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CASE 2017-0010: PHILIPPINE STEEL COATING CORP., VS. EDUARD QUIÑONES, (G.R. No. 194533 19 APRIL 2017, SERENO, CJ:) (SUBJECTS: EXPRESS WARRANTY; NEGLIGENCE; OPTIONS OF A BUYER WHEN WARRANTY IS BREACHED; PRESCRIPTION IN CASE OF WARRANTIES; DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF FAMILY DEFINED; ATTORNEY’S FEES CANNOT BE BASED ONLY ON AGREEMENT WITH LAWYER;)  (BRIEF TITLE:: PHILIPPINE STEEL VS. QUIÑONES)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 March 2010 and Resolution dated 19 November 20 l 0 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED, except for the award of attorney’s fees, which is hereby DELETED.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

THE BASIC FACTS:

 

RESPONDENT WAS PRODUCING BUSES. PETITIONER WAS SELLING G.I. COATED SHEETS. RESPONDENT WANTED TO BUT G.I. COATED SHEETS FROM PETITIONER. PETITIONER  EXPRESSLY REPRESENTED TO RESPONDENT THAT THE PRIMER-COATED G .I. SHEETS WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ACRYLIC PAINT PROCESS USED BY THE LATTER ON HIS BUS UNITS. THIS REPRESENTATION WAS MADE IN THE FACE OF RESPONDENT’S EXPRESS CONCERNS REGARDING INCOMPATIBILITY. RESPONDENT BOUGHT G.I. SHEETS AND MADE THEM INTO BUSES. HOWEVER, THE PAINTS PEELED 0FF AND CUSTOMERS COMPLAINED. RESPONDENT SUED FOR DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF EXPRESS WARRANTY. RTC AWARDED DAMAGES. C.A. AFFIRMED.

 

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES TO BE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THERE IS AN EXPRESS WARRANTY IN A CONTRACT OF SALE?

 

THERE ARE THREE REQUISITES:

 

( 1) THE EXPRESS WARRANTY MUST BE AN AFFIRMATION OF FACT OR ANY PROMISE BY THE SELLER RELATING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SALE;

 

(2) THE NATURAL EFFECT OF THE AFFIRMATION OR PROMISE IS TO INDUCE THE BUYER TO PURCHASE THE THING; AND

 

(3) THE BUYER PURCHASES THE THING RELYING ON THAT AFFIRMATION OR PROMISE.

 

PETITIONER ARGUES THAT THE PURPORTED WARRANTIES ARE VAGUE ORAL STATEMENTS AND THEREFORE CANNOT CONSTITUTE AS GROUND FOR DAMAGES. IS THIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

 A WARRANTY IS NOT NECESSARILY WRITTEN.

 

IT MAY BE ORAL AS LONG AS IT IS NOT GIVEN AS A MERE OPINION OR JUDGMENT. IT MUST BE A POSITIVE AFFIRMATION OF A FACT THAT BUYERS RELY UPON, AND THAT INFLUENCES OR INDUCES  THEM TO PURCHASE THE PRODUCT.

 

THE  ORAL STATEMENTS OF ANGBENGCO CREATED AN EXPRESS WARRANTY. THEY WERE POSITIVE AFFIRMATIONS OF FACT THAT THE BUYER RELIED ON, AND THAT INDUCED HIM TO BUY PETITIONER’S PRIMER-COATED G .I. SHEETS.

 

IS SELLER’S OPINION A WARRANTY?

 

NO UNLESS THE SELLER MADE SUCH AFFIRMATION OR STATEMENT AS AN EXPERT AND IT WAS RELIED UPON BY THE BUYER.

 

WAS PETITIONER AN EXPERT ON WHAT THEY ADVISE RESPONDENT?

 

YES, TO THE EYES OF RESPONDENT.

