J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

CASE 2017-0026– HON. MYLYN P. CAYABYAB, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF LUBAO, PAMPANGA AND ANGELITO L. DAVID, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE BARANGAY CHAIRMAN OF PRADO SIONGCO, LUBAO, PAMPANGA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EMMANUEL SANTOS VS. JAIME C. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT, CARMELA R. DIMSON AND IRENE R. DIMSON (G.R. NO. 223862, 1O JULY 2017,  PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (SUBJECT/S: CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT AS BASIS OF CERTIORARI; ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS PRESUMED REGULAR) (BRIEF TITLE: MAYOR CAYABYAB VS. JAIME C. DIMSON).

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 18, 2015 and the Resolution dated March 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138699 are hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.’

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

CAN YOU OPERATE A BUSINESS MERELY BECAUSE THE BUSINESS IS LEGITIMATE IN NATURE?

NO. YOU MUST FIRST OBTAIN A BUSINESS PERMIT FROM THE MUNICIPALITY OR CITY.

“A business permit must be secured from the municipal business permits and licensing office in order for the business to legally operate in the locality.41 While poultry farming is admittedly a legitimate business, it cannot operate without a business permit, which expires on the 31st of December of every year and must be renewed before the end of January of the following year.”

IN THIS CASE COMPLAINTS FROM NEIGHBORING BARANGAYS WERE RECEIVED BY THE OFFICE OF MAYOR CAYABYAB BEWAILING THE FOUL ODOR COMING FROM THE SAID FARM, 42 WHICH WAS CONFIRMED UPON OCULAR INSPECTION CONDUCTED BY THE HEALTH AND SANITATION OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF LUBAO, PAMPANGA. IS THE OCULAR INSPECTION FINDING VALID?

YES. SETTLED IS THE RULE THAT ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE PRESUMED TO BE REGULAR AND VALID, UNLESS SUFFICIENTLY SHOWN TO BE OTHERWISE.

“In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson filed any application for renewal of his business permit to operate the subject poultry farm in 2014, apparently due to his failure to secure the necessary barangay clearance which was not issued based on complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said farm. Records show that complaints from neighboring barangays were received by the office of Mayor Cayabyab bewailing the foul odor coming from the said farm, 42 which was confirmed upon ocular inspection conducted by the Health and Sanitation Office of the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga.43 Settled is the rule that acts of public officers are presumed to be regular and valid, unless sufficiently shown to be otherwise.44 In this case, Dimson was unable to refute the finding that foul odor is being emitted by his farm, having failed to present the inspection report of the sanitary officer who purportedly did not note any such foul smell in the fann.45 Not having passed the necessary sanitation standard, there was, therefore, a prima facie valid reason for the withholding of the required barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the renewal of Dimson’s business permit to operate.

Having failed to apply for and secure the necessary business pennit to operate in 2014 on account of his inability to obtain the required barangay clearance due to non-compliance with a requirement standard,46 Dimson may not legally operate in the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, thereby, warranting the issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the CDO and the Closure Order. Accordingly, no error, much less grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed on the RTC in denying Dimson’s application for the issuance of a TRO against the said orders. In the absence of a business permit, Dimson has no clear legal right to resume his operations pending final determination by the RTC of the merits of the main case for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law, which is not extant in the present case. It is settled that the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance of an injunctive.”

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2017-0026-Hon. Mylyn P. Cayabyab, in her capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga . . . . .

NOTE: TO RESEARCH ON A TOPIC IN YAHOO OR GOOGLE SEARCH  JUST TYPE “jabbulao and the topic”. EXAMPLE: TO RESEARCH ON FORUM SHOPPING JUST  TYPE “jabbulao and forum shopping”.

CASE 2017-0025– REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ET AL./EUFEMIA C. CULLAMAT, ET AL. VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTER, ET AL./NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, ET AL. (G.R. NO. 231658/G.R. NO. 231771/G.R. NO. 231774. JULY 4, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.) (BRIEF TITLE: REP LAGMAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MEDIALDEA)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CRIME BEING COMMITTED IN MARAWI IS TERRORISM AND NOT REBELLION. THUS, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR MARTIAL LAW SINCE THERE IS NO REBELLION. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?

IT IS NOT CORRECT.

REBELLION MAY BE SUBSUMED UNDER THE CRIME OF TERRORISM WHICH HAS A BROADER SCOPE. REBELLION IS ONLY ONE OF THE VARIOUS MEANS BY WHICH TERRORISM CAN BE COMMITTED.

“It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has be’ n ongoing for decades. While some groups have sought legal and peace 1 means, others have resorted to violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope  covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed, However, while

the scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a “‘terrorist” is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.

In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that “[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government.” Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial  law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. . . .”

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW.

