16]  

 

AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on different nights.  The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAA’s neighbor.  He came to AAA’s house, took off her panty and went on top of her.  She could not see what he was wearing as it was nighttime.  He made her hold his penis then he left.  When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped.  She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina.  Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain.  AAA said that she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night and their window was only covered by cloth.  He entered through the kitchen as the door therein was detached.^[17][17]

 

AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime.  He kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped.  She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because he was heavy.  She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina.  She related that the accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother.  AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did.  She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.^[18][18]

 

After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A – the Medico-Legal Report,^[19][19] which contained the results of the medical examination conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B – the Social Case Study Report^[20][20] pertaining to AAA’s case, which was issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office of the Province of Leyte.      

 

The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:

 

P. E. Findings:              Surg. Findings:

– (-) Physical injuries.

                                    OB- NOTES:

– Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so many times. last act was March 1999.

 

O:        Pelvic Exam:

                                    Ext. Genetalia – grossly normal.

Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 o’clock position

                                    Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.

                                    Internal Exam:

 

Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa:      = NEGATIVE^[21][21]

 

 

Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness stand to deny the informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of AAA.  He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982.  In 1995, he worked in Sagkahan, TaclobanCityas a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to 1996.  He stated that he was working in TaclobanCitywhen the alleged rapes happened in the municipalityof XXX.  When he would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni.  He did not go to the house of AAA as the latter’s parents were his enemies.  He said that he had a quarrel with AAA’s parents because he did not work with them in the ricefields.  He further recounted that in July 1999, he was also living in TaclobanCityand worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant.  He worked there from 1998 up to September 1999.  The accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the same restaurant in TaclobanCity.  While working there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with work.  He denied that he would have drinking sprees with AAA’s stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.^[22][22]

 

On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA was his sister and they were close to each other.  He said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter then resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte.  He indicated that his parents’ house was about two kilometers away from the house of AAA.  While he was working at the restaurant in TaclobanCity, he would visit his parents once every month, mainly on Sundays.^[23][23] 

 

The Judgment of the RTC

 

On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant as follows:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the Court found accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged under the informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape and pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.^[24][24] (Emphases in the original.)

 

 

The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA.  The fact that AAA was in tears when she testified convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-appellant.  If there were inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable considering that AAA was pitted against a learned opposing counsel.  The delay in the reporting of the rape incidents was not also an indication that the charges were fabricated.  Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal officer confirmed that she was indeed raped.  The accused-appellant’s defense of alibi was likewise disregarded by the trial court, declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of the day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban City.  The trial court stated that the accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against him.  The trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years old at the time of the commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.  The trial court also appreciated against the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime.

 

The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[25][25] of the RTC Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance.  As stated in his direct examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17 years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively.  In a Resolution^[26][26] dated November 6, 2002, the trial court denied the accused-appellant’s motion, holding that the latter failed to substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his allegation of minority. 

 

The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.^[27][27]  The parties then filed their respective briefs.^[28][28]  On February 7, 2006, we resolved^[29][29] to transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.^[30][30]  The cases were docketed in the appellate court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.

 

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

 

On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision, decreeing thus:

 

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary damages to [AAA] in the amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape and clarification that the separate award of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each count of rape.  The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.^[31][31]

 

 

The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA were not sufficient to discredit her.  The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when the incidents of rape occurred no longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time.  More significant was her “straightforward, categorical and candid testimony” that she was raped eight times by the accused-appellant.  The Court of Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC that AAA’s charges of rape conformed with the physical evidence and the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated defense of alibi could not stand against the positive identification made by AAA. 

 

As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations and admitted by the accused-appellant.  The appellate court, however, differed in appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAA’s minority.  The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor.  The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape.  In view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages in favor of AAA.       

 

The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal^[32][32] of the above decision and the same was given due course by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution^[33][33] dated May 27, 2008. 

 

On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.^[34][34]  Thereafter, in a Manifestation and Motion^[35][35] filed on December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief.  On February 3, 2009, the accused-appellant submitted a Supplemental Brief.^[36][36]

 

The Issues

 

In the accused-appellant’s brief, the following issues were invoked:

 

I

 

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

 

II

 

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

 

III

 

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.^[37][37]

 

 

The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give weight to the incredible testimony of AAA.  He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time.  The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform manner.  Contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted as insignificant.  He further insists that the qualifying circumstances of AAA’s minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution.  The accused-appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.

 

The Ruling of the Court

 

After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to deny the appeal, but with a modification of the penalties and the amount of indemnities awarded. 

 

To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.

 

Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years old.  However, the accused-appellant points out that the prosecution failed to substantiate the said fact as AAA’s testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to be worthy of any belief.  He explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first time when she was eight years old.  Nonetheless, during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999, she said that the accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only seven years old.  On her redirect examination, AAA then stated that she was first raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.      

 

Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:

 

ART.  266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.  – Rape is committed –

 

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

 

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

 

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

 

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

 

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

 

 

In particular, “Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented.”^[38][38]

 

The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353,^[39][39] or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997.^[40][40]  Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,^[41][41] which provides:

 

ART. 335.        When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

 

1.         By using force or intimidation;

2.         When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3.         When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

 

 

 In People v. Macafe,^[42][42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in this wise:

 

Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape.  What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old.  Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place.  The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.^[43][43]  (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions of law are essentially the same.  Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of the commission of the rape. 

 

Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, “the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.”^[44][44]  “Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.”^[45][45]       

 

As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAA’s testimony.  On this matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Condes^[46][46] that:

 

Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying. Her “furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath” are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying.  The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [Court of Appeals].^[47][47]

 

 In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape charged.  AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes.  With tears in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:

 

[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]

 

Q:        Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you were still 8 years old?

 

[AAA]

 

A:        There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and date.

 

Q:        Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old?

A:        I was raped by Tiyo Henry.

 

Q:        How did he rape you?

A:        He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts.

 

Q:        Do you remember what place did he rape you?

A:        Yes, sir in our house.

 

Q:        Who were the persons present then at that time?

A:        My younger brother and I.

 

Q:        About your mother and step father where were they?

A:        In the ricefield.