 

“Despite its claims to the contrary, petitioner was an expert in the eyes of the buyer Quinones. The latter had asked if the primer-coated G.I. sheets were compatible with Amianan Motors’ acrylic painting process. Petitioner’s former employee, Lopez, testified that he had to refer Quinones to the former’s immediate supervisor, Angbengco, to answer that question. As the sales manager of PhilSteel, Angbengco made repeated assurances and affirmations and even invoked laboratory tests that showed compatibility.13 In the eyes of the buyer Quinones, PhilSteel -through its representative, Angbengco -was an expert whose word could be relied upon.”

 

PETITIONER ARGUED THAT WHAT THEY TOLD RESPONDENT WAS MERE DEALER’S TALK OR EXAGERATION. IS THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

NO.

 

THE COURT SAID:

 

“Contrary however to petitioner’s position, the so-called dealer’s or trader’s talk cannot be treated as mere exaggeration in trade as defined in A1iicle 1340 of the Civil Code.16 Quinones did not talk to an ordinary sales clerk such as can be found in a department store or even a sari-sari store. If Lopez, a sales agent, had made the assertions of Angbengco without true knowledge about the compatibility or the authority to wanant it, then his would be considered dealer’s talk. But sensing that a person of greater competence and knowledge of the product had to answer Quinones’ concerns, Lopez wisely deferred to his boss, Angbengco.

 

Angbengco undisputedly assured Quinones that laboratory tests had been undertaken, and that those tests showed that the acrylic paint used by Quinones was compatible with the primer-coated G.I. sheets of Philsteel. Thus, Angbengco was no longer giving a mere seller’s opinion or making an exaggeration in trade. Rather, he was making it appear to Quinones that Phil Steel had already subjected the latter’s primed G .I. sheets to product testing. PhilSteel, through its representative, was in effect inducing in the mind of the buyer the belief that the former was an expert on the primed G.I. sheets in question; and that the statements made by petitioner’s representatives, particularly Angbengco (its sales manager), 17 could be relied on. Thus, petitioner did induce the buyer to purchase the former’s G .I. sheets.”

 

RESPONDENT ARGUES THAT THE CASE ALREADY PRESCRIBED. IT IS CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

NO, BECAUSE IT WAS FILED WITHIN THE 4 YEAR PRESCRITION PERIOD.

 

WHAT IS THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN CASE OF AN EXPRESS WARRANTY?

 

IT IS THAT SPECIFIED IN THE CONTRACT.

 

IN  ITS ABSENCE, THAT PERIOD SHALL BE BASED ON THE GENERAL RULE ON THE RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS: FOUR YEARS (SEE ARTICLE 1389, CIVIL CODE).

 

WHAT IS NEGLIGENCE?

 

IT IS THE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE CARE AND CAUTION THAT AN ORDINARILY PRUDENT PERSON WOULD HAVE USED IN A GIVEN SITUATION.

 

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF NEGLIGENCE?

 

THAT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED BY LAW OR THE CONTRACT.

 

IF NOT SPECIFIED BY LAW OR CONTRACT THEN IT IS COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS PATERFAMILIAS  OR  AS BONOS PATERFAMILIAS OR “A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY.”

 

A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY MEANS A PERSON OF ORDINARY OR AVERAGE DEIGENCE.

 

TO DETERMINE THE PRUDENCE AND DILIGENCE THAT MUST BE REQUIRED OF ALL PERSONS, WE MUST USE AS BASIS THE ABSTRACT AVERAGE STANDARD CORRESPONDING TO A NORMAL ORDERLY PERSON.

 

ANYONE WHO USES DILIGENCE BELOW THIS STANDARD IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.

 

PETITIONER ACCUSED RESPONDENT OF NEGLIGENCE. IT SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT BY APPLYING ACRYLIC OVER EPOXY PRIMER USED ON THE G.I. SHEETS, THE LATTER PRIMER WOULD BE DISSOLVED OR STIPPED OFF. WAS PETITIONER’S CONTENTION CORRECT?

 

NO.

