J.A.B. Bulao & Associates

TIP 0002: ON DEADLINE FOR DECIDING/RESOLVING CASES/MOTIONS.

SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA (A.M. NO. RTJ-09-2198, 18 JANUARY 2011, CORONA, C.J) SUBJECT: FAILURE OF JUDGE TO DECIDE CASES WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. JUDGE LEONIDA)

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WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE OF A JUDGE TO DECIDE A CASE WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

IT DEPRIVES LITIGANT OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE;

IT MAGNIFIES COST OF SEEKING JUSTICE;

IT UNDERMINES PEOPLE’S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY; AND

IT LOWERS ITS STANDARDS AND BRINGS IT TO DISREPUTE.

Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction.  The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for any delay in the administration of justice; no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.^[1][14] Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.^[2][15]

HOW LONG IS THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

90 DAYS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION.

No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within three (3) months from the date of submission.  The prescribed period is a firm mandatory rule for the efficient administration of justice and not merely one for indulgent tweaking.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SUCH DEADLINE?

MANDATORY.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.^[3][16]

WHAT IS THE BASIS?

THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ADMIN CIRCULAR DATED 15 JANUARY 1999

 In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer justice without delay by disposing of the court’s business promptly and deciding cases within the period prescribed by law.

Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, because failure to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of the cases.^[4][17] Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions of law or complex issues, may a longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon proper application for extension of the period has been made by the concerned judge.^[5][18] 

IF JUDGE FAILS TO DECIDE WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIOD, WHAT IS HIS OFFENSE?

GROSS INEFFICIENCY.

The Court has always considered a judge’s delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency.^[6][21]   Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary.  The raison d’ etre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.^[7][22]

WHAT MUST JUDGES OBSERVE IN CONNECTION WITH SAID DEADLINE?

EFFICIENCY WITH PROBITY.

The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them.^[8][24] As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity.  They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence.  The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent. ^[9][25]

TIP 0001: PROPRIETY OF COPYING PORTIONS OF A MEMORANDUM OF A PARTY INTO A DECISION.

SOURCE: DONNINA C. HALLEY VS. PRINTWELL, INC. (G.R. No. 157549, 30 MAY 2011, BERSAMIN, J) SUBJECTS: TRUST FUND DOCTRINE, JUDGE COPYING MEMORANDUM OF PARTY. (BRIEF TITLE: HALLEY VS. PRINTWELL).

It is to be observed in this connection that a trial or appellate judge may occasionally viewa party’s memorandum or brief as worthy of due consideration either entirely or partly. When he does so, the judgemay adopt and incorporatein his adjudicationthe memorandum or the parts of it he deems suitable,and yet not be guilty of the accusation of lifting or copying from the memorandum.^[1][24] This isbecause ofthe avowed objective of the memorandum to contribute in the proper illumination and correct determination of the controversy.Nor is there anything untoward in the congruence of ideas and views about the legal issues between himself and the party drafting the memorandum.The frequency of similarities in argumentation, phraseology, expression, and citation of authorities between the decisions of the courts and the memoranda of the parties, which may be great or small, can be fairly attributable tothe adherence by our courts of law and the legal profession to widely knownor universally accepted precedents set in earlier judicial actions with identical factual milieus or posing related judicial dilemmas.

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