 

PROS. SABARRE:

 

           May we make it of record that the witness is crying.

 

COURT:

 

           Have it on record.

 

PROS. SABARRE:

 

Q:        Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?

A:        In the afternoon.

 

           x x x x

 

Q:        After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did he do to you next if any?

A:        He went on top of me.

 

Q:        Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?

A:        He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled down the zipper.

 

Q:        And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what did he do next if any?

A:        He was pumping on me.

 

Q:        Did he pull out his organ?

A:        Yes, sir.

 

Q:        And where did he place his organ?

A:        In my vagina.

 

Q:        When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

A:        Pain.^[48][48]

 

 

The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who found “old, healed, incomplete” hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA.  “[W]hen the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.”^[49][49] 

 

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty.  The testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as follows:

 

Q:        How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July 1999?

A:        Five times.

 

Q:        Was it in the daytime or night time?

A:        Night time.

 

Q:        Was it in different nights or on the same night?

A:        Different nights.

 

Q:        Who were present then at that time when he raped you five times?

A:        My Kuya and other siblings.

 

Q:        You have companions why were you raped?

A:        Because they were sleeping.

 

Q:        How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you please narrate to the court?

A:        Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled out my panty and went on top of me.

 

Q:        With whom was he drinking?

A:        With my step father.

 

Q:        Where did they drink?

A:        In our neighbor.

 

Q:        When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused wearing at that time?

A:        I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.

 

Q:        When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

A:        No, sir.

 

Q:        What did he do with his penis?

A:        He made me hold it.

 

Q:        Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?

A:        He left.

 

           x x x x

 

ATTY. SABARRE:

 

Q:        You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how did he rape you?

A:        (witness did not answer)

 

PROS. SABARRE:

 

           Make it of record that the witness is crying again.

 

Q:        Why are you crying?

A:        I am angry and hurt.

 

PROS. SABARRE:

 

           Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding considering that the witness is psychologically incapable of further proceeding.

 

           x x x x

 

Q:        I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please narrate the whole incident to this honorable court?

A:        The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of me.

 

Q:        What was the same thing you are talking about?

A:        He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.

 

Q:        When he pump what did you feel?

A:        Pain.

 

 

 

COURT:

 

           Why did you feel pain?

 

A:        He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.

 

ATTY. SABARRE;

 

           How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night time?

 

A:        It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by cloth as cover.^[50][50]       

 

 

From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of rape.  She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999.  

 

The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August 1999.  AAA narrated only one incident of rape in this manner:

 

Q:        How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the month of August 1999?

A:        Two times.

 

Q:        Was it during day time or night time?

A:        Nighttime.

 

Q:        How did he rape you again that August 1999?

A:        He kissed me.

 

Q:        After kissing you what did he do next?

A:        He took off his shirts.

 

Q:        After he took off his shirts what happened?

A:        He went on top of me and pump.

 

Q:        When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you feel?

A:        My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.

 

Q:        Why did you feel pain in your vagina?

A:        Because he was raping me.

 

Q:        Did his penis penetrate your vagina?

A:        I do not know.

 

Q:        If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize him?

A:        Yes, sir.

 

Q:        Where is he?

A:        That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his name answered Henry Arpon).^[51][51]

 

“It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant’s presumption of innocence.”^[52][52]  Thus, including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. 

 

The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape in a uniform manner does not convince this Court.  To our mind, AAA’s narration of the sexual abuses committed by the accused-appellant contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that he placed his organ in her private part.^[53][53]  “Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid detail of a frightening experience — a verity born[e] out of human nature and experience.”^[54][54]

 

We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellant’s defense of alibi deserves scant consideration.  “Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.  To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.”^[55][55]  “[S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime.”^[56][56]

 

In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court that:

 

The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of the day after working hours while working in Tacloban.  Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday, which according to him he spent in [XXX],Leyte.

 

The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999.  She can not be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the first sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her mother.^[57][57]

 

 

          Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA may have been prompted to falsely testify against him (accused-appellant) in view of the latter’s quarrel with AAA’s parents when he refused to work with them in the rice fields.^[58][58]  Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and implausible.  “Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if true, does not amount to a sufficient justification for dragging a young girl’s honor to a merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its wake.”^[59][59] 

 

          As to the accused-appellant’s objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the incidents of rape were committed.  The testimony of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987,^[60][60] the voluntary stipulation of the accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony regarding his recollection of the age of the victim,^[61][61] his own niece, all militate against accused-appellant’s theory.  In People v. Pruna,^[62][62] the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:

 

1.  The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

 

2.  In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

 

3.  If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

 

a.  If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

 

b.  If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

 

c.  If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.

 

4.  In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

 

5.  It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)

 

 

Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the witness stand (when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.^[63][63] 

 

          That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation need no longer be belabored upon.  “[I]n rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.  Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.”^[64][64]

Penalties

 

On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime of rape with reclusion perpetua.  The sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:

 

         The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

 

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law-spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)

 

 

          Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:

 

ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

x x x x

 

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)

 

          The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three (3) counts of rape committed by the accused-appellant.  “As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.”^[65][65]  In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was less than eighteen (18) years of age when the incidents of rape occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.  The said circumstances were also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference of the case and again admitted by him during his testimony.^[66][66] 

 

In People v. Pepito,^[67][67] the Court explained that “[t]he purpose of entering into a stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.  These admissions during the pre-trial conference are worthy of credit.  Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made by appellant therein must be given weight.”  Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death penalty is warranted.  For the second and third counts of rape, the imposable penalty is also death.   

 

          Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.

 

          The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.  Although this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, we still take cognizance of the same in accordance with the settled rule that “[i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.”^[68][68]    

 

          Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,” provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict with the law,^[69][69] viz:

 

SEC. 7. Determination of Age. — The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority.  He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of age or older.  The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents.  In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.  In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

 

 

          Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,^[70][70] we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions concur, namely: “(1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused’s and/or his relatives’ testimonies are untrue.”^[71][71]

 

          In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.^[72][72]  Other than his testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth.  However, the records of this case show neither any objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same.  Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellant’s minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.

 

          Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:

 

SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.  They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly.  They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.

 

 

          People v. Sarcia^[73][73] further stressed that “[w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.”