 

THE SUPREME COURT POINTED OUT THAT:

 

“It bears reiteration that Quinones had already raised the compatibility issue at the outset. He relied on the manpower and expertise of PhilSteel, but at the same time reasonably asked for more details regarding the product. It was not an impulsive or rush decision to buy. In fact, it took 4 to 5 meetings to convince him to buy the primed G .I. sheets. And even after making an initial order, he did not make subsequent orders until after a painting test, done upon the instructions of Angbengco proved successful. The test was conducted using their acrylic paint over PhilSteel’s primer-coated G.I. sheets. Only then did Quinones make subsequent orders of the primer-coated product, which was then used in the mass production of bus bodies” by Respondent.

 

WAS NON-PAYMENT OF THE UNPAID PRICE JUSTIFIED?

 

YES BECAUSE AN EXPRESS BREACH OF WARRANTY WAS PROVEN.

 

IN CASE OF BREACH OF WARRANTY BY THE SELLER, WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS OF THE BUYER?

 

( 1) ACCEPT OR KEEP THE GOODS AND SET UP AGAINST THE SELLER, THE BREACH OF WAITANTY BY WAY OF RECOUPMENT IN DIMINUTION OR EXTINCTION OF THE PRICE;

 

(2) ACCEPT OR KEEP THE GOODS AND MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST THE SELLER FOR DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF WARRANTY;

 

(3) REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE GOODS, AND MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST THE SELLER FOR DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF WARRANTY;

 

( 4) RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE AND REFUSE TO RECEIVE THE GOODS OR IF THE GOODS HAVE ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED, RETURN THEM OR OFFER TO RETURN THEM TO THE SELLER AND RECOVER THE PRICE OR ANY PART THEREOF WHICH HAS BEEN PAID.

 

THE SUPREME COURT AMPLIFIED:

 

“When the buyer has claimed and been granted a remedy in anyone of these ways, no other remedy can thereafter be granted, without prejudice to the provisions of the second paragraph of article 1191.

 

Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer, he cannot rescind the sale if he knew of the breach of waITanty when he accepted the goods without protest, or if he fails to notify the seller within a reasonable time of the election to rescind, or if he fails to return or to offer to return the goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as they were in at the time the ownership was transferred to the buyer. But if deterioration or injury of the goods is due to the breach or warranty, such deterioration or injury shall not prevent the buyer from returning or offering to return the goods to the seller and rescinding the sale.

 

Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale and elects to do so, he shall cease to be liable for the price upon returning or offering to return the goods. If the price or any part thereof has already been paid, the seller shall be liable to repay so much thereof as has been paid, concurrently with the return of the goods, or immediately after an offi:r io return the goods in exchange for repayment of the price.

 

Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale and elects to do so, if the seller refoscs to accept an offer of the buyer to return the goods, the buyer shall thereafter be deemed to hold the goods as bailee for the seller, but subject to a lien to secure the payment 31 387 Phil. 216 (2000) of any portion of the price which has been paid, and with the remedies for the enforcement of such lien allowed to an unpaid seller by article 1526.

 

In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such loss, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount, is the difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty.”

 

THE RTC AND CA AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE GROUND THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND HIS LAWYER SPECIFIED ATTORNEY’S FEES. IT THIS CORRECT?


THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES MUST BE DELETED.

 

ATTORNEY’S FEE CANNOT BE BASED ON A MERE ALLEGATION OR TESTIMONY THAT A PARTY HAS AGREED TO PAY A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES.

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2017-0010-PHILIPPINE STEEL COATING CORP. VS. EDUARD QUINONES 

 

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SUPREME COURT RAPE MYTHS

Supreme Court rape myths violate women’s rights

By: Rebecka Koziomtzis and Bryan Dennis Gabito Tiojanco@inquirerdotnet

Philippine Daily Inquirer / 12:16 AM May 19, 2017

The Supreme Court should be ashamed of its recent rape decisions. Like sidewalk fortune-tellers who rely on playing cards to determine the future, the Court relies on debunked rape myths and false stereotypes to determine guilt. It has acquitted proven rapists as a result. This is not only tragic for rape victims, it also violates the Philippines’ human rights obligations under international law.

