J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2012-0042: PHILIPPINE TOURISM    AUTHORITY VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC. (G.R. NO. 176628, MARCH 19, 2012, BRION, J.) SUBJECT/S: JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT; ACTS OF COUNSEL BINDS CLIENT/ EXCEPTION; APPEAL VIS A VIS CERTIORARI; EXTRINSIC FRAUD (BRIEF TITLE: PTA VS. PHILIPPINE GOLF)

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DISPOSITIVE:

        WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for certiorari. No costs.

        SO ORDERED.

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WHY DOES THE COURT PROVIDES FOR DEADLINES IN ACTIONS?

TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY DISPOSITION OF CASES.

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CAN A PARTY INVOKE THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS COUNSEL IF COUNSEL FAILED TO MEET A DEADLINE IN AN ACTION?

NO. OTHERWISE, SUCH PRACTICE IF ALLOWED WOULD DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF THE RULES ON PERIODS SINCE EVERY PARTY WOULD MERELY LAY THE BLAME ON ITS COUNSEL TO AVOID ANY LIABILITY.

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WHAT IS THE RULE ON THIS MATTER?

A CLIENT IS BOUND BY THE ACTS, EVEN MISTAKES, OF HIS COUNSEL IN THE REALM OF PROCEDURAL TECHNIQUE[,]AND UNLESS SUCH ACTS INVOLVE GROSS NEGLIGENCE THAT THE CLAIMING PARTY CAN PROVE, THE ACTS OF A COUNSEL BIND THE CLIENT AS IF IT HAD BEEN THE LATTER’S ACTS.”[1][6]

NOTE THE EXCEPTION: UNLESS SUCH ACT INVOLVES GROSS NEGLIGENCE.

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The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in actions before the court to ensure an orderly disposition of cases. PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by simply invoking the negligence of its counsel. This practice, if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods since every party would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any liability. The rule is that “a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique[,]and unless such acts involve gross negligence that the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had been the latter’s acts.”[2][6]

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DEFINE GROSS NEGLIGENCE APPLICABLE TO THIS RULE?

THAT  “[G]ROSS NEGLIGENCE IS CHARACTERIZED BY WANT OF EVEN SLIGHT CARE, ACTING OR OMITTING TO ACT IN A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS A DUTY TO ACT, NOT INADVERTENTLY BUT WILLFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY WITH A CONSCIOUS INDIFFERENCE TO CONSEQUENCES INSOFAR AS OTHER PERSONS MAY BE AFFECTED.”

In LBC Express – Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo,[3][7] the Court held that “[g]ross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.” This cannot be invoked in cases where the counsel is merely negligent in submitting his required pleadings within the period that the rules mandate.

It is not disputed that the summons together with a copy of the complaint was personally served upon, and received by PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department, on October 10, 2003.[4][8] Thus, in failing to submit a responsive pleading within the required time despite sufficient notice, the RTC was correct in declaring PTA in default.

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PTA FAILED TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADING. IT WAS DECLARED IN DEFAULT BY RTC. WAS RTC CORRECT?

YES. THE RECORDS REVEAL THAT THE JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT[5][10] WAS SENT VIA REGISTERED MAIL TO PTA’S COUNSEL. HOWEVER, PTA NEVER AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF A MOTION TO LIFT THE ORDER OF DEFAULT.[6][11] SINCE THE FAILURE OF PTA TO PRESENT ITS EVIDENCE WAS NOT A PRODUCT OF ANY FRAUDULENT ACTS (REFERRED TO AS EXTRINSIC FRAUD)  COMMITTED OUTSIDE TRIAL, THE RTC DID NOT ERR IN DECLARING PTA IN DEFAULT.

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WHAT IS EXTRINSIC FRAUD?

IT REFERS TO ANY FRAUDULENT ACT OF THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THE LITIGATION WHICH IS COMMITTED OUTSIDE OF THE TRIAL OF THE CASE, WHEREBY THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY HAS BEEN PREVENTED FROM EXHIBITING FULLY HIS CASE, BY FRAUD OR DECEPTION PRACTICED ON HIM BY HIS OPPONENT.”[7][9]

        “Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.”[8][9] Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the acts of PTA’s counsel to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.

        The records reveal that the judgment of default[9][10] was sent via registered mail to PTA’s counsel. However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default.[10][11] Since the failure of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in declaring PTA in default.

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PTA FILED A PETITION TO ANNUL JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT? IS THIS THE PROPER REMEDY?

NO. THE PROPER REMEDY IS APPEAL. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS A RECOURSE EQUITABLE IN CHARACTER AND ALLOWED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF NEW TRIAL, APPEAL, PETITION FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REMEDIES ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE THROUGH NO FAULT OF PETITIONER.”[11][12]

        PTA’s appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC decision. “Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.”[12][12]

In this case, appeal was an available remedy. There was also no extraordinary reason for a petition for annulment of judgment, nor was there any adequate explanation on why the remedy for new trial or petition for relief could not be used. The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had withdrawn a properly filed appeal and substituted it with another petition, when PTA could have merely raised the same issues through an ordinary appeal.

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PTA RAISED THE DEFENSE OF STATE IMMUNITY. IS PTA CORRECT?

