J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 14, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 97317 is AFFIRlVIED. The Decision dated May 17, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42 of San Fernando, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 11757 which affirmed with modification the December 15, 1998 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 3 of San Fernando, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 7463, a case for unlawful detainer, entitled Abelardo C. Miranda, et al. v. Eddie Pineda, et al., is hereby REVIVED.

So Ordered.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE?

THIS IS A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER FILED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AT MTC WHICH RULED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS. APPEALED TO RTC WHICH AFFIRMED MTC DECISION. PETITIONERS DID NOT APPEAL THE RTC DECISION. 7 YEARS PASSED. RESPONDENTS FILED AT RTC FOR COMPLAINT TO REVIVE JUDMENT. PETITIONERS FILED SEVERAL MOTIONS AND APPEALS. SUPREME COURT SAID PETITIONERS’ REMEDY WAS APPEAL WHEN RTC PROMULGATED ITS DECISION. THEIR SUBSEQUENT MOTIONS AND APPEALS ARE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS.

In this case, the RTC Branch 42 Decision dated May 17, 1999 became final and executory when no further kgal a,~tion was undertaken by herein petitioners concerning the RTC Branch 42 Decision. Thus, on January 6, 2000 or less than a year after the RTC Branch 42 Decision became final, respondents filed a 1\.1otion for the l,ssuance of a \Vrit of Execution. The Motion was granted on February 14, 2000. However, seven years later, the RTC Branch 42 Decision h~1d not yet been executed. Thus, on .May 9, 2006, the respondents filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment in accordance with the above legal provisions. On the premise that the RTC Branch 42 Decision was already final and executory, respondents filed a revival suit as a procedural means of securing the execution of the RTC Branch 42 Decision which had become dormant after the passage of several years. The revival suit filed by respondents did not intend to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.38, the ordinary remedy of appeal was still readily available as a proper

As for petitioners legal re.rnedy ath~r tlw RTC Bqmch 42 promulgated its Decision on May 17, 1999. l-lov;cver, instead of filing an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed the following motion and petitions throughout the course of the proceedings: (1) Motion to Quash Writ of Execution; (2) Petition for Annulment of Judgment; and (3) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition.

FirstfJJ, the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution was filed on the ground that the Writ of Execution cannot be enforced anymore because more than five years had elapsed since its issuance. 39 However, the Court notes that respondents’ Complaint for Revival of h1dgment was filed on May 9, 2006, two months before petitioners filed their ~1otion to Quash the Writ of Execution on July 20, 2006. Neither did petitioners show that there had been a change in the situation of the parties whtch makes tbe execution inequitable; or that the writ of execution was improperly issued, defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party; or that the judgment debt had been paid or otherwise satisfied; or that the writ was issued without a,.uthority:10 Petitioners’ Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution was therefore groundless.

Secondly, petitioners’ Petition for Annulment of Judgment of both the MTC and R TC Decisions was correctly dismissed by the CA not only because it did not have jurisdiction over the Petition but also because it was not the proper legal remedy.

Rule 47, Sections 1 and 241 of the Rules of Court are clear. The remedy of annulment of judgment can only be availed of when the ordinary remedy of appeal, among others, is no longer available through no fault of the petitioners. Furthermore, the annulment may be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of j urisdiction which were clearly not present in this case.

Lastly, petitioners’ Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed with the CA was to compel the RTC to give due course to petitioners’ Notice of Appeal filed after the RTC granted respondents’ Complaint for Revival of Judgment. A Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition is only available when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.42 Again, the Court reiterates that the ordinary remedy of appeal was easily available to petitioners when the RTC Branch 42 promulgated its l\1ay 1 7, 1999 Decision.

In the end, the Court finds that the CA correctly ruled that the RTC Branch 42 Decision can still be revived as the respondents properly filed a Complaint for Revival of Judgment in accordance with existing law and jurisprudence. The Court therefore instructs the RTC to execute Civil Case No. 11757 with deliberate dispatch.

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The December 22, 2010 Decision and September 26, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103349 are AFFIRMED. The case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the labor arbiter for the computation of the amounts due each respondent.

So Ordered.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE?

