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CASE 2016-0017: MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN, DANTE Q. CATACUTAN, REPRESENTED BY THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FERNANDO Q. CATACUTAN, PETITIONERS, -VERSUS SPOUSES GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN AND TERESITA PUNZALAN, (G.R. NO. 203075, 16 MARCH 2016, PERALTA, J.) (SUBJECT/S: UNLAWFUL DETAINER; FORCIBLE ENTRY; JURISDICTION) (BRIEF TITLE: DIAZ ET AL VS. SPOUSES PUNZALAN)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals; dated February 17, 2012, and its Resolution dated July 25, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 112959, are hereby AFFIRMED. 

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

IN EJECTMENT CASES HOW IS THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT DETERMINED?

 

BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND THE CHARACTER OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT.

 

WHAT STATEMENTS OF FACTS SHOULD BE STATED?

 

SUCH FACTS AS TO BRING THE PARTY CLEARLY WITHIN THE CASES COVERED BY SECTION 1, RULE 70 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE?

 

WHAT DOES SECTION 1, RULE 79 PROVIDES?

 

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. -Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives  or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action !n the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming ·under them, for the restitution of such possession,  together with damages and costs.

 

UNDER THE AFOREQUOTED RULE, WHAT ARE POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ACTION?

 

THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT AND DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION:

 

1)A CASE FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY, WHICH IS AN ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF A PROPERTY FROM THE DEFENDANT WHOSE OCCUPATION THEREOF IS ILLEGAL FROM THE BEGINNING AS HE ACQUIRED POSSESSION BY INTIMIDATION, THREAT, STRATEGY OR STEALTH; AND

 

 2) A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER, WHICH IS AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION FROM THE DEFENDANT WHICH POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY WAS LAWFUL AT THE INCEPTION BY VIRTUE OF A CONTRACT WITH THE PLAINTIFF, BE IT EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME ILLEGAL WHEN HE CONTINUED HIS POSSESSION DESPITE THE TERMINATION OF HIS RIGHT OR AUTHORITY.

 

WHAT ARE THE FACTS TO BE STATED IN A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER?

 

THE COMPLAINT MUST STATE THE FOLLOWING:

 

(1) THE DEFENDANT’S INITIAL POSSESSION ,OF THE PROPERTY WAS LAWFUL, EITHER BY CONTRACT WITH OR BY TOLERANCE OF THE PLAINTIFF;

 

(2) EVENTUALLY, SUCH POSSESSTON BECAME ILLEGAL UPON THE PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT OF THE TENNINATION OF THE LATTER’S RIGHT OF POSSESSION;

 

(3) THEREAFTER, THE  DEFENDANT REMAINED IN POSSESSION AND DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFF OF THE ENJOYMENT OF THE PROPERTY; AND

 

( 4) THE PLAINTIFF INSTITUTED THE COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE LAST DEMAND TO VACATE THE PROPERTY.

 

WHAT ARE THE FACTS TO BE STATED IN A CASE FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY?

 

THE COMPLAINT MUST STATE THE FOLLOWING:

 

 (1) THE PLAINTIFF MUST ALLEGE PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY;

 

(2) THE PLAINTIFF WAS DEPRIVED OF POSSESSION BY FORCE, INTIMIDATION, THREAT, STRATEGY OR STEALTH; AND

 

(3) THE ACTION MUST BE FILED WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE DATE OF ACTUAL ENTRY ON THE LAND, EXCEPT THAT WHEN THE ENTRY IS THROUGH STEALTH, THE ONE (1 )-YEAR PERIOD IS COUNTED FROM THE TIME THE PLAINTIFF-OWNER OR LEGAL POSSESSOR LEARNED OF THE DEPRIVATION OF THE PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY.

 

IT IS NOT NECESSARY, HOWEVER, FOR THE COMPLAINT TO EXPRESSLY USE THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF THE LAW. FOR AS LONG AS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE DISPOSSESSION TOOK PLACE UNDER SAID CONDITIONS, IT IS CONSIDERED AS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS.  

 

THE PETITIONER CLAIMS THAT THEIR CASE WAS NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY BECAUSE THEY TOLERATED THE OCCUPATION OF THE PROPERTY BY SPOUSES PUNZALAN. IT WAS ONLY AFTER THEY DEMANDED THAT THEY LEAVE BUT THEY REFUSED TO LEAVE THAT SPOUSES PUNZALAN COMMITTED UNLAWFUL DETAINER. IS THIS CLAIM CORRECT?

 

NO.

 

WHEN SPOUSES PUNZALAN CONSTRUCTED THEIR DWELLING HOUSE ON SUBJECT LOT WITHOUT PETITIONER’S KNOWLEDGE THEIR ACT FALLS UNDER STEALTH WHICH IS DEFINED AS ANY SECRET, SLY OR CLANDESTINE ACT TO AVOID DISCOVERY AND TO GAIN ENTRANCE INTO, OR TO REMAIN WITHIN RESIDENCE OF ANOTHER WITHOUT PERMISSION.

 

PETITIONER’S TOLERANCE CAME LATER, NOT FROM INCEPTION AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.

 

IS THERE A SIMILAR CASE APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE?

