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CASE NO. 2011-0093: SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO – UNION PRESIDENT VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION (G.R. NO.  169717, 16 MARCH 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.) SUBJECTS: CERTIFICATION ELECTION; LEGITIMACY OF RANK AND FILE LABOR UNION. (BRIEF TITLE: SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA ET AL VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL). 

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA

CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY

OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

FOR EMPOWERMENT AND

REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER),

ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO –

Union President,

  G.R. No.  169717

 

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,

     Petitioner,   LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
    DEL CASTILLO, and
                           – versus –   PEREZ, JJ.
     
CHARTER CHEMICAL AND

COATING CORPORATION,

   

Promulgated:

 Respondent.    March 16, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

 

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor organization provided that it complies with the requirements of law for proper registration. The inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. We apply these principles to this case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal’s March 15, 2005 Decision[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 58203, which annulled and set aside the January 13, 2000 Decision[2] of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) in OS-A-6-53-99 (NCR-OD-M-9902-019) and the September 16, 2005 Resolution[3] denying petitioner union’s motion for reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

On February 19, 1999, Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, National Capital Region.

On April 14, 1999, respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss[4] on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union.[5]

Med-Arbiter’s Ruling

On April 30, 1999, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin issued a Decision[6] dismissing the petition for certification election.  The Med-Arbiter ruled that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because the Charter Certificate, “Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization,” and “Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas” were not executed under oath and certified by the union secretary and attested to by the union president as required by Section 235 of the Labor Code[7] in relation to Section 1, Rule VI of Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, series of 1997. The union registration was, thus, fatally defective.

The Med-Arbiter further held that the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company.

As a result, not being a legitimate labor organization, petitioner union has no right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.

Department of Labor and Employment’s Ruling

On July 16, 1999, the DOLE initially issued a Decision[8] in favor of respondent company dismissing petitioner union’s appeal on the ground that the latter’s petition for certification election was filed out of time. Although the DOLE ruled, contrary to the findings of the Med-Arbiter, that the charter certificate need not be verified and that there was no independent evidence presented to establish respondent company’s claim that some members of petitioner union were holding supervisory positions, the DOLE sustained the dismissal of the petition for certification after it took judicial notice that another union, i.e., Pinag-isang LakasManggagawa sa Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation, previously filed a petition for certification election on January 16, 1998. The Decision granting the said petition became final and executory on September 16, 1998 and was remanded for immediate implementation. Under Section 7, Rule XI of D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, a motion for intervention involving a certification election in an unorganized establishment should be filed prior to the finality of the decision calling for a certification election. Considering that petitioner union filed its petition only on February 14, 1999, the same was filed out of time.

On motion for reconsideration, however, the DOLE reversed its earlier ruling. In its January 13, 2000 Decision, the DOLE found that a review of the records indicates that no certification election was previously conducted in respondent company. On the contrary, the prior certification election filed by Pinag-isang Lakas Manggagawa  sa Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation was, likewise, denied by the Med-Arbiter and, on appeal, was dismissed by the DOLE for being filed out of time. Hence, there was no obstacle to the grant of petitioner union’s petition for certification election, viz:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and the decision of this Office dated 16 July 1999 is MODIFIEDto allow the certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation with the following choices:

1.              Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical-Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reform (SMCC-SUPER); and

2.              No Union.

Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Office of origin for the immediate conduct of a certification election, subject to the usual pre-election conference.

SO DECIDED.[9]

Court of Appeal’s Ruling

 

            On March 15, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, viz:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution dated January 13, 2000 and February 17, 2000 are hereby [ANNULLED] and SET ASIDE.

