J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2017-0009: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CARLITO CLARO Y MAHINAY (G.R. NO. 199894, 05 APRIL 2017, BERSAMIN, J.) (ACQUITAL IN RAPE CASE; MEANING OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; MEANING OF REASONABLE DOUBT? HISTORY OF CONCEPT THAT GUILT MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; DUTY OF THE PROSECUTION) (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS CLARO)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 24, 2011 affirming the conviction for rape of CARLITO CLARO y MAHIN A Y under the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, in Manila; ACQUITS CARLITO CLARO y MARINA Y for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; ORDERS his immediate release from the National Penitentiary unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continuing confinement thereat; and DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement the release of CARLITO CLARO y MAHIN A Y in accordance with this decision, and to report on his compliance within l 0 days from receipt.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

THE MEDICO-LEGAL EXAMINATION SHOWS THAT THERE WERE ABRASIONS IN THE VICTIM’S LEFT BREAST AND CONTUSIONS ON HER RIGHT HAND. IS THIS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED?

NO. THE MERE PRESENCE OF ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS ON HER DID NOT PRECLUDE THE GIVING OF HER CONSENT TO THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, FOR ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS COULD ALSO BE SUFFERED DURING VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION OF THE PARTNERS TO EACH OTHER’S LUST.

 “That the medico-legal examination of March 14, 2006 turned up with the findings of abrasions on AAA’s left breast and contusions on her right hand did not necessarily mean that the accused had applied force in the context of forcing her to have sex with him. The conclusion of the CA was, therefore, too sweeping, for it inexplicably ignored the probability of consensuality between the parties. Such findings did not justify the full rejection of the demonstrable consensuality of their sexual intercourse. Moreover, the mere presence of abrasions and contusions on her did not preclude the giving of her consent to the sexual intercourse, for abrasions and contusions could also be suffered during voluntary submission of the partners to each other’s lust. Such possibility calls for us to open our minds to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse resulted from consensuality between them.”

WHAT IS MEANT BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

IT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A DEGREE OF PROOF AS, EXCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF ERROR, PRODUCES ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY. ONLY MORAL CERTAINTY IS REQUIRED, OR THAT DEGREE OF PROOF WHICH PRODUCES CONVICTION IN AN UNPREJUDICED MIND.

WHAT IS REASONABLE DOUBT?

IT IS IS NOT MERE POSSIBLE DOUBT; BECAUSE EVERYTHING RELATING TO HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND DEPENDING ON MORAL EVIDENCE, IS OPEN TO SOME POSSIBLE OR IMAGINARY DOUBT. IT IS THAT STATE OF THE CASE WHICH, AFTER THE ENTIRE COMPARISON AND CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE EVIDENCE, LEAVES THE MINDS OF JURORS IN SUCH A CONDITION THAT THEY CANNOT SAY THEY FEEL AN ABIDING CONVICTION, TO A MORAL CERTAINTY, OF THE TRUTH OF THE CHARGE.

WHY IS IT THAT ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IS NOT REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

BECAUSE IT WOULD EXCLUDE CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE.

“The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.”

WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT  THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

IT HAS A LONG HISTORY THAT EVEN PRE-DATES OUR CONSTITUTIONS. IT WAS  RECURRENTLY EXPRESSED FROM ANCIENT TIMES, (THOUGH) ITS CRYSTALLIZATION INTO THE FORMULA ‘BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT’ SEEMS TO HAVE OCCURRED AS LATE AS 1798.

‘The requirement of establishing the guilt of the accused in every criminal proceeding beyond reasonable doubt has a long history that even pre-dates our Constitutions. As summed up by jurisprudence of American origin:

The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The ‘demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, (though) its crystallization into the formula ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.”

WHY IS IT THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS VITAL IN OUR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?

BECAUSE DURING A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION THE ACCUSED MAY LOSE HIS LIBERTY UPON CONVICTION AND HE WOULD BE STIGMATIZED BY THE CONVICTION. IT IS ALSO INDISPENSABLE TO COMMAND THE RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE OF THE COMMUNITY IN APPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW.

“The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. . . . . ”

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”

WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE PROSECUTION?

TO PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. HE MUST PROVE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ACCUSED. THE PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS OWN EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED.

“Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.”

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SCD-2017-0009-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CARLITO CLARO Y MAHINAY

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CASE 2017-0018: ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS VS. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. (SODACO), ET AL. (G.R. NO. 198209, 22 MARCH, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (QUESTION OF LAW VS QUESTION OF FACT; MODES OF  APPEAL RE RTC DECISION; HEIRARCHY OF COURTS) (BRIEF TITLE: ALMENDRAS VS SODACO)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.