 

YES. ZACARIAS V. ANACAY (G.R. NO. 202354, SEPTEMBER 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508, 521)

 

IN SAID CASE THE  PETITIONER ARGUED THAT UNLAWFUL DETAINER WAS THE PROPER REMEDY, CONSIDERING THAT SHE MERELY TOLERATED RESPONDENTS’ STAY IN THE PREMISES AFTER DEMAND TO VACATE WAS MADE UPON THEM. THEY HAD, IN FACT, ENTERDD ·INTO AN AGREEMENT .AND SHE WAS ONLY FORCED TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION WHEN RESPONDENTS RENEGED ON THEIR PROMISE TO VACATE THE PROPERTY AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE PERIOD AGREED UPON. THE COURT HELD THAT THE. MCTC CLEARLY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AS THE COMPLAINT DID NOT SATISFY THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF A VALID CAUSE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

 

 WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER?

 

THE NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT’S ENTRY INTO OR INITIAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY.

 

IN FORCIBLE ENTRY, DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION IS ILLEGAL AT THE START.

 

IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER, DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION IS LEGAL BUT BECAME ILLEGAL DUE TO THE EXPIRATION OR T”ERMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO POSSESS.

 

WHEN SHOULD THE ONE YEAR PERIOD STARTS IN FORCIBLE ENTRY?

 

FROM DATE OF ENTRY. IN CASE ENTRY WAS BY STEALTH, FROM DATE OF DISCOVERY.  BECAUSE FORCIBLE ENTRY IS AN OPEN CHALLENGE TO THE RIGHT OF THE POSSESSOR. VIOLATION OF THAT RIGHT AUTHORIZES A SPEEDY REDRESS.

 

WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF THE PETITIONER?

 

HE MAY FILE AN ACCION PUBLICIANA OR ACCION REIVINDICATORIA WITH THE PROPER RTC.

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2016-0017-DIAZ

 

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CASE 2016-0016: MARY ROSE A. BOTO VS. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR VINCENT L. VILLENA, CITY PROSECUTOR ARCHIMEDESV.MANABAT AND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR PATRICK NOEL P. DE DIOS  (A.C. NO. 9684, 16 MARCH 2016, MENDOZA, J.) (SUBJECT/S: PENALTY REDUCED FROM FINE TO REPRIMAND) (BRIEF TITLE: BOTO VS. VILLENA ET AL)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Vincent L. Villena is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The penalty imposed upon him is reduced from paying a fine of PI0,000.00 to REPRIMAND.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

“Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.”6

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2016-0016-BOTO 

 

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CASE 2016-0015: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NILDA B. TAMPUS (G.R. NO. 214243, 16 MARCH 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (SUBJECT/S: JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH) (BRIEF TITLE: REPLUBLIC VS. TAMPUS)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 17, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04588 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition of respondent Nilda B. Tampus to have her husband, Dante L. Del Mundo, declared presumptively dead is DENIED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

WHAT MUST BE PROVEN BEFORE A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH CAN BE OBTAINED?

 

IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT: A) THE PRIOR SPOUSE HAS BEEN ABSENT FOR FOUR CONSECUTIVE YEARS AND B) THE PRESENT SPOUSE HAD A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF THAT THE  PRIOR SPOUSE WAS ALREADY DEAD.

 

WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS IN LAW?

 

ART 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE  WHICH PROVIDES: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

 

WHO HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT ALL THE REQUISITES UNDER ART. 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE EXIST?

 

THE PRESENT SPOUSE. BECAUSE HE/SHE IS THE ONE WHO ASSERTS THE AFFIRMATIVE OF THE ISSUE. HE WHO ALLEGED A FACT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING IT AND MERE ALLEGATION IS NOT EVIDENCE.

 

WHAT DOES “WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF” MEANS?

 

IT MEANS THAT THE PRESENT SPOUSE MUST PROVE THAT HIS/HER BELIEF WAS THE RESULT OF DILIGENT AND REASONABLE EFFORTS TO LOCATE THE ABSENT SPOUSE AND THAT BASED ON THESE EFFORTS AND INQUIRIES, HE/SHE BELIEVES THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ABSENT SPOUSE IS ALREADY DEAD. IT NECESSITATES EXERTION OF ACTIVE EFFORT, NOT A PASSIVE ONE. AS SUCH, THE MERE ABSENCE OF THE SPOUSE FOR SUCH PERIODS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE LAW, LACK OF ANY NEWS THAT SUCH ABSENTEE SPOUSE IS STILL ALIVE, FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE, OR GENERAL PRESUMPTION OF ABSENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE WOULD NOT SUFFICE.22 THE PREMISE IS THAT ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE PLACES UPON THE PRESENT SPOUSE THE BURDEN OF COMPLYING WITH THE STRINGENT REQUIREMENT OF “WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF’ WHICH CAN ONLY BE DISCHARGED UPON A SHOWING OF PROPER AND HONEST-TO-GOODNESS INQUIRIES AND EFFORTS TO ASCERTAIN NOT ONLY THE ABSENT SPOUSE’S WHEREABOUTS, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, WHETHER THE LATTER IS STILL ALIVE OR IS ALREADY DEAD.

 

WHY WAS RESPONDENTS’ EVIDENCE NOT SUFFICIENT?

 

THE COURT RULED:

 

“In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante’s disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court’s mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante’s parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a “well-founded belief’ of his death.

 

Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante’s family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource persons were not even ~ named. In Republic v. Nolasco,24 it was held that the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts was found insufficient as the names of said friends were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.25

 

Finally, other than Nilda’s bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered to support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as. established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a “well-founded belief’ that her husband is dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.”

 

IN EFFECT WHAT WAS THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT?

 

RESPONDENT FALL SHORT OF THE STRINGENT STANDARD AND DEGREE OF DUE DILIGENCE REQUIRED BY JURISPRUDENCE TO SUPPORT HER CLAIM OF A “WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF’ THAT HER HUSBAND DANTE IS ALREADY DEAD.

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2016-0015-TAMPUS

 

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