AS PROOF THAT THE EMPLOYEES WERE PROJECT EMPLOYEES, THE EMPLOYER PRESENTED THE SERVICE CONTRACTS WITH THEIR CLIENT. NO OTHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED. FURTHERMORE EMPLOYER FAILED TO PROVE TERMINATION REPORTS AT END OF EACH PROJECT. SUPREME COURT SAID THE EMPLOYEES WERE NOT PROJECT EMPLOYEES. THEREFORE THEY WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

Clearly, the presentation of service contracts between the employer and their client (even if it shows the duration of the project), in lieu of the employees’ individual employment contracts, does not establish that the latter are project employees. There was no other substantial evidence offered to prove that respondents were informed at the time of their hiring, that they were project employees. Moreover, petitioner’s failure to file termination reports at the end of each project was an indication that respondents were regular employees.46

In view of all the foregoing, pet1t1oner failed to prove through substantial evidence that respondents are project employees. It is evident that respondents were illegally dismissed due to petitioner’s failure to comply with the substantive and procedural due process tenets under the Labor Code.

WHAT IS THE TEST IN DETERMINING WHETHER AN EMPLOYEE IS A PROJECT EMPLOYEE?

The case of Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc. v. Chantengco44 is more applicable:

The principal test in determining whether an employee is a project employee is whether he/she is assigned to carry out a “specific project or undertaking,” the duration and scope of which are specified at the time the employee is engaged in the project, or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. A true project employee should be assigned to a project which begins and ends at determined or determinable times, and be informed thereof at the time of hiring.

In the instant case, the record is bereft of proof that the respondents’ engagement as project employees has been predetermined, as required by law. We agree with the Court of Appeals that OMSI did not provide convincing evidence that respondents were informed that they were to be assigned to a “specific project or undertaking” when OMSI hired them. Notably, the employment contracts for the specific project signed by the respondents were never presented. All that OMSI submitted in the proceedings a quo are the service contracts between OMSI and the MIAA. Clearly, OMSI utterly failed to establish by substantial evidence that, indeed, respondents were project employees and their employment was coterminous with the MIAA contract.45 (Citations omitted; Emphasis ours)

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DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The July 30, 2013 Decision and the February 26, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals i.n CA-G.R. CV No. 01415-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE?

A LAND COVERED BY FREE PATENT TITLE WAS SOLD WITHIN THE PROHIBITORY PERIOD. SUPREME COURT SAID THAT THE SALE WAS VOID. PETITIONERS CLAIM THAT THE CASE IS BARRED BY LACHES. THAT THEY SHOULD BE REIMBURSED FOR THE PURCHASE AND FOR IMPROVEMENTS. SUPREME COURT SAID LACHES DOES NOT APPLY IN CASE OF CONTRACTS VOID AB INITIO. BUT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR PRICE OF THE LAND. BUT NO REIMBURSEMENT FOR IMPROVEMENTS BECAUSE SUCH ARE COMPENSATED FROM FRUITS ARISING FROM POSSESSION.

The CA likewise correctly ordered respondents to reimburse petitioners the purchase price of the sale since the Deed of Sale is void ab initio. As to the improvements made on the land and the interests on the purchase price, these are compensated by the fruits petitioners had received from their long possession of the homestead pursuant to the ruling of the Court in the case of Sps. Maltos v. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo. . .

………………..

Likewise without merit is petitioners’ defense of laches. In the Heirs of A lido v. Campano,73 the Court made it clear that !aches do not apply to void ab initio contracts. It explained –

Laches, however, do not apply if the assailed contract is void ah initio. In Heirs oflng/ug-Tiro v. Spouses Casals, the Court expounded that laches cannot prevail over the law that actions to assail a void contract are imprescriptible it being based on equity, to wit:

In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was null and void ah initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing. “The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.” Neither could !aches be invoked in the case at bar. Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as “justice outside legality,” should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas [nunquam] contravenit legis. The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for declaration of the incxistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, !aches cannot set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse qf time.

………………………..

As above-mentioned, a sale of a parcel of land is in violation of the five[1]year prohibition on the alienation of land acquired via free patent application is void and produces no legal effect. As successors-in-interest of Alido, petitioners’ right to challenge the sale between Alido and respondent cannot be barred by I aches as it was in violation of the restriction on the sale of land acquired through free patent. 74

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