                SO ORDERED.[10]

In nullifying the decision of the DOLE, the appellate court gave credence to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that petitioner union failed to comply with the documentation requirements under the Labor Code. It, likewise, upheld the Med-Arbiter’s finding that petitioner union consisted of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.  Moreover, the CA held that the issues as to the legitimacy of petitioner union may be attacked collaterally in a petition for certification election and the infirmity in the membership of petitioner union cannot be remedied through the exclusion-inclusion proceedings in a pre-election conference pursuant to the ruling inToyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union.[11] Thus, considering that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization, it has no legal right to file a petition for certification election.

Issues

 

I

Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in granting the respondent [company’s] petition for certiorari (CA G.R. No. SP No. 58203) in spite of the fact that the issues subject of the respondent company[’s] petition was already settled with finality and barred from being re-litigated.

II

Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding that the alleged mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employee[s] of petitioner [union’s] membership is [a] ground for the cancellation of petitioner [union’s] legal personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certification election.

III

Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding that the alleged failure to certify under oath the local charter certificate issued by its mother federation and list of the union membership attending the organizational meeting [is a ground] for the cancellation of petitioner [union’s] legal personality as a labor organization and for the dismissal of the petition for certification election.[12]

Petitioner Union’s Arguments

Petitioner union claims that the litigation of the issue as to its legal personality to file the subject petition for certification election is barred by the July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE. In this decision, the DOLE ruled that petitioner union complied with all the documentation requirements and that there was no independent evidence presented to prove an illegal mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in petitioner union. After the promulgation of this Decision, respondent company did not move for reconsideration, thus, this issue must be deemed settled.

Petitioner union further argues that the lack of verification of its charter certificate and the alleged illegal composition of its membership are not grounds for the dismissal of a petition for certification election under Section 11, Rule XI of D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, as amended, nor are they grounds for the cancellation of a union’s registration under Section 3, Rule VIII of said issuance. It contends that what is required to be certified under oath by the local union’s secretary or treasurer and attested to by the local union’s president are limited to the union’s constitution and by-laws, statement of the set of officers, and the books of accounts.

Finally, the legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation pursuant to Section 5, Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Incoprorated v. Tagaytay Highlands Empoyees Union-PTGWO.[13]

Respondent Company’s Arguments

Respondent company asserts that it cannot be precluded from challenging the July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE. The said decision did not attain finality because the DOLE subsequently reversed its earlier ruling and, from this decision, respondent company timely filed its motion for reconsideration.

On the issue of lack of verification of the charter certificate, respondent company notes that Article 235 of the Labor Code and Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, expressly requires that the charter certificate be certified under oath.

It also contends that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because its composition is a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. Respondent company maintains that the ruling in Toyota Motor Philippines vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Labor Union[14] continues to be good case law. Thus, the illegal composition of petitioner union nullifies its legal personality to file the subject petition for certification election and its legal personality may be collaterally attacked in the proceedings for a petition for certification election as was done here.

Our Ruling

 

            The petition is meritorious.

The issue as to the legal personality of petitioner union is not barred by the July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE.

 

 

A review of the records indicates that the issue as to petitioner union’s legal personality has been timely and consistently raised by respondent company before the Med-Arbiter, DOLE, CA and now this Court. In its July 16, 1999 Decision, the DOLE found that petitioner union complied with the documentation requirements of the Labor Code and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that there was an illegal mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership. Nonetheless, the petition for certification election was dismissed on the ground that another union had previously filed a petition for certification election  seeking to  represent  the  same  bargaining unit  in respondent company.

Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner union on January 13, 2000, the DOLE reversed its previous ruling.  It upheld the right of petitioner union to file the subject petition for certification election because its previous decision was based on a mistaken appreciation of facts.[15] From this adverse decision, respondent company timely moved for reconsideration by reiterating its previous arguments before the Med-Arbiter that petitioner union has no legal personality to file the subject petition for certification election.

The July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE, therefore, never attained finality because the parties timely moved for reconsideration. The issue then as to the legal personality of petitioner union to file the certification election was properly raised before the DOLE, the appellate court and now this Court.

The charter certificate need not be certified under oath by the local union’s secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president.