NO.  THE APPLICATION OF STATE IMMUNITY IS PROPER ONLY WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISE OUT OF SOVEREIGN TRANSACTIONS AND NOT IN CASES OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. THE STATE, IN ENTERING INTO A BUSINESS CONTRACT, DESCENDS TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND IS DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED.[13][13]

PTA also erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.[14][13]

Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.

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PTA FILED PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 AT SC. IS THIS A PROPER REMEDY?

NO. CERTIORARI IS NOT A MODE OF APPEAL AND CANNOT BE MADE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR APPEAL.

        Lastly, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only available in cases when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a substitute for appeal. It will not lie in cases where other remedies are available under the law.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[15][14] the Court had the occasion to state:

The general rule is that a [certiorari] will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. xxx

x        x        x        x

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. [emphases supplied; citations omitted]

In sum, PTA had the remedy of appealing the RTC decision to the CA and, thereafter, to us. Under the circumstances, we find no adequate reason to justify the elevation of this case to the CA and then to us, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

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Republic of thePhilippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PHILIPPINE TOURISM                     G.R. No. 176628

AUTHORITY,

                        Petitioner,                               

                                                          Present:

                                                          CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

  BRION,

      – versus –                             PEREZ,

  SERENO, and

  REYES, JJ.

  Promulgated:

PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT

& EQUIPMENT, INC.,                                March 19, 2012

                                Respondent.

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R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to annul the decision[16][1] dated December 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 90402. This CA decision dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment which sought to set aside the decision[17][2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in Civil Case No. 03-212. The RTC held the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) liable for its unpaid obligation to Philippine Golf Development & Equipment, Inc. (PHILGOLF).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

          On April 3, 1996, PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects (PAR 60-66) for a contract price of Fifty-Seven Million Nine Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven and 94/100 Pesos (P57,954,647.94).

The civil works of the project commenced. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course amounting to Twenty-Seven Million Pesos (P27,000,000.00). The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.[18][3]

On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting to Eleven Million Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 53/100 Pesos (P11,820,550.53), plus interest, for the construction of the golf course. Within the period to file a responsive pleading, PTA filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer.

On October 30, 2003, the RTC granted the motion for extension of time.  PTA filed another motion for extension of time to file an answer. The RTC again granted the motion.

Despite the RTC’s liberality of granting two successive motions for extension of time, PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, on April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a judgment of default, ruling as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff:

1. The amount of Eleven Million, Eight Hundred Twenty Thousand, Five Hundred Fifty Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P11,820,550.53), representing defendant’s outstanding obligation, plus interest thereon of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time the unpaid billings of plaintiff were due for payment by the defendant, until they are fully paid.

1. The amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos  (P200,000.00), as attorney’s fees.

1. The amount of One Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand, Five Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (P128,529.14), as filing fees and other costs of litigation.

1. The amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), as moral damages.

1. The amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (Pesos (P150,000.00), as nominal damages, and

1. The amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[19][4]

On July 11, 2005, PTA seasonably appealed the case to the CA. But before the appeal of PTA could be perfected, PHILGOLF already filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC. The RTC, in an Order dated June 2, 2004, granted the motion and a writ of execution pending appeal was issued against PTA. On June 3, 2004, a notice of garnishment was issued against PTA’s bank account at the Land Bank of thePhilippines, NAIA-BOC Branch to fully satisfy the judgment.

PTA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for granting the motion for execution pending appeal. The CA ruled in favor of PTA and set aside the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. 

On July 11, 2005, PTA withdrew its appeal of the RTC decision and, instead, filed a petition[20][5] for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The petition for annulment of judgment was premised on the argument that the gross negligence of PTA’s counsel prevented the presentation of evidence before the RTC.  

On December 13, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of merit. PTA questions this CA action in the present petition for certiorari.

THE PETITION

The petition cites three arguments: first, that the negligence of PTA’s counsel amounted to an extrinsic fraud warranting an annulment of judgment; second, that since PTA is a government entity, it should not be bound by the inactions or negligence of its counsel; and third, that there were no other available remedies left for PTA but a petition for annulment of judgment.

OUR RULING

        We find the petition unmeritorious.

The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in actions before the court to ensure an orderly disposition of cases. PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by simply invoking the negligence of its counsel. This practice, if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods since every party would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any liability. The rule is that “a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique[,]and unless such acts involve gross negligence that the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind the client as if it had been the latter’s acts.”[21][6]

In LBC Express – Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo,[22][7] the Court held that “[g]ross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.” This cannot be invoked in cases where the counsel is merely negligent in submitting his required pleadings within the period that the rules mandate.

It is not disputed that the summons together with a copy of the complaint was personally served upon, and received by PTA through its Corporate Legal Services Department, on October 10, 2003.[23][8] Thus, in failing to submit a responsive pleading within the required time despite sufficient notice, the RTC was correct in declaring PTA in default.

There was no extrinsic fraud

        “Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.”[24][9] Under the doctrine of this cited case, we do not see the acts of PTA’s counsel to be constitutive of extrinsic fraud.

        The records reveal that the judgment of default[25][10] was sent via registered mail to PTA’s counsel. However, PTA never availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default.[26][11] Since the failure of PTA to present its evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in declaring PTA in default.

