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LEGAL NOTE 0060: HOW TO PROVE THAT LAND IS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE.

 SOURCE: UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MR. HILARION P. UY VS. REPUBLIC   OF  THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 185683, 16 MARCH 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) SUBJECT: ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND; POSSESSION SINCE 12 JUNE 1945. (BRIEF TITLE: UNION LEAF VS. REPUBLIC).

CASE DIGEST:

UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORP FILED APPLICATIONS FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND. HIS PROOF THAT THE LANDS ARE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ARE  ADVANCE PLANS AND CONSOLIDATED PLANS WHICH ALL NOTED THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE “INSIDE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA AS PER PROJECT NO. 5-A, LC MAP NO. 2891.”[12] 

ARE THE SURVEY PLANS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT SUCH PARCELS OF LAND ARE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

NO.

THE SUPREME COURT RULED:

The Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are hardly the competent pieces of evidence that the law requires.  The notation by a geodetic engineer on the survey plans that properties are alienable and disposable does not suffice to prove these lands’ classification.[14] 

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[15] directs that    

x x x x [T]he applicant for registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretaryand certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.  These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.  Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) 

Respondent failed to comply with this directive.  This leaves it unnecessary to delve into the testimonies of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest respecting their alleged possession of the subject properties. 

 


*               Designated member per Special Order No. 940 dated February 7, 2011, in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion.

[1]               Rollo, p. 459. 

[2]               Records (LRC Case No. A-294) pp. 1-4; records (LRC Case No. A-295) pp. 1-3; records (LRC Case No. A-296), pp. 1-3; and  records (LRC Case No. A-298), pp. 1-3.

[3]               Id.  

[4]               Id. at  27-29; pp. 16-18; pp. 15-17; and pp. 15-17.

[5]               Id. at 140-141; pp. 94-95;pp. 94-95; and pp. 91-92.

[6]               Id. at p. 151; p. 104, p. 104; and p. 101. 

[7]               Rollo, pp. 286-305.  Penned by Presiding Judge Clifton U. Ganay.

[8]               Ibid. 

[9]               Id. at 47-56.  Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. and Isaias P. Dicdican concurring.

[10]             Id. at 58-60. 

[11]             Id. at  464-466.

[12]             Id. at 465; Exhibit “C.”

[13]             Vide Comment on Motion for Reconsideration dated April 30, 2010, pp. 5-7.  

[14]             Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274 (2000).

[15]             G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477. 

[16]             Id. at 489.

CASE NO.  2011-104: UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MR. HILARION P. UY VS. REPUBLIC   OF  THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. 185683, 16 MARCH 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.) SUBJECT: ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND; POSSESSION SINCE 12 JUNE 1945. (BRIEF TITLE: UNION LEAF VS. REPUBLIC).

THIRD DIVISION

 

 

UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MR. HILARION P. UY,

                                       Petitioner,

                      – versus –

REPUBLIC   OF  THE

PHILIPPINES,

                                   Respondent.

 

G.R. No. 185683    

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

                    Chairperson,

BERSAMIN,

ABAD,*

VILLARAMA, JR., and

SERENO, JJ.

 

 

Promulgated:

                            

March 16, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – — – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

 

 

R E S O L U T I O N

 

 

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

For consideration of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Union Leaf Tobacco Corporation (petitioner) of the Resolution dated March 1, 2010 which denied the present petition for review on the ground of petitioner’s failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution.[1]  

Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union on December 1, 2004 four applications for land registration covering various parcels of land (LRC-A-294, LRC-A-295, LRC-A-296 and LRC-A-298).[2] 

Petitioner alleged that it is the absolute owner of those parcels of land, having bought them from various individuals; and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the properties for more than thirty (30) years.[3]

The Republic opposed the applications, citing Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution which proscribes private corporations or associations from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain for a period not exceeding twenty five (25) years and not to exceed one thousand (1,000) hectares in area. [4]

After the trial court dismissed without prejudice the applications for failure of petitioner to prove its allegation that it had been in “open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation” of the lots,[5] it, on petitioner’s move, reopened the applications and allowed the presentation of additional evidence ─ testimonial ─ in support thereof.[6]   

 By Decision of July 30, 2005,[7] the trial court confirmed petitioners’ titles over the properties subject of its applications. In finding for petitioner, the trial court ruled that petitioner had complied with the minimum 30-year uninterrupted possession; that realty taxes have been paid on these properties; and that no interested private individual opposed the applications.[8]  

On appeal by the Republic, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 30, 2008,[9] reversed the trial court’s decision, it holding that: 

x x x x.  Union Leaf presented no evidence to show that the subject parcels of land have been reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private person.  Absent proof of such reclassification, the subject parcels of land remain part of the public domain.  x x x x.

x x x x.

The trial court ruled that the subject parcels of land were converted to private lands by reason of the possession of Union Leaf’s predecessors-in-interest for a period longer than 30 years.  In so ruling, the trial court relied on the testimonies of Celso Domondon, Bartolome Carreon, Encarnacion Magno, Norma Gayo, Ricardo Fronda, Anastacia Saltat, Em[manuel] Balderas and Jose Padilla.  Analyzing their testimonies, it is our considered view that they are inconclusive to prove that Union Leaf’s predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application.  (underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied) 

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied,[10] it filed a petition for review which, as stated early on, the Court denied by Resolution of March 1, 2010 for failure to show that the appellate court committed any reversible error in its challenged issuances. 

In its present motion for reconsideration, petitioner argues in the main that its documentary evidence shows that the government declared and confirmed that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.[11]   It particularly points to the Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans which all noted that the subject lands are “inside alienable and disposable area as per project No. 5-A, LC Map No. 2891.”[12]

The Solicitor General counters that petitioner failed to present evidence that the subject lands are alienable and disposable and that petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that they have occupied the properties since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[13]

The Motion for Reconsideration fails.   

The Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are hardly the competent pieces of evidence that the law requires.  The notation by a geodetic engineer on the survey plans that properties are alienable and disposable does not suffice to prove these lands’ classification.[14] 

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[15] directs that    

x x x x [T]he applicant for registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretaryand certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.  These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.  Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) 

Respondent failed to comply with this directive.  This leaves it unnecessary to delve into the testimonies of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest respecting their alleged possession of the subject properties. 

WHEREFORE, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.  No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. 

SO ORDERED.        

                                       CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                       Associate Justice

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

 

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

ATTESTATION

 

 

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

                                  CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                      Associate Justice

                                   Chairperson

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                     RENATO C. CORONA

                                                                Chief Justice


*               Designated member per Special Order No. 940 dated February 7, 2011, in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion.

[1]               Rollo, p. 459. 

[2]               Records (LRC Case No. A-294) pp. 1-4; records (LRC Case No. A-295) pp. 1-3; records (LRC Case No. A-296), pp. 1-3; and  records (LRC Case No. A-298), pp. 1-3.

[3]               Id.  

[4]               Id. at  27-29; pp. 16-18; pp. 15-17; and pp. 15-17.

[5]               Id. at 140-141; pp. 94-95;pp. 94-95; and pp. 91-92.

[6]               Id. at p. 151; p. 104, p. 104; and p. 101. 

[7]               Rollo, pp. 286-305.  Penned by Presiding Judge Clifton U. Ganay.

[8]               Ibid. 

[9]               Id. at 47-56.  Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. and Isaias P. Dicdican concurring.

[10]             Id. at 58-60. 

[11]             Id. at  464-466.

[12]             Id. at 465; Exhibit “C.”

[13]             Vide Comment on Motion for Reconsideration dated April 30, 2010, pp. 5-7.  

[14]             Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274 (2000).

[15]             G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477. 

[16]             Id. at 489.

LEGAL NOTE 0059: IF DOUBT EXISTS BETWEEN THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE, THE SCALES OF JUSTICE MUST BE TILTED IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE.

 

SOURCE: LORES REALTY ENTERPRISES, INC., LORENZO Y. SUMULONG III VS. VIRGINIA E. PACIA (G.R. NO.  171189, 9 MARCH 2011, MENDOZA, J.) SUBJECT: TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT; AWARD OF DAMAGES (BRIEF TITLE: LORES REALTY VS. PACIA).

 

 STORY OF THE CASE:

 

SUMULONG DIRECTED ACCOUNTING MANAGER PACIA TO PREPARE CHECK TO BPI. SHE PREPARED BUT AFTER MUCH DELAY. THIS WAS REPEATED. PACIA EXPLAINED THAT SHE DELAYED THE PREPARATION OF THE CHECKS BECAUSE AT THAT TIME THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR THE CHECK. PACIA WAS DISMISSED. THE LABOR ARBITER RULED THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. NLRC REVERSED. CA CONFIRMED.

 

WHAS THERE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.

 

YES. WHILE THERE WAS DOUBT AS TO WHO IS RIGHT, THAT DOUBT SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR.

 

SAID THE COURT:

 

 Let it be noted at this point that the Court finds nothing unlawful in the directive of Sumulong to prepare checks in payment of LREI’s obligations. The availability or unavailability of sufficient funds to cover the check is immaterial in the physical preparation of the checks.

Pacia’s initial reluctance to prepare the checks, however, which was seemingly an act of disrespect and defiance, was for honest and well intentioned reasons. Protecting LREI and Sumulong from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law[18] was foremost in her mind.  It was not wrongful or willful. Neither can it be considered an obstinate defiance of company authority.  The Court takes into consideration that Pacia, despite her initial reluctance, eventually did prepare the checks on the same day she was tasked to do it.

The Court also finds it difficult to subscribe to LREI and Sumulongs’s contention that the reason for Pacia’s initial reluctance to prepare the checks was a mere afterthought considering that “check no. 0000737527 under one of the check vouchers she reluctantly prepared, bounced when it was deposited.”[19] Pacia’s apprehension was justified when the check was dishonored.  This clearly affirms her assertion that she was just being cautious and circumspect for the company’s sake.  Thus, her actuation should not be construed as improper conduct.      

 In finding for Pacia, the Court is guided by the time-honored principle that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The rule in controversies between a laborer and his master distinctly states that doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former’s favor.[20]


* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 933 dated January 24, 2011.

[1] Rollo, pp. 32-42. Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa concurred in by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes (now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals) and Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang.

[2] Id. at 52-59. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier with Commissioner Ireneo B.Bernardo and Commissioner Tito E. Genilo, concurring.

[3] Id. at 74.

[4] Batas Pamabansa Blg. 22.

[5] Rollo p. 75.

[6] Id. at 49.

[7] Id. at 50.

[8] Id. at 60-65.

[9] Id. at 52-59.

[10] Citations omitted.

[11] Rollo, pp. 32-42.

[12] Id. at 159.

[13] Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services Inc., G.R. No. 188637, December 15, 2010.

[14] Diamond Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 462 Phil. 452, 458 (2003).

[15] Rollo, p. 170.

[16] Id. at 145.

[17]Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Marbella, G.R. No. 149074, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 389, 395, citing  Bascon v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 719, 730 (2004), citing Dimabayao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 363 Phil. 279, 284 (1999).

[18] Supra note 4.

[19] Rollo, p. 41 and 56.

[20] E.G. & I Corporation v. Sato, G.R. No. 182070, February 16, 2011.