J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2016-0014: JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES VS. THE HONORABLE OBMUDSMAN (G.R. NOS; 212593-94, 15 MARCH 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE J.) (AND OTHER CASES: GR NO. 213163-78; G.R. NOS. 213540-41; G.R. NOS. 213542-43; G.R. NOS. 215880-94; G.R. NOS. 213475-76)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly,  the assailed Resolutions and Orders of the Office of the Ombudsman  and the Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

“Their arguments fail to persuade.

Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused. The Court, in People v. Castillo,242 delineated the functions and purposes of a determination of probable cause made by the public prosecutor, on the one hand, and the trial court, on the other:

There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. 243 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As above-articulated, the executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to suppot1 an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause~ on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. 24~ ‘

This notwithstanding, the Court in Mendoza v. People245 (Mendoza) clarified that the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information before it, narriely to1: (a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; ( b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and ( c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.246 The Court went on to elabqrate that “the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory” and reiterated that “the court’s first option x x x is·. for it to ‘immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. “‘247 ·

Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitldd to make his own assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is probable cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed:with the trial; or in the absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal df the criminal case.248 This is in line with the fundamental doctrine that “once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.”249 Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza cautions the trial courts in proceeding with dismissals of this nature:

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack o( probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss th~ case. On ‘ . the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate I to’ proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.250 I

A careful study of the records yields the conclusion that the ~eci,uirement to personally evaluate the report of the Ombudsman, and its supporting documents, was discharged by the Sandiganbayan when it explicitly declared in its Resolution251 dated July 3, 2014 that it had “p~rson~lly [read] and [evaluated] the Information, the Joint Resolution f “, ‘ dated March 28, 2013 and Joint Order dated June 4, 2013 of the f ‘ ‘ ·. [0?.1budsman ], together with the a~ove-enumerated documents, including ·the,1~ annexes and attachments, which are all part of the records of the pteliminary investigation x x x. “252 A similar pronouncement was made by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution253 dated September 29, 2014, wherein it was said that “[a]fter further considering the records of these cases and due deliberations, the Court finds the existence of probable cause against the said accused xx x.”254 Later on, in a Resolution255 dated November 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan affirmed its earlier findings when it held that the presence of probabl~ cause against all the accused “was already unequivocally settled x x x in its [Resolution] dated July 3, 2014 x x x.”256 Besides, the ‘Sandiganbayan should be accorded with the presumption of regularity in the perfomiance of its official duties. 257 This presumption was not convincingly overcome by either Reyes or the Napoles siblings through clear and convirn~ing evidence, and hence, should prevail. 258 As such, the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes and the Napoles siblings was judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan when it examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued warrants of arrest . against them. 259

Also, the Court cannot lend any credence to Reyes’s protestations of haste qn the part of the Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed Resolutions, absent any clear showing that the presumed regularity of the proceedings has been breached. Reyes would do well to be reminded of the Court’s ruling in Leviste v. Alameda260 wherein it was instructed that “[s]peed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.” 261 i : :’

 Finally, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed bn the~ part of the andiganbayan in denying Reyes ‘s motion to suspend prdceedings against her in view of her filing of a petition for certiorari qhestioning the Ombudsman’s issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 212593-94′. Under Section 7, Rule 65262 of the Rules of Court, a mere pendendy of a. special civil action for certiorari in relation to a case pending before *1e ~emit a’ quo does not ipso facto stay the proceedings therein, unless the higher· court issues a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary 1 ibjunction against the conduct of such proceedings. Otherwise stated, I a petition for certiorari does not divest the lower courts of jurisdiction vdlidly acquired over the case pending before them. Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari is an original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedin~s in the lower court. It is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, i*cluding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictitjn. Thus, under. Section 7 of Rule 65, the higher court should issue against the public respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of prelimi~ary injunction in order to interrupt the course of the principal case. The peti~oner in a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the proceedings before the public respondent. She should show the existende .of an urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may ~e prevented.263 In this case, since the Court did not issue any temporary rdstraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. Nos. 212593-94, then the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for continuing with the pro6eedings before I it. I

Hence, overall, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in judicially determining the existence of probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings; and in denying Reyes’s Urgent Mot1on to Suspend Proceedings. Perforce, the dismissal of G.R. Nos. 213163-78 and G.R. Nos. 215880-94 is in order.

The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or trib nal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiratjon. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge. 1 263 Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, G.R. No. 190253, June 11, 2014, 726 SCRA 298, 312.”

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 SCD-2016-0014-JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES

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CASE 2016-0013:  UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORP VS. ELMER ABLAY ET AL. (G.R. 218172, 16 MARCH 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (SUBJECT/S: INSTANCE WHEN BACKPAY WAS NOT ALLOWED IN ILLEGAL DISMISSAL) (BRIEF TITLE: UNIVERSAL ROBINA VS. ABLAY ET AL.)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the Amended Decision dated April 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02078 are hereby MODIFIED, directing the DELETION of the award of backwages in favor of respondents Elmer Ablay, Ildefonso Clavecillas, Stanley Blaza, Vincent Villavicencio, Roberto Cacas, and Eleazar Cadayuna. The rest of the decision STANDS.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

“An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages. In certain cases, however, the Court has ordered the reinstatement of the employee without backwages considering the fact that (1) the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (2) the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee. For instance, in the case of Cruz v. Minister of Labor and Employment the Court ruled as follows:

The Court is convinced that petitioner’s guilt was substantially established. Nevertheless, we agree with respondent Minister’s order of reinstating petitioner without backwages instead of dismissal which may be too drastic. Denial of backwages would sufficiently penalize her for her infractions. The bank officials acted in good faith. They should be exempt from the burden of paying backwages. The good faith of the employer, when clear under the circumstances, may preclude or diminish recovery of backwages. Only employees discriminately dismissed are entitled to backpay. x x x

