CASE 2011-0111: (DENIAL OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION) MA.        MERCEDITAS    N. GUTIERREZ VS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); AND JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) [FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.] (G.R. NO. 193459, 8 MARCH 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.)

                                       EN BANC

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R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

          For resolution is petitioner’s “Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)” dated February 25, 2011 (Motion). 

          Upon examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither substantial nor cogent reason to reconsider its Decision.  A plain reading of the Decision could very well dispose of petitioner’s previous contentions, raised anew in the Motion, but the Court finds it proper, in writing finis to the issue, to draw petitioner’s attention to certain markers in the Decision.

I

          Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that the Court sharply deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,^[1] the Decision of February 15, 2011 reaffirmed and illuminated the Francisco doctrine in light of the particular facts of the present case. 

          To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee “separately, one after the other”^[2] is to dismantle her own interpretation of Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing of the impeachment complaint.  Petitioner’s Motion concedes^[3] that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the House’s initial action on the complaint.  By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint. 

          Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not “constructive initiation by legal fiction” as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion in Francisco. 

          In Justice Azcuna’s opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of the House.^[4] Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12^th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be “deemed initiated” upon the Committee’s finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the Committee’s finding,^[5] which was clearly referred to as the instances “presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant matters.”^[6]  Definitely, “constructive initiation by legal fiction” did not refer to the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.

          The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want to stretch and those who want to shrink the term “initiate,” either of which could disrupt the provision’s congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision.  Petitioner’s imputation that the Court’s Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow. 

          Petitioner urges that the word “initiate” must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion.

          Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as “no initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official more than once within a period of one year,” in which case the reckoning would literally point to the “start of the beginning.”  To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.  

          In re-affirming what the phrase “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated” means, the Court closely applied Franciscoon what comprises or completes the initiation phase.  Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco.  Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.

          Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members of the House.^[7] 

          The facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however.  Suffice it to restate a footnote in the Court’s Decision that in such case of “an abbreviated mode of initiation[, x x x] the filing of the complaint and the taking of initial action [House directive to automatically transmit] are merged into a single act.”^[8]  Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to coincidentally initiate a second impeachment proceeding in the interregnum, if any, given the period between filing and referral.

          Petitioner’s discussion on the singular tense of the word “complaint” is too tenuous to require consideration.  The phraseology of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical limitation of impeachment complaints.  If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the number of complaints, they would have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.

          Petitioner further avers that the demonstrated concerns against reckoning the period from the filing of the complaint are mere possibilities based on a general mistrust of the Filipino people and their Representatives.  To her, mere possibility of abuse is not a conclusive argument against the existence of power nor a reason to invalidate a law. 

          The present case does not involve an invalidation of a legal provision on a grant of power.  Since the issue precisely involvesupholding an express limitation of a power, it behooves the Court to look into the rationale behind the constitutional proscription which guards against an explicit instance of abuse of power.  The Court’s duty entails an examination of the same possible scenarios considered by the framers of the Constitution (i.e., incidents that may prove to disrupt the law-making function of Congress and unduly or too frequently harass the impeachable officer), which are basically the same grounds being invoked by petitioner to arrive at her desired conclusion. 

          Ironically, petitioner also offers the Court with various possibilities and vivid scenarios to grimly illustrate her perceived oppression.  And her own mistrust leads her to find inadequate the existence of the pertinent constitutional provisions, and to entertain doubt on “the respect for and adherence of the House and the respondent committee to the same.”^[9] 

While petitioner concedes that there is a framework of safeguards for impeachable officers laid down in Article XI of the Constitution, she downplays these layers of protection as illusory or inutile without implementation and enforcement, as if these can be disregarded at will. 

          Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Court left in the hands of the House the question as to when an impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely underscored the House’s conscious role in the initiation of an impeachment proceeding.   The Court added nothing new in pinpointing the obvious reckoning point of initiation in light of the Francisco doctrine.  Moreover, referral of an impeachment complaint to the appropriate committee is already a power or function granted by the Constitution to the House.

          Petitioner goes on to argue that the House has no discretion on the matter of referral of an impeachment complaint and that once filed, an impeachment complaint should, as a matter of course, be referred to the Committee.    

          The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar.  To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion.  It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the House’s power or function to refer a complaint.

          Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint.  The House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.

          To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression.  She particularly cites Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulo’s concerns on the amount of time spent if “multiple impeachment charges”^[10] are allowed.  She fails, however, to establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than one complaint or charge.

          IN SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present case, with Franciscoas the guiding light.  Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light, however.

II

Petitioner, meanwhile, reiterates her argument that promulgation means publication.  She again cites her thesis that Commonwealth Act No. 638, Article 2 of the Civil Code, and the two Tañada v. Tuvera^[11] cases mandate that the Impeachment Rules be published for effectivity.  Petitioner raises nothing new to change the Court’s stance on the matter.

          To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.  Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to make known” as it should be generally understood. 