 

          Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:

 

SEC. 6.  Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.  However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.

 

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

 

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.  (Emphases ours.)

 

 

          As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,^[74][74] “i.e., from ‘under nine years of age’ and ‘above nine years of age and under fifteen’ (who acted without discernment) – to ‘fifteen years old or under’ and ‘above fifteen but below 18’ (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability.”^[75][75] 

          Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that time.  In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein “should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.”^[76][76]  The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344.  The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.   

 

          For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old.  We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment.  In Madali v. People,^[77][77] the Court had the occasion to reiterate that “[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.  Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.”  In this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible.  Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her mother if she did so.  That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the consequences thereof.

 

          Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.  However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.”  Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.

 

          Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:

 

SEC. 38.  Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.  However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

 

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.

 

 

          Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21.  The said provision states:

 

SEC. 40.  Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.  

 

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.  (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:

 

SEC. 51.  Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the [Department of Social Welfare and Development].

 

 

 Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law and the pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.

 

Civil Liability

 

          The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.^[78][78] that “[c]ivil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been committed.  Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil indemnity for each count.”  We also explained in Sarcia that “[t]he litmus test x x x in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.”^[79][79]  The trial court’s award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore increased to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the instant case.

 

            Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified “without need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience she underwent].”^[80][80]  We also increase the trial court’s award of P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein established in keeping with the recent case law.^[81][81]

 

          Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of exemplary damages.  As held in People v. Llanas, Jr.,^[82][82] “[t]he award of exemplary damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the offense, both of which were alleged in the information and proved during the trial.”  The appellate court’s award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is raised to P30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping with the current jurisprudence on the matter.^[83][83]

 

          WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED.  The Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

 

(5)                     For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.

 

(6)                     For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. 

 

(7)                     As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3) counts of rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision. 

 

(8)                     The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

 

No costs.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice	MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

         Chief Justice         

 

 

CASE 2011-0234: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA (G.R. NO. 186131, 14 DECEMBER 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECT: VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 11 AND 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OR THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS. AMANSEC).

 

==================

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the April 15, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02557.

SO ORDERED.

 

==================

 

 

 

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

FIRST DIVISION

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  x

D E C I S I O N

 

 

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 

For review is the April 15, 2008 Decision^[1][1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02557, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) August 30, 2006 Decision^[2][2] in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118187,^[3][3] wherein accused-appellant Benjamin Amansec y Dona (Amansec) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

On June 18, 2003, Amansec was charged before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95 of violation of Sections 11 and 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.  The pertinent portions of the Informations^[4][4] are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Q-03-118186

The undersigned accuses BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA of violation of Section 11, Art. II, R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), committed as follows:

That on or about the 15^th day of June, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control zero point zero nine (0.09) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydroc[h]loride otherwise known as “SHABU” a dangerous drug.^[5][5]

Crim. Case No. Q-03-118187

The undersigned accuses BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA a.k.a. “Benjie” for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15^th day of June, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero nine (0.09) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydroc[h]loride otherwise known as “SHABU” a dangerous drug.^[6][6]

 

 

Amansec pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment^[7][7] on August 7, 2003.  After the termination of the pre-trial conference^[8][8] held on October 2, 2003, trial on the merits followed.

The prosecution’s first witness was Engineer Bernardino M. Banac, Jr., a forensic chemist from the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.  However, upon agreement by the prosecution and the defense, his testimony was dispensed with, and in lieu thereof, the following stipulations and admissions were made by the parties:

1. That on June 16, 2003, a request for laboratory examination was prepared and sent by La Loma Police Station 1 to the Central Police District Crime Laboratory together with the specimens which were received by the said office on June 16, 2003, as shown in the stamp marked received attached to the said request for laboratory examination;

1. That upon receipt of the said request, a qualitative examination was conducted by the Central Police District Crime Laboratory Office, examined by Engr. Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. and that the specimens were found to be positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug which findings conducted contained in Chemistry Report No. D-472-03 dated June 16, 2003;

1. That attached to said Chemistry Report is a small brown envelope which when opened by the Court Interpreter yielded three heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with markings : A (JR-BA)= 0.09 gram; B (RP-BA)= 0.09 gram; C (RV-JM)= 0.09 gram; [and]

1. That the forensic chemical officer has no personal knowledge leading to the arrest of the accused as well as the source of specimens.^[9][9]

On July 15, 2004, the RTC granted the prosecution’s motion^[10][10] to try the two cases jointly.

The prosecution’s version, which was primarily lifted from the testimonies of two of the operatives involved in the buy-bust operation, is summarized below:

Police Officer (PO) 1 Alfredo Mabutol, Jr. and PO2 Ronald Pascua, members of the PNP assigned at Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the La Loma Police Station, testified that on June 15, 2003, at around 11:00 p.m., while they, along with PO1 Roderick Valencia and their Officer-in Charge (OIC), Police Inspector Oliver Villanueva were on duty, an informant, whose identity remained confidential, arrived at the station to talk to Villanueva.  After talking to the informant, Villanueva formed a team for a buy-bust operation against Amansec, at Santos St., Barangay Damayan, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City.  The team consisted of Mabutol as the poseur-buyer and Pascua and Valenciaas his back-up members.  Villanueva then gave Mabutol a one hundred peso (₱100.00) bill to be used as his buy-bust money.  Mabutol marked this with his initials “JR” on the lower left side portion and listed its serial number in his dispatch book.  The team, with their informant, then proceeded to the target area using a white marked vehicle with red plate.  As soon as they reached the place, Mabutol and the informant moved ahead to the house of Amansec at Santos St., corner Caragay St., while the rest of the team positioned themselves at a strategic location, keeping Amansec within viewing distance.  The informant then introduced Mabutol to Amansec as a drug addict, in dire need of drugs.  Mabutol had just told Amansec that he was going to purchase one hundred pesos worth of shabu when another buyer, later identified as Jerome Pintis, came up to Amansec to also buy shabu.  Amansec then showed both Pintis and Mabutol three plastic sachets containing crystalline substance.  Pintis gave a one hundred peso bill to Amansec who in return, let him pick one of the three plastic sachets.  After Pintis left, Amansec continued his transaction with Mabutol, and gave Mabutol another of the remaining two plastic sachets after receiving the buy-bust money.  Mabutol thereafter examined the plastic sachet he obtained from Amansec, and suspecting it to be shabu, scratched the right side of his head with his right hand to signal his team to approach the target.  Valencia immediately arrested Pintis and recovered from the latter one plastic sachet, while Pascua went after Amansec, who, upon seeing Pintis’ arrest, tried to run away.  Pascua thereafter frisked Amansec and retrieved the buy-bust money that Mabutol had given Amansec, and another plastic sachet.  The team then brought Pintis and Amansec to the Station Investigator.  The team also marked with their initials the plastic sachets that they had recovered and turned them over to their Investigator.  They later brought the plastic sachets to the Crime Laboratory to have their contents examined for the presence of shabu.^[11][11]