In a case decided in February, the victim testified that she fell asleep from dizziness while drinking alcohol with the accused and another friend. She was roused from sleep when the other friend started having sex with her. She was afraid that a knife atop a nearby table “would be used to kill her if she resisted,” so she cried. She was still dizzy, frightened, and shivering when the friend left and the accused approached her to ask if he could also have sex with her. She did not answer as she was still shivering, but the accused nevertheless raped her.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the victim’s testimony “credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things,” and so held the accused guilty. But the Supreme Court acquitted the accused. It held that the victim gave the accused “the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit consent” because “she did not, and chose not to utter a word or make any sign of rejection.”

The Court repeated this reasoning last month, when it acquitted an accused rapist because there was no evidence that the victim “resisted in that whole time,” and held that “[w]hat she did not do was eloquent proof of her consent.” This reasoning follows the common misconception that victims instinctively scream and physically resist their rapists. That is simply untrue. Victims rarely react to rape this way. In fact, psychological studies consistently show that the brain’s usual response to a violent or threatening situation is to paralyze the body—a state called “frozen fright.” Physical resistance is consequently often beyond the conscious control of rape victims. The Court’s reasoning thus conditions justice on a requirement that defies human nature. To expect victims to scream and physically resist their rapists is to expect them to override the brain’s inherent survival mechanism. To find consent in the victim’s nonresistance is therefore outrageous.

An international human rights body has in fact castigated the Philippines for adhering to this rape myth. Ten years ago, a Filipino woman went to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to claim that the Philippines violated her right to nondiscrimination when her rapist was acquitted based on several rape myths, including the myth that rape victims naturally resist their rapists. The Committee agreed with her, stating in 2010 that “to expect [the victim] to have resisted in the situation at stake reinforces in a particular manner the myth that women must physically resist the sexual assault. In this regard, the Committee stresses that there should be no assumption in law or in practice that a woman gives her consent because she has not physically resisted the unwanted sexual conduct.” The Committee concluded that the Philippines failed to comply with its obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and recommended that the Philippines compensate the woman and “[e]nsure that all legal procedures in cases involving crimes of rape and other sexual offences are impartial and fair, and not affected by prejudices or stereotypical gender notions.”

Seven years after these recommendations, prejudices and false gender stereotypes still grip our courts. And the Supreme Court still follows the same debunked myth that rape victims instinctively resist rapists. Meanwhile, police records show that one woman or child is raped in the Philippines every hour. To help deliver justice to these victims, the Court must recognize the reality of rape and stop anchoring its decisions on rape myths.

Rebecka Koziomtzis is a PhD candidate at the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law. Her dissertation is on rape and international law. Bryan Dennis Gabito Tiojanco is a JSD candidate at Yale Law School. He graduated cum laude from the University of the Philippines College of Law.

CASE 2017-0009: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CARLITO CLARO Y MAHINAY (G.R. NO. 199894, 05 APRIL 2017, BERSAMIN, J.) (ACQUITAL IN RAPE CASE; MEANING OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; MEANING OF REASONABLE DOUBT? HISTORY OF CONCEPT THAT GUILT MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; DUTY OF THE PROSECUTION) (BRIEF TITLE: PEOPLE VS CLARO)

 

DISPOSITIVE:

 

“WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 24, 2011 affirming the conviction for rape of CARLITO CLARO y MAHIN A Y under the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, in Manila; ACQUITS CARLITO CLARO y MARINA Y for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; ORDERS his immediate release from the National Penitentiary unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continuing confinement thereat; and DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement the release of CARLITO CLARO y MAHIN A Y in accordance with this decision, and to report on his compliance within l 0 days from receipt.

 

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

 

SO ORDERED.”