Preliminarily, we must note that Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481[16] which took effect on June 14, 2007.[17]This law introduced substantial amendments to the Labor Code. However, since the operative facts in this case occurred in 1999, we shall decide the issues under the pertinent legal provisions then in force (i.e., R.A. No. 6715,[18] amending Book V of the Labor Code, and the rules and regulations[19] implementing R.A. No. 6715, as amended by D.O. No. 9,[20]series of 1997) pursuant to our ruling in Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc.[21]

In the main, the CA ruled that petitioner union failed to comply with the requisite documents for registration under Article 235 of the Labor Code and its implementing rules. It agreed with the Med-Arbiter that the Charter Certificate, Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorizationand Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas were not executed under oath. Thus, petitioner union cannot be accorded the status of a legitimate labor organization.

We disagree.

The then prevailing Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, provides:

Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local chapter — A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following:

(a)  A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;

(b)  The names of the local/chapter’s officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter; and

(c)  The local/chapter’s constitution and by-laws provided that where the local/chapter’s constitution and by-laws [are] the same as [those] of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.

All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President.

As readily seen, the Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization and Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas are not among the documents that need to be submitted to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations in order to register a labor organization. As to the charter certificate, the above-quoted rule indicates that it should be executed under oath. Petitioner union concedes and the records confirm that its charter certificate was not executed under oath. However, in San Miguel Corporation (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW (MPPP-SMPP-SMAMRFU-FFW),[22] which was decided under the auspices of D.O. No. 9, Series of 1997, we ruled – 

In San Miguel Foods-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Hon. Laguesma, 331 Phil. 356 (1996), the Court ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers. IdWhile this ruling was based on the interpretation of the previous Implementing Rules provisions which were supplanted by the 1997 amendments, we believe that the same doctrine obtains in this case. Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the national union and not the local/chapter, it does not make sense to have the local/chapter’s officers x x x certify or attest to a document which they had no hand in the preparation of.[23] (Emphasis supplied) 

In accordance with this ruling, petitioner union’s charter certificate need not be executed under oath. Consequently, it validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter certificate,[24] (2) the names of its officers, their addresses, and its principal office,[25] and (3) its constitution and by-laws[26]— the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out by the records.

The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in petitioner union does not nullify its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization.

 

The CA found that petitioner union has for its membership both rank-and-file and supervisory employees. However, petitioner union sought to represent the bargaining unit consisting of rank-and-file employees. Under Article 245[27] of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file employees. Thus, the appellate court ruled that petitioner union cannot be considered a legitimate labor organization pursuant to Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union[28] (hereinafter Toyota).

Preliminarily, we note that petitioner union questions the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that 12 of its members, consisting of batchman, mill operator and leadman, are supervisory employees. However, petitioner union failed to present any rebuttal evidence in the proceedings below after respondent company submitted in evidence the job descriptions[29] of the aforesaid employees. The job descriptions indicate that the aforesaid employees exercise recommendatory managerial actions which are not merely routinary but require the use of independent judgment, hence, falling within the definition of supervisory employees under Article 212(m)[30] of the Labor Code. For this reason, we are constrained to agree with the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that petitioner union consisted of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.

Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees in petitioner union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization. The appellate court’s reliance on Toyota is misplaced in view of this Court’s subsequent ruling inRepublic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc.[31] (hereinafter Kawashima).  In Kawashima, we explained at length how and why the Toyota doctrine no longer holds sway under the altered state of the law and rules applicable to this case, viz:

R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation of the prohibition [on the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees] would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.

It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency by introducing the following amendment to Rule II (Registration of Unions):

“Sec. 1. Who may join unions. – x x x Supervisory employees and security guards shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own; Provided, that those supervisory employees who are included in an existing rank-and-file bargaining unit, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, shall remain in that unit x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

and Rule V (Representation Cases and Internal-Union Conflicts) of the Omnibus Rules, viz:

“Sec. 1. Where to file. – A petition for certification election may be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath.