Annulment of judgment is not

the proper remedy

        PTA’s appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC decision. “Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.”[27][12]

In this case, appeal was an available remedy. There was also no extraordinary reason for a petition for annulment of judgment, nor was there any adequate explanation on why the remedy for new trial or petition for relief could not be used. The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had withdrawn a properly filed appeal and substituted it with another petition, when PTA could have merely raised the same issues through an ordinary appeal.

PTA was acting in a proprietary

character

PTA also erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.[28][13]

Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.

A special civil action for certiorari

under Rule 65 is proper only when

there is no other plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy

        Lastly, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only available in cases when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a substitute for appeal. It will not lie in cases where other remedies are available under the law.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[29][14] the Court had the occasion to state:

The general rule is that a [certiorari] will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. xxx

x        x        x        x

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. [emphases supplied; citations omitted]

In sum, PTA had the remedy of appealing the RTC decision to the CA and, thereafter, to us. Under the circumstances, we find no adequate reason to justify the elevation of this case to the CA and then to us, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

        WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for certiorari. No costs.

        SO ORDERED.

                                ARTURO D. BRION

                                Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                Associate Justice

                                Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                        RENATO C. CORONA

                                         Chief Justice

CASE 2012-0041: STRADCOM CORPORATION VS. HONORABLE HILARIO L. LAQUI AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 97 AND DTECH MANAGEMENT, INC., (G.R. NO. 172712,  MARCH 21, 2012, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECT/S: MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES; EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES  (BRIEF TITLE: STRADCOM VS. JUDGE LAQUI)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

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SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHEN DOES A CASE BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC?

WHEN WHEN, BY VIRTUE OF SUPERVENING EVENTS,^[1][23] THERE IS NO MORE ACTUAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND NO USEFUL PURPOSE CAN BE SERVED IN PASSING UPON THE MERITS.^[2][24]

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WHEN A MOOT CASE IS FILED WITH THE COURT WHAT WILL THE COURT DO?

AS A GENERAL RULE, THE COURT WILL DECLINE JURISDICTION ON GROUND OF MOOTNESS.

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WHY WILL THE COURT DECLINE JURISDICTION ON GROUND OF MOOTNESS?

BECAUSE COURTS ARE CONSTITUTED TO PASS UPON SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AND THUS COURTS WILL NOT CONSIDER QUESTIONS WHERE NO ACTUAL INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED.

        Where a case has become moot and academic, there is no more justiceable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value.^[3][22] A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events,^[4][23] there is no more actual controversy between the parties and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.^[5][24]  Since they are constituted to pass upon substantial rights, courts of justice will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved.^[6][25]  As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness.^[7][26]

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RTC ISSUED A TRO RESTRAINING LTO TO TERMINATE DETECH’S SERVICES. LATER DETECH’S CONTRACT WITH LTO EXPIRED. DESPITE SUCH EXPIRATION, STADCOM STILL PURSUED ITS CASE AGAINST RTC ALLEDGING GRAVE ABUSE OF DECISION WHEN RTC ISSUED THE TRO. CA DENIED THE PETITION OF STADCOM ON GROUND OF MOOTNESS. WAS CA’S DECISION CORRECT?

YES. THE MAIN CASE OF DTECH HAS BEEN MOOTED BY EXPIRATION OF ITS CONTRACT WITH LTO. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS A PROVISIONAL REMEDY, AN ADJUNCT TO THE MAIN CASE SUBJECT TO THE LATTER’S OUTCOME.^[8][31]  IT IS RESORTED TO BY A LITIGANT FOR THE PRESERVATION OR PROTECTION OF HIS RIGHTS OR INTEREST AND FOR NO OTHER PURPOSE DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTION.^[9][32] 

        Our perusal of the record shows that STRADCOM’s petition assailing the CA’s decision which upheld the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC had been rendered moot and academic.  It is beyond dispute, after all, that DTECH commenced its main action for injunction for no other purpose than to restrain the LTO from putting into effect its termination of the 1 July 2002 MOA and, with it, DTECH’s services as sole IT provider of the verification aspect of the COCAS.  In its 6 June 2003 complaint, DTECH specifically sought the following reliefs:

        WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that:

(a)               immediately upon receipt of this complaint, a temporary restraining order be issued restraining [LTO] and all other agencies, parties or persons acting for and in his behalf and under its authority from – terminating and/or otherwise giving effect and implementing the termination of the [MOA] dated July 01, 2002 and the COCAS and/or the services of [DTECH] as IT service provider of the verification aspect of the COC Authentication System; allowing any other IT service provider or party to perform the function of [DTECH] as the sole IT service provider for the verification of Certificates of Cover of motor vehicles for registration and in any way disrupting the function of [DTECH] as such, either directly or indirectly, by terminating the MOA and/or rendering the rights of the parties emanating therefrom to become ineffective, moot and academic;

(b)              after due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued in the same tenor as that of the temporary restraining order herein prayed for; and

(c)               thereafter, making the injunction permanent within the period of effectivity of the [MOA] by and among the LTO, IC, ISAP and [DTECH] dated July 01, 2002.^[10][27] (underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned from the MOA, however, the engagement of DTECH as exclusive IT service provider for the verification aspect of the COCAS was only for a limited period of five years.  In specifying the term of the agreement, Section 2 of the MOA provides that, “(t)he engagement of [DTECH] by ISAP as the sole IT service provider for the verification of COCs shall be five (5) years commencing on July 24, 2002 until July 24, 2007, renewable for the same period of time under such terms and conditions mutually acceptable, subject to the provisions of sections 7^[11][28] and 8^[12][29] hereof.”^[13][30]   Having been prompted by LTO’s supposed wrongful pre-termination of the MOA on 26 May 2003, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that DTECH’s cause of action for injunction had been mooted by the supervening expiration of the term agreed upon by the parties.