SCD-2017-0025- Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, et al

NOTE: TO RESEARCH ON A TOPIC IN YAHOO OR GOOGLE SEARCH  JUST TYPE “jabbulao and the topic”. EXAMPLE: TO RESEARCH ON FORUM SHOPPING JUST  TYPE “jabbulao and forum shopping”.

CASE 2017-0024–EDRON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION AND EDMER Y. LIM VS. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR VICENTE T. PIMENTEL, JR. (G.R. NO. 220211, 05 JUNE 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (SUBJECT/S: DEFENSES NOT RAISED IN THE ANSWER DEEMED WAIVED; COMPUTATION OF INTEREST ON JUDGMENT AMOUNT) (BRIEF TITLE: EDRON CONSTRUCTION ET AL VS. PROV GOVERNMENT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR)

 DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 26, 2014 and the Resolution dated September 8, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99539 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 28, 2010 and the Order dated September 16, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77 in Civil Case No. Q-08-63154 are hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, in that respondent the Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur, represented by Governor Vicente T. Pimentel, Jr., is liable to petitioners Edron Construction Corporation and Edmer Y. Lim for the amounts of: (a) ?4,326,174.50 plus legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from first demand on June 20, 2000 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of the Decision; (b) PS0,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and (c) the costs of suit. Furthermore such amounts shall earn an additional six percent ( 6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED RTC GRANTING RELIEF TO PETITIONER BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT A CERTAIN SWORN AFFIDAVIT THAT WORKERS ARE PAID ETC PURSUANT TO CONTRACT. BUT SUCH GROUND WAS NOT RAISED IN THE ANSWER OF RESPONDENT BUT IN A MOTION TO DISMISS FILED MUCH LATER. IS CA CORRECT?

CA IS WRONG.

ANY DEFENSE NOT RAISED IN THE ANSWER IS DEEMED WAIVED PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF COURT.

In the instant case, a judicious review of the records reveals that respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim31 dated January 6, 2009 did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners’ non-execution of the sworn statement pertained to in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements. In fact, such matter was only raised in its Motion to Dismiss32 filed more than a year later after the Answer, or on May 24, 2010, to support the ground relied upon in the said Motion, which is failure to state a cause of action. However, it must be pointed out that the Motion and the arguments supporting it can no longer be considered since it was filed out of time as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that motions to dismiss should be filed “[w]ithin the time for but before the filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” More importantly, such matter/ defense raised in the motion does not fall within the exceptions laid down in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. As such, respondent was already precluded from raising such issue/defense. Hence, the RTC cannot be faulted in: (a) issuing an Order33 dated August 11, 2010 denying the Motion to Dismiss; and (b) not including a discussion of said issue/defense in its Decision34 dated December 28, 2010 and Order35 dated September 16, 2011.

In light of the foregoing, the CA erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint on a ground belatedly and improperly raised by respondent. Thus, the Court is constrained to overturn said dismissal and in tum, uphold the RTC’s finding of liability on the part of respondents, especially considering that it issued Certificates of Final Acceptance36 essentially stating that the projects were satisfactorily completed, free from major defects, and that it was formally accepting the same. As a result, respondent is hereby adjudged to be liable to petitioners in the amount of P4,326,174.50, which is the valuation of such liability according to the Presidential Flagship Committee’s valuation accepted by petitioners.

THE VALUATION OF LIABILITY TO PETITIONER PER GOVT COMMITTEE IS P4,326,174.50. HOW MUCH INTEREST SHALL IT EARN?

12% PER ANNUM COMPUTED FROM FIRST DEMAND ON 20 JUNE 2000 TO 30 JUNE 2013. THEN 6% FROM 01 JULY 2013 TO FINALITY OF DECISION. THEN SUCH SUM AND OTHER AMOUNTS AWARDED SHALL EARN INTEREST OF 6% PER ANNUM FROM FINALITY OF DECISION UNTIL FULLY PAID.

Finally and in line with prevailing jurisprudence, such amount shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from first demand on June 20, 2000 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of the Decision. Said sum, as well as the other amounts awarded by the RTC (i.e., PS0,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs of suit) shall then earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until fully paid. 37

TO READ THE DECISION, JUST CLICK/DOWNLOAD THE FILE BELOW. THEN OPEN YOUR DOWNLOAD FOLDER, LOOK FOR THE DOWNLOADED FILE AND OPEN IT.

SCD-2017-0024-Edron Construction Corporation and Edmer Y. Lim Vs. The Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur, represented by Governor Vicente T. Pimentel, Jr.

NOTE: TO RESEARCH ON A TOPIC IN YAHOO OR GOOGLE SEARCH  JUST TYPE “jabbulao and the topic”. EXAMPLE: TO RESEARCH ON FORUM SHOPPING JUST  TYPE “jabbulao and forum shopping”.