Sec. 2. Who may file. – Any legitimate labor organization or the employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may file the petition.

The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization, shall contain, among others:

x x x x

(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require; and provided further, that the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees shall not include supervisory employees and/or security guards. (Emphasis supplied)

By that provision, any questioned mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate and duly registered labor organization from exercising its right to file a petition for certification election.

Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore in Toyota, the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, held:

“Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code.
x x x x

In the case at bar, as respondent union’s membership list contains the names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of its supervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification election.” (Emphasis supplied)

In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for certification election was one for supervisory employees, but in which the membership included rank-and-file employees, the Court reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right to file a certification election to represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file employees among its members.

It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.

But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees – was removed. Instead, what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining unit, thus:

Rule XI

Certification Elections

x x x x

Sec. 4. Forms and contents of petition. – The petition shall be in writing and under oath and shall contain, among others, the following: x x x (c) The description of the bargaining unit.

In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano, the Court had occasion to uphold the validity of the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, although the specific provision involved therein was only Sec. 1, Rule VI, to wit:

“Section. 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter.- A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the following: a) a charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter; (b) the names of the local/chapter’s officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter; and (c) the local/ chapter’s constitution and by-laws; provided that where the local/chapter’s constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.

All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its President.”

which does not require that, for its creation and registration, a local or chapter submit a list of its members.

Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int’l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PGTWO in which the core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a petition for certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

 

In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW, the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to its individual members.

More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of union registration filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-and-file labor organization on the ground of mixed membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.

 

All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands,San Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set the tone for itToyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered state of the law and the rules.[32] [Underline supplied]

The applicable law and rules in the instant case are the same as those in Kawashima because the present petition for certification election was filed in 1999 when D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, was still in effect. Hence, Kawashima applies with equal force here. As a result, petitioner union was not divested of its status as a legitimate labor organization even if some of its members were supervisory employees; it had the right to file the subject petition for certification election.

 

The legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked by respondent company in the certification election proceedings.

Petitioner union correctly argues that its legal personality cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings. As we explained in Kawashima:

                Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer’s only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

The amendments to the Labor Code and its implementing rules have buttressed that policy even more.[33]

 

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 15, 2005 Decision and September 16, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58203 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 13, 2000 Decision of the Department of Labor and Employment in OS-A-6-53-99 (NCR-OD-M-9902-019) is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

                                     MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

             Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO  

Associate Justice       

 

 

 

 

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

            Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice


[1]       Rollo, pp. 29-36; penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.

[2]       Id. at 74-75.

[3]       Id. at 38.

[4]       Id. at 214-223.

[5]       Id. at 215-220.

[6]       Id. at 40-50.

[7]       PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, as amended.

[8]       Rollo, pp. 52-54.

[9]       Id. at 75.

[10]     Id. at 36.

[11]     335 Phil. 1045 (1997).

[12]     Rollo, pp. 12-13.

[13]     443 Phil. 841 (2003).

[14]     Supra note 11.

[15]     Upon reconsideration, the DOLE noted that the other union which allegedly filed a prior petition for certification election was prevented from doing so because its petition for certification election was filed out of time. Thus, there was no obstacle to the conduct of a certification election in respondent company.

[16]     “An Act Strengthening the Workers’ Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.”

[17]     Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc.G.R. No. 160352, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 386, 396.

[18]     “An Act to Extend Protection to Labor, Strengthen the Constitutional Rights of Workers to Self-Organization, Collective Bargaining and Peaceful Concerted Activities, and Foster Industrial Peace and Harmony.”  Effective March 21, 1989.

[19]     Approved on May 24, 1989.

[20]     Effective: June 21, 1997.

[21]     Supra note 17 at 396-397.

[22]     504 Phil. 376 (2005).

[23]     Id. at 400.

[24]     DOLE records, p. 51.