Considering that DTECH’s main case has been already mooted, it stands to reason that the issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC had likewise been mooted.  Indeed, a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome.^[14][31]  It is resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interest and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.^[15][32]  Under the above-discussed factual milieu, we find no more reason to determine whether or not the RTC’s grant of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by DTECH amounted to grave abuse of discretion. 

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IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOT AND ACADEMIC PRINCIPLE?

YES. A COURT WILL DECIDE A CASE, OTHERWISE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, IF IT FINDS THAT:  (A) THERE IS A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION; (B) THE SITUATION IS OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER AND PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IS INVOLVED; (C) THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE RAISED REQUIRES FORMULATION OF CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE BENCH, THE BAR, AND THE PUBLIC; AND (D) THE CASE IS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET EVADING REVIEW.^[16][34] 

While courts should abstain from expressing its opinion where no legal relief is needed or called for,^[17][33] we are well aware of the fact that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that should automatically dissuade courts from resolving a case.  Accordingly, it has been held that a court will decide a case, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that:  (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.^[18][34]  None of these exceptions is, however, present in this case.

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SECOND DIVISION

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D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

        Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the Decision dated 8 May 2006^[19][1] rendered by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87233, dismissing for lack of merit the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM) which sought the nullification of the Resolutions dated 3 March 2004 and 16 August 2004 in turn issued in Civil Case No. Q03-49859 by public respondent, the Hon. Hilario Laqui, as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),  Branch 97, Quezon City.^[20][2]

       On 19 June 2003, respondent DTech Management Incorporated (DTECH), filed a complaint for injunction, with prayer for Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the Land Transportation Office (LTO), represented by Assistant Secretary Robert T. Lastimoso.  Docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-49859 before the RTC,^[21][3] the complaint alleged that, in May 2001, DTECH submitted to the LTO a proposal to remedy problems relating to Compulsory Third Party Liability (CTPL) insurance of motor vehicles, specifically the proliferation of fake or duplicate CTPL insurance policies or Certificates of Cover (COC) which resulted in non-payment of claims thereon and loss of government revenues. To determine the viability of the proposal which entailed the computerization of all CTPL insurance transactions, the LTO conducted consultations with the Insurance Commission (IC), the Insurance and Surety Association of the Philippines, Inc. (ISAP) and DTECH.  An acceptable information technology (IT) solution denominated as the COC Authentication System (COCAS) was eventually approved whereby COCs issued by insurance companies would undergo authentication and verification by IT service providers chosen by ISAP.  Through its own selection and bidding process, ISAP hired DTECH to undertake the COC verification process while SQL Wizard, Inc. (SQL) likewise engaged to handle the COC authentication process.^[22][4] 

        DTECH further averred that, on 1 July 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed by the LTO, IC and ISAP which affirmed, among other matters, DTECH’s accreditation and qualification “as an entity that could effectively and efficiently provide the required IT services in the verification end of the COCAS.”  Consistent with the MOU, the LTO, IC, ISAP and DTECH also executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on the same date, specifying the terms and conditions of DTECH’s engagement as “the sole IT service provider for the verification of COC for a term of five (5) years commencing on July 24, 2002 until July 24, 2007.”  Under the MOA, verification was defined as “the act of having an authenticated COC validated through the process of the on-line verification via the internet, SMS and other present day information technology and telecommunications applications.”   For each and every verification, DTECH was allowed to charge a fee of P20.00, exclusive of VAT, payable by the insurance company concerned within thirty (30) days from receipt of the billing therefor.  After purportedly investing millions of pesos and exerting diligent effort to comply with its obligations under the MOA, DTECH maintained that, without any burden on public coffers, its initial operations yielded dramatic improvements and huge benefits to the government and the public.^[23][5]  

        Despite the foregoing factual antecedents, however, DTECH claimed that, on 17 January 2003, LTO wrote ISAP, suggesting the termination of DTECH’s services in view of its supposed failure to interconnect with the LTO IT Motor Vehicle Registration System (LTO IT MVRS) owned and operated by STRADCOM under a Build Operate and Own (BOO) contract with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)/LTO.    LTO further issued a Memorandum Circular directing that all COCs must be registered and verified under the LTO IT MVRS and that only COCs thus authenticated and verified would be thereafter accepted.  The strict implementation of the foregoing directive was required in the 10 March 2003 Memorandum Circular issued by LTO, in blatant disregard of the meetings conducted by the parties to discuss the recall and/or postponement of the implementation thereof.  Although the implementation of the directive was briefly suspended, the LTO went on to issue yet another Memorandum Circular on 28 April 2003, instructing all its officials and employees to accept COCs “that have been verified and authenticated on-line, real time either by [STRADCOM’s] CTPL COC Authentication Facility or ISAP-[SQL]-[DTECH].”  On 26 May 2003, the LTO notified the IC, ISAP and DTECH of its termination of the 1 July 2002 MOA, in view of the latter’s failure to integrate the COCAS with the existing workflow of the LTO and its offices nationwide.^[24][6]