Likewise, in the case of Jtogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court pronounced that “[t)he ends of social and compassionate justice would therefore be served if private respondent is reinstated but without backwages in view of petitioner’s good faith.” 46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To reiterate, respondents were indeed guilty of some form of misconduct and, as such, petitioner was justified in exercising disciplinary action against them. Absent any evidence to the contrary, petitioner’s resort to disciplinary proceedings should be presumed to have been done in good faith. 47 Thus, perceiving that petitioner had ample ground to proceed with its disciplinary action against respondents, and that the disciplinary proceedings appear to have been conducted in good faith, the Court finds it proper to apply the exception to the rule on backwages, and consequently, direct the deletion ofbackwages in favor of respondents.48

Finally, the CA correctly observed that Ablay’s conviction as an accomplice to the murder of petitioner’s former assistant manager had strained the relationship between Ablay and petitioner. Hence, Ablay should not be reinstated in the company and, instead, be paid separation pay, as reinstatement would only create an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism would be generated as to adversely affect his efficiency and productivity.49 In this relation, it should be clarified that said strained relation should not affect the grant of benefits in his favor prior to his conviction, as the latter pertains to an offense entirely separate and distinct from the acts constituting petitioner’s charges against him in the case at bar, i.e., taking of the company equipment without authority. Petitioner’s payment of separation pay to Ab lay in lieu of his reinstatement is therefore warranted.

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SCD-2016-0013-UNIVERSAL ROBINA 

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CASE 2016-0012: SPOUSES CESAR and THELMA SUSTENTO VS.  JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, 08 MARCH 2016, BERSAMIN, J. (SUBJECT/S: JUDICIAL ETHICS; DELAY IN RESOLVING CASES) (BRIEF TITLE: SUSTENTO VS. JUDGE LILAGAN)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Tacloban City GUILTY of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in resolving the pending motion for reconsideration; and, ACCORDINGLY, FINES him in the amount of P45,000.00, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future will be more severely sanctioned.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

SUPPOSE A JUDGE HAS VOLUMINOUS CASELOAD, WHAT SHALL HE DO IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY DELAY IN DISPOSITION OF CASES WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

HE SHOULD NOTIFY THE SUPREME COURT THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY AND REQUEST A REASONABLE EXTENTION OF TIME.

“The respondent judge sought to justify his delay by citing the voluminous caseload he had as the presiding judge. The justification does not persuade. Although we are not insensitive to the heavy caseloads of the trial judges, we have allowed reasonable extensions of the periods for the trial judges to resolve their cases. If the heavy caseload of any judge should preclude his disposition of cases within the reglementary period, he should notify the Court, through the Court Administrator, of the reasons or causes for the delay, and request in writing a reasonable extension of the time to dispose of the affected cases. No judge should arrogate unto himself the prerogative to extend the period for deciding cases beyond the mandatory 90-day period.”

THE RESPONDENT’S EXCUSE WAS THAT NO LEGAL RESEARCHER WAS ASSIGNED TO HIM AND HIS CLERK OF COURT WAS JUST RECENTLY APPOINTED. IS THIS  A VALID EXCUSE?

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROMPT ACTION ON THE CASE BELONGED FOREMOST TO THE JUDGE AND COULD NOT BE SHIFTED TO OTHERS.

“We are also not swayed by his other excuses of not having then a legal researcher assigned to him; and of his branch clerk of court being recently appointed. The court’s business did not stop because of such events; hence, he could not use such excuses to delay his actions on the pending matters before his court. Verily, the responsibility for the prompt and expeditious action on the case, which belonged first and foremost to him as the presiding judge, could not be shifted to others like the legal researcher or the recently appointed branch clerk of court.”

RESPONDENT ALSO USED AS JUSTIFICATIONS THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS AND THE FACT THAT HE WAS ALSO THEN UNDER SUSPENSION BECAUSE OF ANOTHER CASE. ARE THESE EXCUSES  VALID?

NO BECAUSE  THEY DO NOT PLACE THE TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THE CASE BEYOND HIS CONTROL.

“The respondent judge gave other justifications, like the time when the motion for reconsideration was submitted for resolution on December 10, 2009 being already in “the period of euphoria for the Christmas holidays;”23 and that he was serving his three-month suspension from office relative to another administrative case of undue delay in rendering an order when the case was filed, but resolved the complainants’ motion for reconsideration as soon as he reported back to work. We reject these justifications as unworthy explanations of the failure to resolve the motion for reconsideration in an expeditious and seasonal manner simply because they did not place the timely resolution beyond the control of the respondent judge.”

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE FAILURE TO RENDER A DECISION WITHIN THE 90 DAY PERIOD FROM SUBMISSION OF THE CASE FOR DECISION?

IT IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE HONOR AND INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICE AND CONSTITUTES A DEROGATION OF THE SPEEDY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

“The respondent cannot be spared from the consequences of his undue delays in the case of the complainants. He did not show that he ever requested the Court for the additional time within which to dispose of the matters therein. It then becomes inescapable for him to face the consequences of his inexplicable inaction. He was guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty. Failure to render a decision within the 90day period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of. the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice.”

WHAT IS THE SANCTION AGAINST UNDUE DELAY IN RENDERING A DECISION OR ORDER?

“Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order falls within the category of a less serious charge, and is penalized as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. -x x x

1. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge. any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
3. A fine of more than Pl 0,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

xx xx”

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SCD-2016-0012-SUSTENTO 

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