The Resolution dated August 27, 2014 directing petitioner to file a
Consolidated Reply is RECALLED and SET ASIDE.

The Motion for Leave to Enter Appearance as Collaborating Counsel with
Manifestation filed by Atty. Edgar Y. T01res, Jr. which did not bear the
conformity of petitioner is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 AND PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65?

PETITION FOR REVIEW IS LIMITED TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND ERRORS OF JUDGMENT. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CONCERNS ERRORS OF JURISDICTION INCLUDING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

IN THIS CASE PETITIONER RAISED THE ISSUE ON WHETHER A COPY OF A MOTION WAS DULY SERVED TO HIM. THIS IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHICH CANNOT BE RAISED IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED WITH THE SUPREME COURT UNDER RULE 45.

HOW TO DETERMINE QUESTION OF LAW FROM QUESTION OF FACT?

A QUESTION OF LAW ARISES WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE LAW IS ON A CERTAIN STATE OF FACTS. A QUESTION OF FACT ARISES WHEN DOUBT ARISES AS TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF THE ALLEGED FACTS.

THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER AN ISSUE INVOLVES A QUESTION OF LAW OR QUESTION OF FACT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN REPUBLIC V. MALABANAN 18 WHERE THIS COURT EXPLAINED:

A QUESTION OF LAW ARISES WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE LAW IS ON A CERTAIN STATE OF FACT; WHILE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHEN THE DOUBT ARISES AS TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF THE ALLEGED FACTS.

FOR A QUESTION TO BE ONE OF LAW, THE SAME MUST NOT INVOLVE AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE LITIGANT OR ANY OF THEM. THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE MUST REST SOLELY ON WHAT THE LAW PROVIDES ON THE GIVEN SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT MODES OF APPEALING AN RTC DECISION?

THEY ARE:

A) ORDINARY APPEAL OR APPEAL BY WRIT OF ERROR, WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED IN A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION BY THE RTC IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION;

B) PETITION FOR REVIEW, WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED BY THE RTC IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION;

AND  C) PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE SUPREME COURT.

THE FIRST MODE OF APPEAL IS GOVERNED BY RULE 41, AND IS TAKEN TO THE CA ON QUESTIONS OF FACT OR MIXED  QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

THE SECOND MODE, COVERED BY RULE 42, IS BROUGHT TO THE CA ON QUESTIONS OF FACT, OF LAW, OR MIXED QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

THE THIRD MODE, PROVIDED FOR BY RULE 45, IS ELEVATED TO THIS COURT ONLY ON QUESTIONS OFLAW.

SUPPOSE A WRONG MODE OF APPEAL IS RESORTED TO, WHAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE?

THE APPEAL WILL BE DISMISSED.

Section 4 of Circular 2-90 in effect provides that an appeal taken either to this Court or to the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE RULE ON HEIRARCHY OF COURTS?

DIRECT RESORT FROM LOWER COURT TO THE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT BE ENTERTAINED UNLESS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY CANNOT BE OBTAINED IN THE LOWER TRIBUNALS.

Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court departs from the hierarchy of courts. Normally,  direct resort from the lower courts to this Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2017-0008-ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS VS. SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. (SODACO), ET AL.

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CASE 2017-0007: JONATHAN Y. DEE, VERSUS HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., (G.R. NO. 224834);  HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., VERSUS ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS,  (G.R. NO. 224871  15 MARCH 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM’L. CASE NO. 15-234 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOC. TRINES/DIGEST:

THERE IS A GENERAL RULE THAT STATUTES ARE PROSPECTIVE AND AND NOT RETROACTIVE. IS THIS RULE APPLICABLE TO PROCEDURAL LAWS?

NOT APPLICABLE. A RETROACTIVE LAW TAKES AWAY OR IMPAIRED VESTED RIGHTS UNDER EXISTING  LAWS. PROCEDURAL LAW DOES NOT CREATE  CREATE OR TAKE AWAY VESTED RIGHTS. IT OPERATES IN FURTHERANCE OF REMEDY OR CONFIRMATION OF RIGHTS ALREADY EXISTING. NO VESTED RIGHT MAY ATTACH TO NOR RISE FROM PROCEDURAL LAWS.

“The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that “a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.” The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are pending.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” 40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.’ s action as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016. The matter is therefore remanded to the R TC in order:

(a) to first determine if Harvest, et al.’ s payment of filing fees in the amount of P8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;

(b) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.’ s payment of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or

(c) if Harvest All, et al.’s payment of ?8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.”

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 SCD-2017-0007-JONATHAN Y. DEE VS. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL.HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, ET AL. VS. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

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