        DTECH maintained that LTO’s termination of its services and cancellation of the COCAS is violative of its contractual rights, the law as well as principles of fairness and due process.  Since it was never a part of the parties’ agreement, DTECH’s alleged failure to interconnect with LTO MVRS is neither a valid ground for the termination of its services nor a reason to give undue advantage to STRADCOM.  Emphasizing its considerable investments in the setting up the IT infrastructure required nationwide for the COCAS as well as its hiring of hundreds of personnel, installation of facilities and entry into service contracts required by the endeavor, DTECH argued that the pre-termination of the five-year term for which it was designated the sole IT provider for the verification of COCs and/or the performance of its functions by another private IT service would not only cause injustice and irreparable damage but would also engender confusion in the insurance industry and to the general public.^[25][7] 

 Over the opposition interposed by the LTO, the RTC issued the 25 June 2003 order granting DTECH’s application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the termination of the implementation of the parties’ 1 July 2002 MOA.^[26][8]  Contending that the complaint was fatally defective and failed to state a cause of action, LTO filed an urgent motion to dismiss dated 8 July 2003, with opposition to DTECH’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction for lack of showing of a right in esse and the resultant irreparable injury from the act complained against.^[27][9]  On 1 August 2003, the RTC issued two (2) resolutions, denying LTO’s motion to dismiss^[28][10] and granting DTECH’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction which was deemed necessary pending the determination of the validity of the MOA’s termination at the trial of the case on the merits.^[29][11]   Upon DTECH’s posting of the bond which was fixed at P1,500,000.00, the RTC went on to issue the corresponding writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction dated 4 August 2003, restraining LTO from implementing the termination of the MOA.^[30][12]

On 6 August 2003, STRADCOM filed a motion for leave to admit its answer-in-intervention, manifesting its legal interest in the matter in litigation and its intent to unite with LTO in resisting the complaint.  In its attached answer-in-intervention, STRADCOM averred that, on 26 March 1998, it executed with the DOTC a BOO Agreement for the implementation of infrastructure facilities in accordance with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6957, as amended by R.A. 7718.  Having been authorized to design, construct and operate the IT system for the DOTC/ LTO, STRADCOM argued that the 1 July 2002 MOU and MOA breached the BOO Agreement which included the verification of COCs granted to DTECH without the requisite public bidding.  With the latter’s failure to comply with its contractual undertakings despite repeated warnings, STRADCOM claimed that LTO validly terminated the MOA on 26 May 2003 and effectively mooted DTECH’s cause of action for injunction.  STRADCOM likewise called attention to the prohibition against the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction against national infrastructure^[31][13] projects like those Covered by R.A. Nos. 6957^[32][14] and 7718.^[33][15]

On 21 August 2003, LTO moved for the reconsideration of the RTC’s 1 August 2003 Resolution.^[34][16]  With the admission of its answer-in-intervention, STRADCOM, in turn, filed its 15 October 2003 motion for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued in the case.^[35][17]  On 3 March 2004, the RTC issued a resolution, denying the motions filed by LTO and STRADCOM upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) the pleadings so far filed required factual issues which can only be determined after trial of the case on the merits; (b) as LTO’s agents insofar as the COCAS is concerned, the IC and ISAP are not indispensable parties to the case; (c) in the absence of government capital investment thereon, the COCAS do not come within the purview of the prohibition against injunctive orders and writs under R.A. 8975; (d) there is no adequate showing that the verification of the COCs is included in the BOO Agreement between DOTC/LTO and STRADCOM which even participated in the bidding ISAP conducted for the COCAS; and, (e) DTECH was able to demonstrate that the damage it would suffer as a consequence of the pre-termination of the MOA went beyond monetary injury.^[36][18]  STRADCOM’s motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was denied for lack of merit in the RTC’s Resolution dated 16 August 2004.^[37][19]

Aggrieved, STRADCOM filed the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition which, docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 87233, was dismissed for lack of merit in the herein assailed Decision dated 8 May 2006.  In affirming the RTC’s Resolutions dated 3 March 2004 and 16 August 2004, the CA’s then Fourteenth Division ruled that the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued a quo was directed against the pre-termination of the 1 July 2002 MOA and not STRADCOM’s BOO Agreement with the LTO.  Finding that the scope of the BOO Agreement had yet to be threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits, the CA discounted the grave abuse of discretion STRADCOM imputed against the RTC which, in issuing the injunctive writ, was found to be exercising a discretionary act outside the ambit of a writ of prohibition.  Absent showing of manifest abuse, the CA desisted from interfering with the RTC’s exercise of its discretion in issuing the injunctive writ as it involved determination of factual issues which is not the function of appellate courts.^[38][20] 

       Unfazed, STRADCOM filed the petition at bench, urging the reversal of the CA’s 8 May 2006 Decision on the following grounds:

A.