The examination made by Engr. Banac on June 16, 2003, yielded the following results, as stated in his Chemistry Report No. D-472-03^[12][12]:

TIME AND DATE RECEIVED:          1200H          16 JUNE 2003

REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT:           OIC, SDEU

                                                            PS-1  CPD

                                                           LalomaQC

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

            Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance having the following markings and recorded net weights:

                        A(JR-BA)  =  0.09 gram          C(RV-JM)  =  0.09 gram

                        B(RP-BA)  =  0.09 gram

x x x x

 

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

            To determine the presence of dangerous drugs.  xxx

FINDINGS:

            Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE results to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.  x x x.

CONCLUSION:

            Specimens A, B, and C contain Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.  x x x.

TIME AND DATE COMPLETED:  1400H 16 JUNE 2003

This report, along with the three plastic sachets with white crystalline substance, and the ₱100.00 bill^[13][13] recovered from Amansec, were presented in court, and, except for the plastic sachets, were submitted to the court as evidence.

The defense presented Amansec who vehemently denied, on the witness stand, the charges against him.  He testified that on June 15, 2003, he was in his residence when two police officers, whom he later came to know as Mabutol and a certain PO1 Lozada, entered his room and thoroughly searched it.  He was then brought to the precinct where he was instructed to call somebody who could help him settle his case.  As he knew no one who could help him, Mabutol asked him to give a name of a big-time drug seller/pusher who could take his place, or “pamalit-ulo.”^[14][14]  Since Amansec did not know any big-time drug pusher, reasoning that he had been in his residence for only six months then, the police officers proceeded with the case and he was brought to the Inquest Prosecutor.  Amansec averred that he did not file a case against the police officers because he did not know how to go about it.^[15][15]  On cross-examination, he said that he was denying the allegations as the police officers had “no proof [of] what they [were] saying.”^[16][16]  Amansec also stated that the first time he saw Mabutol and Pascua was when he was arrested, and he did not know of any grudge or ill motive that they might have against him.^[17][17]

On August 30, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

          WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118187 for violation of Section 5 of Article II of R.A. 9165, (selling of dangerous drugs) and he is hereby sentenced him (sic) to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (Php500,000.00) pesos.

            However, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118186 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

            The pieces of evidence [that is the] subject matter of these cases are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of as provided by law.^[18][18]

In convicting Amansec of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish and satisfy the elements in the sale of illegal drugs.  The RTC averred that Amansec failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers whom he admitted to have met only after his arrest.  Moreover, the RTC found the testimonies of Mabutol and Pascua to be consistent, clear, direct, positive, and corroborative of the material and significant aspects of what actually transpired.^[19][19]

 However, the RTC acquitted Amansec of the illegal possession of dangerous drugs charge, ratiocinating in this wise:

            Anent the second offense, the public prosecutor was able to prove that indeed the accused was caught in possession of illegal drugs known as “shabu” after the entrapment.  After the arrest of the accused for selling illegal drugs, PO2 Ronald Pascua was able to recover another plastic sachet containing shabu from the accused.  However, the Court is convinced that the second plastic sachet containing shabu (Exhibit “E-2”) was intended by the accused to be sold to the buyer at the time of the buy-bust operation.  In People vs. Hindoy [357 SCRA 692], possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.  In the case at bar, it is clear from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the second plastic sachet of shabu was shown and offered by the accused during the transaction in the buy-bust operation.^[20][20]

On September 11, 2006, Amansec filed his Notice of Appeal with the RTC.  In his Brief, ^[21][21] Amansec cited irregularities, which allegedly create a reasonable doubt that a buy-bust operation was conducted.  He also questioned the admissibility of the evidence against him.

However, the Court of Appeals was not convinced by Amansec’s arguments.  The Court of Appeals found the prosecution’s evidence to be sufficient to uphold the conviction of Amansec.^[22][22]  The Court of Appeals held that “[n]on-compliance by the apprehending officer with Section 21 of [Republic Act] No. 9165 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. x x x.”^[23][23]

On April 15, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, with the following fallo:

 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 30, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118187 convicting accused-appellant BENJAMIN AMANSEC Y DONA for violation of Section 5, Article II of  R.A. No. 9165, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment, and ordering him to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00), is hereby AFFIRMED.^[24][24]

Aggrieved, Amansec appealed^[25][25] the above ruling to this Court, assigning the same errors he assigned before the Court of Appeals, to wit:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

 

I

 

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE ITS APPARENT UNREALITY AS TO HOW THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED.

II

 

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF SELLING ILLEGAL DRUGS DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

III

 

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SPECIMENS.^[26][26]

 

The Ruling of this Court

 

Amansec was charged and convicted for selling methylamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, which provides:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a “financier” of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a “protector/coddler” of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses

and conduct of the buy-bust operation

 

Amansec argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as they failed to pass the test in determining the value of a witness’s testimony that such must be “in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.”^[27][27]

Amasec claims that the charges against him were merely planted and enumerates the following as evidence, which supposedly “creates reasonable doubt as to the allegation of the prosecution that a buy-bust operation was conducted”^[28][28]:

1. Only Amansec was charged with violating Republic Act No. 9165, and not Pintis, whom the police officers alleged to have bought shabu from him, while the buy-bust operation was being conducted.
2. The prosecution failed to produce and present in court the ₱100.00 bill Pintis allegedly used to buy shabu from Amansec.
3. The informant was not presented in court, and no explanation was given by the prosecution for their failure to do so.
4. There was no surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers.
5. The buy-bust money used by Mabutol was not dusted with ultraviolet powder.

