J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2010-0001: MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES VS.  RAMON REYES (G.R. NO. 185286, 18 AUG 2010, NACHURA J.) SUBJECT/S: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE (BRIEF TITLE: REYES VS. REYES)

DISPOSITIVE:

        “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

CONCLUSION ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MAY BE REACHED WITHOUT INTERVIEWING THE PARTY WHO IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED.

CA REJECTED THE TESTIMONIES OF DOCTORS MAGNO AND VILLEGAS FOR BEING HEARSAY SINCE THEY NEVER PERSONALLY EXAMINED AND INTERVIEWED THE RESPONDENT. WAS CA CORRECT?

THE TOTALITY OF THE BEHAVIOUR OF RESPONDENT WAS PERSONALLY EXPERIENCED BY PETITIONER. SHE HAD OCCASION TO INTERACT WITH, AND EXPERIENCE, RESPONDENT’S PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR WHICH SHE COULD THEN VALIDLY RELAY TO THE CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS AND THE PSYCHIATRIST. SECONDLY THE FINDINGS OF THE DOCTORS WERE NOT BASED SOLELY ON THE INTERVIEW WITH PETITIONER BUT ALSO ON THE INTERVIEW WITH OTHER INFORMANTS.

 “The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents behaviour and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.”

WHAT ARE THE GENERAL DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIAL FOR PERSONALITY DISORDERS? 

“The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[1][18] citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),[2][19] instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

1. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

        (4) impulse control

1. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.
2. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.
3. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
4. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.
5. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:

1. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest

(2)    deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure

(3)    impulsivity or failure to plan ahead

(4)    irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults

(5)    reckless disregard for safety of self or others

(6)    consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations

(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another

1. The individual is at least 18 years.

1. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.

1. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode.[3][20]”

CAN DENIAL BY RESPONDENT THAT HE IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED CONTRAVENE DOCTOR’S FINDINGS?

1. A PERSON AFFLCITED WITH A PERSONALITY DISORDER WILL NOT NECESSARILY HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THEREOF.

“Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.”

THE CA SAYS THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS NOT INCURABLE BECAUSE THE DOCTOR RECOMMENDED THERAPY. IS CA CORRECT?

NO.

THERAPY IS USUALLY RECOMMENDED ONLY TO MANAGE BEHAVIOUR.

“The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.

The appellate court is mistaken.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,[4][21] treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.”

IN THIS CASE WHAT WERE THE MANIFESTATIONS ON RESPONDENT’S PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR WHICH BECAME BASIS FOR THE FINDING ON HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY?

 “In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.”

…………………………………….

        In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.”

WHAT IS THE GENERAL RULE ON DIAGNOSES MADE BY CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS OR PSYCHIATRISTS?

THESE FINDINGS ARE NOT AUTOMATICALLY BELIEVED BY THE COURT.

“It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.

On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed psychological incapacity of a party.[5][24] In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[6][25] we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,[7][26] the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals[8][27] must be independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus:

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between the “psychodynamics of the case” and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas’ sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas’ testimony did not illuminate on the parties’ alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x.

Curiously, Dr. Villegas’ global conclusion of both parties’ personality disorders was not supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests’ use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people’s intelligence, thinking, or personality.

x x x x

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.”

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SC-2010-0001-AUGUST-2010-REYES

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[1][18]     G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010.

[2][19]     Quick Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria from DSM IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000.

[3][20]     See Kaplan and Saddock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry and Psychology Behavioral Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry (8^th ed.), p. 785.

[4][21]     See Kaplan and Saddock’s Synopsis of Psychiatry and Psychology Behavioral Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry (8^th ed.), 1998.

[5][24]     Padilla-Rumabaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157; Paz v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010.

[6][25]     Supra note 18.

[7][26]     Supra.

[8][27]     Supra note 11.

CASE 2016-0002: BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, GR. No. 222731 INC., and RICHARD J. GORDON, as Chairman of BAGUMBAYAN-VNP Present: MOVEMENT, INC., Petitioners, versus-  COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (G.R. NO. 222731, 08 MARCH 2016, LEONEN J.) BRIEF TITLE: GORDON ET AL VS. COMELEC)

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. The Commission on Elections is ORDERED to enable the vote verification feature of the vote-counting machines, which prints the voter’s choices without prejudice to the issuance of guidelines to regulate the release and disposal of the issued receipts in order to ensure a clean, honest, and orderly elections such as, but not limited to, ensuring that after voter verification, receipts should be deposited in a separate ballot box and not taken out of the precinct.

SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINES:

 COMELEC HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO ENFORCE THE LAW

It is true that the Commission on Elections is given ample discretion to administer the elections, but certainly, its constitutional duty is to “enforce the law.” The Commission is not given the constitutional competence to amend or modify the law it is sworn to uphold. Section 6( e ), (t), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is law. Should there be policy objections to it, the remedy is to have Congress amend it.

COMELECT CANNOT OPT TO BREACH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW

The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the requirements of the law to assuage its fears regarding the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper procedures. The Commission on Elections has the power to choose the appropriate procedure in order to enforce the VVPAT requirement under the law, and balance it with the constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. 73

REASON FOR VOTER’S RECEIPT

We see no reason why voters should be denied the opportunity to read the voter’s receipt after casting his or her ballot. There is no legal prohibition for the Commission on Elections to require that after the voter reads and verifies the receipt, he or she is to leave it in a separate box, not take it out of the precinct. Definitely, the availability of all the voters’ receipts will make random manual audits more accurate.

The credibility of the results of any election depends, to a large extent, on the confidence of each voter that his or her individual choices have actually been counted. It is in that local precinct after the voter casts his or her ballot that this confidence starts. It is there where it will be possible for the voter to believe that his or her participation as sovereign truly counts.

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 SCD-2016-0002-GORDON

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CASE 2016-0001: MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- LLAMANZARES, Petitioner,  -versus COMMISSION. ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents, (G.R. NO. 221697); MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POELLAMANZARES, Petitioner, -versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ,  G.R. Nos. 221698-700 (08 MARCH 2016, PEREZ, J.) (BRIEF TITLE: POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC ET AL)

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. . . . .

SO ORDERED. “

DOCTRINES:

ON CITIZENSHIP:

”It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a naturalborn Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it “should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.” This Court also said that “while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should be respected.”148

…………………….

ON RESIDENCY:

“In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner’s “sworn declaration in her COC for Senator” which the COMELEC said “amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006”; such that “based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President.” This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six ( 6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. . . ”

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SCD-2016-0001-POE

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