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI’S PATENT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE “COCAS” SUBJECT OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT IS NOT A “GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT” WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW PARTICULARLY COVERED BY THE BAN ON COURTS FROM ISSUING TRO/PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CONTEMPLATED BY P.D. 1818 AS AMENDED BY R.A. 8975 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 DATED JUNE 25, 1999, BY NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE BUILD-OWN-AND-OPERATE AGREEMENT EXECUTED BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION (DOTC/LTO) AND PETITIONER STRADCOM CORPORATION COVERED BY R.A. 6957, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 7718.

B.

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI’S OBVIOUS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER STRADCOM IS IN ESTOPPEL FOR HAVING PARTICIPATED IN THE BIDDING CONDUCTED BY ISAP FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHOOSING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) SERVICE PROVIDER FOR THE COCAS WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF THE BOO AGREEMENT.

C.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI’S PATENT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST AN ACCOMPLISHED ACT, AN ACT IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON FAIT ACOMPLI.

D.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI’S GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED WRIT OF INJUNCTION DESPITE CLEAR AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF RESPONDENT DTECH WHO COME TO COURT OF EQUITY WITH UNCLEAN HANDS.^[39][21]

        We find the denial of STRADCOM’s petition in order.

        Where a case has become moot and academic, there is no more justiceable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value.^[40][22] A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events,^[41][23] there is no more actual controversy between the parties and no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.^[42][24]  Since they are constituted to pass upon substantial rights, courts of justice will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved.^[43][25]  As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness.^[44][26]

        Our perusal of the record shows that STRADCOM’s petition assailing the CA’s decision which upheld the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC had been rendered moot and academic.  It is beyond dispute, after all, that DTECH commenced its main action for injunction for no other purpose than to restrain the LTO from putting into effect its termination of the 1 July 2002 MOA and, with it, DTECH’s services as sole IT provider of the verification aspect of the COCAS.  In its 6 June 2003 complaint, DTECH specifically sought the following reliefs:

        WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that:

(d)              immediately upon receipt of this complaint, a temporary restraining order be issued restraining [LTO] and all other agencies, parties or persons acting for and in his behalf and under its authority from – terminating and/or otherwise giving effect and implementing the termination of the [MOA] dated July 01, 2002 and the COCAS and/or the services of [DTECH] as IT service provider of the verification aspect of the COC Authentication System; allowing any other IT service provider or party to perform the function of [DTECH] as the sole IT service provider for the verification of Certificates of Cover of motor vehicles for registration and in any way disrupting the function of [DTECH] as such, either directly or indirectly, by terminating the MOA and/or rendering the rights of the parties emanating therefrom to become ineffective, moot and academic;

(e)               after due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued in the same tenor as that of the temporary restraining order herein prayed for; and

(f)                 thereafter, making the injunction permanent within the period of effectivity of the [MOA] by and among the LTO, IC, ISAP and [DTECH] dated July 01, 2002.^[45][27] (underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned from the MOA, however, the engagement of DTECH as exclusive IT service provider for the verification aspect of the COCAS was only for a limited period of five years.  In specifying the term of the agreement, Section 2 of the MOA provides that, “(t)he engagement of [DTECH] by ISAP as the sole IT service provider for the verification of COCs shall be five (5) years commencing on July 24, 2002 until July 24, 2007, renewable for the same period of time under such terms and conditions mutually acceptable, subject to the provisions of sections 7^[46][28] and 8^[47][29] hereof.”^[48][30]   Having been prompted by LTO’s supposed wrongful pre-termination of the MOA on 26 May 2003, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that DTECH’s cause of action for injunction had been mooted by the supervening expiration of the term agreed upon by the parties.

Considering that DTECH’s main case has been already mooted, it stands to reason that the issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC had likewise been mooted.  Indeed, a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome.^[49][31]  It is resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interest and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.^[50][32]  Under the above-discussed factual milieu, we find no more reason to determine whether or not the RTC’s grant of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by DTECH amounted to grave abuse of discretion. 

While courts should abstain from expressing its opinion where no legal relief is needed or called for,^[51][33] we are well aware of the fact that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that should automatically dissuade courts from resolving a case.  Accordingly, it has been held that a court will decide a case, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that:  (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.^[52][34]  None of these exceptions is, however, present in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for having been rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION                         MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO     
     Associate Justice                                  Associate Justice

  BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                  ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                                                 Associate Justice

                                               Chairperson, Second Division 

CERTIFICATION

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                                 RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                     Chief Justice

CASE 2012-0040: JANDY J. AGOY VS. ARANETA CENTER, INC. (G.R. NO. 196358, MARCH 21, 2012, ABAD, J.) SUBJECT/S: LEGALITY  OF SC MINUTE RESOLUTIONS (BRIEF TITLE: AGOY VS. ARANETA CENTER)

=====================

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES petitioner Jandy J. Agoy’s motion to rescind dated December 21, 2011 and the Motion for Clarification and to Resolve Pending Incidents dated January 31, 2012 for lack of merit. 

The Court shall not entertain further pleadings or motions in this case.  Let entry of judgment be issued. 

SO ORDERED. 

=====================

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST

AGOY FILED A PETITION FOR REVIEW. THE SC DENIED IT BY A MINUTE RESOLUTION. IS AN SC MINUTE RESOLUTION VALID?