Petitioner continues to misapply Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations^[12] where the Court noted that the Constitution unmistakably requires the publication of rules of procedure pertaining to inquiries in aid of legislation.  If the Constitution warranted the publication of Impeachment Rules, then it could have expediently indicated such requirement as it did in the case of legislative inquiries.

          The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its Impeachment Rules.  It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.  

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that “to require publication of the House Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods…”  She insists that the Committee, after publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period within which to finish its business.

Petitioner is mistaken in her assertion.  Note that the Court discussed the above-mentioned scenario only “in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress.”  Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution contains relevant self-executing provisions which must be observed at the start of the impeachment process, the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules notwithstanding.  

Petitioner rehashes her allegations of bias and vindictiveness on the part of the Committee Chairperson, Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr. Yet again, the supposed actuations of Rep. Tupas partake of a keen performance of his avowed duties and responsibilities as the designated manager of that phase in the impeachment proceeding.  Besides, the actions taken by the Committee were never its Chairperson’s sole act but rather the collective undertaking of its whole 55-person membership.  The Committee members even took to voting among themselves to validate what actions to take on the motions presented to the Committee.            

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise.  Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases.  Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding.  The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality towards the concerned member only.  And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision. 

Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Court’s control.  Again, impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject only to the constitutionally imposed limits.^[13]  And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which would effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.

FINALLY, the Court has, in its February 15, 2011 Decision, already lifted its September 14, 2010 Status Quo Ante Order^[14]which, as said Order clearly stated, was “effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court.”^[15]  Such “further order” points to that part of the disposition in the February 15, 2011 Decision that directs the lifting of the Status Quo AnteOrder. 

The lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order is effective immediately, the filing of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration notwithstanding, in the same way that the Status Quo Ante Order was made effective immediately, respondents’ moves to reconsider or recall it notwithstanding.  There is thus no faulting the Committee if it decides to, as it did proceed with the impeachment proceeding after the Court released its February 15, 2011 Decision.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

  SO ORDERED.

                                                CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                                      Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

I maintain my dissenting vote with J. Brion

 RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

                                                   RENATO C. CORONA

                                                            Chief Justice

^* No part.

^[1]               460 Phil. 830 (2003).

^[2]               Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8.

^[3]               Motion for Reconsideration, p. 9: “From these entries, it is clear that each impeachment complaint was the subject of separate and distinct referrals.  Following Francisco, upon the referral of the First Impeachment Complaint to the respondent Committee, an impeachment proceeding against petitioner Ombudsman has already been initiated.” (underscoring supplied)   

^[4]               Vide Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 1054-1055.

^[5]               Id. at 865.

^[6]               Id. at 1055.

^[7]               CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 3, par. (4).   

^[8]               Decision of February 15, 2011, footnote 61.  

^[9]               Motion for Reconsideration, p. 36.

^[10]             Vide II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 282 (July 26, 1986).

^[11]             220 Phil. 422 (1985); 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

^[12]             G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77; and September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152.

^[13]             Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra. 

^[14]             Rollo, pp. 264-267.

^[15]             Id. at 266, emphasis and underscoring supplied.

CASE NO. 2011-0110: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, AND ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE (G.R. NO. 187714, 8 MARCH 2011, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECTS: INDISPENSABLE PARTY; DOCTRINE OF PRIOR JURISDICTION; PUBLICATION OF SENATE RULES. (BRIEF TITLE: PIMENTEL ET AL V S. SENATE COMMITTEE).

EN BANC

Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

– versus –                                 DELCASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.

SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE

WHOLE represented by SENATE

PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,       Promulgated:

Respondents.                                               March 8, 2011

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – — – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition¹ with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Manuel B. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N.Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter S. Cayetano (petitioners). Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act.

The Antecedents

On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled “Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!”² In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway toSucat Road in Parañaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly calledPresident Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same stretch – from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.

On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706,³ the full text of which reads:

WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly “advocated” (sic) the construction of the C-5 Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking Sucat Roadin Parañaque Cityto the South Luzon Expressway;

WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act;

WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that the double insertion for the C-5 Road Extension Project was made by the Senate President;

WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg;

WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, from the time he was member of the House of Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the realignment of the C-5 Road Extension project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio, ParañaqueCity and Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Piñas would be financially benefited by the construction of the new road;

WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, through his corporations, negotiated the sale of his properties as roads right of way to the government, the same properties affected by the projects he proposed;

WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President caused the sale of his landholdings to government as a grossly overpriced cost prejudicial to other lot owners in the area, the government, and the Filipino people;

WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, in the overpriced sale of another property, used his power and influence to extort from the original landowner the profit made from the overprice by the Villar owned corporations;

WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers;

WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in order to serve his personal interests thereby sacrificing the people’s welfare;

WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President has betrayed the trust of the people, and by doing so has shamed the Philippine Senate;

WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to reclaim the people’s trust and confidence and show that the illegal conduct of any of its member, even of its leaders, shall not go unpunished;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.

Adopted,

(Sgd.)