[25]     Id. at 43-44.

[26]     Id. at 25-40.

[27]     Article 245. Ineligibility of Managerial Employees to Join Any Labor Organization; Right of Supervisory Employees.— x x x Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in the collective bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate collective bargaining units and/or legitimate labor organizations of their own. x x x

[28]     Supra note 11.

[29]     Respondent company claimed that the batchman, mill operator and leadman perform, among others, the following functions:

        Prepares, coordinates and supervises work schedules and activities of subordinates or helpers in their respective area of responsibility.

1.       Recommends the reduction, increase, transfer and number of employees assigned to them.

2.       Sees to it that daily production schedules and outputs are carried on time.

3.       Coordinates with their respective managers the needed raw materials and the quality of finished products. (Rollo, p. 220)

[30]     Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, states in part: “Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. x x x”

[31]     Supra note 17.

[32]     Id. at 402-407.

[33]     Id. at 408.

LEGAL NOTE 0050: WHAT IS GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

 

SOURCE: ATTY. RAFAEL T. MARTINEZ, AND SPOUSES DAN AND EDNA REYES VS. JUDGE GRACE GLICERIA F. DE VERA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, SAN CARLOS CITY,PANGASINAN (A.M. NO. MTJ-08-1718, 16 MARCH 2011, CARPIO, J.)  SUBJECT: GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. (BRIEF TITLE: ATTY MARTINEZ ET AL VS. JUDGE DE VERA)

 

WHAT IS GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in the performance of her official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.29

 

CAN THE JUDGE MAKE AS AN EXCUSE THE INEFFICIENCY OF HIS COURT PERSONNEL?

NO.

Judge De Vera would do well to keep in mind that “[a] judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.”30 A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement by court personnel. Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions.31

 

CAN FILING AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST THE JUDGE A REMEDY TO CORRECT  AN ERRONEOUS ORDER OR DECISION?

NO.

Complainants should also bear in mind that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge’s challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against her at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, assuming she has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make her position doubly unbearable.32

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 933 dated 24 January 2011.

1 Rollo, pp. 609-611.

2 Id. at 1-6.

3 Id. at 112.

4 Id. at 114-116.

5 Id. at 196-203.

6 Id. at 210-265.

7 Id. at 473-506.

8 Now Supreme Court Justice.

9 Rollo, p. 612.

10 Id. at 628.

11 Id. at 639-743.

12 Id. at 1528.

13 Id. at 1529-1538.

14 Id. at 1553-1558.

15 Id. at 1677-1706.

16 Id. at 1688.

17 Id. at 1689-1690.

18 Id. at 1597-1598.

19 Id. at 1712-1713.

20 Under Chapter VII, D.2 of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, Clerk III Soriano had the following functions:

2.1.12.1. Receives and dockets cases filed with the Court;

2.1.12.2. Receives and records all pleadings, documents and communications pertaining to the Court;

2.1.12.3. Refers to the Clerk of Court or Branch Clerk of Court all cases, pleadings, documents and communications received;

2.1.12.4. Takes charge of all mail matters and maintains a systematic filing of criminal, civil, special civil actions, land registration and administrative cases;

2.1.12.5. Maintains and keeps custody of record books on pending cases, record book on disposed cases, books on appealed cases;

2.1.12.6. Checks and verifies in the docket book applications for clearances and certifications;

2.1.12.7. Prepares weekly reports to the court on the status of individual cases;

2.1.12.8. Checks and reviews exhibits and other documents to be attached to records on appeal;

2.1.12.9. Keeps record book on warrants of arrest issued, record book on accused persons who are at-large, and record book on judgment against bail bonds;

2.1.12.10. Prepares subpoenas, notices, processes, and communications for the signature of the Judge and/or the Clerk of Court;

2.1.12.11. Releases decisions, orders, processes, subpoenas and notices as directed by the Judge or Clerk of Court by delivering them in addressed envelopes and with return cards to the process server for service or mailing; and

2.1.12.12. Performs other duties that may be assigned to him.

21 Rollo, pp. 1714-1716.

22 Id. at 1719-1720.

23 Id. at 1725-1727.

24 Id. at 1730-1732.

25 Id. at 1731-1732.

26 Id. at 1529-1534.

27 Id. at 1529-1531.

28 Rule 3.08, Code of Judicial Conduct.

29 Lumbos v. Baliguat, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1641, 27 July 2006, 496 SCRA 556, 573 (citations omitted).