YES. IT IS AN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND CONSTITUTES SOUND AND VALID JUDICIAL PRACTICE.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF MINUTE RESOLUTIONS?

FOR PROMPT DISPATCH OF THE ACTIONS OF THE COURT.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS ITS BASIS?

SECTION 7 OF THE SC INTERNAL RULES.

Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court.  While they are the results of the deliberations by the Justices of the Court, they are promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants whose duty is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by quoting verbatim the resolutions adopted by the Court.^[1][1]  Neither the Clerk of Court nor his assistants take part in the deliberations of the case.  They merely transmit the Court’s action in the form prescribed by its Internal Rules:

Sec. 7.  Form of notice of a minute resolution.—A notice of minute resolution shall be embodied in a letter of the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court notifying the parties of the action or actions taken in their case.  In the absence of or whenever so deputized by the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court, the Assistant Clerk of Court or Assistant Division Clerk of Court may likewise sign the letter which shall be in the following form: 

(SUPREME COURT Seal)

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC/____ DIVISION

NOTICE

          Sirs/Mesdames:

          Please take notice that the Court en banc/___ Division issued a Resolution dated _____, which reads as follows:

          “G.R./UDK/A.M./A.C. No. ____ (TITLE).—(QUOTE RESOLUTION)”

                                                Very truly yours,

                                                         (Sgd.)

                             CLERK OF COURT/Division Clerk of Court

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IS IT NECESSARY THAT THE JUSTICES SIGN MINUTE RESOLUTIONS?

NO. THERE IS NO LAW OR RULE REQUIRING THEM TO SIGN MINUTE RESOLUTIONS. TO REQUIRE THE JUSTICES TO SIGN ALL ITS RESOLUTIONS RESPECTING ITS ACTION ON NEW CASES WOULD BE UNREASONABLE AND UNNECESSARY.

As the Court explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals,^[2][2] no law or rule requires its members to sign minute resolutions that deny due course to actions filed before it or the Chief Justice to enter his certification on the same.  The notices quote the Court’s actual resolutions denying due course to the subject actions and these already state the required legal basis for such denial.  To require the Justices to sign all its resolutions respecting its action on new cases would be unreasonable and unnecessary. 

Based on last year’s figures, the Court docketed a total of 5,864 new cases, judicial and administrative.  The United States Supreme Court probably receives lesser new cases since it does not have administrative supervision of all courts.  Yet, it gives due course to and decides only about 100 cases per year.  Agoy’s demand that this Court give due course to and decide all cases filed with it on the merits, including his case, is simply unthinkable and shows a lack of discernment of reality. 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

AGOY ARGUES THAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES EVERY COURT TO STATE IN ITS DECISION CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACT AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED AND THEREFORE MINUTE RESOLUTION WHICH DOES NOT DISCUSS THE LAW AND THE FACTS IS ILLEGAL. IS HIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?

NO. THE CONSTITUTION ALSO STATES THAT DENIAL OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW MAY ONLY STATE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR SUCH DENIAL. THE SC MINUTE RESOLUTION STATES THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ITS DENIAL.

Two.  While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial.

Sec. 14.  No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.  No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.^[3][3]  (Emphasis supplied)

        With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined the instances when cases are to be adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution.^[4][4]  Among those instances when a minute resolution shall issue is when the Court “denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below.”^[5][5]  The minute resolutions in this case complied with this requirement. 

XXXXXXXXXXX

WHEN SC STATES IT DOES NOT FIND ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE DECISION OF THE CA, SHOULD THE SC STILL FULLY EXPLAIN ITS DENIAL?

NO NEED BECAUSE IT WOULD BE REDUNDANT. ITS DENIAL MEANS THAT SC ADOPTS THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE CA.

The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits.^[6][6]  They are the result of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court.^[7][7]  When the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.  The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.^[8][8]  It would be an exercise in redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the minute resolution denying the petition the conclusions that the CA reached. 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

AGOY SAID HIS MOTION WAS TO RESCIND THE MINUTE RESOLUTION. SC WAS WRONG WHEN IT CONSIDERED HIS MOTION AS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

SC WAS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE AGOY IN HIS MOTION TO RESCIND WAS ASKING SC TO REVIEW THE MERITS OF HIS CASE AGAIN.

Agoy questions the Court’s act of treating his motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration, arguing that it had no basis for doing so.  But the Court was justified in its action since his motion to rescind asked the Court to review the merits of his case again. 

======================

THIRD DIVISION

JANDY J. AGOY,                             G.R. No. 196358

                Petitioner,

                                                        Present:

                                                  VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

        – versus –                                   PERALTA,

  ABAD,

  MENDOZA, and

  PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

ARANETA CENTER, INC.,

                Respondents.                   Promulgated:

                                   March 21, 2012

x ————————————————————————————— x

RESOLUTION

ABAD, J.:

        This case reiterates the Court’s ruling that the adjudication of a case by minute resolution is an exercise of judicial discretion and constitutes sound and valid judicial practice. 

The Facts and the Case

On June 15, 2011 the Court denied petitioner Jandy J. Agoy’s petition for review through a minute resolution that reads:

          “G.R. No. 196358 (Jandy J. Agoy vs. Araneta Center, Inc.).- The Court resolves to GRANT petitioner’s motion for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.