 

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

 

THE MEDICO-LEGAL EXAMINATION SHOWS THAT THERE WERE ABRASIONS IN THE VICTIM’S LEFT BREAST AND CONTUSIONS ON HER RIGHT HAND. IS THIS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED?

 

NO. THE MERE PRESENCE OF ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS ON HER DID NOT PRECLUDE THE GIVING OF HER CONSENT TO THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, FOR ABRASIONS AND CONTUSIONS COULD ALSO BE SUFFERED DURING VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION OF THE PARTNERS TO EACH OTHER’S LUST.

 

 “That the medico-legal examination of March 14, 2006 turned up with the findings of abrasions on AAA’s left breast and contusions on her right hand did not necessarily mean that the accused had applied force in the context of forcing her to have sex with him. The conclusion of the CA was, therefore, too sweeping, for it inexplicably ignored the probability of consensuality between the parties. Such findings did not justify the full rejection of the demonstrable consensuality of their sexual intercourse. Moreover, the mere presence of abrasions and contusions on her did not preclude the giving of her consent to the sexual intercourse, for abrasions and contusions could also be suffered during voluntary submission of the partners to each other’s lust. Such possibility calls for us to open our minds to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse resulted from consensuality between them.”

 

WHAT IS MEANT BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

 

IT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A DEGREE OF PROOF AS, EXCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF ERROR, PRODUCES ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY. ONLY MORAL CERTAINTY IS REQUIRED, OR THAT DEGREE OF PROOF WHICH PRODUCES CONVICTION IN AN UNPREJUDICED MIND.

 

WHAT IS REASONABLE DOUBT?

 

IT IS IS NOT MERE POSSIBLE DOUBT; BECAUSE EVERYTHING RELATING TO HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND DEPENDING ON MORAL EVIDENCE, IS OPEN TO SOME POSSIBLE OR IMAGINARY DOUBT. IT IS THAT STATE OF THE CASE WHICH, AFTER THE ENTIRE COMPARISON AND CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE EVIDENCE, LEAVES THE MINDS OF JURORS IN SUCH A CONDITION THAT THEY CANNOT SAY THEY FEEL AN ABIDING CONVICTION, TO A MORAL CERTAINTY, OF THE TRUTH OF THE CHARGE.

 

WHY IS IT THAT ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IS NOT REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

 

BECAUSE IT WOULD EXCLUDE CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE.

 

“The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.”

 

WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT  THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

 

IT HAS A LONG HISTORY THAT EVEN PRE-DATES OUR CONSTITUTIONS. IT WAS  RECURRENTLY EXPRESSED FROM ANCIENT TIMES, (THOUGH) ITS CRYSTALLIZATION INTO THE FORMULA ‘BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT’ SEEMS TO HAVE OCCURRED AS LATE AS 1798.

 

‘The requirement of establishing the guilt of the accused in every criminal proceeding beyond reasonable doubt has a long history that even pre-dates our Constitutions. As summed up by jurisprudence of American origin:

 

The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The ‘demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, (though) its crystallization into the formula ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.”

 

WHY IS IT THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS VITAL IN OUR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?

 

BECAUSE DURING A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION THE ACCUSED MAY LOSE HIS LIBERTY UPON CONVICTION AND HE WOULD BE STIGMATIZED BY THE CONVICTION. IT IS ALSO INDISPENSABLE TO COMMAND THE RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE OF THE COMMUNITY IN APPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW.


“The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. . . . . ”

 

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”

 

WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE PROSECUTION?

 

TO PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. HE MUST PROVE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ACCUSED. THE PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS OWN EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED.

 

“Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.”

 

 

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

 

SCD-2017-0009-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CARLITO CLARO Y MAHINAY

 

NOTE: TO RESEARCH ON A TOPIC IN YAHOO OR GOOGLE SEARCH  JUST TYPE “jabbulao and the topic”. EXAMPLE: TO RESEARCH ON FORUM SHOPPING JUST  TYPE “jabbulao and forum shopping”.