Amansec’s arguments are untenable.  As we have held before, “[i]t is for the party to plan its own strategy and to choose which witnesses to call and what evidence to submit to support its own cause.”^[29][29]

 

Non-inclusion of Pintis in this case and

Non-presentation of Pintis’ ₱100.00 bill

Recovered from Amansec

         

          It is not within the province of this Court to speculate or make presumptions as to what happened to Pintis after he was arrested.  Suffice it to say that he was apprehended for not only a different, but also, a separate illegal act.  He was caught in flagrante delicto of purchasing shabu from Amansec, and when he was caught, a plastic sachet, similar to the ones sold to Mabutol and recovered from Amansec, was found in his possession.  Since this had nothing to do with Amansec’s own acts, this Court sees no reason why they should have been tried jointly.

          Anent the ₱100.00 bill Pintis used to buy shabu from Amansec, this Court also sees no need for its presentation before the RTC because Amansec was charged with violation of Section 5, or the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, for selling shabu to Mabutol, and not to Pintis.  Thus, even if Pintis’ ₱100.00 peso bill were presented in court, it would serve very little purpose for the prosecution, and even for the RTC, as, to reiterate, Amansec was on trial for his act of selling dangerous drugs to Mabutol, who was then a poseur-buyer, and not to Pintis, who just happened to buy from him while the buy-bust operation was being conducted.

 

 

 

 

Non-Presentation of Informant

 

          This point need not be belabored as this Court, has time and again, held that “the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative.”^[30][30]  If Amansec felt that the prosecution did not present the informant because he would testify against it, then Amansec himself should have called him to the stand to testify for the defense.^[31][31]  The informant’s testimony is not needed if the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven by the prosecution.^[32][32]  In People v. Ho Chua,^[33][33] we said:

The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases.  In People v. Nicolas, the Court ruled that “[p]olice authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court.  Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly upon squealers and informants.  It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their identities are kept secret.”  In any event, the testimony of the informant would be merely corroborative.^[34][34]

No prior surveillance conducted

          This issue in the prosecution of illegal drugs cases, again, has long been settled by this Court.  We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant.^[35][35]  In People v. Eugenio,^[36][36] we held:    

There is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken especially when, as in this case, the policemen are accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant.  Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one.  We have held that when time is of [the] essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.^[37][37]

Buy-bust money was not

dusted with ultraviolet powder

 

The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham.  “The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court.”^[38][38]  In People v. Rivera,^[39][39] we declared:

It was x x x the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the money to be used in the buy-bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with fluorescent powder did not render the exhibit inadmissible.  Indeed, the use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court in numerous cases.^[40][40]

Inventory and Chain of Custody of Evidence

 

Amansec asserts that his conviction was incorrect because the evidence against him was obtained in violation of the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9165.  He claims that Section 21 of the aforesaid act was violated when the police officers who arrested him did not take his picture with the shabu they confiscated from him, and when they made no physical inventory of the shabu in his presence, or in the presence of his representative, the media, the department of justice, or any elected public official.  Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption that the police officers performed their duty in a regular manner.^[41][41]

He also avers that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidence obtained from him as the station investigator, to whom the specimens were turned over, was not presented in court.  Moreover, Amansec claims, there was no evidence to show that the forensic chemist examined the same articles allegedly confiscated from him.  Amansec says that the stipulations made as regards the testimony of the forensic chemist mentioned nothing about the chemist’s actual receipt of the specimens from the Investigator or from any other person.  Amansec argues that the prosecution’s failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal and leads to the unavoidable suspicion on its integrity.^[42][42]

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, provide as follows:

 

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;

(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;

(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused/and or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SECTION 21.    Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

 (a)   The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

(b)  Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(c)   A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, that when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, that a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;

(d)  After the filing of the criminal case, the court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall, within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter, proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, that those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, that a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(e)   The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In cases of seizures where no person is apprehended and no criminal case is filed, the PDEA may order the immediate destruction or burning of seized dangerous drugs and controlled precursors and essential chemicals under guidelines set by the Board. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(f)   The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;

(g)  After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and 

(h)  Transitory Provision:

h.1) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of the Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel; and

h.2) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.

In the meantime that the PDEA has no forensic laboratories and/or evidence rooms, as well as the necessary personnel of its own in any area of its jurisdiction, the existing National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police (PNP) forensic laboratories shall continue to examine or conduct screening and confirmatory test on the seized/surrendered evidence whether these be dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment; and the NBI and the PNP shall continue to have custody of such evidence for use in court and until disposed of, burned or destroyed in accordance with the foregoing rules: Provided, that pending appointment/designation of the full complement of the representatives from the media, DOJ, or elected public official, the inventory of the said evidence shall continue to be conducted by the arresting NBI and PNP operatives under their existing procedures unless otherwise directed in writing by the DOH or PDEA, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)

Ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken.  However “a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.”^[43][43]  Thus, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, this will not render Amansec’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible in evidence.^[44][44]  This Court has consistently held that “what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused.”^[45][45]

The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.  Both the prosecution witnesses were categorical and consistent that Amansec offered three plastic sachets containing shabu to Mabutol and Pintis.  These were later recovered from Amansec, Pintis, and Mabutol himself.  As soon as the police officers, together with Amansec and Pintis, reached the La Loma Police Station, the seized sachets were marked with the initials of the police officers, with each officer marking the sachet he personally retrieved from the suspects.  This was done before the specimens were turned over to the station investigator for the preparation of the request for laboratory examination.  Thereafter, the specimens were forwarded to the crime lab by the police officers themselves.^[46][46]  The Chemistry Report prepared by the forensic chemist listed the same specimens, which bore the initials of the police officers, and which were later identified by Mabutol and Pascua in open court as the plastic sachets they marked with their initials.

Besides, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence.  Amansec bears the burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties.^[47][47]  This, Amansec failed to do.