          The court further resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated 19 October 2010 and Resolution dated 29 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, in CA-G.R. SP No. 108234 for failure to show that the CA committed reversible error when it affirmed the dismissal of petitioner Jandy J. Agoy. Petitioner’s repeated delays in remitting the excess cash advances and admission that he spent them for other purposes constitute serious misconduct and dishonesty which rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by respondent Araneta Center, Inc.”

Apparently, however, Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of the above minute resolution that he received through counsel since he promptly filed a motion to rescind the same and to have his case resolved on its merits via a regular resolution or decision signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation.  In a related development, someone claiming to be Agoy’s attorney-in-fact requested an investigation of the issuance of the resolution of June 15, 2011. 

On September 21, 2011 the Court denied Agoy’s motion to rescind the subject minute resolution and confirmed the authenticity of the copy of the June 15, 2011 resolution.  It also treated his motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration and denied the same with finality. 

Upon receipt of the Court’s September 21, 2011 resolution, Agoy filed a motion to rescind the same or have his case resolved by the Court En Banc pursuant to Section 13 in relation to Sec. 4(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.  Agoy reiterated his view that the Court cannot decide his petition by a minute resolution.  He thus prayed that it rescind its June 15 and September 21, 2011 resolutions, determine whether it was proper for the Court to resolve his petition through a minute resolution, and submit the case to the Court en banc for proper disposition through a signed resolution or decision.

Questions Presented

At the heart of petitioner’s motions are the following questions:     

1.     Whether or not the copies of the minute resolutions dated June 15, 2011 and September 21, 2011 that Agoy received are authentic; and

2.     Whether or not it was proper for the Court to deny his petition through a minute resolution.

The Court’s Rulings

One.  The notices of the minute resolutions of June 15 and September 21, 2011 sent to Agoy, bearing the signatures of Assistant Clerk of Court Teresita Aquino Tuazon and Deputy Division Clerk of Court Wilfredo V. Lapitan, both printed on pink paper and duly received by counsel for petitioner as evidenced by the registry return cards, are authentic and original copies of the resolutions.  The Court has given Tuazon and Lapitan the authority to inform the parties under their respective signatures of the Court’s actions on the incidents in the cases. 

Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court.  While they are the results of the deliberations by the Justices of the Court, they are promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants whose duty is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by quoting verbatim the resolutions adopted by the Court.^[9][1]  Neither the Clerk of Court nor his assistants take part in the deliberations of the case.  They merely transmit the Court’s action in the form prescribed by its Internal Rules:

Sec. 7.  Form of notice of a minute resolution.—A notice of minute resolution shall be embodied in a letter of the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court notifying the parties of the action or actions taken in their case.  In the absence of or whenever so deputized by the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court, the Assistant Clerk of Court or Assistant Division Clerk of Court may likewise sign the letter which shall be in the following form: 

(SUPREME COURT Seal)

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC/____ DIVISION

NOTICE

          Sirs/Mesdames:

          Please take notice that the Court en banc/___ Division issued a Resolution dated _____, which reads as follows:

          “G.R./UDK/A.M./A.C. No. ____ (TITLE).—(QUOTE RESOLUTION)”

                                                Very truly yours,

                                                         (Sgd.)

                             CLERK OF COURT/Division Clerk of Court

As the Court explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals,^[10][2] no law or rule requires its members to sign minute resolutions that deny due course to actions filed before it or the Chief Justice to enter his certification on the same.  The notices quote the Court’s actual resolutions denying due course to the subject actions and these already state the required legal basis for such denial.  To require the Justices to sign all its resolutions respecting its action on new cases would be unreasonable and unnecessary. 

Based on last year’s figures, the Court docketed a total of 5,864 new cases, judicial and administrative.  The United States Supreme Court probably receives lesser new cases since it does not have administrative supervision of all courts.  Yet, it gives due course to and decides only about 100 cases per year.  Agoy’s demand that this Court give due course to and decide all cases filed with it on the merits, including his case, is simply unthinkable and shows a lack of discernment of reality. 

Two.  While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial.

Sec. 14.  No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.  No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.^[11][3]  (Emphasis supplied)

        With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined the instances when cases are to be adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution.^[12][4]  Among those instances when a minute resolution shall issue is when the Court “denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below.”^[13][5]  The minute resolutions in this case complied with this requirement. 

The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits.^[14][6]  They are the result of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court.^[15][7]  When the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.  The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.^[16][8]  It would be an exercise in redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the minute resolution denying the petition the conclusions that the CA reached. 

Agoy questions the Court’s act of treating his motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration, arguing that it had no basis for doing so.  But the Court was justified in its action since his motion to rescind asked the Court to review the merits of his case again. 

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES petitioner Jandy J. Agoy’s motion to rescind dated December 21, 2011 and the Motion for Clarification and to Resolve Pending Incidents dated January 31, 2012 for lack of merit. 

The Court shall not entertain further pleadings or motions in this case.  Let entry of judgment be issued. 

SO ORDERED. 

ROBERTO A. ABAD

                                                    Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

      DIOSDADO M. PERALTA          JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

              Associate Justice                                 Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

        I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                              PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                                     Associate Justice

                                    Chairperson, Third Division               

CERTIFICATION

        Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                    Chief Justice