30 Rule 3.09, Code of Judicial Conduct.

31 Nidua v. Lazaro, A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 581, 586.

32 De Vega v. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1997, 23 October 2006, 505 SCRA 1, 5 citing De Guzman v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1736, 26 June 2003, 405 SCRA 22.

 

CASE NO. 2011-0092: EXECUTIVE JUDGE LEONILO B. APITA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY VS. MARISSA M. ESTANISLAO, COURT LEGAL RESEARCHER II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, TACLOBAN CITY (A.M. NO. P-06-2206, 16  MARCH 2011, CARPIO, J.)  SUBJECT: DUTIES OF LEGAL RESEARCHER; DUTIES OF COURT INTERPRETER; JUDGE CANNOT ASSIGN ONE TO PERFORM THE TASKS OF ANOTHER INDEFINITELY. (BRIEF CASE TITLE: JUDGE APITA VS. ESTANISLAO).

SECOND DIVISION

EXECUTIVE JUDGE LEONILO                               A.M. No. P-06-2206

B. APITA, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 7, Tacloban City,                                               Present:

Complainant,

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

PERALTA,

– versus –                                                     ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

MARISSA M. ESTANISLAO,

Court Legal Researcher II,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 34,                                   Promulgated:

Tacloban City,

Respondent.                                                                    March 16, 2011

x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for insubordination filed by Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) of Tacloban City against respondent Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II in Branch 34 of the same court.

The Facts

In 2004, Atty. Pamela A. Navarrete, Court Interpreter in Branch 7 of the RTC of Tacloban City, was appointed as Clerk IV under Justice Pampio Abarintos of the Court of Appeals, leaving the position of Court Interpreter in Branch 7 vacant. Judge Apita designated respondent to act as Court Interpreter in the said Branch until the vacancy was filled up.1

However, respondent refused to act as Court Interpreter claiming that her designation was a demotion tantamount to removal from the service without cause; that interpreting during trials was not included in the duties and responsibilities of her present position; and that she was not defying Judge Apita’s directive, but merely asserting her right as a civil service employee holding a permanent appointment.2

In his Complaint3 for insubordination filed in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Judge Apita requested the OCA to rule whether his directive designating respondent as Court Interpreter in Branch 7 was valid and if so, whether respondent may be subjected to administrative sanctions for insubordination.

The Complaint was docketed as OCA-IPI No. 04-2051-P. The OCA forthwith required respondent to submit her Comment.4

In her Comment,5 respondent maintained that acting as Court Interpreter was outside the scope of her job description as Legal Researcher and constituted a demotion tantamount to removal from the service without cause.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

The OCA, in its Report and Recommendation,6 found respondent liable for insubordination. According to the OCA, Judge Apita acted well within his authority in designating respondent as Court Interpreter in view of the vacancy in the position. The OCA explained that respondent had no right to defy Judge Apita’s directive in the absence of any showing of abuse of discretion or any proof that the designation was due to some improper motive. The OCA recommended that respondent be suspended from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely, thus:

Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:

1.      This matter be FORMALLY DOCKETED as an administrative complaint against Marissa M. Estanislao, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City; and

2. Marissa M. Estanislao be SUSPENDED for one (1) month and one (1) day for insubordination with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.7

The Court’s Ruling

This is an administrative complaint of first impression involving the designation of court personnel by an executive judge. Judge Apitaadmitted he was unsure whether he could designate a Legal Researcher from one branch to act as a Court Interpreter in another branch of the same court. Hence, he brought the matter to the OCA for a ruling.