Furthermore, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which requires each and everyone who came into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court.  “As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand.”^[48][48]  This Court, in People v. Hernandez,^[49][49] citing People v. Zeng Hua Dian,^[50][50] ruled:

After a thorough review of the records of this case we find that the chain of custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.^[51][51]

It is worthy to note, and we agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation, that Amansec questioned the chain of custody of the evidence only when he appealed his conviction.  Not once did he raise this defense or mention these procedural gaps before the trial court.  Thus, whatever justifiable ground the prosecution has will remain a mystery in light of Amansec’s failure to raise this issue before the trial court, viz:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.^[52][52]

Amansec’s theory, from the very beginning, were that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for his failure to give the police officers either money or some big-time pusher to take his place.  In other words, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up.  However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.  In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.  In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations.^[53][53]

          Equally important is the fact that Amansec has not ascribed any improper motive on the part of the police officers as to why they would hand-pick him, and falsely incriminate him in such a serious crime.  No evidence has been offered to show that Mabutol and Pascua, were motivated by reasons other than their duty to curb the sale of prohibited drugs.^[54][54]  Amansec himself admitted that he only came to know his arresting officers after his arrest.  He also testified that he knew of no grudge that they might have against him.  Hence, until Amansec can show clear and convincing evidence that the members of the entrapment operation team were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit. ^[55][55]    

Elements of illegal sale of

dangerous drugs established

 

The successful prosecution of the sale of dangerous drugs case depends on the satisfaction of the following elements:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. ^[56][56]

To elucidate on the foregoing elements, this Court has said that “[i]n prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.”^[57][57]

It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was able to establish the said elements.^[58][58]

Amansec was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses, as the person who sold to the poseur-buyer a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.  He had been caught red-handed in the entrapment operation conducted by the SDEU of the La Loma Police.  Such positive identification must prevail over Amansec’s uncorroborated and weak defense of denial, and unsubstantiated defense of frame-up.^[59][59]

The corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness.  Amansec gave one of the two remaining plastic sachets to Mabutol after receiving the ₱100.00 buy-bust money.^[60][60]  In People v. Legaspi,^[61][61] we said:

The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and Legaspi.

This Court therefore finds no error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in convicting Amansec for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the April 15, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02557.

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

 

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice	MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

 

CASE 2011-0233: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (G.R. NO. 172458, 14 DECEMBER 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.) SUBJECT: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE REVISED RULES OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND THE RULES OF COURT IN FILING A PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE CTA EN BANC.  (BRIEF TITLE: PNB VS. CIR)

 

=================

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

=================

 

 

 

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

 

FIRST DIVISION

 

 

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –  x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

 

This Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1][1] seeks to reverse and set aside the January 27, 2006^[2][2] and April 19, 2006^[3][3] Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA En Banc) in C.T.A. E.B. NO. 145, which dismissed outright the Petition for Review filed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) dated December 27, 2005 for being filed four days beyond the additional 15 days granted to file such petition.

 

On April 15, 1999, petitioner PNB filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) its Tentative Return for 1998 with the documents enumerated in the “List of Attachments to Annual Income Tax Return Calendar Year Ended December 31, 1998” enclosed.  On September 30, 1999, PNB filed its Amended Income Tax Return for 1998, with the corresponding attachments to an amended annual income tax return appended, including copies of the Certificates and Schedule of Creditable Withholding Taxes for 1998.  PNB likewise filed its Corporate Quarterly Returns for the calendar year 1998.^[4][4]

 

On February 8, 2001, PNB filed with respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) an administrative claim for refund in the amount of ₱6,028,594.00, which were payments made in excess of its income tax liability for 1998.^[5][5]

 

As BIR did not act upon PNB’s claim for refund, PNB, on March 30, 2001, filed with the Second Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA Division) a Petition for Review,^[6][6] and prayed that it be refunded or issued a tax credit certificate in the amount of ₱6,028,594.00, representing creditable taxes withheld from PNB’s income from the sale of real property, rental income, commissions, and management fees for the taxable year 1998.

 

In his Answer,^[7][7] the CIR alleged that PNB’s claim for refund/tax credit is subject first to an investigation and that it failed to establish its right to a refund.

 

After PNB had rested its case, the CIR manifested that he would not be presenting evidence.  The parties were thereafter required to submit their memoranda.^[8][8]

 

On May 19, 2003, the BIR issued in PNB’s favor Tax Credit Certificate No. SN 023837 for ₱4,154,353.42, leaving a balance of ₱1,874,240.58 out of PNB’s total claim of ₱6,028,594.00.  PNB then informed the CTA Division of such tax credit certificate, and manifested that its acceptance was without prejudice to recovering the balance of its total claim.^[9][9]

 

Consequently, the CIR filed a Motion,^[10][10] asking that he be allowed to present evidence on PNB’s excluded claim.  The CIR argued that the amount of ₱1,874,240.58 was disallowed because it was not remitted to the BIR, as verified by its Regional Accounting Division.^[11][11]

 

On August 11, 2005, the CTA Division rendered its Decision,^[12][12] the dispositive portion of which reads:

 

            WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition For Review is hereby partially GRANTED.  Respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND or ISSUE a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of herein petitioner in the amount of ₱1,428,661.66, representing the latter’s unutilized creditable withholding tax for the year 1998.^[13][13]

 

 

The CTA Division held that payments of withholding taxes for a certain taxable year were creditable to the payee’s income tax liability as determined after it had filed its income tax returns the following year.  The CTA Division said that since PNB posted net losses, it was not liable for any income tax and consequently, the taxes withheld during the course of the taxable year, which was 1998, while collected legally under Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, Section 2.57 (B), became untenable and took on the nature of erroneously collected taxes at the end of that year.  The CTA Division averred that while the right to a refund is not automatic and must be established by sufficient evidence, there is nothing in the Tax Code that would suggest that the actual remittance of the withholding tax is a condition precedent to claim for a tax refund.  Moreover, the CTA Division added, that the CIR failed to present the certification to prove his contention of PNB’s non-remittance of the disallowed amount.  However, the CTA Division affirmed the disallowance of eight transactions, amounting to ₱445,578.92 as they had already been reported as income for other years, had not been recorded, or were not supported by pertinent documents.^[14][14] 

 

On September 14, 2005, PNB filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,^[15][15] asserting its entitlement to be refunded the amount of ₱445,578.92, by explaining each transaction involved and pinpointed by the CTA Division.  This however was still denied by the CTA Division in its Resolution^[16][16] dated November 15, 2005, for lack of merit.