M.A. MADRIGAL⁴

On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee) which at that time was composed of the following members:

Sen. Pia S. Cayetano – Chairperson

Sen. Loren Legarda – Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal

Sen. Joker Arroyo – Member

Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano- Member

Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member

Sen. Gregorio Honasan – Member

Sen. Panfilo Lacson – Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon

On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President. The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16 December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee.⁵ After consultation with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee.⁶ On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee.⁷ Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minority’s decision on the matter is final.⁸ Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.⁹

On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech¹⁰ where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009, Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech¹¹ where he stated that the Ethics Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.¹²

Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009.

Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:

1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of SenatorVillar’s constitutional right to equal protection;

2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar isviolative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and

3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication.¹³

In its Comment, respondent argues that:

1.    The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such time that the said indispensable party has been joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard;

2.    There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;

3.    Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;

4.    The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;

5.    The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;

6.    It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior;

7.    The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which exclusively pertains to Congress;

8.    The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of discretion; [and]

9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted[,] allow the adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.¹⁴

The Issues

The issues for the Court’s resolution are the following:

1.    Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition;

2.    Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort;

3.    Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole isviolative of Senator Villar’s right to equal protection;

4.    Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of SenatorVillar’s right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

5.    Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.

The Ruling of this Court

Indispensable Party

Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7 – Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.

The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:

An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.

A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoidmultiple litigation.¹⁵

In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal’s interest. The nature of Senator Madrigal’s interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her participation.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction “simply calls for the determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by courts of justice.”¹⁶ Citing Pimentel v. HRET,¹⁷ respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled:

x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x¹⁸

The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.¹⁹

As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that “the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.”²⁰ Thus, it has been held that “the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers.”²¹ The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.

Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee

to the Senate Committee on the Whole

Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the Senate Committee of the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed SenatorVillar’s recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body.

We do not agree with petitioners.

Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the Court notes that upon the election of SenatorEnrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics Committee was also reorganized. Senator Lacson, who first called the Senate’s attention to the alleged irregularities committed by Senator Villar, was elected as Chairperson. On 16 December 2008, when Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacsonreiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel informed him that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minority’s decision on the matter is final but the records did not show that a caucus was convened.

On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. It was because of the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case that Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate acting as a Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.

The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that “all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges.”²²However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.

Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee

by the Senate Committee of the Whole

Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of SenatorVillar’s right to due process.

We do not agree.

Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process.

The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:

First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.”

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.²³

The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.

Prior Publication

Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole.

In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,²⁴ the Court declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates:

Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court explained in the Resolution²⁵ denying the motion for reconsideration:

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.²⁶ (Emphasis supplied)

In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.,²⁷ the Court further clarified:

x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution’s directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Tañada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.²⁸

The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.

In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:

Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.²⁹

Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected.

Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole³⁰ is an exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges³¹ which states that the Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary to the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate. In addition, Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole³² is an exact reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges³³ which states that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to respondent’s allegation in its Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a quorum.³⁴

However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.³⁵ Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

1 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Rollo, pp. 117-123.

3Id. at 53-54. RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.

4 Id.

5 Id. at 131. Journal of the Senate.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 132. Journal of the Senate.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 141-154.

10 Id. at 155-159. Journal of the Senate.

11 Id. at 162-164. Journal of the Senate.

12 Id. at 165.

13 Id. at 19-20.

14 Id. at 86-87.

15 Lagunilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169276, 16 June 2009, 589 SCRA 224, 232-233 citing Regner v. Logarta, G.R. No. 168747, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 277 and Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250 (1997).

16 Rollo, p. 108, Comment.

17 441 Phil. 492 (2002).

18 Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, 18 April 1990, 184 SCRA 426, 431-432.

19 Arimao v. Taher, G.R. No. 152651, 7 August 2006, 498 SCRA 74.

20 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

21 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630.

22 Section 2.

23 Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, G.R. No. 184849, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 521, 525.

24 G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77.

25 G.R. No. 180643, 4 September 2008, 564 SCRA 152.

26 Id. at 230-231.

27 G.R. No. 193459, 15 February 2011.

28 Emphasis in the original.

29 Rollo, p. 52.

30 Id. at 31.

31 Id. at 141. It states:

Sec. 4. Composition. – It shall have seven (7) members who, including the Chairperson, shall be chosen by the Senate. The President Pro Tempore and both the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate are Ex-Officio Members of the Committee.

32 Id. at 32.

33 Id. at 141. It states:

Sec. 5. Meetings. x x x.

B. QUORUM: The presence of at least two (2) Members of the Committee shall constitute a quorum.

34 Id. at 96. The Comment states:

x x x For instance, with respect to the quorum, the records of the deliberations of the Respondent Committee of the Whole will show that Senate President Enrile, after tracing the long history of instances when the Senate was constituted as a Senate Committee of the Whole, pointed out that for purposes of its proceedings and consistent with tradition and practice, eight (8) of its members – not two (2) as Petitioners claimed – will constitute the quorum.

35 Section 16. x x x

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.