In Castro v. Bague,8 the Sheriff IV of the RTC (Branch 1) of Tagbilaran City was designated to act as Deputy Sheriff in the Office of the Clerk of Court to fill a temporary vacancy. The Court did not question the designation since the duties of a Sheriff IV are identical with the duties of a Deputy Sheriff as described in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court9 (Manual), which defines the general functions of all court personnel in the judiciary.

Under 2.2.4 of Chapter VI, Volume I of the Manual, the Sheriff IV is tasked with serving writs and processes of the court; keeping custody of attached properties; and maintaining the record book on writs of execution, writs of attachment, writs of replevin, writs of injunction, and all other processes. Under 2.1.5 of the same Chapter, the Deputy Sheriff serves writs and processes of the court; keeps custody of attached properties; and maintains the record book on writs of execution, writs of attachment, writs of replevin, writs of injunction, and all other processes. Unarguably, the Sheriff IV and the Deputy Sheriff perform exactly the same functions.

The duties of a Legal Researcher in the RTC are described under 2.2.1 of Chapter VI, Volume I of the Manual, to wit:

1.      verifies authorities on questions of law raised by parties- litigants in cases brought before the Court as may be assigned by the Presiding Judge;

2.      prepares memoranda on evidence adduced by the parties after the hearing;

3.      prepares outlines of the facts and issues involved in cases set for pre-trial for the guidance of the Presiding Judge;

4.      prepares indexes to be attached to the records showing the important pleadings filed, the pages where they may be found, and in general, the status of the case;

5.      prepares and submits to the Branch Clerk of Court a monthly list of cases or motions submitted for decision or resolution, indicating therein the deadlines for acting on the same; and

6.      performs such other duties as may be assigned by the Presiding Judge or the Branch Clerk of Court.

On the other hand, 2.2.3 of Chapter VI, Volume I of the Manual describes the functions of a Court Interpreter in the RTC thus:

1.      acts as translator of the court;

2.      attends court hearings;

3.      administers oath to witnesses;

4.      marks exhibits introduced in evidence and prepares the corresponding list of exhibits;

5.      prepares and signs minutes of the court session;

6.      maintains and keeps custody of record book of cases calendared for hearing;

7.      prepares court calendars and the records of cases set for hearing; and

8.      performs such other functions as may, from time to time, be assigned by the Presiding Judge and/or Branch Clerk of Court.

Notably, the duties of a Legal Researcher are vastly different from those of a Court Interpreter. A Legal Researcher focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities, drafting memoranda on evidence, outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial, and keeping track of the status of cases. On the other hand, a Court Interpreter is limited to acting as translator of the court, administering oaths to witnesses, marking exhibits, preparing minutes of court session, and preparing the court calendar.

While the Manual provides that court personnel may perform other duties the presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional duties must be directly related to, and must not significantly vary from, the court personnel’s job description. However, in case of a sudden vacancy in a court position, the judge may temporarily designate a court personnel with the competence and skills for the position even if the duties for such position are different from the prescribed duties of the court personnel. The temporary designation shall last only for such period as is necessary to designate temporarily a court personnel with the appropriate prescribed duties. Such temporary designation cannot go on for an indefinite period, or until the vacancy is filled up like in the designation by Judge Apita to respondent in this case.

Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel10 expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to perform any work outside the scope of their job description, thus:

Sec. 7. Court personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty outside the scope of their assigned job description. (Emphasis supplied)

In Re: Report of Senior Chief Staff Officer Antonina A. Soria on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Accounts of Clerk of Court Elena E. Jabao, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Ecija, Guimaras,11 the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia in Guimaras was designated to act as Court Stenographer in addition to her duties as Clerk of Court to fill in for the newly appointed Court Stenographer who was not yet well-versed in stenography. The designation passed the Court’s scrutiny as the duties of a Court Stenographer are subsumed under the general responsibilities of a Clerk of Court since Clerks of Court exercise control and supervision over Court Stenographers.