 

Aggrieved, PNB, filed a partial appeal by way of Petition for Review^[17][17] under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 9282^[18][18] before the CTA En Banc, to review and modify  the CTA Division’s August 11, 2005 Decision.  This petition was received by the CTA En Banc on December 27, 2005, four days beyond the additional 15 days granted to PNB to file its petition.

 

Thus, on January 27, 2006, the CTA En Banc issued a Resolution^[19][19]  denying due course and consequently dismissing PNB’s petition for the following reasons:

 

1)                  The Petition For Review was filed four (4) days late on December 27, 2005, the reglementary deadline for the timely filing of such petition being December 23, 2005.

 

Appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised in the manner provided by law.  Therefore, perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and non-compliance is fatal having the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory (Cabellan vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 119).  Not only that, late appeals deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less entertain the appeal (Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373).

 

2)                  The petition is not accompanied by the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed Decision dated August 11, 2005 and Resolution dated November 15, 2005, in violation of Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, in relation to Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

 

3)                  The Petition does not contain an Affidavit of Service, in violation of Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

 

In the case of Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 344, 351, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to dismiss the petition for failure to attach an affidavit of service.

 

Lastly, Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that:

 

            SEC. 7.  Effect of failure to comply with requirements.– The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”

 

 

Persistent in its claim, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation of Compliance^[20][20] on February 23, 2006, and answered each ground propounded by the CTA En Banc in its Resolution.

 

PNB asserted that its petition was filed on December 23, 2005, which was the last day of the additional 15-day period granted by the CTA En Banc, via LBC Express, as shown by the copy of LBC Official Receipt No. 12990350^[21][21] dated December 23, 2005.  PNB explained that its counsel, Atty. Flerida P. Zaballa-Banzuela, accompanied by her administrative assistant, tried to personally file the petition with the CTA En Banc on December 23, 2005.  However, PNB claimed, that due to heavy traffic, Atty. Zaballa-Banzuela arrived at the CTA office in Quezon City at 4:30 p.m., just as the CTA personnel were leaving the CTA premises in their shuttle bus.^[22][22]

 

PNB attached to its Motion the Affidavit^[23][23] of Christopher Sarmiento, the Security Guard who was then assigned at the CTA main gate.  Sarmiento averred that he did not allow Atty. Zaballa-Banzuela to enter the CTA compound because there was no one left to receive her document.  He also alleged that Atty. Zaballa-Banzuela even tried to ask some of the CTA personnel who were on board the CTA shuttle that passed her by, if they could receive her document, but they declined.  This was corroborated by Atty. Zaballa-Banzuela’s administrative assistant, Macrina J. Cataniag, in her Affidavit,^[24][24] also annexed to PNB’s Motion.

 

PNB argued that while its petition was deposited with LBC Express on December 23, 2005, very well within the reglementary period, CTA En Banc received it only on December 27, 2005, as December 24 to 26, 2005 were holidays.^[25][25]

 

 Addressing the second ground that the CTA En Banc used to dismiss the petition, PNB said that its non-submission of the duplicate original or certified true copy of the CTA Division’s decision and resolution was not intended for delay but was “mere inadvertence and unintentional, but an honest mistake, an oversight, an unintentional omission, and a human error occasioned by too much pressure of work.”^[26][26]

 

In compliance, PNB attached to its Motion the Affidavit of Service^[27][27] and certified true copies of the CTA Division’s decision and resolution supposed to be attached to its petition before the CTA En Banc.

 

On April 19, 2006, the CTA En Banc denied PNB’s motion for lack of merit.  The CTA En Banc held that “absent any cogent explanation [to not] comply with the rules, the rules must apply to the petitioner as they do to all.”^[28][28]  The CTA En Banc ratiocinated in this wise: 

 

It is a jurisprudential rule that the date [of] delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading (Benguet Electric Corporation, Inc. vs. NLRC, 209 SCRA 60-61).  Clearly, the present Petition For Review was filed four (4) days late.

 

            The instant Petition For Review is an appeal from the decision of the Court in Division.  Accordingly, the applicable rule is that the fifteen-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature; that failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period renders the assailed decision final and executory and no longer subject to review (Armigos vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 1; Jocson vs. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550).  Petitioner had thus lost its right to appeal from the decision of this Court in Division.^[29][29]

 

 

The CTA En Banc added:

 

            Although petitioner subsequently attached to its present motion, certified true copies of the assailed Decision, dated August 11, 2005, and Resolution, dated November 15, 2005, and the Affidavit of Service, this did not stop the questioned decision from becoming final and executory.  It has been held that strict compliance with procedural requirements in taking an appeal cannot be substituted by “good faith compliance”.  To rule otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the rules of procedure, i.e., to “facilitate the orderly administration of justice” (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 806, 810; Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 712).^[30][30]

 

 

PNB thereafter filed a Petition for Review^[31][31] before this Court on June 16, 2006, which was the last day of the additional thirty days it was granted^[32][32] to file such petition.

 

In order to convince this Court to allow its petition, PNB posits the following arguments:

 

I

 

THE HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS EN BANC ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE EXPLANATION SUBMITTED BY PNB IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH MANIFESTATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION ON DECEMBER 23, 2005 (THE DUE DATE FOR FILING THEREOF) VIA LBC SERVICE INSTEAD OF REGISTERED MAIL WITH RETURN CARD.

 

II

 

THE PROCEDURAL LAPSE OBSERVED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, AS POSTULATED IN VARIOUS SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

 

III

 

THE PETITION FILED BY PNB BEFORE THE CTA EN BANC RAISES A MERITORIOUS LEGAL DEFENSE WARRANTING JUDICIAL RESOLUTION.^[33][33]

 

 

PNB once again narrated the circumstances leading to its counsel’s decision to mail its petition for review via LBC Express, a private letter-forwarding company, instead of registered mail.  It claims that since this Court has repeatedly pronounced the primacy of substantive justice over technical rules, then its procedural lapses should likewise be excused, especially since no substantial rights of the CIR are affected.

