J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

DISPOSITIVE:

“ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2019 and Resolution dated March 3, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 154289 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Dohle Seafront Crewing Manila, Inc., and Dohle (IOM) Limited are held jointly and severally liable to petitioner Jolly R. Carandan for the following amounts:

1. US$60,000.00 or its Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of payment as total and permanent disability rating in accordance with the 20 IO Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract;

2. Ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorney’s fees; and

3. Six percent (6%) interest per annum of the total monetary award from the :finality of this Decision until fully paid.53

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE?

PETITIONER WAS CLAIMING FOR TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS DUE TO CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE. RESPONDENT ARGUED THAT UNDER THEIR CBA HE CAN ONLY CLAIM TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISAPLITY BENEFITS IF THE CAUSE IS AN ACCIDENT AND THERE WAS NO ACCIDENT. SUPREME COURT SAID PETITIONER CAN CLAIM NOT UNDER CBA BUT UNDER THE POEA-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT (POEA-SEC).

As in Illescas, petitioner’s cardiovascular disease cannot be said to have been an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Heart ailment may be expected from someone who is often exposed in hard manual labor like petitioner.

In any event, although the provisions of the CBA are not applicable here, petitioner is still entitled to total and permanent disability benefits under the 2010 POEA-SEC. In Julleza v. Orient Line Philippines, Inc. , 52 the Court held that Julleza’s lumbar spondylosis did not result from an accident, he cannot claim total and permanent disability benefits under the CBA provisions, but under the POEA-SEC. As discussed, cardiovascular disease is specifically listed as a compensable disease under Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC. Hence, petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under the 2010 POEA-SEC.

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DISPOSITIVE:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders dated August 13, 2019, October 1, 2019 and October 7, 2019 of the Regional Trial Court – Branch 58, Makati City in People v. Emerito P. Manalo, et al. (Criminal Case Nos. 19-00774, 19-00775, 19-00778, 19- 00780, 19-00781, 19-00782, 19-00784, 19-00787, 19-00789, 19-00796, 19- 00797, 19-00798, 19-00799, 19-00801, 19-00803, 19-00804, 19-00806, 19- 00807, and 19-00810.), People v. Vicente J. Campa, Jr. et al., (Criminal Case Nos. 19-00773, 19-00777, 19-00783, 19-00786, 19-00793, I 9-00801, 19- 00802, 19–00805, 19-00807, 19-00808, and 19-00809), and People v. Perfecto M. Pascua, et al. (Criminal Case Nos. 19-00790, 19-00794, and 19- 00808.) are NULLIFIED. The charges against VICENTE J. CAMPA, JR. and PERFECTO M. PASCUA are DISMISSED on ground of inordinate delay.

SO ORDERED.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

In Magante v. Sandiganbayan,46 the CoUii noted that prejudice from delay is most serious when a defendant is rendered unable to adequately prepare his case, as here. There is also prejudice when defense witnesses could no longer accurately recall events in the distant past.

In fine, the Court agrees with petitioners that the DOJ was guilty of inordinate delay in issuing its Resolution dated February 8, 2019 only about ten (10) years and five (5) months from the filing of the complaint.

.. . . . .

 Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

Here, petitioners sufficiently established that the trial court acted in grave abuse of discretion in denying their motions to dismiss and/or quash. Indeed, procedural rules are clear on the periods for resolving cases and jurisprudence is rich with analogous situations on which the trial court could have based its rulings. As it was, however, the trial court denied petitioners’ motions without properly determining whether there·was inordinate delay in accordance with Cagang. Had the trial court applied the balancing test and guidelines in Cagang, it would have discovered for itself that inordinate delay had indeed attended the DOJ investigation and that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of their cases had been violated by reason thereof. Thus, a reversal of the assailed rulings is in order.

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DISPOSITIVE:

“ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 24, 2019 and Resolution dated August 9, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 158565 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 1, 2017 and Resolution dated November 19, 2018 of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board – Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators in MVA-090-RCMB-NCR-081-13-03-2017 are REINSTATED.

Respondents United Philippine Lines, Inc. and/or Shell International Trading and Shipping Co. are ORDERED to jointly and severally pay petitioner Kennedy R. Quines the following amounts:

1) total and permanent disability benefits of US$98,848.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, in accordance with the IBFAMOSUP/IMEC TCCC Collective Bargaining Agreement for 2015-2017, less whatever amount that had already been paid to petitioner by way of financial assistance;

2) ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorney’s fees; and

3) six percent ( 6%) legal interest per annum of the total monetary amount from finality of this Decision until full payment.

So Ordered.“

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

“Surely, the fact that petitioner is taking five (5) maintenance medications for his hypertension alone, already permanently incapacitates him from securing gainful employment as a seafarer. Too, there is no showing that he had been re-employed by respondents or engaged as a seaman by any other company ever since he got repatriated in 2016. Verily, his continuous unemployment until this very day indicates his total and permanent disability.

Further, without a valid final and definitive assessments from the company-designated doctors within the 120/240-day period, as in this case, the law already steps in to consider a seafarer’s disability as total and permanent. By operation of law, therefore, petitioner is already deemed to be totally and permanently disabled.”

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