In the instant case, both Legal Researcher and Court Interpreter are subject to the control and supervision of the Clerk of Court.12 Since Legal Researchers do not exercise control and supervision over Court Interpreters,13 the duties of a Court Interpreter cannot be deemed subsumed under the general functions of a Legal Researcher.

While the executive judge may not require court personnel to perform work outside the scope of their job description, except duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions, the executive judge may reassign court personnel of multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of administrative supervision when there is a vacancy or when the interest of the service requires, after consultation with the presiding judges of the branches concerned. Section 6, Chapter VII of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC Re: Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties14 so provides:

Sec. 6. Reassignment of lower court personnel. – (a) Executive Judges of the RTCs shall continue to have authority to effect the following temporary assignments within his/her area of administrative supervision:

1.      Personnel of one branch to another branch of a multiple-branch court;

x x x x

Reassignments shall be made only in case of vacancy in a position in a branch, or when the interest of the service so requires. In either case, the assignment shall be made only after consultation with the Presiding Judges of the branches concerned. In case of any disagreement, the matter shall be referred to the OCA for resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

However, consistent with Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, the reassignment of court personnel in multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of the executive judge’s administrative supervision must involve (1) workwithin the scope of the court personnel’s job description or (2) duties that are identical with or are subsumed under the court personnel’s present functions.

In this case, since respondent’s job description is that of Legal Researcher, Judge Apita may not designate her to act as Court Interpreter indefinitely or until the vacancy is filled up. The said designation will require respondent to perform work, which is outside the scope of her job description and which involves duties not identical with or subsumed under respondent’s current functions. To do so would violate the express language of Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.

This rule is rooted in the time-honored constitutional principle that public office is a public trust. Hence, all public officers and employees, including court personnel in the judiciary, must serve the public with utmost responsibility and efficiency.15 Exhorting court personnel to exhibit the highest sense of dedication to their assigned duty necessarily precludes requiring them to perform any work outside the scope of their assigned job description, save for duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions.

Indeed, requiring a Legal Researcher to perform the work of a Court Interpreter is counter-productive and does not serve the ends of justice. Not only will respondent jeopardize her present position as Legal Researcher by constantly shifting from one job to another, her qualification as Court Interpreter will also be put in question. This arrangement does nothing but compromise court personnel’s professional responsibility and optimum efficiency in the performance of their respective roles in the dispensation of justice.

Judge Apita may not designate respondent to act as Court Interpreter for an indefinite period or until a new Court Interpreter is appointed. To meet a sudden vacancy or emergency, Judge Apita may only designate respondent in an acting capacity pending designation of a Court Interpreter from another branch of the RTC of Tacloban City to temporarily fill the vacancy in Branch 7 of the same court. This would have been in accord with pertinent rules governing the reassignment of, and the code of conduct for, court personnel.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS for lack of merit the instant administrative complaint for insubordination filed by Executive Judge LeoniloB. Apita of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) of Tacloban City against respondent Marissa M. Estanislao, Legal Researcher II in Branch 34 of the same court.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

*Designated additional member per Special Order No. 933-A dated 24 January 2011.

1Rollo, p. 24.

2Id. at 25-26, 28-30.

3Id. at 2-6.

4Id. at 14.

5Id. at 16-23.

6Id. at 35-36.

7Id. at 36.

8411 Phil. 532 (2001).

9Dated 8 March 2002.

10Otherwise known as A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Effective 1 June 2004.

11359 Phil. 385 (1998).

12Chapter VI, Volume I of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court.

13Id.

14Approved 27 January 2004.

15Court Personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court-San Carlos City v. Llamas, 488 Phil. 62 (2004).