 

This Court’s Ruling

 

 The only issue to be resolved here is whether or not this Court should require the CTA En Banc to give due course to C.T.A. E.B. No. 145 despite PNB’s failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals and the Rules of Court in filing a petition for review with the CTA En Banc.

 

Not having been successfully convinced by PNB, we answer the above issue in the negative.

 

This Court would like to underscore the fact that PNB failed to comply with not just one, but three procedural rules when it filed its petition for review with the CTA En Banc.

 

 

 

Petition was filed late

 

It is stated under Section 3, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals that the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.  Thus, the manner in which petitions are filed before the CTA is also covered by the relevant provision of the Rules of Court, to wit:

 

          Rule 13. x x x.

 

                x x x x

 

Sec. 3. Manner of filing.  The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail.  In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing.  In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court.  The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case.  (Emphases ours.)

 

 

To recall, PNB filed its petition with the CTA En Banc four days beyond the extended period granted to it to file such petition.  PNB argues that it was filed on time since it was mailed on the last day of the extended period, which was on December 23, 2005.  It has been established that a pleading “filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial service x x x is deemed filed on the day it is actually received by the court, and not on the day it was mailed or delivered to the messengerial service.”^[34][34]  In Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,^[35][35] we said:

 

The established rule is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.^[36][36]

 

 

It is worthy to note that PNB already asked for an additional period of 15 days within which to file its petition for review with the CTA En Banc.  This period expired on December 23, 2005.  Knowing fully well that December 23, 2005 not only fell on a Friday, followed by three consecutive non-working days, but also belonged to the busiest holiday season of the year, PNB should have exercised more prudence and foresight in filing its petition. 

 

It is, however, curious why PNB chose to risk the holiday traffic in an effort to personally file its petition with the CTA En Banc, when it already filed a copy to the other party, the CIR, via registered mail.^[37][37]  Considering the circumstances, it would have been more logical for PNB to send its petition to the CTA En Banc on the same occasion it sent a copy to the CIR, especially since that day was already the last day given to PNB to file its petition.  Moreover, PNB offered no justification as to why it sent its petition via ordinary mail instead of registered mail.  “Service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances where no registry service exists.”^[38][38]  Rule 13, Section 7 reads:

 

Sec. 7. Service by mail.  Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (l0) days if undelivered.  If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. (Emphasis ours.)

 

Petition was not accompanied by the

required duplicate originals or certified

true copies of the decision and resolution

being assailed, and Affidavit of Service

 

 

          The following provisions are instructive:

 

Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals:

 

SEC. 2. Petition for review; contents. – The petition for review shall contain allegations showing the jurisdiction of the Court, a concise statement of the complete facts and a summary statement of the issues involved in the case, as well as the reasons relied upon for the review of the challenged decision.  The petition shall be verified and must contain a certification against forum shopping as provided in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.  A clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the decision appealed from shall be attached to the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)

 

 

Section 4(b), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals:

 

Sec. 4(b) An appeal from a decision or resolution of the Court in Division on a motion for reconsideration or new trial shall be taken to the Court by petition for review as provided in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.  The Court en banc shall act on the appeal.

 

 

Sections 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court:

 

Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

This Court has already upheld the mandatory character of attaching duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed decision to a petition for review.^[39][39]  Moreover, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, non-compliance with such mandatory requirement is a sufficient ground to dismiss the petition, viz:

 

            Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.  (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

          Anent the failure to attach the Affidavit of Service, Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

 

Sec. 13. Proof of service.  Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.  The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.

 

 

          Although the failure to attach the required affidavit of service is not fatal if the registry receipt attached to the petition clearly shows service to the other party, ^[40][40] it must be remembered that this was not the only rule of procedure PNB failed to satisfy.  In Suarez v. Judge Villarama, Jr.^[41][41] we said: 

 

It is an accepted tenet that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.  Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, however, should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.^[42][42]

 

 

This Court agrees with the CTA En Banc that PNB has not demonstrated any cogent reason for this Court to take an exception and excuse PNB’s blatant disregard of the basic procedural rules in a petition for review.  Furthermore, the timely perfection of an appeal is a mandatory requirement.  One cannot escape the rigid observance of this rule by claiming oversight, or in this case, lack of foresight.  Neither can it be trifled with as a “mere technicality” to suit the interest of a party.  Verily, the periods for filing petitions for review and for certiorari are to be observed religiously.  “Just as [the] losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner have the x x x right to enjoy the finality of the decision.”^[43][43]  In Air France Philippines v. Leachon,^[44][44] we held:

 

Procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing an appellate petition are generally inviolable.  It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege.  Hence, parties who seek to avail of the privilege must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.  The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must, as a rule, be strictly followed.  Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays, and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business.  For sure, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional as well.  Failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment appealed from final and executory.^[45][45]

 

 

While it is true that the Court may deviate from the foregoing rule, this is true only if the appeal is meritorious on its face.  The Court has not hesitated to relax the procedural rules in order to serve and achieve substantial justice.  “In the circumstances obtaining in this case however, the occasion does not warrant the desired relaxation.”^[46][46]  PNB has not offered any meritorious legal defense to justify the suspension of the rules in its favor.  The CTA Division has taken into consideration all of the evidence submitted by the PNB, and actually allowed it a refund of ₱1,428,661.66, in addition to the ₱4,154,353.42 the BIR already gave.  The CTA Division explained why it disallowed the remaining balance of ₱445,578.92 in its Decision dated August 11, 2005.  When PNB moved to reconsider this decision, it did not offer the CTA any other evidence or explanation aside from the ones the CTA Division had already evaluated.  Nevertheless, the CTA carefully considered and deliberated anew PNB’s grounds, albeit they found them lacking in merit.  Thus, it cannot be said that PNB was deprived of its day in court, as in fact, it was given all the time it had asked for. 

 

While PNB may believe that it has a meritorious legal defense, this must be weighed against the need to halt an abuse of the flexibility of procedural rules.  It is well established that faithful compliance with the Rules of Court is essential for the prevention and avoidance of unnecessary delays and for the organized and efficient dispatch of judicial business.^[47][47] 

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

 

 

 

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

                                                 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

                                       Associate Justice

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice	MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

 

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice